Turning a blind eye?: a moral and theological examination of corruption in current Portuguese culture by Fernandes, Fabiano  Lourenco Aleluia
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Turning a blind eye?: a moral and theological
examination of corruption in current Portuguese
culture
Thesis
How to cite:
Fernandes, Fabiano Lourenco Aleluia (2007). Turning a blind eye?: a moral and theological examination of
corruption in current Portuguese culture. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2007 Fabiano Lourenco Aleluia Fernandes
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Turning a Blind Eye? A Moral and Theological Examination 
of Corruption in Current Portuguese Culture
Fabiano Lourenfo Aleluia Fernandes, BA
A thesis pertaining to social ethics 
and submitted to The Open University 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
October 2006
The Kirby Laing Institute for Christian Ethics 
Tyndale House, Cambridge - UK
D P fT 'C  o f  r' i - -2-
r , r ^ r -  A . , a / i D :
ProQuest Number: 13917235
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13917235
Published by ProQuest LLC(2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Abstract
The subject of this thesis is contemporary Portugal from 1974 onwards. The object is 
corruption. The purpose is to examine the dynamics of both the occurrence of, and impunity to, 
corruption, as a means of evaluating the quality of democracy and improve it.
Part One (Problem and Awareness Pattern) focusing primarily on the Emaudio case study, 
the thesis establishes within politics and economics a summative evaluation of the most critical 
issues heeding to be addressed when dealing with alleged cases of corruption.
Part Two (Cause and Response Pattern) moves beyond a single case study to include both 
historical and current socio-religious, political and economic contexts of corruption, by exploring 
critically certain patterns of practice, structures of incentives and opportunities, and perceived 
cultural assumptions most likely to either nurture or ignore corruption. Three clusters of responses 
are advanced. They illustrate the inadequate administrative and judiciary responses of the anti­
corruption agencies, which include a detailed analysis of the Parliament’s Inquiry Commission 
regarding the dismissal of two deputy directors of the Judicial Police.
Part Three (Tentative Solution Pattern) seeks to develop morally and theologically a means 
of minimising such corruption and the tendency to ignore it, by formulating an alternative 
framework which could be used both as a foundation and a starting point (first phase only) for a 
nationwide, comprehensive, and a multidisciplinary anti-corruption scheme. A classic (10 Great 
Words) and contemporary (Singapore experience) case study are provided prior to proposing eight 
principles upon which to base the new anti-corruption alternative response. This follows a tripartite 
jointly approach of top-down (political will), bottom-up (civil society) and middle-ground 
(administrative and judiciary) structures.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Purpose and Aims
The thesis examines a twin problem in contemporary Portugal, namely the occurrence of 
corruption and its impunity,1 by developing three particular themes. Firstly, focusing on the 
Emaudio case study,2 the thesis raises socio-political and economic awareness by highlighting (a) 
the individual, institutional and environmental factors that nurtured corruption; and (b) the patterns 
of individual and institutional responses that tolerated corruption.
Secondly, by enlarging the analysis to include both the historical and current cultural 
contexts,3 the thesis explores briefly certain patterns of practice, perceived cultural assumptions, 
and incentive and opportunity structures most likely to feed and ignore corruption. Attention is 
devoted to the environment of corruption with particular concern in examining the inadequacies of 
current responses to corruption.4
And finally, the thesis develops in much greater detail a means of minimising corruption 
and its impunity by: (a) re-examining and proposing key basic principles; (b) laying the basic 
foundations upon which to (c) formulate an alternative ethical framework for the initial phase of 
the anti-corruption strategy.5
These aims are crucial for understanding the “why of corruption” for two main reasons. 
Firstly, and as correctly stated by the World Bank scholars, efforts to reduce corruption must move 
beyond a narrow response to a broader and multidisciplinary approach. They must address its 
underlying causes which include a complex mix of historical legacies, institutional factors, and
1 For a detailed description see Chapter 2 “The problem of corruption”, and Chapter 3 “The problem of 
impunity”.
2 See Chapter 4 “The Emaudio case study”. This interesting case covers two interconnected fields of analysis, 
namely politics and economics from both national and international perspectives.
3 See Chapter 5 “Historical determinants of corruption”, and Chapter 6 “Current contextual factors of 
corruption”.
4 See Chapter 7 “Types of existing responses to corruption”.
5 See Chapter 8 “Formulating an alternative framework of response”.
Introduction 3
policy choices that facilitate corruption in each specific country (World Bank 2000, 39; UNDP 
1997; Husted 1999; Crespo 1991, 8). Therefore, this thesis distances itself from the intermittent, 
confusing and casuistic approaches to corruption that characterise Portuguese official conduct 
today.
Secondly, they constitute a first step towards setting a comprehensive anti-corruption 
national strategy, something that does not yet exist, as is openly yet surprisingly acknowledged by 
the Portuguese leaders in the recent Greco report.6 Existing anti-corruption agencies have become 
an anachronism. Although the principles of independence and autonomy of the Public Prosecutor 
Services (PPS) are held firmly, and theoretically assign the responsibility to initiate and control 
criminal investigation, they are actually dependent on the expertise of the Judicial Police (PJ) for 
their execution. The latter is vulnerable because it is in the hands of the Ministry of Justice whose 
responsibility it is to appoint the National Director every three years, and the National Director can 
easily change things around internally with or without justification, including the leadership of the 
anti-corruption unit. The former, having been granted independent status, resources and power is 
almost always unproductive in conducting investigations and detecting corruption. Additionally, 
cooperation between these key institutions can never be taken for granted, particularly when there 
are various intermediate sectors as well as distinct institutions (police forces included) “cutting the 
same cake”?
So, a study describing the occurrence of corruption and the lack of adequate responses to it 
is long overdue, not least because the neglect of corruption may significantly account for the
6 See (GRECO 2003, 5). Greco (Group of States against Corruption) is the latest initiative of the Council of 
Europe which replaced the GMC (Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption), established in 1994. With similar 
views, see M.J.Morgado’s interview in JN:Noticias-Magazine:05.02.2006:42.
7 Although it is often emphasised that the Judicial Police (PJ) stands out as the main body responsible to 
tackle corruption, other Police institutions namely PSP: Public Security Police; GNR: Republican National 
Guard; and SEF: Aliens and Frontiers Departament, can also investigate corruption, in addition to the Public 
Prosecutor and its specially created DCIAP: Central Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Department. Cf 
(Maia 2004, 96-97; Simoes 2006,30). But smooth cooperation, even with the Public Prosecutor, is never 
linear - see the experience of former Deputy Director of PJ in a text written by M.Vitorino, CM:20.05.2005: 
“A direcgao nacional da PJ depende de nomeagao politico do Governo. Maria Jose Morgado diz que nao 
quer fazer acusagdes, mas regista as circunstancias em que o Ministerio Publico diligencia junto da Policia 
Judiciaria, esta actua, mas por vezes da instrugoes para avangar com outras prioridades. ‘A sua acgao e 
boicotada’, regista Morgado, lembrando que os meios sao sempre jinitos.”
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country’s poverty8 and incapacity to reform its rather backward socio-religious, political, and 
economic institutions. Portugal can learn from, and join in the growing international research on 
corruption. Although it is a latecomer, and despite the recent public warning of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, D.F.Amaral in 2006, when he referred “so frankly” to Portugal, saying that for the 
time being, “in matters of corruption, unfortunately, it is unable to give lessons to any other country 
in the world...”9 it nevertheless has a genuine service to share, including among former colonies, all 
of which suffer severely from unresolved corrupt systems as well.10 This is not to justify the quip, 
“Portuguese (Catholic, or Latin) therefore corrupt”. Far from it because corruption as it is practised 
is thoroughly intelligible. The condition for genuine dialogue is not for Portugal to be a corrupt-free 
country, as the optimal level is never zero, but simply to be both serious and consistent in its 
determination to combat it by going beyond mere intentions. This is precisely what is missing at 
present, at great cost to the nation.
Rose-Ackerman is right to remind us that corruption is never more than a second-best 
(Rose-Ackerman 1978, 8). Corruption does not pay; only ethics does.11 In fact, being dishonest 
always has its cost, and scholars have pointed out for many years that corruption increases 
inequality and poverty (Lodge 1998; Vogl 2002,13; Hawley 2003, 5). These are both serious 
problems in Portugal, although their root causes are highly contested.12 However, there is nothing
8 Cf. M.J.Morgado’s views expressed in the First Congress concerning Democracy in Portugal: '‘''Portugal, 
enquanto pals pobre, jica ainda mais pobre com a corrupgao.” (CM: 12.11.2004 “Corrupgao esta fora de 
controlo"').
9 See his interview in DN:20.07.2005. The question and answer follow: “A proposito de PALOP e da sua 
visita a Angola, de que forma e que Portugal pode chamar a atengao dos responsaveis angolanos para o 
facto de que os nlveis de corrupgao nao abonam nem a favor do pais nem para a sua imagem externa?”
“Posso ser inteiramente franco consigo? Eu acho que Portugal, em materia de corrupgao nao pode dar 
ligdes a nenhum outro pais do mundo. Infelizmente. Comecemos nos por liquidar esse fenomeno ca dentro e 
entao, depots, talvezpossamos falar da nossa experienciaperante outros paises.” Cf. A.Correia,
VIS: 11.05.2006 “Polemica: Os dias (cansativos) de Freitas”.
10 The following literature alludes to the problem of corruption faced by Brazil (Assis 1984; Bezerra 1995; 
Bezerra 1999; Geddes and Neto 1992); and Mozambique (Stasavage 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 18).
11 See an interesting short article giving reasons “why cheats don’t win” by J.P.Duarte of Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in PUB: 17.01.2005 “Missao possivel, desenvolvimento e eticd\
12 For long, this unresolved debate has been capturing people’s attention - see (Quental [1871] 1994; Pires 
1992; Reis 1984).
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genetically wrong with being Portuguese, or Catholic, or sharing a wider Latin culture.13 In our 
research we offer no alibis of this kind. The problem lies elsewhere, in the lack of a basis prepared 
to design and launch comprehensive anti-corruption schemes, in the absence of sufficient numbers 
of well trained and equipped personnel, often deployed in disconnected (and piecemeal) fashion, 
and in the ill-functioning control mechanisms which exist to prevent, detect and punish corruption 
in a timely, swift and just fashion. Without these powerful concepts such as transparency, 
competition, and accountability that permeate the entire literature become meaningless, as now 
appears to be the case in present-day Portuguese society.
1.2 Key Concepts and Focus
These aims combine two fundamental conceptual issues, which constitute the main focus 
of the thesis. The first deals with opportunities, incentives, and motivations for practices that are 
corrupt (Ferreira and Baptista 1992; Alam 1990; Alam 1995; Meny 1996; Meny and Rhodes 1997; 
Kwong 1997). Corruption is seen primarily as a process - a dynamic process which evolves in a 
concrete environmental context, with both actors and spectators, rather than simply a case of 
sporadic or one-off episodes. As stated by former Attorney General, Cunha Rodrigues, J.M. Judice, 
Vital Moreira and Barbosa de Melo, a certain culture of corruption exists and expands because it 
has been left largely unchallenged (AACC 1990,138; AACC 1991,94; Melo 1991, 26).
Jones argues convincingly that either there must be the opportunity to perpetrate a corrupt 
act which has been planned and contrived at great length, or else the act in question arises from a 
chance taken in a passing moment (Jones 1993, 2). The latter seems less serious, unless it becomes 
a habit, whereas the former is in fact more serious, being generally founded on the assumption that 
corruption poses low risks. Whatever is the case, people in general respond to incentives, as in the 
Portuguese saying: “a ocasiao faz o ladrao” (opportunity makes a thief). Corruptors in particular 
pay great attention to the ways others react and, in advance, measure certain risks and compare
13 As E.Buscaglia correctly said in a panel discussion, systemic corruption in Latin America “is not related to, 
like many scholars and practitioners may think in Europe and North America, a weak moral fibre. It’s more 
related to weak institutional frameworks - in other words, rules of the game that are not being enforced.” - 
(Symposium 1999,202).
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them with possible benefits (Becker 1968; Becker and Stigler 1974). When the latter outnumber the 
former, engaging in corruption seems both easy and appealing.
On this assumption, Buscaglia and Dakolias’ causal analysis of corruption in the judiciary 
of Chile and Ecuador focuses on three areas, namely the probability of apprehension and 
conviction, and the severity of punishment (Buscaglia and Dakolias 1999). These are critical 
aspects worth considering. Therefore, this thesis largely concentrates on the way legal, social, 
cultural, economic and political changes have provided both opportunity and incentive structures 
for corruption (Sousa 1999,1; Antunes 1990, 117; Goudie and Stasange 1997; Center for 
Democracy and Governance 1999, 7).
The second issue concerns people’s perception of, and response to, corruption (Ferreira, et 
al. 1992; Heidenheimer, A., Perspectives on the perception of corruption, 1993; Grabosky 1990).14 
The way people perceive, react or respond is of utmost relevance in determining the root causes 
and conditions for corruption. This too, needs to be handled dynamically, using sound theoretical 
knowledge, creativity, and appropriate means of fostering active investigation within the complex 
structures of society and crime. For instance, if people and organisations react with indifference, 
then such apathy contributes to the spread of corruption and needs to be addressed properly. 
Responses to corruption, like its nurturing factors, are equally relevant and should be considered 
side by side, as factors which contribute towards an ideal environment. To some people, corruption 
is an optimal response to market distortions (Liu 1996); to the pressures of shortage economy 
(Kwong 1997,108); to internal organisational apathy towards preventing fraud (Levi and Sherwin 
2000); or to excessive political power and the arbitrary use of it (Ribeiro 1990, 94).
In summary, the rationale behind the factors nurturing corruption on one side, and the 
inadequate responses to these on the other, when left unchallenged, facilitate both the occurrence 
and the spread of corruption. Thus there is a need to concentrate on socio-cultural patterns, broad 
structural changes and long-term historical developments, looking particularly for regularities of 
practice, structures of incentives and opportunities, and cultural assumptions that both nurture and
14 For example, the Transparency International (TI) annual worldwide Corruption Perception Index (PCI) is a 
well publicised survey based on business people, risk analysts and the general public’s perception of 
corruption in their respective countries of work.
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ignore corruption. These are critical issues and constitute two sides of a single coin which this 
thesis seeks to describe in a holistic way, although the main emphasis is on the inadequacies of the 
responses.
1.3 The relationship between the subject and object
It should now be clear that the subject of this thesis is contemporary Portugal, from 1974 
onwards; and the object is corruption, here initially broadly defined as the abuse of public or 
private office for illegitimate gain.15 But the relationship between the subject and object needs 
some clarification. Firstly, addressing corruption, from the April 1974 “Carnation Revolution”, to 
the present, as part o f ‘real world research’ (Robson 1993), is always a sensitive, and sometimes a 
painful task, because corruption usually carries a great many negative connotations. The intention, 
however, is not to explore its dark side, nor to join a populist-demagogic rhetoric of the kind that 
has for many years been aimed at politicians and people in business. The purpose instead is to 
raise, first and foremost, public and political awareness of corruption because its known effects 
seriously obstruct economic growth and this leads to unstable social, economic and political 
conditions. This is best achieved if (1) politics and politicians are properly and openly appreciated, 
in a spirit far removed from Harold Lasswell’s much cited definition of politics as '"the art o f who 
gets what, when, and how”; (2) fair acquisition of wealth is equally openly encouraged and 
welcomed in line with the Protestant preacher John Wesley’s famous saying “Gain all you can, 
save all you can, give all you can”; and (3) ethics are adequately applied, including a pluralistic 
religious ethics.16
Secondly, the Portuguese media in general tend to treat corruption anecdotally. This, in 
itself, does not eliminate the value of the media, and particularly the views of its opinion makers. 
This thesis makes constant reference to them, thus privileging popular perception of the problem.
15 This slightly modified definition takes after that of the Asian Development Bank as opposed to a much 
more widely used definition by leading organisations such as the WB, IMF and TI which only focus on “the 
abuse of public office”. For further discussion see section 1.6 Definition.
16 The author is well aware that this scenario never existed but will insist on it, as perhaps the most needed 
pre-conditional basis if one expects effective changes. The reason seems simple. Distrust brings further 
distrust just as war tends to generate even more war.
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But every effort is made to treat the issue according to scientific rules, and to pay due respect to 
individuals and organisations that fall within this enquiry with the understanding that its aim is not 
to give the author’s verdicts, ethical or otherwise, upon present or past individuals or institutions.
Thirdly, the topic of corruption continues to be extremely confused both conceptually and 
jurisprudentially. Politicians, in particular, illegitimately get most of the blame without ever having 
been given proper support or the basic equipment for undertaking such a noble task. Demagogy of 
all kinds prevails, with the result that reform of the political system is permanently on the
17 * 1 8parliamentary agenda. The same is true for the long awaited reform of public administration.
Even the control policy mechanisms regarding rules on patrimony, wealth and interest disclosure, 
and the rules governing conflicts of interests have been defective in their composition, and worse in 
their implementation.19 But hope must remain as democracy is still in its early decades.
Fourthly, to the best of my knowledge this thesis represents the first multidisciplinary and 
global treatment of responses to corruption in Portugal. Aware of the profound limitations imposed 
by these complex, secret, and largely unstudied phenomena, the ultimate purpose of this thesis is to 
enlarge our understanding of something that deserves proper academic treatment, knowing that the 
end result will require further complementary research to deepen and possibly to correct it.
17 These critical issues will be included in the Current Contextual Factors of Corruption in Chapter 6.
18 Notice the steps taken, starting with the last year of Salazar’s leadership until 1989. In 1967, the 
Secretariat of Administrative Reform was created under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; when 
M.Caetano took over the government in 1968, he created and presided over the Higher Council for 
Administrative Reform, supported by the above mentioned Secretariat; in 1970, the actual Secretariat was 
integrated into the Secretariat General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; in 1973, it became 
Secretariat of Public Administration. After the military coup in 1974, the 2nd Constitutional Government 
(hereafter, CG) in 1978 created the Ministry of Administrative Reform. The 3rd CG disbanded the newly 
created Ministry, and integrated responsibility for Public Administration into the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers, with a Secretary of State of Administrative Reform. In 1981, the 7th CG established the 
Ministry of Administration Reform. The 9th CG closed it and the responsibility for public administration was 
re-integrated again into the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The 10th CG (C.Silva minority 
government) in 1985 united all administrative tasks related to the public service and assigned to the 
Directorate-General of Public Administration within the Ministry of Finance; and in 1986 became the 
government to devote a specific chapter of its Programme to administrative modernisation; it disbanded the 
Secretariat of State of Public Administration and created the Secretariat for Administrative Modernisation, 
directly attached to the PM. The 11th CG (First majority for C.Silva: 1987-91), in 1988 created the Under­
secretary of State of Administrative Modernisation, directly attached to the PM, which in 1989 was replaced 
by the Secretary of State of Administrative Modernisation.
19 A good example is the so-called “transparency package” laws issued in the last days of the C.Silva 
government in 1995.
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And finally, corruption is a powerful indicator of the real quality of ethics - applied to 
democracy (the exercise of power),20 capitalism (the acquisition of wealth), and to the socio­
religious context (the function of values). Therefore, power, wealth, and values form part and 
parcel of any study of corruption, and this study is no exception. Democracy finds corruption one 
of its greatest threats, and rightly so, because in a corrupt transaction some have illegitimate 
privileged access to inside information and contracts for example, to the clear detriment of others, 
thus violating the principles of equality and justice. Within the European Union, Portugal must 
enforce mechanisms of fair trade and competition. These are theoretically regarded as the most 
effective tools to prevent corrupt practices. The values of civil society, largely intertwined with 
Catholic moral teaching and practices, are important deterrents to be considered too. It is generally 
and correctly assumed that, without the vigorous and conscientious support of the people, any fight 
against corruption is unlikely to succeed. Therefore, cultural patterns and assumptions behind broad 
structural changes and long-term historical developments matter significantly if we are to explain 
and deter corruption. So the advantage of focussing on Portugal as the subject of this thesis is that it 
provides a specific context of corruption without which the topic remains meaningless, and one in 
which efforts to fight corruption remain unsuccessful, as at present seems to be the case.
1.4 Reasons and Assumptions
The following are five reasons of an international, national and personal nature for 
undertaking the present study. Firstly, corruption has received great international attention since the 
late seventies. As a result there is an increasing number of national,21 regional,22 and international23
20 Cf (Dobel 1978, 967): “Corruption destroys the coherence of the political discourse.”
21 Several countries have organized an independent anti-corruption agency. For three examples of well 
known and successful cases in Hong-Kong, see (Speville, B., Hong Kong policy, 1997; Speville, B.,
Strategic control of corruption: A quiet revolution over two decades, 1996; IACC 1996, 1591-3; Bishop 
1997); in Singapore, see (Leak 1999; Ali 2000); and Australia, see (Williams 2000; Elliot L., 1996). TI has 
open branches (Chapters) in more than 80 countries around the world.
22 For regional initiatives in the EU, see (Salisch 1995; Vermeulen 1997; Liberati 2000); in the COE see 
(Council of Europe 1999; Csonka 1997). For other regions see The Organization of American States which 
signed The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption - (Zagaris and Ohri 1999).
23 For international efforts see (Elliott K., 1996, Ch. 10; Griffin 1994; Pieth 1999; Pieth 2000; Savona and 
Mezzanotte 1997). The following organizations are active in providing assistance: WB (Shihata 1997; World
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initiatives, conferences, agreements, and specialised agencies, and a vast amount of elaborate 
research including surveys and tool-kits, that tell us more about corruption and its negative effects 
than we ever knew before. Such theoretical and factual knowledge, some of it included here, is 
important for Portugal to be able to perceive and relate to, as well as to build on, and possibly even 
to improve upon too.
Secondly, in the aftermath of 9/11 Western governments are checking out why stock 
markets in Western cities have not properly dealt with increasing evidence of money laundering, 
tax evasion, organised crime, and corrupt deals that enable terrorist groups to transfer wealth in 
support of their illegitimate causes. It seems obvious that manipulation of power, wealth and values 
have serious consequences. So corruption and connected crimes must be included in the agenda of 
the world leaders if they are to pursue a better and safer environment.
Thirdly, corruption affects advanced democracies also. It is no longer confined to third- 
world countries with which it was largely associated in the early phases of research. Particularly in 
the post Cold War period,24 the waves of scandal have not spared Western European and North 
American democracies.25 This may indicate an apparent failure of the old and once influential 
ideals of liberal democracy.26 And now one hopes that such a corrective move will not be replaced 
by another potential error of focusing in neo-patemalistic style mainly on former Marxist countries 
of Eastern Europe. And most important, Portuguese leaders must no longer disguise or ignore
Bank 1997; World Bank 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1997); IMF; OECD (OECD 1997); World Trade 
Organization (Nichols 1997); International Chamber of Commerce; and UN (Chaikin 1997).
24 During the cold war period, corruption was largely ignored by the respective superpowers whenever their 
security and military interests were at stake. As correctly pointed out by Charlick “With the end of the Cold 
War...donor agencies have begun to say openly what they could previously only privately mutter - that 
corruption, rent-seeking, or other such euphemisms, is a major impediment to the economic development of 
many African countries. Perhaps just as important, it is a threat to donor programs as well.” (Charlick 
1992,177).
25 According to Della Porta, a wave of successive scandals have also reached the political elite in France, 
Spain, Germany and Denmark, in addition to already known cases of endemic corruption in Italy. The 
financing of political parties, the arrogance on the part of the elite in power, the determined action by the 
magistracy and the investigative journalism are some of the critical issues raised by corruption in Western 
Europe. (Della Porta and Meny 1997,2-4)
26 Liberal democracy with its emphasis on constitutional order, separation of powers, and the tendency to 
view corruption in terms of the weakening of ethical constraints on individual conduct in public office has 
somehow failed to provide a fair system of government. Most recent scandals appear in the USA with highly 
commentated cases of Enron and World.Com.
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corruption under the cover of “solidly established” democratic regime discourse or under the alibi 
of freedom, human rights and arguments about equality.
Fourthly, Portugal does seem to care about corruption. However, the author shares the view 
of many that corruption remains largely unchallenged, and that this poses a serious problem for the 
newly established democracy. As S.P. Huntington correctly reminded us, Portugal started the 
"third wave of democracy", which then spread to Spain, Latin America and Eastern European 
states.27 Of all these countries, Portugal remains one of the least studied with regard to corruption, 
both by international28 and national29 experts. One searches almost in vain for articles concerning 
Portuguese cases or by Portuguese scholars in any of the major specialist web sites or journals.
And finally, a more personal reason is advanced also. In the midst of the author's ongoing 
academic and pastoral experiences as a Protestant theologian in training new clergy in and among 
Portuguese-speaking peoples in Africa and Portugal, there were countless occasions on which 
allegations of corruption devastated individuals’ expectations and trust in both public and private 
institutions. Such circumstances jeopardised the progress of individuals as well as of society. 
Apathy and resignation often prevail, and these are unjustifiable even when the political, economic 
and socio-religious elites seem indifferent.
This thesis received further initial encouragement when the late Vice-Attorney General, 
Dias Bravo received the author in his own office in the Palace of Palmela. We exchanged views in 
a friendly conversation on corruption, which was seen as a contemporary democratic dilemma 
requiring multidisciplinary attention. These old and unresolved matters prompted the author to
27 As keenly cited by J.C.Espada, EXP:13.02.1999 tlAlianga Mundialpara a Democracia”. Cf (Soares 
1999, 104), and J.M.Moreira, PUB:07.11.2001 “A Iberia e a Aventura Civilizadora”.
28 Although the situation is changing slowly, in general terms, Portugal was rarely included in international 
social science research of any kind. According to Makler and Graham, up till the late seventies Portugal has 
been the most neglected of all Western European countries. See both the Foreword and Introduction in 
(Graham and Makler 1979) which contain an excellent overview of the emerging studies regarding Portugal. 
But in respect to corruption, Portugal remains largely unknown. TI-CPI includes Portugal but rarely one finds 
articles tackling the problem in Portugal.
29 The exception started perhaps with the publication of (Sousa 1999; Sousa 2002; Sousa 2004a; Sousa and 
Araujo 2004). The Portuguese Chapter of TI barely survived, despite its initial impact. Cf. R.Eiras, 
EXP:07.07.2001-Economia, “Corrupgao Ganha Terreno Em Portugal’; V.Andrade, EXP:24.03.2001
“Corrupgao cresce em Portugal’; E.Damaso, PUB:02.09.2001 “ONG International Langa Guia Contra a 
Corrupgao Em Portugal; and A.Soares, PUB:09.09.2001 “ONG Contra Corrupgao Recebe Denuncias Pela 
Internet\
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address theoretically the problem of corruption by relating theology to ethics, and Christian 
community to society, things that should never have been separated in the first place. Mutual 
coexistence and respect are the ideal. Therefore this thesis offers another approach to a concrete 
social problem as part of the contribution of wider civil society in its aspiration toward firmer 
democracy and more sustainable prosperity.
There are two assumptions worth highlighting here. Despite a great deal of legal 
complexity, political demagogy, administrative discretion, media confusion, social tolerance and 
envy, criminal sophistication, few verdicts and even rarer prison sentences, corruption in Portugal 
is both intelligible and detectable. It is a thoroughly rational game involving calculation, not crimes 
of passion.30 Players engage in corrupt deals because the socio-religious, political, economic, and 
judicial environment somehow give them their unofficial go-ahead. The risk of being caught 
remains very low. The chances of escaping trial are high. And the possibility of avoiding a prison 
sentence is great, by appealing to higher courts, which has been made much easier since the 
creation of the Constitutional Court. None of these tactics appears irrational when contextual 
analysis is undertaken in a serious, global and multidisciplinary way.
The other assumption seems straightforward but is nevertheless widely neglected in both 
literature and anti-corruption agencies. Considering that corruption flourishes in well-established 
environments and is often supported by certain deep-rooted cultural and administrative elements 
that remain either unnoticed or ignored, any anti-corruption effort which is to be successful must 
first spend a great deal of time, energy, resources and creativity to form a strong basis or 
foundation upon which to launch its activities. The latter need to be thoroughly realistic and 
gradual and in direct proportion and relationship to the former. But because little attention is paid 
to such a foundation, the failure of attempts to fight corruption round the world is notorious. Cases 
of success are rare and amount to only three or four, which should embarrass leading organisations 
in the West such as the World Bank, IMF and Transparency International. However, this is not the
30 As R.Klitgaard writes: “corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion. True, there are saints who resist 
all temptations, and honest officials who resist most. But when the size of the bribe is large, the chance of 
being caught small, and the penalty if caught meager, many officials will succumb. Combating corruption, 
therefore, begins with better systems.” (Klitgaard 1998).
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whole story as there is never only a single reason, either. The interesting U4 study, which measured 
success in five African anti-corruption commissions seems to incline in this direction (Doig, Watt 
and Williams 2005). So, the mere formation of a specialized anti-corruption agency is certainly not 
a panacea and may achieve few results.
1.5 Scope
The study of corruption throws considerable light on Portugal’s three most recognised 
features, which distinctively establish the interdisciplinary nature of this research. Portugal is a 
democratic, capitalist and Catholic country. Corruption has a universal effect whenever political, 
economic, and socio-religious beliefs and values are unable to challenge corrupt mindsets, 
structures and behaviour. Therefore, this thesis covers the fields of politics, economics, and 
religion.
Politics covers government and State affairs, commonly referred to as public functions. Its 
key responsibilities are fostering the citizen’s own welfare and creating and implementing fair laws 
to govern the market place. Economics raises private issues pertaining to the agents and institutions 
in business and industry. Its chief aim is profit, ensuring that the country also benefits from taxes 
and opportunities for employment. There is, however, no neat division between politics and 
economics, as this paragraph may indicate.
Instead there are tensions and even collusion between them. The Portuguese Constitution 
theoretically subordinates economic to democratically elected political power (cf. Article 80). But 
in practice, almost nothing is linear, and corruption is illustrative of the lack of harmony between 
public and private functions (Girling 1997, ix-x; Philp 1997, 37). The “capitalist-democracy 
nexus” in which power (political), wealth (economic) and market forces (actually a combination of 
both political and economic markets) can easily undermine whatever normative line that society 
may attempt to impose. It is not uncommon to see pervasive economic forces “imposing” their own 
rules to the point of weakening the regulatory political function. Such a tenuous dividing line poses 
critical questions while revealing dysfunctional public and private institutions. This resembles what
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Rose-Ackerman calls a “mixed-economy” concept (Rose-Ackerman 1978,1-2), which is not all 
that rare, considering the example of semi-public and semi-private institutions.
Let us consider the influential role of political parties as a gateway to power and public 
office. In many ways they are neither truly private nor public institutions.31 Juridically though, they 
are private. While in power they play an enormous part in shaping government and thus become 
closely linked or mixed with public agents and companies. But in actual practice, where 
transparency is far from perfect, political parties have a mixed nature. The Portuguese case speaks 
for itself as the central administration offices that have been “colonised” by leading party members 
and friends, under the well-known tacit system of “jobs for the boys”.
In addition, the Prime Minister may speak as the leader of government (public function) or 
as the general-secretary of his party (private function). To make matters worse, there is a constant 
movement of personnel from the public to the private sector and vice-versa, thus making the 
separation of powers a complex issue. In many ways, these examples confirm the impression that a 
mixed economy, with strong market forces, can also encourage governmental and private 
corruption.
Therefore corruption is seen as a serious issue to be left entirely in the hands of politicians 
and business people. After all, their activities are anchored in society and are ultimately for its 
benefit, as they often assure us in public. In fact, society’s ethical attitudes and beliefs must also be 
taken into consideration. Personal and institutional values are invaluable because one of the 
essential features of corruption is the “decline in the ability and willingness of the citizens to act 
spontaneously or disinterestedly to support other citizens or communal institutions” as Dobel 
writes. He then adds that “Societal or state corruption involves the moral incapacity of citizens to 
make disinterested moral commitments to actions, symbols and institutions which benefit the 
common welfare” (Dobel 1978, 960).
Where then are the sources of morality in a pluralist society? There are certainly many, 
arising from education, religion and the media. The last of these, for instance, are often viewed as
31 This brings to mind the Catholic University that appears to be neither public nor private under a supra­
national Concordat regime. For a severe criticism of such view see V.Moreira, PUB: 18.04.2000:13 “The 
fiction of the ‘Concordat Education’”.
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“the third power”. The role of the independent media, particularly their investigative character, is 
highly relevant in both denouncing and raising the awareness of corruption. But as far as Portugal 
is concerned, the main source is still its religious institution, the highly influential, traditional, and 
hierarchical Catholic Church. What is of interest here is not so much private beliefs and 
spirituality, but what filters through from this area into daily social actions in the public sphere on 
the one hand, and the cultural heritage and the general adherence to a Catholic world-view on the 
other.
Unlike northern European Protestant countries, the process of secularisation32 or religious 
disengagement has not greatly diminished the social power and influence of Catholicism in 
Portugal. Although there is an apparent significant decline in church attendance, the Catholic 
Church permeates all key institutions including key decision-making centres. It is the only 
institution which consistently merits people’s trust. P.Balsemao, a former Prime-Minister and co­
founder of PSD, himself a non-practising Catholic, is right in saying that “Real change in Portugal 
will hardly be achieved without the support, or at least the understanding, of the Catholic 
Church...”.33
In fact, and next to the State, Catholicism is the most powerful single institution. It has 
great wealth and influence, and reaches into strategic non-religious areas like political economy, 
education, health, social affairs, and even the media.34 The former Minister of Education, Augusto 
Silva, himself uninvolved in Catholicism, experienced the relevance of religious beliefs and values 
in the process of his PhD research among the people of Sao Torcato in the northwest of Portugal. 
He correctly explains that religion which is “so easily mixed up with history and tradition,
32 B.Wilson defines secularisation as “the process whereby religious thinking, practices and institutions lose 
social significance” (Selfe and Starbuck 1998, 86).
33 See (Maxwell 1986, 209).
34 So much so that S.Franco, himself a devout Catholic, former Minister of Finance and negotiator on behalf 
of Catholic Church in redesigning the new 2003 Concordat, starts his article “The Church and the power: 
1974-1986” saying “It is common and correct to affirm that in Portugal the Catholic Church constitutes the 
first one of the civil society institutions.” Then he writes “Deep down, and once again, the fundamental 
national dialogue happens between the State (with its groups and civil or military institutions) and one 
Church, which stand almost alone in the civil society. It will be impoverished, but it is like this...”. And 
concludes: “.. .in few European countries so much has passed through the influence of the Church, and this is 
almost everything that is truly important in matters of power and society in Portugal. That is, throughout 
History and also in the last years.” (Franco 1989,403,421,425). For better or for worse he seems to be right.
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nevertheless offers the most powerful criterion for the ethical evaluation of events and acts.” (Silva 
1994, 227).
However, the inclusion of religion, as one of several analytical tools, is almost a novelty in 
the study of corruption in contemporary research. Perhaps the first attempt to relate religious 
affiliation and corruption in recent times appeared in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, et al. 
1997. The authors viewed hierarchical forms of religion such as the Muslim, Catholic, and the 
Eastern Orthodox as prejudicial to a civic engagement that could affect people’s willingness to 
fight corruption. Other studies followed such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, et al. 1999; 
Paldam 2001; Treisman 2000; Lambsdorff 1999, 10; Lash 2003. Paldam, for instance, argues that 
religions have considerable power to explain the variation in levels of corruption in the countries 
included in the TI CPI.35 This is justifiable on the grounds that religion continues to play an 
apparently vital role in democratic nations such as the USA and Latin based countries in Europe, 
namely Italy, Spain and Portugal, to mention only Christianity. The collapse of the New York twin 
towers that profoundly marked the beginning of the twenty-first centuiy has demonstrated how 
religious thoughts and beliefs should never have been so widely neglected in academic circles as 
they were in most of the previous century in the West. An Islamic mindset, like Judaism and 
Catholicism, does not simply detach political economy from religion. Exactly as Max Weber so 
emphatically stated, religious thoughts and habits do influence economic developments (outcomes) 
and vice-versa. It is a mistake therefore to neglect the social ethics dimension of religion, 
particularly in countries such as Portugal.
Perhaps next to Catholic ethics there is the so-called “Republican ethics”, dating from the 
short-lived First Republic (1910-1926) which apparently reappeared after the 1974 revolution, and 
was most closely connected with the Socialist Party. It also appears to be somehow linked with the 
influence of Masonic ideals. But both these ethical influences seem to have failed to impact the 
nation in general, and political economic institutions in particular, in deterring widespread 
malpractices including systemic corruption.
35 For him, the least corrupt countries are the Protestant and Anglicans. For contrary views regarding the 
inclusion of religion in the analysis of corruption, see (Tavares 2004).
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Whatever other problems may exist, the Portuguese population obviously needs to be 
consistently informed, and specifically challenged, in order to enhance its own intolerance towards 
corruption. These are relevant building steps towards the achievement of trust in and among 
citizens and institutions alike. Up till now, the people have never been properly consulted, guided 
or supported in such a necessary civic task. This seems to be the biggest of all the mistakes in the 
recent transition to democracy. So far, they continue to be the unnoticed and vulnerable victims or, 
as Morgado and Vegar put it “faceless victims” of corruption.
In summary, this thesis is shaped throughout by socio-religious-political-economy 
viewpoints, set in the context of a changing and pluralistic society. And rightly so because 
corruption is, after all, a moral issue par excellence whether one refers to public or private matters. 
However, having presented three major areas of research, it is important to clarify that none of 
them, separately, is fully intelligible if isolated from the others.
To complete this section, a comment is needed with regard to perceived limitations in 
undertaking an ambitious multidisciplinary approach to corruption. Concentration on a mixed and 
complex field of socio-politics and economics means that this thesis is unable to cover many 
different aspects likely to relate to or to influence corruption. Choices have to be made. Some 
relevant points are certain to be omitted. For example, purely private corruption is left out as this 
thesis barely touches on the illegal financing of political parties. Likewise, “off-shores” are another 
cloudy and complex area that Western democratic countries seem unable to tackle. Aware as we 
are of these genuine limitations, we nevertheless embark on this study according to our stated aims, 
knowing that it has the potential to contribute to and to enlarge the knowledge of critical contextual 
factors for corruption in Portugal. This contribution has not yet been made and the fact that there 
are inherent limitations is not in itself a reason not to embark on this research.
1.6 Definition
Wrestling with a definition is critical issue as it largely determines what should or should 
not be included in fighting corruption. The literature is so full of different definitions that Deysine 
classifies it as a case of “overdefinition”. Although the debate is endless, it is nevertheless possible
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to identify key historical categories and developments. Because the first foundations were laid 
primarily by political scientists, the early definitions are largely influenced by politically-desired 
outcomes. The threefold classification of public office-centred,36 public interest-centred,37 and 
market-centred38 definitions is frequently cited.39 The last incorporates more clearly an economic 
concept, sometimes developed under principal-agent theory (Banfield 1975; Rose-Ackerman 1978; 
Shleifer, et al. 1993), and rent-seeking models (Krueger 1974; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993; 
Parker 1996). Many of these follow Nye’s definition, which is by far the most widely used one.
To a certain extent, one agrees that “the topic remains conceptually muddled in large part 
due to the varying and idiosyncratic operational definitions employed. This circumstance, in turn, 
has obstructed comparative analysis and the development of sound empirical theory” (Dolan, 
McKeovan and Carlson 1988, 3). Since that definition is essential, it seems that pragmatically, the 
future of definition lies in a choice between a narrow and a broad one also suggested by Deysine 
(1980). Due to the pioneer nature of this multidisciplinary research, a broader approach is perhaps 
the most adequate as it provides a more flexible way of dealing with a crime full of secrecy and 
complexity. The following broad definition by Della Porta and Meny (1997:4-5) seems a valid one.
Corruption is “a clandestine exchange between two ‘markets’, the ‘political and/or 
administrative market’ and the economic and social market.” They further explain that “The 
exchange is an occult one since it violates public, legal and ethical norms and sacrifices the 
common good to private - personal, corporatist, partisan, etc. - interests. And such a transaction 
enables private actors to have access to public resources (contracts, financing, decision-making, 
etc.) by giving them an unfair advantage, because there is neither transparency nor competition. 
This procures present or future material benefits to corrupt public actors either for themselves or 
for the organisation of which they are members.” (Della Porta, et al. 1997, 4-5)
36 Nye in (Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine 1993, 966).
37 Friedrich in (Heidenheimer, et al. 1993,10).
38 Leff in (Heidenheimer, et al. 1993, 389).
39 Philp discusses the utility of these definitions in greater detail (Philp 1997). He has the merit of 
demonstrating the complexity of matching a definition with concrete situations in real life, particularly in 
politics.
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This seems appropriate because it clearly supports a multidisciplinary analysis; it takes into 
account the critical collusion between public and private sectors; and it correctly observes legal 
requirements as the basic pillar of democracy alongside ethical values as perceived by the wider 
civil society. Above all, it captures the significance of a mixed economy concept argued above. It 
can easily be related to the Portuguese Penal Code which views the “marketisation” of the public 
office as the focal protective function (Costa 1987,95; Dias 1991, 64). But the definition can also 
cover both public and private corruption and, arguably, in equal terms. Critical concepts such as 
transparency and competition are specifically included and can be explored against the background 
of power, wealth and values.
There are, however, some weaknesses too. The definition does not appear to give equally 
serious attention to private corruption. At least it does not unequivocally point in that direction. But 
one may legitimately argue that private corruption is far more than a mere transgression of 
transparency and competition rules. Its outcome also affects the consumer, for instance. But in 
general, Della Porta and Meny's definition seems a valid one to support the analysis and aims of 
this thesis.
1.7 Methodology
Corruption is highly secretive and usually unavailable for detailed internal examination. 
Intentions and motives are often hidden or at best mixed in a complex array of factors and 
situations. As such, any study of corruption must adjust accordingly and find ways of examining its 
root causes and responses with whatever material and evidences appear to exist in and around any 
given context and time.40
There is a very general sense in which corruption, like all human practices, whether 
individual or collective, needs to be interpreted either in terms of the beliefs and attitudes of the 
agents involved (rarely disclosed anyway) or else in terms of causes of action that are not explicit 
beliefs or attitudes. So, in cases where the causes of actions are not stated or discoverable reasons,
40 While wrestling with methodological aspects, the author is grateful for the timely advice given by 
Professor Ringer, author of an interesting book in which Weber’s methodology is presented afresh as a valid 
contemporary tool in search of historical and causal analysis behind social practices (Ringer 1997).
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but rather “causes other than reasons” (Ringer 1997,149), one must look for regularities or patterns 
of practice, tacit customs, some of which are historically and religiously rooted and passed down as 
hallowed traditions. Additionally one must certainly look at the structure of incentives and 
opportunities, and at socio-cultural assumptions that continue to shape current issues. These easily 
penetrate institutional arrangements or social relations.
This implies a methodology that takes a broader view concerning the why of corruption, 
including its inadequate responses likely to capture the most important elements that both nurture 
and ignore corruption. Special attention is given to people’s perception of the problem of 
corruption made public through opinion articles, interviews and participation in conferences and 
similar activities. This is even more justified because there is little literature available that deals 
with the current context of Portuguese corruption.
1.8 Literature Review
So far, we have established the need to move beyond the legalistic, individual, and isolated 
cases of corruption that have occupied the main attention in Portugal. Instead we concentrate on 
the process and dynamics of corruption. We have already argued that causes of corruption, and its 
responses must be found in a wider tripartite field of enquiry, that is, within a complex nexus of 
socio-religious, political and economic relationships.
In order to proceed, one must not neglect the growing cumulative research already 
available. This section describes how knowledge has been structured by briefly referring to key 
works and theorists as well as their methodologies, moral assumptions, key principles and models, 
including weaknesses that shape the inquiry into corruption. The ultimate purpose, however, is to 
build on existing knowledge and thus offers a better approach in explaining, relating and 
comparing generalised causal and response theories for undertaking a study of national corruption. 
This obviously demands a closer review of existing Portuguese literature as the primary source of 
analysis.
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Newcomers find their search for sources of information much facilitated as a result of 
recently edited compendia,41 specialist journals,42 Internet resources,43 kits and manuals,44 and anti­
corruption conference proceedings.45 The major structural divisions seem to be legal, political, and 
economic categories. This order reflects how the specialised literature came to exist in the first 
place.
Legislators have been the main initiators for raising the anti-corruption profile in the world. 
For instance, the very first editions of the International Anticorruption Conference series (IACC) 
started with particular concerns regarding the need to enforce the laws.46 There is no doubt that 
corruption incorporates first and foremost a legal concept of crime, often committed by those who 
held some power, money and wealth. Good legislation is therefore vital. All governments rely on 
their law books for social and economic order. In particular, a democratic regime demands a law- 
abiding foundation. Otherwise anarchy prevails and easily nurtures both corrupt attitudes and 
vengeance against corruptors. Neither approach is acceptable. Fair legislation and adequate 
enforcing mechanism are the necessary underpinning for controlling corruption in a civilised 
manner. In other words, corruption cannot be treated without good and fair legislation.
41 The earliest one is (Heidenheimer, A. J., The context of analysis, 1970), later replaced by (Heidenheimer, 
et al. 1993) with the first edition dated in 1989. At the turning of the century two new compendiums appeared 
(Fiorentini and Zamagni 1999) in three volumes, all written from an economic perspective; and (Williams 
and Doig 2000) in four volumes, each with different editors, covering matters of explaning (vol.l) and 
controlling (vol.4) corruption, and its occurrence in both developing (vol.3) and developed (vol.3) worlds.
42 Corruption and Reform started in 1986. As from mid-1993 it merged with Crime, Law and Social Change.
43 Some websites include a valuable section of annotated bibliographies such as the World Bank Institute; the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD); the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 
also known as the “U4”; and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC - Australia).
44 Key organisations either adopt or produce their own tool kits and manuals. See TI Source Book in (Pope 
2000), and a Tool Kit - (Transparency International 2002). The UN has its own Tool Kit (United Nations 
2004); and so does the US Agency for International Development (Center for Democracy and Governance 
1999).
45 The International Anti-Corruption Conference - IACC Secretariat, held eleven international conferences in 
the last twenty years in Washington (1983), New York (1985), Hong Kong (1987), Sydney (1989), 
Amsterdam (1992), Cancun (1993), Beijing (1995), Lima (1997), Durban (1999), Prague (2001), and Seoul 
(2003). The papers of the last four conferences are available in CD-Roms edited by TI and-or in TI's website. 
For the Beijing conference see (IACC 1996).
46 This is clearly stated in Anti-Corruption History Conference section of TI web site: “While the initial focus 
of the conference was on law enforcement issues and the development of successful strategies and tactics for 
deterring and investigating offical corruption, the scope of the conference quickly grew to include the entire 
spectrum of stakeholders in the effort to combat corruption and fraud throughout the world.”
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Such a foundation is widely perceived, as Noonan clearly established, so that there is not a 
single nation in the world that refuses to view corruption as a crime on its law books (Noonan Jr 
1987, 702). Portugal gives special importance to legal issues. Portuguese literature on corruption is 
largely related to legal matters (Costa, A. 1987; Moura 1993; Dias 1991; Gomes, et al. 1998; Costa, 
J. 1996). Of these, A.Costa’s research (1987) concentrates on state-driven corruption and has been 
well received. Unfortunately, there has been very little debate about his views among jurists and 
other specialists, as M.Fonseca has pointed out (AACC 1990,101). This is proving unhelpful in the 
midst of the ever increasing mixed relationships between public and private sectors. It seems that 
he has not taken the Portuguese context seriously, particularly the almost invisible dividing line 
between these two sectors. This has obvious implications for anti-corruption strategies too.
Such an acknowledgement does not mean that legal matters stand above other disciplines. 
Far from it, as legal concepts are sometimes inadequate to deal with several critical corrupt issues. 
For example, in countries which are not very law-abiding, legislation sometimes becomes easily 
muddled in legalistic disputes, which often turns out to be a serious problem in itself. This is 
certainly the case in Portugal. Such a pitfall needs to be avoided by including other non-legal 
approaches in the inquiry into corruption.
In fact, as the IACC series developed over the years, it became obvious that legal aspects 
are not sufficient to counteract corrupt practices. Therefore political and economic scientists enter 
into the research by addressing critical issues left unresolved by legal scholars. A brief reference to 
two pioneer works is important in tracing back key influential thoughts and developments. This is 
even more relevant for the study of corruption in Portugal, where the topic is still in its infancy.
Firstly, the contribution of Sutherland is acknowledged in the definition and powerful 
concept of “differential association” in white-collar-crime (Sutherland 1945).47 He laid the ground 
work for a systematic approach to both an empirical and a theoretical-criminological understanding 
of economic deviance. In his definition, white-collar crime is a crime undertaken by those who
47 For the limited initial impact of Sutherland’s concept of white-collar crime see (Hauber, Toomvliet and 
Willemse 1988). For a positive review of his ideas, see (Ruggiero 1996; Ferreira, et al. 1992; Comer 1985). 
For opposite views, see (Nelken 1997, 896-901; Andrade 1999).
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hold high social and economic status.48 His views were keenly taken up and explored by the 
influential left wing and Marxist politicians of the past (Andrade 1999,148). This is an early 
warning about mixed motives and self-interest which affect the study of corruption.
More interesting is perhaps Sutherland’s sociological concept of “differential association”. 
He attempts to move away from a general trend to attribute causes based mainly on individual or 
social pathological factors. Basically stated his hypothesis is that criminal behaviour is perceived in 
association with a tension between those who define it favourably or unfavourably. There is 
criminal behaviour only if the weight of favourable definitions exceeds the weight of unfavourable 
definitions. And this is intimately related with the social disorganisation concerning either lack of, 
or conflicting standards. According to Sutherland these are the root sources of economic deviance 
of the powerful.
Although Sutherland did not intended that his hypothesis would cover all cases, his ideas 
nevertheless attempted to provide a rather universal causal, if not in fact a mono-factorial, theory of 
crime. Such an approach was later dismissed. As Nelken writes, Sutherland’s theory is now 
regarded as flawed and superficial, and the search for a universal theory of crime has lost its 
attraction (Nelken 1997, 902). Here possibly lies one of the major factors for the confusing status 
of the current causal analysis of corruption. Researchers then concentrated mainly on particular 
case studies alone. But localised and narrow case studies have their own limitations too. For this 
reason this thesis goes beyond the Emaudio case study to include both historical and contemporary 
factors of corruption.
Secondly, Becker's seminal article is a reference work for economic crime (Becker 1968).
It basically deals with reasons why individuals may decide to take an illegal path in acquiring 
money or profit. He takes into account the cost of enforcement, investigation and punishment and 
seeks to answer the optimal level of punishment to deter crime. His approach, later expounded in a 
joint article with G. Stigler, clearly indicates that corruption is also a crime of calculation (Becker,
48 Such distinctions led Quiney to then advance a parallel concept of a “blue-collar crime”, perpetrated by 
lower bureaucrats and professionals.
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et al. 1974). It definitely opened up a new way to consider the mathematical rationale behind a 
corrupt action, which is critical for causal analysis too.
In many ways Sunderland and Becker’s contributions have opened up critical issues for 
future research. Among political scientists, Nye's "Corruption and political development" has been 
perhaps the single most influential article (Nye 1967), not least because of his widely used legal 
and public-centred definition of corruption. It was specifically chosen to fit his study of corruption 
in Less Developed Countries (hereafter, LDCs) under a debatable concept of "political 
development". Like any legislator, Nye is mainly concerned to reduce the level of both 
ambivalence and ambiguity, particularly when these are associated with equally debatable 
normative or moral views.
His assumption is that LDCs have dual worldviews with regard to ethics: the "indigenous" 
one and the "more or less Western" point of view. He applies a Western standard of corruption, 
believing, in our view wrongly, that there is a conceptual consensus in the West. However, Nye's 
great theoretical achievement lies in the fact that most subsequent political and economic scientists 
have settled their analysis around both his definition and the concepts of corruption associated 
within the context of LDCs. So that thirty years later it is still catching attention despite some 
minor changes which are occasionally suggested. In our view, Nye’s approach is wrong. Firstly, 
because of his definitional focus which is entirely based on public corruption. People’s perspectives 
around the world, and most certainly in LDCs where poverty is a serious problem, few would agree 
that corruption is confined largely to public officials’ conduct. Many would like to ‘condemn’ the 
private individuals and firms equally.
Secondly, Nye’s simplistic view of culture, with apparently no regard to a country’s 
history, religion, values and institutional developments, seems inappropriate too. It clearly lacks an 
holistic perspective. So, when key institutions such as WB, IMF and TI have largely adopted his 
approach, one cannot help thinking that there will be a negative outcome. A decade after these 
institutions began to tackle corruption around the world seriously, the results are not yet promising 
-  “Unfortunately, the history of anti-corruption campaigns around the world is not propitious. At 
the national and local levels, in ministries and in agencies such as the police, even highly
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publicized efforts to reduce corruption have tended to lurch, lapse, and, ultimately, disappoint” 
(Klitgaard, MacLean-Abaroa and Lindsey 2000,11).
Such a situation should have prompted criticisms before now. In many ways, Doig, Watt 
and Williams’ conclusion appeared very late indeed (Doig, et al. 2005,49-50). And despite the 
creation of anti-corruption special agencies, many countries, in addition to those five included in 
their research, have missed the target, wasted resources and demoralised their own people and 
external donors too. Their recommendations, such as (1) success based upon the concept of 
country-specific realism, and (2) corruption remains a matter of opportunities, incentives and risks, 
here understood beyond the realm of public office, are right but not usually observed by academics, 
policy makers and social practioners.
For instance, the causal analysis of corruption lacks comprehensive, multidisciplinary and 
contextual approaches. A lot is confined to a random list of general and universal causes.49 As such, 
they may be useful to illustrate the general situation but are rarely accurate enough to build a 
reasonable and contextual strategy to fight corruption, which in our opinion remains a special 
concern and priority in analysing corruption. Without consistent regard for environmental factors, 
superficiality dominates the inquiry, leading to varying and idiosyncratic definitions and policies 
most likely to obstruct anti-corruption progress, comparissons and sound empirical theory.
A good example is the case of Portugal in international literature. Somehow, it entered the 
list of successful anti-corruption cases in the world and scholars are citing it. For instance, two 
studies place Portugal alongside Hong Kong and Singapore (Hessel and Murphy 1999; Tanzi 
1998,30). Kaufmann too indicates that “Portugal has undergone significant improvements over the 
past dozen years or so...” - these generalisations can only distort the evidence (Kaufmann 1997).
Another important political concept from Nye is that "some kinds of corruption might 
promote economic development." During the sixties, several influential authors have proposed a 
similar idea such as Bayley, Huntington, and Leff.50 This beneficial idea has been labelled as 
"grease-the-wheels" by (Kaufmann 1997), and "efficient grease payments" by Wei (Wei 1997a).
49 See footnote 324.
50 See respectively pp 935-952; 377-388; and 389-403 in (Heidenheimer, et al. 1993).
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Such a position is also known as the "revisionist approach" and gained many critics.51 Bardhan's 
excellent review includes a brief discussion of the effects of corruption on efficiency by dealing 
with both sides of the arguments (Bardhan 1997). But over the years and particularly in the recent 
past, Nye's position has been under considerable attack. It is now largely abandoned.52 In some 
ways this has left an almost empty space without an alternative view in the ongoing discussion of 
the effects of corruption. As a result, there seems to be a false consensus under the banner of a 
"politically correct" approach. And yet, the reality varies so much in different socio-political and 
economic contexts and it is possible to see why, in some cases, corruption is the preferred 
alternative route for making things happening. Such a stand is far from uncommon either among 
the population in the LDCs or among the bribees of the rich world. So it seems now in the 
international arena.
Despite this apparent consensus, corruption remains, in the words of Lowenstein, an 
essentially contested concept, covering various levels and themes. With regard to levels there are 
two broader concepts, namely grand and petty corruption. They are largely based on the 
perspective of the agent's status and-or the size of the bribery involved. Grand corruption refers to 
misconduct perpetrated by top executive and political leaders. Specific literature in the field is rare. 
Moody-Stuart's book Grand Corruption is a notable exception (Moody-Stuart 1997). He explains 
how and why heads of state, ministers and top officials misuse public power for private, pecuniary 
profit. He also suggests that a higher share of responsibility must rest on the tempters - that is, the 
rich Northern countries - than on the tempted ones - that is, the Global South (54).
Grand corruption is harder to account for, due to the higher quality of the agents’ power; 
their secrecy and ability to camouflage; their ability to use and abuse intermediating lower-level 
personalities; and in times of prosecution their ability to pay for good lawyers’ fees. And because 
of this capacity, it is not uncommon for them to pursue legal action against people who appear to
51 See D.Kaufinann in (Stapenhurst and Kunded 1999, 39-47; Tanzi 1998; Kurer 1997, 117-138; Mauro 
1995).
52 A good recent exception is perhaps Girling's explanation concerning the "functional corruption" which he 
finds in South East Asia. See chapter (Girling 1997, Ch. 2).
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be defenceless whistleblowers. It seems therefore that there are unequal weapons in fighting 
corruption when the alleged corruptors belong to powerful or wealthy classes.
By far the most common approach is towards petty, low-level or micro corruption 
perpetrated by lower ranks of civil servants, customs officials and policeman in violation of 
principal’s institutional norms concerning illegal benefits (patron-client relationship). For example, 
political scientists prefer to speak of corruption as a symptom of more deeply-rooted dilemmas in 
politics and society involving low-level personnel. Economists provide specific theories, including 
game theories in which corruption appears to play a negative role among workers, in resource 
allocation,53 taxes,54 wage incentives,55 productive control,56 direct foreign investment,57 public 
contracts,58 and competition.59
Of these, fiscal matters seem to be of greater relevance for Portugal where tax evasion 
remains very high. A higher tax burden leads to more unofficial activity (Johnson, Kaufmann and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1999; Pommerehne, Hart and Frey 1994). Levels of tax evasion are high when 
penalty rates on the private sector and tax collectors are low and when the probability of detection 
is low - so argue (Haque and Sahay 1996). And of significance remains the existence of offshores 
(Besley, et al. 1993; Frey and Pommerehne 1984; Schneider 1994; Hampton 1996).
53 Inefficient allocation of resources affects business and state enterprise alike and may be the result of a 
corrupt behaviour. Shleifer & Vishny's article focuses on the consequences of corruption for resource 
allocation (Shleifer, et al. 1993). Cf. (Baumol 1990; Grossman and Kim 1995; Lien 1990).
54 Tanzi includes taxation under ‘direct factors’ that promote corruption (Tanzi 2000). For additional 
literature on tax collectors' behaviour, see (Chander 1992; Feige 1994); for taxpayers' behaviour, see (Das- 
Gupta 1994; Erard and Feinstein 1994; Isachsen 1980; McBamet 1991).
55 Low salaries, particularly in the public office, are often cited as a contributory factor of corruption (Gupta, 
Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 1998; Besley and McLaren 1993; Biswal 1999; Mauro 1997).
56 Owoye’s analysis, based on a macro economic approach, argues that corruption affects production and 
eventually increases the price level in the market (Owoye and Bendardaf 1996) whereas Murphy 
acknowledges some negative effects of production but they emphasize that corruption and rent-seeking is 
even more harmful to innovation (Murphy, et al. 1993).
57 Wei’s study finds that foreign direct investment is negatively associated with high levels of corruption 
(Wei 1997b; Wei 1997c; Wei 1999).
58 To comply with strict rules, sometimes seen as obsolete and unnecessary, leads many to irregular, illegal 
and/or corrupt conduct such as farce contracts; side-contracting; non-observance of rules; illicit disclosure of 
information; manipulation of contractual figures; payment of kickbacks, commissions and so forth (Della 
Porta and Vannuci 1999, 33-54; Jones 1993; Rose-Ackerman 1999,27-35).
59 It is often cited that corruption is deeply associated with the lack of competition (Ades and Di Telia 1996; 
Weyand and Rummel 1998).
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All these issues and others as well form the overall context of corruption. It is not practical 
to embrace them all in a single study. Johnston offers three major concepts worth referring in 
explaining corruption; the personalistic, the institutional, and the systemic viewpoints (Johnston 
1982). He associates each aspect with an analogy such as "the rotten apples", "the rotten barrels" 
and "the big picture". He then provides a brief analysis of their positive and negative strengths.
The personalistic concept tends to associate corruption with "human nature" - the "natural" 
tendency towards greed, mismanagement of power and other vices manifested by those in positions 
of public trust. Many scholars avoid addressing corruption from a moral perspective (Meny 
1996,111-2), and react strongly against a moralistic viewpoint as this tends to be exploited by 
political opponents especially in the context of electoral disputes, often fuelled by the media.60 The 
fear of falling into a ‘moralistic ghetto’ seems to be one of the most clearly perceived explanations, 
perhaps due to the widely accepted move towards secularization, here seen as a sociological theory 
which accounts for a reaction against the traditional and strong influence of religion. Although 
Guodao and Zhengkun acknowledge that the spread of corruption has "deeper causes of morality 
and culture, which make people behave with the social condition", they also warn that 
"exaggeration of morality makes it false" (Guodao and Zhengkun 1996). Despite these warnings 
one cannot ignore completely the agent’s personal and moral behaviour, including that which is 
religiously motivated. Patrick Dobel’s perspective emphasises this aspect when defining corruption 
as the moral incapacity of citizens to make reasonably disinterested commitments to actions, 
symbols and institutions which benefit the common welfare (Dobel 1978, 958).
The institutional concept takes into consideration the environment in which individuals are 
operating by looking especially at organisational structure (Ermann and Lundman 1996). In this 
case, causes are to be found in mundane matters such as the workings of bureaucracy and related 
institutional factors, including some forms of handling the laws and the internal disciplinary 
mechanisms (Charap and Harm 1999; Geddes, et al. 1992; Nas, Price and Weber 1986). This 
approach, which was not considered by Johnston in the course of his book, is nevertheless useful.
60 Cf. C.Leys in (Heidenheimer, et al. 1993, 51-3; Beenstock 1979; Corm 1996, 97-9).
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It has the possibility of providing a comprehensive explanation and is widely used in various 
countries still. Banfield’s well-known article is a good example (Banfield 1975).
The systemic concept sees the origins of corruption - here seen in a "neutral" analytical 
manner - in this interaction between government and society. But according to Johnston, it is a 
form of influence, rather than failure of individuals and institutions that accounts for corruption. He 
may be right in considering the misuse of influence to be at the heart of the problem, but to isolate 
this aspect only is certainly not the best strategy for a systemic approach, which in theory appeals 
to a "big picture" view. Max Weber's determination in refusing a mono-causal factor in any social 
science research is something to take seriously here, it seems.
Inherent to a systemic perspective is a multidisciplinary approach to corruption, which in 
our view Johnston does not take seriously enough in his book. This approach, in fact, is rare in the 
literature, as Shihata has correctly pointed out (Shihata 1997,255). Future research needs to try to 
bring together various interrelated disciplines in the political, economic, and cultural fields. The 
trend now is to concentrate on the political and economic dimensions of corruption.61 This is 
hardly surprising considering that the most adopted definition is centred around 'official' corruption 
as already stated above. As a result, private sector aspects are neglected.
On the other hand, the economist's valuable contributions tend to detach themselves from 
complex political nuances. The major gap in the current literature is in the critical area of culture 
and how it conditions the manner in which different nations view corruption. The inclusion of 
culture is important though it is a difficult analytical concept to deal with in social studies.
Allusions to cultural matters have not been entirely absent. Many writers mentioned them but in an 
entirely superficial matter. For instance, Rose-Ackerman in her first book calls attention to 
subtleties of cultural features in the overall analysis of corruption in specific places (Rose- 
Ackerman 1978,4-5). There is now a broad consensus that corruption is rooted in poorly 
functioning institutions, as well as in policies that undermine free trade and competition all over the 
world. This raises important cultural issues needed to explain corruption.
61 Other Johnston’s writings follow the same political perspective (Johnston 1991; Johnston 1998). Other 
scholars have followed the same path (Morris 1991; Padhy 1986; Bezerra 1995) in Mexico, India, and Brazil, 
respectively.
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In the case of post-Marxist countries in Europe, researchers acknowledge that one of the 
key legacies of communism was a "culture of policymaking" in which the state played the 
dominant role in mediating economic relations. Bureaucrats and executive state officers determined 
both suppliers and customers, set prices and wages, provided finance and controlled the distribution 
of goods. Although a change has taken place and a new redirection is geared towards democracy, 
there are no doubts that old habits remain widespread in those countries. We argue therefore that 
cultural matters, including powerful ingrained traditions and moral views based on religion also are 
essential factors that need to be properly accounted for in the causal analysis of corruption.
And lastly in the way of influential political concept is Heidenheimer's useful and well 
cited concept of "black, grey and white corruption".62 At the very bottom of these concepts is the 
attempt to seriously consider the cultural and social contexts in which power, wealth and status are 
exercised and therefore affect perceptions of whether and how much corrupt behaviour is morally, 
culturally and legally condemned in a concrete place. Also useful and not well used are 
Heidenheimer’s ten types of corrupt behaviour applied in four types of political obligation 
relationships characteristic of certain communities.63
Although political scholars have written extensively over the years, the fact is that there are 
not yet classic works in the field. DeLeon, himself a political scientist, admitted that "it is perhaps 
indicative of the chariness of political scientists towards this subject that the book which most 
rigorously examines political corruption was written by Susan Rose-Ackerman, herself an 
economist" (DeLeon 1989, 195). Her book, Corruption A Study is Political Economy is indeed a 
masterpiece in the field (Rose-Ackerman 1978).
The time of its appearance (1978) should have led by now to a far better result in the 
overall contemporary analysis of corruption, particularly in the field of causal theories that has
62 "Black corruption" indicates the case when both elite and mass opinion would condemn an action as 
corrupt beyond any dispute and as a matter of principle. "Grey corruption" indicates greater ambiguity. Some 
would perceive a certain action as corrupt whereas others may not. "White corruption" indicates that a large 
majority would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a kind of corruption that is widely tolerated 
(Heidenheimer, etal. 1993,161).
63 For a full details see table 10.1 and 10.2 in (Heidenheimer, et al. 1993, 152,156). The four types are the 
Traditional Familist; Traditional Patron-Client; Modem Boss-Follower; and the Civic-Culture, based 
systems.
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remained generally confused. Her complex, multidisciplinary analysis is not easy to digest. It is 
mainly targeted for an audience of economists and highly technically trained political scientists.
The author's most recent book is an attempt to simplify the argument and reach a wider audience 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999). Only time will tell if this effort is successful.
In the first book, Rose-Ackerman sets a good foundation as to the way corruption should 
be perceived and dealt with. Unlike Nye and most political analysts, she did not view corruption as 
a problem unique to the LDCs. She did not follow Sutherland's narrow concentration on the 
powerful elite either. She begins her analysis by correctly bringing together public and private 
officials as the main players in a corrupt dispute within democratic and capitalist settings. She 
explores in detail the key variables mainly under principal-agent theory of corruption which has 
been followed by several analysts ever since (Klitgaard 1988; Goudie, et al. 1997). The principal 
represents the top level government official whereas the agent is an official designated to perform a 
certain task.
Particularly noticeable is her inclusion of a full chapter on private sector corruption. It was 
innovative in the seventies. As correctly noticed by Ades and Di Telia, Rose-Ackerman was the 
first to emphasise the effect of bureaucratic market structure on corruption when she introduced the 
"principle of overlapping jurisdictions" (Ades, et al. 1996, 7-8). From the very beginning she 
included the hypothesis of corruption of corporate boards and top managers of the private markets 
by affirming that "Just as legislators may sell out voters, corporate directors may sell out 
stockholders..., so too may private managers exploit imperfections in the market mechanism that 
generate corrupt opportunities" (197).
Perhaps, the fact that this is placed in the last chapter of the book contributed to its 
minimum impact. But despite its inclusion in the well used Heidenheimer's Handbook, the chapter 
is generally neglected. The author admits the economist's tendency to overlook critical market 
failures, including the illegal or unethical behaviour perpetrated by managers, stockholders and 
employees operating under profit and non-profit making firms. We are correctly reminded that such 
misconduct does not necessarily have to involve public officials.
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What is also interesting in Rose-Ackerman’s findings is the fact that most of the analytical 
tools and remedies applied to the study of official (and political) corruption can easily be adapted to 
apply to counteracting corruption in the private sector, as she insists. Unlike the principal-agent 
theory that deeply influenced future research, scholars around the world do not seriously follow 
this important aspect of private corruption. By and large, research continues to focus mainly on 
official corruption. As noticed, this is the path followed by leading institutions around the world 
such as the WB, IMF, and TI. The latter, however, made a valuable contribution in launching the 
Bribee Perception Index in 1999.
Our key argument here is that unless both private and public corruption are taken equally 
seriously, to the point of exercising pressure to correct most legal national statutes that 
unreasonably punishing public offenders more heavily than private ones, most anti-corruption 
campaigns are likely to continue to fail. Failure to do so might well mislead us in coming to terms 
with causes of corruption.
Still on the foundational basis, Rose-Ackerman has the merit not to have trapped the 
analysis in the all too common political dualism of Western democratic versus Socialist economic 
styles which characterised the world then. Now that Marxism is widely defeated her analysis is still 
valid as something apparently timeless. What she highlights is the mixed nature of the economy in 
a modem society, which is equally relevant to a post-modern environment such as ours. Mixed 
systems are by far the most common feature in a society where politics and economics take place. 
Another important analytical aspect is the belief that society somehow continues to draw the line 
between a vast and complex range of mixed alternatives. This respect for society’s normative 
beliefs, coming particularly from an economist, is outstanding. She acknowledges that normative 
statements about corruption require a standard of "goodness" and a "model" of how corruption 
functions in particular instances. She goes on to criticise her colleagues who so often adopt a 
narrow definition of goodness and an oversimplified model of the corrupt marketplace (9). She 
seems to have emphasised the importance of personal morality (p5) but throughout the book she 
hardly evidenced it. The exception is in the very last section in the conclusion where a brief 
discussion of morality, corruption and economic theory appears.
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Lastly, Rose-Ackerman's key contribution lies in the wealth of variables used in 
understanding the kind of incentives that exist in legislative, bureaucratic and economic corruption. 
With regard to arguments she did well to start on legislative type of corruption by reviewing both 
the legislative process (individualistic or corporate levels) and powerful lobbies in the midst of 
intense and often antagonistic interest groups and political parties. In this way, her analysis is 
grounded in very early possible set of incentives for corruption. She tested it by considering the 
ideal as well as an imperfect democratic society, particularly the relationship between legislators 
and their constituency on one side, and politicians and market forces on the other.
The influence and misuse of money, power and status is expanded under various 
bureaucratic scenarios such as "lining up and paying off'; monopolistic conditions, and competitive 
environment. Critical for such an evaluation is the observance of contextual conditions for each 
variable used. In the case of legislative corruption, it is important to know whether voters are faced 
with ignorance and-or apathy in their relationship to political agents.
But despite this achievement, and the subsequent massive publications in the field, scholars 
have generally failed to address one of the most important aspect in the overall analysis of 
corruption - that of causal theories and responses to corruption. Rose-Ackerman's classic book has 
not been concretely applied in the study of national corruption. And without an in-depth causal 
analysis in a given context it is improbable that anti-corruption campaigns will succeed. In many 
ways what we see today is a casual treatment of the subject. The result is often a non-related set of 
causes given without reference to socio-political, economic and cultural contexts within a single 
country.
For instance, Morris acknowledges that causal theories encounter three problematic results 
(Morris 1991,10-12). Firstly, it has produced "an array of contradictory hypothesis". Secondly, it 
appears "fragmented". And finally, it fails to differentiate between various types of corrupt 
behaviour. The last two reasons seem correct. Often the analysis is too general and hardly refers to 
a concrete type of corruption. Another reason not advanced by Morris is the contextual, that is, 
institutional and environmental factors do play a significant role in determining the causes of a
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specific type of corruption. We are indeed confronted so often with a list of causes of corruption. 
Such a list is of little value because it is unrelated to concrete problem and context.64
With regard to Morris' contradictory reasons, one must say that the example he cited is not 
the best one may think of. The fact that both "centralisation" and "decentralisation" are often used 
as determinants of corruption is not necessarily a contradiction. Both can be correctly perceived as 
causing administrative and political corruption. What determines the matter is the concreteness of 
each situation. So causes of corruption, particularly of "grey corruption" to use Heidenheimer's 
classification once again must be analysed within a specified context, taking into account historical, 
cultural, political, legal and economic conditions.
At least in theory, it is possible that "centralisation" may nurture corruption in one country 
in a given time and context, and may deter corruption in the same country in a different time and 
context. The problem is not different countries, cultures or political styles but concrete factors in 
operation in a concrete time and situation. One may argue in the same manner with regard to 
decentralisation theory.65
So, our aim is to provide a framework of analysis that goes well beyond the short-lived 
impact of individual or institutional scandals. We concentrate instead on basic process factors that 
make the incident possible and even predictable. This seems more helpful in discerning the 
environmental root causes of corruption and its impunity that somehow remain neglected by social 
and political scholars.
1.9 Procedure of thesis
In the following two chapters we introduce the twin problem of corruption (occurrence and 
impunity), followed by an examination of a case-study in Chapter 4. Then we proceed with Part 
Two which analyses the historical and contemporary factors that nurture and ignore corruption with
64 For example, excessive bureaucracy is often cited as one of the root causes of corruption. Although it is 
generally right, one needs to go beyond that and inquiry what are the key factors that allow bureaucrats to 
succeed in their corrupt intention.
65 In this same line of argument stands Ruggiero recent helpful concept of "causality of contraries". In short, 
it reacts against generalisations and favours "variations and differences in a particular way". This implies that 
"each time we subscribe to one cause of crime we may realise that the opposite cause also possesses some 
reasonable validity" (Ruggiero 2001, 6-8).
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emphasis on the inadequacies of existing responses to corruption. And finally, a tentative 
alternative framework of response is presented as a means of minimising the effects of corruption 
in modem Portuguese culture.
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Chapter 2 
The problem of corruption
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to raise public awareness about corruption by introducing the 
problem of its occurrence and permeation into both public and private spheres. This first critical 
step is the focus of Part One, starting here and following with an explanation of the parallel 
problem of impunity in the next chapter. Then we conclude with a concrete example of a 
transnational case study in chapter four, with the overall objective of pinpointing corruption as one 
of the most serious national issues which still demand an adequate contextual analysis.
Unless there is a genuine perception from within that corruption is slowly but nevertheless 
steadily destroying the inner fabric of the entire society - of which trust is perhaps the most 
valuable, albeit invisible, social capital - its seriousness will continue to be disregarded for the 
foreseeable future. Already the result of past delays in discerning the present situation was to make 
it seem rather critical in economic, political and ethical terms.
The following two sections critically describe corruption as a problem in itself, and in 
context. The last section briefly summarises why corruption is best perceived as one of the most 
serious national problems by highlighting critical issues which receive further attention in Part 
Two, in which factors which lead to corruption are outlined and responses are proposed.
2.2 Corruption as a problem in itself
First of all, corruption must be seen as problem in itself. This has the advantage of 
introducing clarity before our discussion becomes closely connected with various equally critical 
matters to be included under “corruption in context” in the course of Part Two (Historical and 
Contemporary Context). The decision to discuss it separately however, is mainly to avoid falling 
into the normal trap of prematurely enlarging the field of analysis to an extent that it appears so 
complex that it becomes impossible to reach an intelligible explanation. Because they have fallen
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into this pitfall alone, many discussions have ended up being useless. The following are four 
reasons why corruption is a problem in itself, namely the climate of suspicion, mixed relationships 
between public and private sectors, faulty political responsibility, and deliberate confusion.
2.2.1 The climate of suspicion
In the air there persists an obscure but real perception66 that the suspicion of corruption lies 
almost everywhere,67 to such an extent that key institutions and their representatives feel utterly 
incompetent to even clarify the gossip, let alone to solve it. For precision’s sake the concept of 
suspicion is considered first rather than corruption. Meneres Pimentel, the former Ombudsman, is 
partially right in saying that “the Portuguese people do not know the phenomenon of corruption” as 
there are only suspicions.68 This is largely because the courts are failing to come to terms with 
critical known cases of alleged corruption. A study of corruption cannot afford to confuse concepts 
or infringe democratic rights and mechanisms.
Of course a suspicion can be irrational and illegitimate. However, the mere fact that it is 
allowed to develop and to infect the environment is a serious issue intimately related to corruption. 
Its existence, conditions and means of perpetuation require an early expert analysis for two reasons. 
Firstly it is necessary to deal with the matter itself and decide what comes next, and secondly it 
may lead on to other crimes worth pursuing if it turns out to be legitimate. This is the sole
66 See the following survey in EXP:24.03.2001 “Corruption increases in Portugal” by V.S.Andrade - 79% 
believe that it is growing “drastically” in these last years; 80.5% consider to be “widespread”; 68% think that 
corruption exist among the country leaders, including in central administration; 80.9% think that local 
councillors are involved in corrupt schemes; 86.4% have no doubt that corruption flourishes in sports; 77.2% 
guarantee that they are frequently confronted with less transparent situations or corruption; and 92.7% have 
the conviction that anti-corruption work is extremely weak. Cf. TI survey three years later in CM: 10.12.2004 
“Sounding on corruption”.
67 This might justify J.Cravinho’s theory of the Portuguese “Italianisation process” in DN:21.09.2002. Cf. 
F.F.Silva, EXP:10.10.1998 “The king is going naked!” - “Curioso e que as suspeitas de corrup9ao, seja ou 
nao para financiar partidos, nao sao de hoje nem de ontem, nem se resumem as obras publicas. ...O director 
da Policia Judiciaria, Fernando Negrao, disse... que existem cumplicidades politicas no grande crime 
economico. Ferraz da Costa ja por mais de uma vez chamou a aten9ao para o problema. Garcia dos Santos 
afirmou que existe corrupfao e o Govemo sabe. O ministro das Finan9as confirmou que, efectivamente, 
sabia, enquanto o resto do Executivo se mostrava surpreendido. Agora ja ninguem pode fingir que nao 
conhece a questao...”; M.S.Tavares, DD:21.11.2001 “More of the same”; J.M.Femandes, PUB :02.10.2002 
“Innocent questions? (or not really)”; L.Marques, EXP: 10.10.1998 “The Attorney’s labyrinth”; and 
J.Geraldes in Jomal Online, University of Beira Interior, “Corruption and democracy” (http://urbi.ubi.pt).
68 See his interview marking the end of eight years as Ombudsman in EXP: 11.03.2000 “Save the justice 
system”.
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responsibility of the relevant public authorities to deal with. But the normal response is for the 
authorities to simply delay the cases by passing them over or promising an investigation - the usual 
polite response. In Singapore for instance, a complaint - initially no more than a suspicion - must 
receive a response within a maximum of two months if it is to be legally followed up or not; and 
the actual complainant is the first to be informed of the decision if he or she so wishes or remains 
strictly anonymous. In Portugal, it can take many months and years. And just as bad, many 
complaints are not tackled at all.
Is Portugal now corrupt? A fair but persistent question, so it seems. The only possible 
accurate answer is “no one knows”. Everything else is pure speculation. Here lies the most serious 
problem of all. Those in positions of authority feel almost incapable of providing voluntarily or in 
advance the minimum evidence that public bids, admissions and contracts, supply and demands, 
public and private interchange of personnel, financing of the political parties, access to funds, local 
and central government relationships, and, to shorten the list, the bureaucratic decision making 
process in critical sectors are both transparent and accessible for verification. Not being willing to 
go an “extra mile” is problematic, not least in a context where “law on the book” differs radically 
from “law in practice”. Appealing to the former is therefore useless as long as the latter dominates 
matters of common interest behind the scenes.69
Instead, an unreasonable burden is placed on vulnerable individuals to provide hard 
evidence leading to proof. For instance, what good really came out of the incident in which the 
Dutch Protestant whistleblower courageously denounced the irregularities of the accounts and 
contaminated bureaucracies in the heart of the European Union’s Commission? Although the 
“Wise Men’s report” later criticised Deus Pinheiro, Edith Cresson, Manuel Marin and Wulf- 
Mathies it clearly warned that problems are not confined to these individuals. They lost their jobs 
but so did the entire Santer Commission. And so what? OLAF replaced UCLAF. Did it matter? Not 
really, because the environment is largely constituted by a man-made, or better still, by members- 
states-made combination of tricks in addition to a badly based control mechanism which has no
69 L.Marques, PUB:27.02.1999 “My dear engineer” - a letter written to an anonymous engineer concerned 
with lots of suspicions in public works. The author insists that the major problem lies in the poor quality of 
rules and regulations in public projects which left suspicion and corruption unchallenged.
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criminal investigative powers to take matters to their logical conclusion, making the EU a bad 
example to follow in anti-corruption related issues.70
The traditional Portuguese demands on individuals to “prove it”, the political refuge behind 
the separation of powers and respect for the judiciary, and the obvious inability or unwillingness to 
share vital information on time and across dozens of institutions, including those of international 
cooperation, compounded with an ingrained tradition of secrecy, demonstrate that the fight against 
corruption is, at best, an amateurish endeavour.
If this picture is not utterly distorted, than it has the inauspicious consequence of tampering 
with inbuilt beliefs, legitimately acquired in the aftermath of the almost bloodless and honourable 
Carnation Revolution. And this is certainly no minor issue, unless the greatest asset of the country 
is no longer its people. Therefore, downplaying people’s motivation is planting seeds for the socio­
cultural tensions which damage civic participation in particular. And without people’s voluntary 
cooperation, no legislation or power alone will be likely to succeed in countering corruption.
Instead, a climate of discouragement, low esteem and pessimism will prevail despite short­
lived periods of enthusiasm (Expo98, Euro 2004). It is perhaps better described in the words of the 
co-director of the Correio da Manha newspaper “Portugal has the stigma of not being a serious 
country. For many years we had no democracy and in the last 30 we have debated too many 
problems. Justice no longer works and corruption floods every sector of national life. The country 
with a history made up of Faith is thus weighed down under an avalanche of corruption: the 
existing situation and justice show difficulty in determining its real dimension; and what is made 
known, because of the imperfect functioning of Justice, comes across as suspicion fed by every 
type of cunning.”71
And since the cloud of suspicion remains continuously dense in the air,72 it is therefore 
right to proceed with the analysis from the perspective of corruption itself, as a valid theoretical
70 For the EU case details see Chapter 9.
71 J.Vaz, CM:25.05.2004 “Corruption and justice”.
72 See former President Sampaio’s discourse in DD:21.01.2003 “PR wants greater transparency and more 
resources for Justice” - illNao e possivel continuar este clima de suspeigao generalizada, que inquina e 
fragiliza as instituigoes e os seus agentes, so porque, na contabilidade dos recursos, nunca sobra para
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exercise independently of whether there will ever be or not a Portuguese version of Marbella which 
surprised the Spanish nation at Easter, 2006.73
2.2.2 Public and private sector corruption
Although corruption in the public and private sectors appears intermittently in the press,74 
the media and people’s interest seldom go beyond the “pyrotechny of the scandal”.75 Yet, as the 
scandal rapidly reproduces itself, it becomes clear that there is more to it than the set of 
inconsequent stories implies. For the study of corruption reveals a great deal of what lies behind a 
complex web of relationships, most of which exist at the interface of public and private affairs.76 
There boundaries are ignored, and rules not observed, often with the familiar set of excuses 
repeated to exhaustion until it becomes “normal”. But in fact it is part of the unchallenged historic 
routine,77 made new in different contemporary formats only as argued by Ruivo.78
investir, suficientemente, na investigagao criminal da corrupgao diz Sampaio”. Cf. His words in TSF 
interview, which appeared also in PUB: 16.12.2000:2 “Jorge Sampaio dixit”: “O clima de suspeigao e um 
clima que tem que terminar. E um problema corrosivo e da ao cidadao uma desconfianga, ja  ha uma 
desconfianga secular em torno do Estado em Portugal
73 The Spanish government closed down the local government of Marbella with a total of 24 detentions, 
including its president on charges of corruption too. See H.Gongalves, DN:05.04.2006 “Spanish government 
dissolves Marbella Assembly because of corruption”, and in DN:21.04.2006 “Corruption and mafias in the 
south of Spain”; and E.Damaso, DN:23.04.2006 “Marbella”.
74 It would be rather tedious to attempt listing the cases that passed via the media in the last couple of 
decades, for example. An interesting article appeared in EXP: 11.09.1999 by A.I.Abrunhosa with a table 
containing 13 legal cases between 1986 and 1994, with brief data, type of charges, and legal case evolution. 
Only one is not directly related with economic crime.
75 Cf. The Portuguese edition of Democratic et corruption en Europe (Della Porta and Meny 1995, 8) - the 
editor intended to add a complementary chapter regarding Portugal but was unable to do so, justifying 
himself in the following manner: “.. .the factual information remains very incipient in our country, the 
investigations are left incomplete and those who discover and denounce political depravity appear to take 
more pleasure in the pyrotechnics of scandals, which are quite popular, than in the urge to contribute 
effectively toward a moralization of administrative activity, which must necessarily include a 
psychosociological and economic comprehension of their subversion.” (emphasis added).
76 Dr Antunes’ timely book “A doenga da saude” (The illness of health) illustrates the problem in the national 
health system: “A promiscuidade entre estes dois sectores e a principal causa da falta de produtividade... 
cerca de 90% dos medicos estao integrados no Sector Publico e destes a grande maioria faz tambem parte do 
Sector Privado, que funciona como um sistema paralelo, supletivo do Estado.” (Antunes 2000,18). More 
recently, a similar book appeared regarding the local governments (Sousa, A., Paulo Morais - Mudar o poder 
local. 2006).
77 See Chapter 7 for an overview of the historical ingrained habits that somehow play a part in shaping 
contemporary conduct.
78 Consider the following selection - (Ruivo 2000): (1) From a president’s wife: “Nesta salapassaram 
centenas de pessoas... Aqui for am criadas empresas, aqui foi criada a Radio (...) por aqui [passaram] 
membros do Governo... ” (Interview with local privileged actor 9), (p.205). (2) Local councillor comments: 
“O que se tem passado ao nivel dos concursos limitados e que a lei, prevendo que tem de ser tres os
The problem o f corruption 41
Carlos Tavares, the former Minister for Economy released the results of the McKinsey 
Institute’s study in September 2003. It unequivocally states that “informality”, that is the parallel
79economy in current language, is the number one obstacle affecting the growth of the economy. 
Next come confused conditions of public office and unreasonable legal constraints. And Helena 
Garrido of Diario Economico accuses all governments of “irresponsibility and irrationality” in 
allowing such a situation.80 Or is it better seen as a result of die Portuguese drama of “instability” 
as A.P.Leite does?81
Gra$a Franco poses a challenging question, in some ways odd because of the strong and 
unnecessary reactions which usually follow any Catholic attempt to address critical political issues. 
She asks what the last pastoral letter82 (from the Portuguese Bishops’ Episcopal Conference) 
concerning seven social sins, corruption included, has in common with the McKinsey report. 
“Apparently nothing and substantially everything” she replies. The ethical dimension link seems 
obvious and fair. But her additional call for a cultural revolution by involving everybody (the state) 
and everyone (citizens) is a typical superficial recipe for doing and expecting nothing but pure 
discourse and good intentions.83
empreiteiros, vamos la, consultados, nada impede que nao se cumpra essa lei, mas para quern o nao quiser 
fazer pode-se fazer um conluio. Vai chamar os seus tres amigos, cada um apresenta a suaproposta, ja  se 
fica a saber os valores que cada um vai apresentar, negociando-os ate... E uma coisa que esta expandidapor 
todo o pais!" (Interview with a Chamber President, 5), (p.227).
79 See CM: 16.09.2003 “Parallel economy stops Portuguese development”; CN: 16.09.2003 “After McKinsey 
report”; F.Pacheco, CN:07.10.2003 “The report and 2010: two sides of two coins”. For a critical view of the 
study see A.Castro Guerra, PUB: 13.10.2003 “The dangerous conclusions of McKinsey”. The real analysis 
and debate was impossible since the government released only the conclusions of the study. See (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2003).
80 See DE: 19.09.2003 “The culprit of secrecy”.
81 See EXP:30.07.2005 “Why does Portugal become poor?”. Leite gives some comparative data concerning 
Portugal and Spain’s politics: “Desde 1976 a 2005 os espanhois tiveram quatro chefes de governo...
Portugal teve quinze.” Then, he extrapolates as follows “Analisando as longevidades medias, Espanha com 
mais quinze chefes de governo chega ate ao ano 2125. Portugal, para chegar a 2125, precisard de mais 
sessenta primeiros-ministros. ”
82 See Pastoral Letter of the Portuguese Episcopal Conference, September 15,2003, “Joint responsibility for 
the common good”, available in www.ecclesia.pt. For a positive reaction see M.Alegre, EXP:20.09.2003 “A 
guide for action”; and G.O.Martins, DE:25.09.2003 “For a better Portugal”. For a somewhat critical insights 
see F.Madrinha, EXP Online: 17.09.2003 “Well does Brother Thomas preach...”.
83 See PUB:22.09.2003 “Saints and sinners”. Among the illegalities, Franco includes absenteeism from work 
based on false medical certificates, fraud related to bankruptcy, tax evasion, corruption, and bureaucracy. Cf. 
J.M.Paquete de Oliveira correctly remarks “Neither is the city totally perverse nor the State completely 
perfect” in (AACC 1990,20).
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And finally, what can be said of the views of Antonio Borges, a highly respected 
economist, who emphatically declared that the very first priority for the next government is to 
combat corruption?84 This is known to drive away good foreign investment. Cadilhe, once in 
charge of a department whose sole objective is to attract investments, used an interesting term 
“custos de contexto” (context related costs) to explain Portugal’s difficulty in the area. This 
prompted VJ.Silva’s comment as follows: “I shall not commit the awful unorthodoxy of 
suspecting that in the ‘costs of context’ are included those of us going along for years and years 
hearing the same diagnosis a la Palisse, seeing prescribed the same miraculous remedies for our 
economic illnesses... or maintaining government agencies which are useless - and without anything 
concrete and innovative happening.”85 What else can be gleaned from the above four cases?
These views indicate that corruption raises particular concerns in mixed private and public 
relationships. Unless checks and balances are well defined, seemely placed and functional, the 
chaotic atmosphere prevailing will not attract good politicians and investments. Individuals - alone, 
in groups or under principal-agent models - will use and abuse the system. Ethics pays and is 
necessary in the process of political economy affairs too. Therefore inside knowledge regarding the 
conditions, actors, and viewers’ attitudes is fundamental for perceiving this web of unwritten 
contacts and contracts.
2.2.3 A fundamental political responsibility
It is perceptible that of all governments, parliaments and presidents of the last three 
decades, none has really focused on corruption yet. Although isolated discourses and even concrete 
efforts at certain peak periods have been made, the overall result is nil. Indifference makes 
corruption particularly serious.
84 L.Ferreira, PUB:26.07.2001 “A.Borges gives priority to the fight against corruption”; F.S.Cabral,
PUB.T 1.09.2001 “The vicious cycle of demoralization”; J.Amorim, PUB:29.09.2001 “‘Corruption’ seen by 
A.Borges”. Cf. N.Santos, EXP:28.07.2001 “A rodagem do carro de Borges’'’ and in EXP:04.08.2001 “A 
prudent silence”; S.Sanches, EXP:05.10.2001 “The state of the State”; and E.Damaso, PUB:23.06.2001 “The 
crisis”.
85 V.J.Silva was not sure what this term really means, it seems. See in DE:28.11.2003 “The mysteries of the 
economy (or the ‘costs of context’)”. Silva thinks that economic and judicial languages are two inward 
looking codes to which ordinary citizens have no access. Cf. PUB:24.11.2003 “‘costs of context’ need public 
investment”; DE:09.01.2004 “Investment: 40 IDE contracts are worth 1,100 millions”.
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Consider first the transition86 to democracy started in 1974. It covers the “provisional” 
(prior to the 1976 Constitution) and the “constitutional” governments up to 1985, correctly 
designated by S.Franco as “critical times”.87 Although chaos dominated politics, many argue that 
little could effectively be achieved as a result. But it is interesting that concerns about corruption 
entered into the very first programme approved by the government.88 This in itself rules out the 
idea that no one ever thought much about corruption in the emotional days of the transition. In fact, 
it was not a bad start at a time which marked two critical events, namely the massive increase of 
public officials, and the nationalisation of several private companies. The State also increased its 
role as a player in addition to being the market’s regulator. This proved problematic89 as also did 
the fact that corruption received no additional attention while these critical steps were rapidly 
shaping the country, particularly the apparatus of public administration.
Instability prevailed throughout the first eight constitutional governments. Of these, only 
the second, third and seventh governments referred to corruption in their programmes. But in 1978, 
the first autonomous anti-corruption and related public office crimes unit was created under the PJ 
known as Brigada Anti-Corrupgao. This indicates that between' 1974 to 1978 the investigation of 
economic crimes was somewhat relaxed. And herein lies a fundamental error. They failed to lay the 
basis for tackling corruption fairly, and swiftly, and for reasons going beyond mere political 
motivations. This jeopardised any future attempts to minimise the effects of corruption because it
86 There are various ways in typifying critical political periods. An interesting one is put forward by 
J.M.Ferreira: Republic of revolutionaries (1974-75); Republic of politicians (1976-82); Republic of 
entrepreneurs (1982-90); and lately, the Republic of financiers (financeiros) and journalists. In between, he 
adds, there are other key players such as the growing influence of the Catholic Church visible in the approval 
of the law of religious liberty - see DN: 19.06.2001 “Pressure groups in the regime”.
87 See a global overview of the first twenty years (1974-1994) in (Reis 1996) where S.Franco wrote four 
chapters under the economy section: The revolution framework; The revolutionary experience (1974-75); 
The critical times (1976-85); and The European period (1986-1993).
88 See for example the First Provisory Government, dated May 15, 1974 and published in the Di&rio do 
Govemo 113/74 Serie I, and in Decreto-Lei 203/74 of May 15, 1974 which reads: “Promover um inquerito a 
todos os abusos depoder, atentados contra os direitos dos cidadaos oupraticas de corrupgao... ” and 
“Activagao dos meios preventivos dos crimes em geral e, em particular, da corrupgao, dos delitos 
antieconomicos e de todas as formas de atentado contra pessoas e bens”. See also the V Provisory 
Government programme, under “Measures concerning the private sector”: “Simplificagao radical dos 
processos de concurso e adjudicagao de empreitadas, integrando aparticipagao e controlo dos organismos 
representativos dos trabalhadores e reforgando as medidas repressivas contra os crimes econdmicos 
(corrupgao, fraude, etc.)” (www.portugal.gov.pt).
89 See (Viegas 1996,1,34).
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was not discussed in the first place. That is, corruption was not part of the Parliament’s discussions 
to the point of seeking multiparty agreement, legislation and strategy. Instead, anti-corruption 
philosophy and practice has become a victim of “politicizagao e judicializagao” (politicizing and 
judicializing) ever since.
According to S.Franco, the very first time when “corruption was talked about” after the 
revolution was in March 1979 when the Resolution of the Council of Ministers (78/79 of March 
20) envisaged the creation of a special anti-corruption unit under the direct responsibility of the 
Prime Minister (Franco 1996,225). This was inconsequential as Mota Pinto resigned as PM, three 
months later. The AD (Democratic Alliance) under the charismatic leadership of Sa Cameiro 
included corruption in its programme of action, but Cameiro died in a controversial air crash in 
December 1980.
When the ninth constitutional government, known as the “Central Block” coalition, took 
over in May 1983 for 2 years and 5 months, the longest of them all, the effects of corruption were 
visible. Still without Parliament’s intervention, the government established an autonomous anti- 
corruption administrative investigation unit, Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupgao on August 1983, 
an obvious methodological error, identical to the 1979 one. Additionally, this unit did not have 
criminal investigative powers; therefore it was useless, like the current OLAF in the European 
Union office in Brussels. The excessively slow method of setting it up and equipping it with 
resources and personnel reveals critical problems which show that perhaps the organisation was not 
welcome in the first place. Its mandate was weak, to say the least.
The consolidation period started in 1985 with a minority government and two majority 
ones led by Cavaco Silva (PSD) until 1995. At last, a stable administration took office in 1987, but 
only the last of its three governments in 1991 approved programmes mentioning corruption. Much 
needed “surgical” changes were made to the Constitution and as a result nationalised firms were 
returned to private ownership on a large scale.90 Here lies perhaps the second major fault of 
neglecting corruption again, when massive European funding and economic progress were under
90 Viegas is right in acknowledging various concrete efforts to diminish state intervention in the economy 
starting after 1976 (Viegas 1996,171).
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way. So when scandals became known in 1989-1990 and were legally charged in 1991, at the time 
of a second majority election, the cause of corruption was affected by two factors.
In the first place, the extinction by Parliament in 1993 of the anti-corruption unit which had 
lasted approximately 10 years, followed by the creation of a new subsection within the PJ 
framework. Secondly, a number of badly formulated laws appeared regarding the financing of 
political parties and vital control mechanisms of politicians and their relationship with the public 
sector. The last set of laws ended in a complete fiasco when, shortly before the 1995 general 
election, the so-called “transparency package” was approved in Parliament, only to be altered later 
when the Guterres (PS) administration replaced C.Silva.
The socialist period did not alter significantly the anti-corruption scenario. Some important 
laws appeared, including the Law 108/01 of November 28,2001 which changed important aspects 
of corruption and traffic of influence laws, and defined private corruption as a crime, and the Law 
5/02 of January 11,2002 which facilitated some special access to bank accounts, fiscal data and 
recovery of assets in favour of the State, in economy related crimes.
This rather brief review confirms that corruption was loosely dealt with, mainly in 
intermittent legal matters, under unhealthy political conditions, with various changes in the process 
unilaterally introduced, still unfinished, and politicised throughout. This was so much so that 
current political party finances and enforcement mechanisms, for example, are entirely unrealistic, 
and anti-corruption units are ill equipped both legally and in terms of personnel. The problem of 
relationships between institutions is serious, and even more so when dealing with vital bodies 
outside the anti-corruption units.91
For this situation, the political leadership is directly responsible. And in fact, there can be 
no substitute for top political responsibility to change the problematic scenario which exists today. 
The following subsection completes the evidence as to why corruption is a problem in itself.
91 These issues will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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2.2.4 A deliberate confusion
Corruption remains alive mostly as a subject chattered about, either in the corridors of the 
elite in search of power for money, and of money for power, or gossipped about in a popular 
fashion in coffee shops around the country. The latter reveals a powerless civil society whereas the 
former have abused their access to power for the illegitimate gain of the few. If this is 
sociologically correct, as a “natural” consequence of the previous three factors, how has the 
problem of corruption been affected as a whole?
The concept is certainly quite amorphous, and this diminishes the possibility of grasping 
the questions at stake in a corrupt transaction. Superficiality super-abounds instead. In short, and 
contextualising according to the spirit of the present moment, it may be said that the apparently 
positive “Simplex”92 mood of the Socrates administration has not yet reached the confusing 
legislation and the jurisprudence, structures and strategies which surround corruption.
If once the famous “3 F’s” of Fatima, Fado (traditional folk singing) and Football 
entertained Portuguese minds during the longest of all the twentieth century Western European 
dictatorships, corruption now seems to entertain the free press while somehow failing to reach the 
research chairs of universities, and the interest of the civic groups,93 at least until the early years of 
the twenty first century. In practice the negative implications of this are that there is an almost total 
absence of any meaningful outside pressure upon existing anti-corruption bodies such as the Public 
Prosecutor,94 the Police Forces,95 and ultimately the Courts.96
92 Simplex - Programa de Simplificaqao Administrativez e Legislativa (Administrative and legislative 
simplified programme), is the latest (March 2006) of government efforts to reduce the bureaucracy it 
inherited. The first major step simplified 333 administrative acts - Available from www.portugal.gov.pt.
93 As stated above, the 1998 TI Portuguese Chapter initiative did not survive beyond its initial phase. 
Currently, there is no similar civil society group at all.
94 It consists of DCIAP: Central Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Department based in Lisbon, and 
four regional DIAP: Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Departments.
95 It includes the PJ, and its anti-corruption unit, DCICCEF: Central Directorate for Combating Corruption, 
Fraud, and Economic and Financial Crime; the Public Security Police (PSP); the Republican National Guard 
(GNR); and the Department of Immigration and Frontiers (SEF).
96 There are four types of Courts: Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Justice (the courts of law of the 
first and second instance), Supreme Administrative Court (administrative and tax courts of first and second 
instance), and the Court of Auditors.
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The media are important observers, and are also facing critical problems, including low 
investigative performance, and the unclear movement of personnel to and from critical sectors.
That most politicians and private donors alike make corruption a deliberately confused issue is 
perceptible to anyone with a minimum understanding of socio-religious, political and economic 
contexts. That many, especially those in elite positions, maintain the current status quo, with its 
confusion as to legal and administrative powers on the one hand, and highly inefficient control 
mechanisms and the overstretched judiciaiy on the other, is also hardly a surprise. These rather 
critical skeleton elements account for the prevailing laissez-faire approach and severely curtail 
whatever trust citizens have acquired concerning the State’s sharp eye to discourage corruption. 
Against such a confusing background, it ends up as a nurturing ground for corruption instead. This 
explains why corruption is a problem in itself, first and foremost.
2.3 People’s perception
It is both possible and desirable to perceive critical aspects of corruption through the lenses 
of individual observers. But this raises at least two immediate concerns. Firstly, what to include or 
exclude is problematic in itself due to a variety of viewpoints. And secondly, perception is related 
to individual concerns and may not reflect society’s awareness of the problem. However, the aim is 
to bring together dispersed and previously unrelated views, in a way which will make possible 
reflection on the seriousness of corruption. What is included will carefully consider some degree of 
consistency and conceptual clarity over a period of time, in a search for critical themes.
Over the years, national public surveys are used to increase public awareness and promote 
discussion but seldom contribute towards change. An interesting one appeared on the occasion of 
the thirtiest anniversary of democracy, revealing the perception of 325 army officials, now between 
50 and 75 years old, who took active part in the 1974 military coup.97 None regrets taking part in it 
and, when asked about the contemporary situation, their concerns are centred on corruption,
97 The survey was jointly organised by O Publico and the Catholic University. Only 4 officials failled to hand 
in the anonymous inquiry. For further details see three articles in PUB:24.04.2004: A.Gomes “Democracy 
and the end of the war were the objectives of the coup” and “Robot portrait of the April Captain”.
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unemployment, low economic growth and drugs. The reference to corruption is of some 
significance even though no specific matters are raised.
• 98In fact, several surveys usually put corruption within people’s first four major concerns. 
The variation largely depends on the political occasion at the time (Morlino 1998,314-316). In the 
context of a study about Portuguese Courts, corruption appears in ninth place out of 12 possible 
priorities for the government’s action (Santos, et al. 1996, 575). Since TI began to publish its 
annual Corruption Perception Index in 1995, Portugal appears steadily between the 22nd and 25th 
positions with a score around 6.3 to 6.5, 10 being the highest, corruption-free or cleanest mark." It 
seems therefore correct not to draw conclusions over and above the established fact that corruption 
is part of the Portuguese list of concerns.
In thirty years of democracy, views on corruption have touched two extremes. Starting 
with humorous viewpoints, Herman Jose, a TV personality, in his own characteristic style declares 
that “violence is to live in a corrupt state where things are deeply mechanised and no one will ever 
accuse anybody. The rest is a joke”.100 In his weekly television programme, he invited the Attorney 
General Cunha Rodrigues who had then (1999) been fourteen years in office, together with a 
famous blind black American singer, Stevie Wonder. A journalist, who imagines the reactions of 
readers, asked what led Herman to unite these two? The reply goes “It is obvious neither of them 
can see anything”, and another version says: “Rodrigues never discovered a single case of money 
laundering to date because he had Mr Negrao (a derivative of black in Portuguese) as director of 
the PJ”.101 On the same lines, Sergio Figueiredo compares the system of justice to a large washing
98 See the following surveys: J.M.Femandes, PUB:25.04.2004 “The time for insisting”, where corruption 
appears in second place (49.9%); C.Viana, PUB:Publica (Magazine):25.04.2004 “Are we like that? A portrait 
in 100 dimensions” - see item 31 in particular; PUB:21.12.2002 “Corruption: a rapidly rising concern” (first 
place); DG:05.12.2003 “Sampaio’s popularity exceeds the 80% barrier” (second place); PUB:03.07.2003 
“Unemployment is the main concern” (second place -49.9%); PUB: 12.01.2002 “Concerns with corruption 
continue to increase” (third place - 38.3%); and PUB: 10.12.2004 “Politicians, Inland Revenue and Justice 
come top in corruption” based on TI study (2004 Corruption Barometer).
99 All indexes are available in www.transparency.org/. They annually hit the news in Portugal. See for 
example CM:28.02.2002 “Portugal is among the most corrupt”; L.Bessa, CN:06.02.2004 “Transparency is 
not a question of degree”.
100 See his interview in IND: 13.07.2001:32-33. The context of this citation relates to a couple of episodes of 
violence in the reality-shows, including the Big Brother.
101 See EXP:02.04.1999, subsection “Vidas”: “Herman a Cunha”.
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machine where white-collar crimes, false invoices, fiscal fraud, and corruption go in, and come out 
spotless;102 and finally M.E.Cardoso suggests surrounding the country with wires as all inhabitants 
are somehow knowledgeable spectators who are accomplices of corrupt practices.103
The other extreme is more common but humourless. It consists of severe unspecified 
criticisms made by the elite. J.MJudice while Bastonario (Presidential title) of Lawyers said that 
corruption exists in criminal investigation because people in high places have told him so.104 
Another Bastonario, Pires de Lima, tells that corruption is not being investigated for reasons of 
political expediency.105 Manuela Arcanjo, while Minister of Health, acted as a shadow minister 
also, says F.Azevedo Silva (DN: 19.04.2001). She identifies clinical directors of public hospitals 
performing their duties and seeking political interests and the interests of syndicates instead of the 
welfare of patients, concluding that it is the sector in society most politicised and influenced by 
parties (partidarisado).106 And lastly, Joao Cravinho who writes extensively on corruption,107 after 
stepping down as Minister of Public Works denounced the existence of powerful lobbies that 
defeated not only his Ministry but also Guterres’ administration, thus marking the first 
parliamentarian polemic of the year 2000.108 So, as P.Sande write in his article “In the land of 
lobbies”: “Nothing new: Joao Cravinho complained of the lobbies, Santana Lopes too. Which? A 
mystery.”109
But in between these short samples of two extremes, there are important themes to 
highlight as well. In 2001, the daily newspaper, Publico addressed 17 critical problems under a
102 As cited in PUB: 10.04.2001 (originally in DE:09.04.2001 by S.Figueiredo).
103 See his interesting article entitled “0  papel selado” (paper used for official documents) in (AACC 
1990, 66-67) initially published in EXP:28.06.1986.
104 See interview with J.M.Judice, PD: 19.09.2003 “There is corruption in criminal investigations”. When 
asked where? He replied: Where, I do not know.”
105 A.P.Lima interview in EXP: 12.02.2000:32 “Corruption is not investigated for political reasons”.
106 See her three pages interview in DN:18.04.2001:17-19.
107 J.Cravinho, DN:21.09.2002 “The Modema’s University and Italianization in flow”.
108 See JN:08.01.2000 “Cravinho set Parliament ‘on fire’”; PUB:08.01.2000 “PS doesn’t want a 
parliamentary hearing”; PUB:08.01.2000 “The laws of polemics”; DN:08.01.2000 “Opposition tightens on 
Cravinho”; SEM: 14.01.2000 “Guterres obliges Cravinho to deny lobbies?”; SEM: 14.01.2000 “The lobbies 
which dismissed the minister”; VIS: 13.01.2000 “Cravinho’s sowing”; and IND:21.01.2000 “Lobbies howl 
softly”.
109 See P.A.Sande, DN: 11.10.2002.
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broader citizenship perspective. Corruption being one of these is associated with the financing of 
political parties, traffic of influence, lack of transparency in politics, and the fact that veiy few 
cases reach the courts. The study then favours an agreement between political parties in tackling 
corruption effectively.110 The Agenda para o Empreendedorismo (Agency for Entrepreneurism) 
reveals that three out of four Portuguese young people between the age of 15 and 34 view 
negatively a career in public administration, and 11 percent of 858 respondents considered 
corruption to be the cause of poor achievement of the current administration.111
At one of corruption’s many peaks, and out of all cases being investigated in the PJ, 42 per 
cent were centred on local government corruption.112 It is often part of a well known triangle with 
construction firms and football clubs that appear frequently in literature and the media (Ferreira and 
Baptista 1992, 77-82) where the dividing line between irregularity and illegality seems rather 
thin.113 As briefly referred to above, the illegal financing of political parties is of particular concern 
(Sousa 1999; Costa 1998),114 something which A.Vitorino calls “a clouded zone” or 
“sottogovemo” (substitute government) (AACC 1991, 89). Equally serious is the fact that political 
parties prefer to pay annual symbolic fines rather than complying with already precarious 
legislation.115
110 See a summary in PUB:08.10.2001 “Um mes de cidadania,,\ the following articles by E.Damaso, 
A.C.Campos and P.Correia, PUB:06.10.2001 “So um quarto dos casos de corrupgao chegam a tribunaU’, 
and E.Damaso, PUB:06.10.2001 “O jogo das reformas casuisticas‘\
111 See DD: 18.11.2003 “Youths fail the present and future of the Public Administration”. The study is 
available in www.agep.pt.
112 See DN:08.02.2006. Cf. PD: 10.12.2005 “PJ investigates nearly 400 Councils (Local Governments) on 
suspicion of corruption”; EXP: 19.03.2005 “Crimes in the Chamber” (350 cases involving 30 presidents of 
308 councils).
113 See CM:01.11.2003 “Corruption in Portugal - football attracts to itself contractors and business” - citing 
M.J.Morgado; CM:03.11.2003 “Pacheco Pereira says yes to Morgado”; E.Rangel, CM:01.11.2003 “Crime 
from A to Z”; V.J.Silva, DE:09.05.2003 “Paradoxes of democratic minimalism”; and H.Santos,
DD:31.10.2003 “Corruption”.
114 See also J.C.Vasconcelos, VIS:16.12.1999:48 “Financing and corruption”; F.B.Costa, IND:08.01.1999 
“Hidden financing... with the tail showing”; M.Monteiro, EXP:04.12.1999 “Financing and transparency”; 
J.Tavares and P.Ferreira, PUB: 14.05.2001 “Who pays for democracy?”; R.Vaz, DE:14.01.2003 “For 
transparency”; J.B.Moura, DE:08.01.2003 “Party financing”; N.G.Ribeiro in DE:13.05.2004 “Money, 
politics, parties etc.”; and R.Cartaxana, CM:25.05.2004 “Promiscuous relations”.
115 See CM:09.01.2004 “All parties with irregular accounts”; J.M.Judice, EXP: 17.10.98 “May God give them 
virtue!”; TSF:12.10.2001 “Court of Auditors: Accounts of political parties have illegalities”; A.T.Ribeiro, 
VIS: 11.01.2001 “Accounts: Parties outside the law”, and in VIS:18.01.2001:48-51 “Accounts of the 1999 
parliamentary election”; and L.Sousa, PUB :06.10.2001 “The game of casuistic reforms”.
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Concerns with expenditure levels in the Health Ministry are also perceptible and these 
prompted the heart surgeon M .J.Antunes to write a book giving ample evidences of waste and 
mismanagement (Antunes 2000). Such an unprecedented decision from the elite is valuable in 
itself, even though he may have ended up “preaching” in the desert. If that is truly the case, then the 
analysis must look elsewhere and search for causes other than reasons, impregnated though these 
may be in the strange webs of relationships that prevent ears from hearing and eyes from seeing 
what is being transmitted by well-intentioned citizens.
Although the above mentioned cases are often regarded as the most readily perceived areas 
of corruption, this seems rather simplistic and possibly unfair too. With no reliable studies or 
statistics, and with cases reaching the courts symbolising just a “tip of the iceberg” theory,116 it is 
not desirable to attempt to reach conclusions yet. Instead, and for the time being, it is best to 
consider seriously the concerns of additional people.
Many have already acknowledged the widespread nature of corruption as it permeates most 
spheres of national life. Insightful terms such as “corruptogeneas (corruptogenic) conditions”117; 
“pre-corruption”;118 the religiously based idea of being “omnipresent”;119 and “viveiro (nursery) of 
corruption”120 illustrate the point. They all appeal directly to the existence of structures of 
opportunities and incentives that underpin what may be called a subculture of corruption, which 
promotes an atmosphere of chaos. In reference to the latter, writes Helena Garrido “it must be said 
that those who benefit from the chaos in the Portuguese public administration are the corruptors, 
fraud makers, inefficient firms and incompetent public officials.”121
116 A concept widely applied nationally - see S.Moura in (AACC 1991,70; Moura 1993,23); PCP’s 
magazine “Jva«te/”No.l298 of October 15,1998 “Corruption in Portugal”; EXP: 10.03.2001 “The tip of the 
iceberg” in reference to the collapse of the Entre-os-Rios bridge; and V.J.Silva, DE:23.01.2003 “Will 
democracy be excessive?” by considering the cases of Felgueiras and Agueda as a microcosm of the national 
corruption ‘iceberg’.
117 V.Moreira in (AACC 1991, 94).
118 J.Salgueiro, EXP: 11.03.2000.
119 M.Coutinho, DE:30.12.2002 “The system”.
120 A.Barreto, PUB:27.10.2002 “Fantasmas”.
121 As quoted in PUB:09.06.2001 “Z/cfo” - originally in DE:08.06.2001.
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In conclusion, Dom J.Policarpo referred to corruption as a problem in his 2002 Christmas 
homily.122 In the following year, a pastoral document of the Catholic Church bishops identified the 
seven national social sins.123 They included corruption. P.Sande and others welcomed such a 
document but wished the bishops had the opportunity to substantiate the reasons for its stubborn 
existence, and added the complaint, “Why is there so much talk and nothing changes?”124SEDES, a 
Catholic inspired organisation which unites several business people, has also pinpointed corruption 
as a serious, unresolved problem. In a document released prior to the 2002 legislative election, it 
reads under section 6:
“In face of the widespread feeling among the population, confirmed in international 
publications as to its general extent, it is necessary to combat corruption efficiently 
... by eliminating the opportunities for its practice... It is not understood, for 
example, that, year after year, the Constitutional Court should come to present 
reservations as to the accounts of different parties and that, also year after year, 
nothing ever happens to change the situation.”125
2.4 Concluding remarks
Corruption permeates many spheres of public and private life, over and above isolated 
individual cases. The above selection of views indicates that corruption is serious and deserves 
special attention. Although several critical elements and areas of corruption have been noticed, it is 
the present situation that poses the most urgent need for analysis as institutions themselves are 
affected by countless suspicions and episodes of corruption. A traditional casuistic approach needs 
to be abandoned in the search for structures for incentives and opportunities behind corrupt 
attitudes and practices.
122 See DN:26.12.2002 “What have we done of our ideals”.
123 See the document “Joint responsibility for the common good”, September 2003, in www.ecclesia.pt.
124 P.A.Sande, DN.T9.09.2003 “Catholic, apostolic and roman”.
125 See PUB:04.02.2002 “Commitment to change proposed by the SEDES”.
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Chapter 3 
The problem of ignoring corruption
3.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the previous one by increasing public awareness but this time 
focusing on the problem of the impunity of corruption. This is a twin problem because the absence 
of response - or the inadequacy of it - favours the spread of the crime. Impunity, added to the 
occurrences of corruption alluded to previously, provides a unified overview of the predicament. 
Each feeds on the other, irrespective of the order, which is unimportant, as the situation has clearly 
deteriorated since the early days of democracy.
Impunity significantly lowers the risks involved in corruption. When crime is left 
unpunished, the cost is reversed, that is, honest people pay the social penalty for being the odd ones 
out, and therefore unwelcome in the system. The righteous are subject to peer pressure. Such an 
environment favours first and foremost those who perpetuate and protect illegal practices. In the 
end, power is subverted, wealth reduced, except for the wrongdoers, and ethics becomes 
demagogic rhetoric.
The Portuguese situation seems perplexing. Consider three introductory factors. Azevedo 
and Rolim remind us that “At the end of the eighties, Portugal awoke to the judicial scandals 
involving public figures. Fifteen years later, none of them has been satisfactorily resolved.”126 This 
raises the problem of the lack of response. But from the cases on which a verdict was pronounced, 
the problem is different, as the following two examples demonstrate.
In 2000, two bribed traffic police officers were eventually found guilty. They were 
sentenced to two years in jail, but the judge suspended the sentence for a period of three years. The 
one who paid the bribe and afterwards took criminal procedure following his lawyer’s advice, was
126 A.P.Azevedo and M.L.Rolim, Exp: 12.09.1998 “Cases without justice”. Cf. Two sets of related articles 
published in subsequent years: A.I.Abrunhosa, EXP: 11.09.1999 “Justice drip by drip” (Justiqa a conta-gotas) 
and “Criminal investigation at various speeds”; and A.I.Abrunhosa and A.P.Azevedo, EXP:08.01.2000 
“Justice with no room to reply” and “State should compensate” by A.P.Azevedo.
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sentenced to eight months in jail. He too had his sentence suspended for two years.127 This raises 
additional concerns. Considering that denunciation of such practices is rare, and judicial conviction 
is rarer still, one of the key questions is how the general public, including potential corruptors and 
corruptees, reacts to such a decision. It is possible that such a decision is likely to discourage 
citizens from becoming whistle blowers. Consequently people’s toleration of corruption may 
increase. This however is not an isolated case, as the following paragraph indicates.
Secondly, some basic statistics revealed by the Portuguese News Agency, Lusa, on the 
occasion of the 10th anniversary of the legal extinction of the Alta Autoridade Contra a Corrupgao 
(anti-corruption unit) in 1993 illustrate the point as well.128 The following 1997-2001 figures refer 
to the total number of convictions and effective prison sentences only. In 1997,46 were convicted 
and 6 sent to prison; in 1998, 33 were convicted and 8 imprisoned; in 1999, 24 convicted and 5 
imprisoned; in 2000, 43 convicted and none imprisoned; and in 2001, 39 convicted and 4 
imprisoned. To complete the picture, the article says “And for more than a year there have been no 
registered imprisonments.”
These factors prompt the following observations. Firstly, in the thirty years of the current 
regime, not a single prominent, top-level politician has been convicted of corruption. Secondly, all 
the convicted people, though these are not many, come from the “small fish” pond. Thirdly, in most 
of the crimes that reached the courts, the bribes offered were around 100 Euros.129 Fourth, the 
tendency to impose a fine or to suspend prison sentences is common, and there are very few 
effective prison sentences - 4.6 individuals on average each year. This scenario points towards a 
climate of impunity combined with mild punishments. This situation requires an examination of the 
critical facts leading to these circumstances. That should include an inquiry as to why public 
reaction is so muted.
127 See the report in JN:24.10.2000:28; Pub:24.10.2000:13; and DN:24.10.2000:18.
128 See PD:30.08.2002 “Crimes through corruption lessen: Hundreds of lawsuits registered but only half a 
dozen in prison”. Figures are taken from the Gabinete de Politico Legislativa e Planeamento, Ministry of 
Justice.
129 This figure refers to another statistic, covering the period of2002 to 2005 presented by the PJ. See 
N.Ferraz, CM:06.02.2006 “A study: Local government and police forces are the main focuses (of 
corruption)”. Cf. J.Godinho, CM:02.01.2006 “Justice: unpublished study analyses 224 lawsuits and traces the 
profile of criminals - corrupt for 100 Euros only”.
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The following section looks at nine contextually related issues which facilitate the 
ignorance of corruption by key sectors within society. The concluding summary section specifies 
critical elements needing further analysis in the course of Part Two, Chapter 7 (Models of existing 
responses).
3.2 Critical elements behind impunity
Corruption is never an isolated problem. It inevitably arises alongside other critical matters 
within, as well as beyond, politics. In the case of Portugal, the following nine correlated issues 
highlight the widespread ignorance of corruption. They are critically described with a view to 
grasping the overall multidisciplinary implications of combatting the web of corruption.
3.2.1 An unacknowledged seriousness of corruption
Perhaps the first critical issue is that corruption has not yet been properly and globally 
acknowledged, either in the distant past or since the establishment of the current democratic 
regime, by business persons, members of the elite or the clergy, not to mention politicians, as 
observed in the last chapter. By “properly and globally” is meant that corruption is not 
unequivocally perceived by the leadership of all four “sovereign bodies”,130 as a serious national 
problem. At best, it remains a diffuse phenomenon. The way to test it appears simple and must be 
made clear from the outset to avoid ambiguities in future discussions. In the first place, it consists 
of finding out whether or not there is a fully comprehensive and unified regulation - as all actions 
against corruption must be solidly grounded on fair and good legislation.
Secondly, following a clear legal mandate, it must be certified that all the administrative 
and criminal bodies established to prevent and counteract corruption are equipped with adequate 
power, expertise, resources and capacity to efficiently perform their duties on time, fairly and 
swiftly.131 And thirdly, there must be an anti-corruption mandate which enables the financial
130 Constitutionally assigned to President of the Republic, House of Parliament (Assembleia da Republica), 
Government, and the Courts.
131 This is relevant and needs to be properly specified in each stage of the entire process of either 
administrative or criminal investigation. For the time being, D.F.Amaral’s general guide seems appropriate 
and briefly reveals the apparent crisis in the judiciary: “casos normais, que se deviam resolver em 6 meses ou
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proceeds to be adequately recovered. In this way corruption becomes a very risky business to get 
involved in.
This rather desirable and realistic democratic scenario has certainly not been achieved yet. 
And worse still, no political plan is underway which is likely to achieve it either, despite abundant 
but intermittent, dubious, confusing and misleading political discourses and concepts. And beyond 
politics, other critical fields directly or indirectly involved, namely the private and civil society 
sectors, are not playing their role in a desirable manner either.
Such a situation seems inexplicable knowing as we do the pervasive effects of corruption 
in slowing down political reforms and economic growth. These constitute two major critical 
aspects awaiting better performance and outcome, and in that order. Meanwhile, having already 
“invested” rather generous funds into needed and vital areas such as education and health, almost 
comparable to the level of an advanced European country, Portugal’s results still seem meagre. An 
inquisitive mind inquires why after generous European Union support schemes, massive and 
uninterrupted since 1985, amounting to millions of Euros daily, the country is still largely 
uncompetitive and unproductive, with levels of poverty affecting up to fifteen per cent of the 
population. What might account for this though is that corruption wastes resources132 that despite 
all generosity remain scarce. Thus the urgent need to take a close look at corrupt practices and 
mechanisms that evade accountability and transparency. So what can justify the widespread 
reluctance to recognise this problem?
It may be because corruption is unquestionably a very delicate issue, always hard to admit 
in one’s own space and situation. Somehow it looks as if it will seriously damage the country’s 
image, something very precious indeed. Secondly, relativism also plays a vital role, as there always 
will be so many “good” excuses, not least because corruption is a highly contested concept. There
um ano, demoram 5 anos a julgar; providencias urgentes que careceriam de decisao em 48 horas chegam a 
durar 2 ou 3 meses a ser tomadas; casos dificeis e complexos que poderiam justificar processos de 2 ou 3 
anos levam 15 anos a terminar.” (Amaral 2000,247). Equally important is to set a time limit for deciding if a 
complaint is feasible or not in the early stages of the criminal inquiry, which Amaral has not included.
132 Just one example at this point, put forward by E.Damaso, PUB:22.01.2000:8 “The politics and money” - 
“Obras, custam, em media, 77% a mais. ...Se calhar, e mesmoprovavel que as democracias estejam 
condenadas a aceitar a corrupgao como pratica admissivel ate certo nivelpara que todos possamos dormir 
descansados, na paz do Senhor, vivendo o sono feliz da estabilidade prometida, para esconjurar os 
fantasmas da radicalidade politico de esquerda e de direita.”
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is no shortage of countries in a far worse situation “than us”. This is a rather false consolation, 
tactically used and abused by many. As L. Marques explains, Portugal poses as a rich country in 
the south, and as a poor one in the north.133 Meanwhile, such ambivalence inhibits one from 
coming to terms with one’s own reality.134
Thirdly, there is a tendency to compare Portugal with the average EU situation, thus 
ignoring the fact that a number of its member states have unresolved historic problems with 
corruption such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and France, and these should not be seen as ideal points of 
comparison.135 Since the enlargement of the EU there is an even greater possibility of falsifying the 
figures. The good example of the Nordic countries (Finland and Norway) is normally little referred 
to except in brief and isolated references here and there.
And finally, it is easy to think, as well as to behave in such a way, that assumes that the 
problem will resolve itself, perhaps in a magical democratic form, or to leave it entirely in the 
hands of others to come, considering it to be somebody else’s dilemma. Damaso’s following 
perception seems correct “As I have written so many times, in Portugal corruption is accepted as a 
sweet drug”.136 This is simply not enough. If for theology, for instance, the acknowledgment of sin 
is the sine qua non for salvation, a proper recognition of corruption is obviously also the first step 
towards its comprehensive treatment. To miss it is a mistake and weakens the anti-corruption cause 
altogether.
133 L.Marques, EXP:12.12.1998 “Rich and poor”: “A Norte temos a reivindicagao resultante dapobreza e do 
subdesenvolvimento. A Sul vivemos a gloria de estar entre os grandes do universo, a frente de paises como a 
Italia e o Canada. Entre a pobreza, a Norte, e a riqueza, a Sul, ha uma economia de contrastes.”
134 Some headings cause real concern such as the one put forward by L.S.Matos, PUB:02.09.2002 “Below 
Botswana”, in reference to the TI-CPI annual results.
135 In a drastic critical mode, which often characterised S.Franco’s many public interventions and duties, he 
writes in the context of fiscal reform: “All this when our evasion, fraud and secret economy today, after 1998 
(I don’t say ten years before), are not much better than those of Southern Europe.” One wonders, presumably 
correctly why choosing Southern Europe as a comparative element? Is cultural affinity the best criteria even 
in evaluating economic performance? We think not. See A.S.Franco, DN:09.10.2001:01 “Fiscal reform and 
the rosy became red”.
136 Cf. E.Damaso, PUB: 13.04.2002.
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3.2.2 Unstudied problem
For apparently unknown reasons, corruption has not yet merited any special interest by 
academics, universities’ research departments or civic institutions. This, in turn, clearly reduces the 
possibility of perceiving the seriousness of corruption, which is a problem in itself. The evidence is 
both historical and contemporary. From the historical viewpoint, Oliveira Marques clarifies that 
“The history of corruption in Portugal has not, in practice, had devotees. Cases and examples crop 
up here and there, but a systematic documentary analysis and an accompanying study of opinion 
don’t exist, as far as we know, in our historiography.” (AACC 1990,10). The current situation has 
only started to change slightly.
Back in the early nineties, Costa Braz, the former head of the anti-corruption unit explains 
it well: “The phenomenon of Corruption has not received, in our country, a genuine and exhaustive 
study, except in rare monographs of a judicial nature. It is, however, a frequent topic - or title - 
within the media” (AACC 1990, 5).137 Among the judicial articles, the rather influential views of 
distinguished scholars such as Antonio Costa138 and J.Figueiredo Dias,139 for instance, are taken at 
face value and their findings are rarely criticised by other lawyers, thus impoverishing even further 
this undebated academic field.140 And Vital Moreira adds “Because this (political) corruption also 
exists in Portugal, there are no studies on this issue, the cases are rare, and those which have been 
made public have been no more than speculation, which has not been duly investigated.” (AACC 
1991, 94).
Jose Vegar, a former investigative journalist, found himself amused by the fact that citizens 
who occupied high responsibility in public life did not share their findings and experiences in 
books (Morgado and Vegar 2003,19). It seems difficult to explain the reasons why a country with 
850 years of history, being the first world power back in the 15th century “discovery age”, and the
137 By far the most comprehensive legal work is the supplementary bulletin of the University of Coimbra’s 
Law Department (Costa 1987). Most of the remaining articles are now included in the two following 
publications (AACC 1990; AACC 1991).
138 See (Costa 1987).
139 See (Dias 1991).
140 See M.Fonseca in (AACC 1990,101).
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last to release its vast colonies towards the end of the 20th century, with the oldest defined borders 
in Europe and no major internal ethnic, linguistic, or religious fractions whatsoever, should reach 
the 21st century without publishing a single political economy book or similar technical report 
likely to comprehensively elucidate the possible root causes of corruption.141
More recently, in the First Congress on Portuguese Democracy held in 2004, one 
magistrate, M.J.Morgado, urges the civil society to demand from the PJ, Ministry of Justice, and 
the Attorney General, more statistics, studies, diagnoses and results concerning the fight against 
corruption.142 These reports are essential for two reasons. Firstly, it fosters a culture of corporate 
accountability. And secondly, it is vital for encouraging greater citizens’ awareness and for seeking 
their support for the cause.
When in February 2006, Mouraz Lopes, former Deputy Director of the PJ released its very 
first study, he himself required a qualitative research too. This first study is only about 
straightforward statistics of cases open for inquiry between 2002 and 2005.143 In terms of 
usefulness there is nothing substantially different from the annual statistics of the Ministry of 
Justice which reveal a lot more about the Court’s efficiency or, in this case the Police, than 
corruption itself. In actual practice, neither PJ nor the PPS have ever yet published a 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary study of corruption.
Equally serious is the generally apathetic attitudes of the universities. The already known 
painful birth of sociological research,144 heavily constrained by the inward looking views of 
Salazar, has produced a discipline which now seems particularly uninterested in corruption. 
Consider the journals and working papers of the two best established social science departments, 
recently classified as the Associated Laboratories of the State. The oldest, Analise Social (1963-
141 The first book, though not academic in its style nor exclusively on corruption, appeared only in 2003 as a 
joint initiative from a former Deputy Director of anti-corruption unit and a journalist. See (Morgado, et al. 
2003).
142 N.Ferraz, CM: 12.11.2004 “Justice: M.J.Morgado warns: corruption is out of control”.
143 N.Ferraz, CM:06.02.2006 “Study: Local governments and Police forces are main focuses”;
DN:08.02.2006 “Local governments represent 43% of corruption investigated by JP”; and F.Galope, 
VIS:04.05.2006 “Corrupt? Us?” indicates that 1 in 5 inquiries (1.251 of 6.976) concerning economic related 
crimes were connected with corruption (just over 300 cases per year).
144 M.V.Cabral, DN:21.05.2004 “Building a profession”.
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2006 - 2nd Trimester) of the Institute of Social Science of Lisbon University has not dedicated 
even one of its 179 volumes to the theme of corruption and not a single article out of 1,285 titles is 
specifically on corruption, although they were mostly written by Portuguese scholars.145 The same 
is true of the Revista Crltica de Ciencias Sociais of the Centre for Social Studies of Coimbra 
University, in existence since 1978 (76 issues, and about 592 articles). None of their working 
papers (31 and 251 titles respectively) have touched on corruption either, which indicates that new 
scholars are neither inclined nor encouraged to analyse one of the most compelling social issues. 
This looks both unimaginative and backward.
And yet, B. Santos, the founder and director of the Centre in Coimbra since its inception in 
1978, unambiguously views corruption as “a great invisible threat and the most dangerous for the 
country” and often refers to it in his popular writings.146 The same is true for both Antonio 
Barreto147 and Manuel V.Cabral,148 former editors (and directors) of Analise Social (1998-2003, 
and 2004 respectively). Therefore, academics and their institutions have neglected to provide much 
needed contextually grounded theories of corruption, so vital for policy makers in their essential 
national role.149
145 For conciseness’ sake, there are authors who touched on corruption and related issues though. See (Sousa 
1969; Aguiar 1986; Aguiar 1988; Lobo 1996).
146 As cited by L.Botelho, PUB:06.07.2003 “Reforms of penal justice are in a dim light”. See other popular 
articles written by B.Santos in which corruption is mentioned in VIS:29.05.2003 “On a razor edge”,
VIS: 15.05.2003 “A terrible example”, and VIS:07.08.2003 “Fires and justice”. Cf. An interview in 
IND:21.01.2000:16-17. See also (Santos, et al. 1996, 31-35, 679-696).
147 Barreto is a former Minister and a well-known academic and sociologist. Under his leadership interesting 
studies were published. See for example (Barreto 1996; Barreto 1998; Barreto 2000). Among his popular 
articles that deal with corruption see in PUB: 11.03.2001 “Disasters” (misprinted as A.Guterres);
PUB: 13.05.2001 “The specter of the rose”; PUB:09.12.2001 “The two Midases”; PUB:16.12.2001 “0  
deserto autarquico”; PUB:27.01.2002 “Fantasmas”; and PUB:27.02.2002 “Um duelo devices”.
148 M.V.Cabral is a prolific writer and research coordinator for several surveys - (Cabral 1997; Cabral 1998; 
Cabral, Vala and Freire 2000; Cabral, Vala, Pais, et al. 2000). One of his articles deals with the underground 
economic concept in Portugal - (Cabral 1983). For popular writings see M.V.Cabral, DN:30.07.1999:17 
“Public works and electioneeing”; DN:21.06.2002:11 “A party-controlled tribunal” (Constitutional Court); 
DN:27.09.02:11 “Endemic venality”; DN: 15.11.2002:1 “Crisis, State and Society” DN: 13.02.2004 
“Administrative despotism”; and DN:07.11.2003 “The faceless enemy”.
149 Is then P.Pereira right, in his apparently provocative article? See PUB:31.08.2000 “A country without 
intellectual life”.
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3.2.3 Legally and jurisprudentially confused
Of course corruption is a legal concept. Civilisation and democracy demand it above all 
else. But the extreme appetite for creating, altering, adding, and substituting laws, at an incredible 
speed, is weird, so much so because it largely corresponds to the official main response to episodes 
of corruption.150 This is problematic in itself,151 not least because of the confusion and proliferation 
of rules which are hard to handle even by the most gifted professional. It actually reveals more 
about the state of the Parliament and governments than the problems they seek to resolve.
It is also inadequate because core ideas of corruption are not discussed as a whole but in 
parts that remain distant from one another, without coherent logic, missing vital elements, that at 
best are incorporated in a very gradual and slow process but far from completion yet. It falsely 
assumes that corruption can better be dealt with by legislation, thus ignoring the complex 
relationship between legality and political ethics or accountability, as something may be legal but 
unethical or not explicit in the law but politically unacceptable. And realistically, it is impossible to 
conceive laws likely to anticipate all the critical aspects inherent to a political function, conduct, 
and above all the ever-changing environment in politics and economics. However, it is possible and 
desirable to incorporate essential elements in a comprehensive way to achieve two fundamental 
goals: firstly, to unambiguously protect the judicial core elements behind the crime of corruption; 
secondly, to provide the fundamental means by which to convict wrongdoers.
The absence, or the distortion of one or more of these crucial ingredients will make 
jurisprudence not only difficult but confused. Portuguese experience has categorical examples in 
the recent past. If one takes, for instance, the legal basis and procedures regarding the use of 
wiretapping in the investigation and prosecution process, the case is widely perceived as being 
highly confused. Courts of appeal have endangered many criminal cases already. This could well 
serve other interests but not the cause of reducing corruption and making it accountable.
150 A.Santos, former President of Parliament, and a key legislator since 1974 summarises the problem well 
“Laws replace laws in a delirious rhythm. Laws contradict laws. Laws without application due to lack of 
follow up regulamentation.” (Barreto 2000, 51).
151 It is not uncommon to hear jokes about this - see G.Albuquerque, DN: 12.08.2002 “Laws, laws, laws. If 
the production of laws entered in the accounting of GDP, Portugal would hold the world record for 
productivity”.
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Recently, the former Minister of Works, Bagao Felix decided to put an end to a massive 
sets of labour laws that inundated the law books for consecutive decades and anarchically. This was 
perceived to be detrimental to business and foreign investment. And rightly so. Despite obvious 
criticisms mainly during the process, there is now a more unified body of legislation. Contextually, 
this amounts to an outstanding service and achievement thus making B.Felix perhaps the “John the 
Baptist” or precursor of Simplex. This has not yet happened to corruption, as is already the case in 
Singapore for example.
So, despite continuous legislation, including transposition of European and international 
regulations to national law books, the cause of corruption continues to suffer from the lack of 
simple, unified and effective legislation that clarifies what key concepts (bem jurldico) are all about 
and provides anti-corruption bodies with adequate tools and power to prevent it, support 
whistleblowers, investigate, charge, punish, and recover the proceeds of corrupt transactions. This 
is an awful and unnecessary situation to be in, and in direct contradiction to the spirit of 
democracy.
3.2.4 Conceptually distorted
Not only legislators, but other key anti-corruption agents including magistrates and judges 
appeared not to have grasped key concepts concerning corruption.152 In practical terms there is not 
only a deficit of knowledge of what is debated in international research but there are also 
misconceived ideas. In fact, there are many conceptual ramifications which add greater difficulty in 
pinpointing what criminal corruption is all about and in differentiating one crime from others. This 
may have caused misclassification of charges by prosecutors, and later on judges too, in deciding 
the final verdict.
The variant elements behind a single concept of corruption which currently largely focus 
on protecting the function of the public office, include passive versus active corruption; illicit 
(corrupgao propria - proper corruption) and licit corruption (corrupgao impropria - improper 
corruption); antecedent and subsequent; mediate and immediate (mediata and imediata), qualitative
152 For a brief overview of the problem see (Antunes 1996, 152)
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and quantitative types of rewards, and various degrees of “intentionality” which complicate the
•  • 153judge’s final decision in critical corrupt cases.
The diversity of this terminology show how difficult it is to deal with these concepts. The 
result, unsurprisingly though, has often led PPS and Judges to “fail to act when they could 
investigate more deeply or accuse, fail to come to a conclusion when they ought to pass a sentence 
or declare someone innocent when they should condemn, taking refuge in the shadow of die 
principle 'in dubio’ at the first appearance of incomprehension.” (Simdes 2006, 37).
Likewise, there are too many related crimes which enlarge the ambiguity of the concept 
and classifications such as various types of embezzlement (peculato) and extortion {concussao), 
prevarication, personal favour on the part of an official agent, undue promotion, non-promotion, 
participation in economic transactions, refusal to cooperate, abuse of power, violation of secrecy, 
and traffic of influence, most of which are connected with public functions too.154 Jose G. Marques 
already warned of this critical confusion due to the “lack of dogmatic rigour and dispersed 
regulation” (AACC 1990,98). A. Maia believes that most of the media’s classification of 
corruption may be wrong too (Maia 2004, 84-85). But the problem is not between the media and 
the judiciary only.
This situation also confuses the lay reader and the population in general who most likely 
refuse to denounce such practices, even when confronted with apparent corruption, as it is often the 
case. If this argument is correct, the negative effects for prevention are unimaginable. Another 
critical consequence is the misunderstandings and miscommunications which are not rare either 
within the judiciary and public administration. A judge from TIC (Criminal Court Investigation) 
sent a case back to the Public Prosecutor (DCIAP) in disagreement with the latter’s 
classification.155 The judge justifies this saying “It is not the judge’s duty to accuse, and even less
153 Cf. A juridical Portuguese term “sinalagmaticcT and tipseudo-sinalagmdticct'‘ (relationship between cause 
and effect of a bribe) often used in this context - (Simoes 2006,27; Costa 1987, 73,113,125; Maximiano 
1993, 71, 75-76; Morgado 2006).
154 For a very good introduction to these variants as contained in the Penal Code and other legal books see 
(Costa 1996; Gomes 1995; Almeida 1997). For a comparative, but equally complex case of Brazil see 
(Ribeiro 2004).
155 J.Cravinho, DN:13.11.2004 “Corruption never existed!”; CM:30.06.2003 “Lawyer for main person to be 
examined warned judge”; CM:18.07.2003 “PPS waits for the end of court holidays”; CM.05.10.2003 “Taxes:
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so to accept an accusation detached from reality” (CM:01.07.2003). One needs to remember how 
complex is the current judicial model, as M.J. Morgado explains by the analogy of the “santissima 
trindade” (holy Trinity) of investigator, Public Prosecutor and the Judge of Criminal Investigation - 
if someone from this triangle breaks the cord, everything goes wrong.156 With regard to public 
administration, Morgado adds: “Without exchange of information between the public 
administration and the police organisations it is not possible to progress in the battle against 
corruption. Social security, the fiscal administration, the police, all have secrets. It is the country of 
secrets.... that allows impunity.”157
No wonder, therefore, that what the media and people in different professions call 
corruption is for others more conveniently perceived as mere abuse of power, embezzlement or 
even traffic of influence. Usually, these are more lenient that corruption itself, including the 
penalties. Therefore, a failure to grasp the core of corruption and to somehow even out the penalties 
wherever possible across related crimes is of utmost relevance in reducing incentives to economic 
crimes.
3.2.5 Multiplication of parallel activities and institutions
The 2003 McKinsey Global Institute research indicates that “informality” is the single 
major obstacle to the development of the Portuguese economy.158 This notion is in direct 
relationship to equivalent concepts such as the parallel, underground, or unofficial economy. Like 
corruption itself, its optimal level is never zero. So the issue is to contain it within acceptable 
levels. Otherwise it does become a correlated problem, as is consistently supported by several 
studies.159 B.Santos warns of the coexistence of two states acting in parallel in Portugal. These are
PPS refutes arguments of Fatima Mata-Mouros”; CM:01.07.2003 “C. Almeida: MP made responsible 
accusation”; N.Ferraz, CM: 12.01.2004 “Corruption: Tribunal da Relagao grants petition for MP’s appeal”.
156 M.J.Morgado, VIS:24.06.2004. Cf. C. Almeida, CM:01.07.2003 “MP fez acusagao responsdveF’.
157 Cited by C.Ferro, DN:23.01.2004 “Criminal politics is done with populism” - in reference to 
M.J.Morgado’s speech in a conference held in Lisbon University on “Corruption and Fundamental Rights - 
the role of the Public Administration”.
158 See (McKinsey Global Institute 2003); VIS: 16.09.2003 “Economia a crescer ate 2010”.
159 One study reveals that the informal economy in Portugal amounts to 22.5 per cent of the GDP which is 
greater than Austria (10.6), England (12.5), Holland (13) and France (15) - T.S.Dias, CM:05.04.2004 
“Parallel economy is more productive”; H.M.Rio, DE: 19.03.2004 “Economy: underground, informal,
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the formal and informal states; the official and the underground states which moulds the way the 
Portuguese state is managing its affairs during the transition phase to a point of conditioning its 
own future activities (Santos, B., Estado na semiperiferia, 1985, 900; Santos, B., Social crisis and 
the state, 1986, 188).160
According to S.Sanches, the parallel economy gives special advantages for local 
councillors who have unresolved criminal problems with justice by openly disregarding the law, 
such as the case of Valentim for Gondomar, Isaltino for Oeiras, Avelino for Amarante and 
Felgueiras for Felgueiras who stood for local election while criminal cases remained unresolved.161 
It also gives birth to many practices, including the creation of parallel public or semi-public 
institutions.162 Adding this into an already twisted environment of corruption, the problem can only 
be made worse precisely because individuals and associations exploit such weaknesses to their 
utmost advantage.
The media, on the other hand also explored to exhaustion the FPS case (Foundation for the 
prevention and security). It seems that it was created as a private institution with the apparent 
double error of duplication and state funding from its origin.163 Such action was achieved directly 
by members of the government. At that time, Vital Moreira who conducted an official research, 
clarified that “In addition to the State itself, there is not a local government, university or other
unofficial and parallel”; and M.Frasquilho, CN:07.01.2004 “Death and paying taxes”. Cf. The OCDE study 
cited by J.R. Almeida, PUB:01.03.2001 “25 to 30 percent of the Portuguese GDP is produced in a parallel 
economy”; and J.F.Guedes, DE:23.01.2004 “The costs of formality II”.
160 Cf. L.Marques, EXP:08.12.2000:20 “The parallel state”: “...in Portugal there is a parallel state, bom, 
financed and dependant of the official state. The first does not substitute the second, double its services, add 
costs, nurture new clientelisms, with the advantage of escaping the control which the official state is subject 
to.”
161 See EXP:09.07.2005 “The little creatures of the local power”.
162 See former Secretary of State for Public Administration, S.Toscano in DE:30.06.2003 in which she 
acknowledges the “creation of many institutions for bad reasons”. Cf. M.B.Sousa, DN:26.03.2001:3 “Public 
Institutes without king or rock” which reveal the study undertaken by Vital Moreira and others regarding the 
proliferation of such bodies - she concluded “the situation is chaotic, as each body regulate itself as it 
wishes”; J.C.das Neves, DN:29.04.2002 “Government without control” and in DN:27.05.2002 “Public jobs”; 
and E.O.Silva, DE:21.10.2003 “Budget: persistence and courage”.
163 See PUB:22.08.2001 “Story of a polemic foundation”; M.Silva, DN:20.06.2001 “Court of Auditors fails 
at foundation of Vara”; J.M.Femandes, PUB:02.12.2000:56 “Loss of shame and arrogance”; J.P.Henriques; 
N.S.Louren9o; and L.Alvarez, PUB:03.08.2002 “Court of Auditors reveals new irregularities in FPS”. 
Concerning the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission see N.Pacheco, PUB:22.08.2001 “Inquires for what?”; 
J.Ferreira, SEM:24.08.2001:10 “Deflecting behaviour”; and from the President of the Inquiry himself, 
J.B.Moura, DE:29.08.2001 “A Parliamentary inquiry”.
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public body that aims of administrative ‘modernisation’ which does not boast of having created 
foundations, associations and companies in which they take an active role or which have been 
created more or less under parallel conditions”.164 If this is correct, it enlarges the context that 
favours illegality immensely at the expense of public funds. On the positive side though, the single 
case of FPS reveals that some strict regulations exist in fact, as former President Sampaio used to 
remind people that “in Portugal there are impunity and illicit phenomenona that are not tolerable 
and must be efficiently dealt with”.165 But somehow it does not stop wrong behaviour completely. 
Instead it enables some people to bypass it by other means including creating parallel, semi-public 
or semi-private institutions, which somehow escape strict financial control, at least for some time. 
The ultimate unresolved issue, however, lies in the root problem of not tackling corrupt structural 
mechanisms. Instead, the preference is for an isolated or casuistic approach.
3.2.6 Obsession with state-driven corruption
The apparent obsession of protecting the interests of the State office has led almost all 
legislators, politicians and magistrates to concentrate on state-driven corruption by largely ignoring 
its private dimension although it was always included in the Penal Code under crimes committed 
against public office. At best, private business crimes are mainly confined under a broad range of 
free competition rules.166 These are rarely punished. It is noticeable that there has never been a 
strong tradition of an open market culture and competition. Lobbying as such is not regulated yet. 
Consequently, there is much less public awareness of this case of private corruption which remains 
completely muddled.
In the process of transposing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention into Portuguese law 
books, a further amendment was introduced to Decree-Law 28/1984 (Article 41-A/B/C) through 
Law 13/2001 which contemplates private corruption more explicitly although the key objective was
164 See PUB: 12.12.2000:13 “The secret state - O Estado clandestino”. Cf. F.Rosas, 24H:23.12.2000:5 
“Corruption in a pure state”.
165 See J.Sampaio’s traditional new year’s speech in CM:02.01.2003 “Sampaio: No-one is beyond the law”.
166 See an interesting article which briefly gives an overview of some of the dilemas facing by the private 
sector written by F.A.Pinto in DE:25.02.2004 “Corporate Governance, The government of societies (I)”.
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the protection of international business. But this private corruption concept remains a distant or 
“foreign” concept still.
So much so that E.Simdes of DIAP starts his most recent article saying that the concept of 
private corruption is “newly created” but then pays no attention to it in the course of his argument, 
which is puzzling (Simoes 2006). Not least because Merida’s UN anti-corruption convention which 
prompted the author to write the article clearly includes and highlights private corruption 
matters.167 Secondly, for a long time it is being included in international discussion. For instance, 
Rose-Ackerman’s classic and most cited work includes it (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 189-210). And 
thirdly, several countries do not make such a drastic distinction as Portugal seems to, particularly 
from the perspective of legal application.
Consider the following article in a single paragraph, in the last page of PUB:07.12.2000, 
under the title of “Corruption: Public Prosecutor clears doctors and laboratories”. It reads: 
“According to yesterday’s TVI news, the Public Prosecutor filed the first legal process about 
dangerous relationships between doctors and pharmaceutical companies. In the process against 13 
officials of Atral-Cipan and 372 doctors, the Public Prosecutor concluded that a large majority of 
doctors received small or insignificant presents related to their profession. For this process, the 
distinction between prescriptions issued by the National Health Services or by private doctors was 
fundamental because private professionals are allowed to prescribe drugs for which compensation 
is given. The only cases liable for punishment are those undertaken by the public service (NHS). 
Charges against Atral-Cipan were also cleared.”
So, the point to raise here is precisely what the current application of rules allows to 
happen while the public remains amazed. Private doctors can receive gifts while NHS doctors 
simply cannot, although in practice the so-called “insignificant gifts” make this transaction highly 
possible, or so it seems anyway. The problem is even more complex due to the permanent 
movement from public to private, and back again. Sometimes, as with the doctors for instance, it is 
possible to be both which complicates the analysis even further. This appears bizarre if one agrees
167 See for example Article 12 (Private sector); Article 21 (Bribery in the private sector); Article 22 
(Embezzlement of property in the private sector); and Article 39 (Cooperation between national authorities 
and the private sector).
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with Rogerio Martins’ statement “Whoever seduces is as corrupt as whoever lets themself be 
seduced.” (AACC 1990,21).
Apparently, such an obsession for state-driven corruption appears inconceivable in the eyes 
of the population, from whom the authorities somehow expect cooperation. People’s perception is 
something that needs to be taken more seriously even though logic, legal logic included, often is 
not easily assimilated. Whatever the case, this, as it is, needs better articulation if not change too, as 
the current situation is simply misleading and adds an element of complexity which is undesirable.
Germano de Sousa, former Bastonario of the Ordem dos Medicos accepted the evidence 
when a Judge charged four doctors of passive corruption. He then made a very clear point that 
justice will never be completed without the inclusion of corrupt private companies too (DD:06-04- 
2001). Experience shows that the private sector goes more unpunished. Even the penalty for the 
public office offender is substantially heavier than the active corruption counterpart, with obvious 
implications.168 In some cases people found guilty of active corruption are liable up to six months 
in jail only. This was the maximum that several pharmaceutical companies agents could get as a 
result of their corrupt deals, when the amnesty was given on the occasion of 25 years of 
democracy. It pardoned all those companies, and the public and opinion makers were astonished by 
the implications, so much so that the title given by Fernando Esteves is self explanatory: “Crime 
Pays” (IND:18.01.2002:30).169
Strongly held views of J.F.Dias (1991, 67) against any expansion of the concept to include 
private corruption in more comparable terms remains unchallenged, despite some contrary views. 
For example, Martins da Fonseca’s analysis of the jurisprudence led him to the conclusion that “all 
that has been said about passive corruption applies, with minor alterations, to active corruption” 
(AACC 1990,106).170
168 See Penal Code, Articles 372 and 373 for passive corruption and Article 374 for active corruption.
169 Other similar examples are put forward by the Syndicate of Tax Officers: “Corruption is the follow-up of 
the chaos already installed. ...Current impunity creates an ideal culture for the multiplication of active 
corruption in particular, and not only passive corruption.” (PD:04.04.2002); and by F.Bras, President of the 
STAL (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores da Administragdo Publica) in CM:05.07.2003.
170 Exactly the same argument uses Rose-Ackerman “Turning from government bureaucracies to the private 
sector in Chapter 10,1 show that much of the analysis of public institutions can be applied to private 
institutions as well.” (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 88). Cf. J.Vasconcellos e Sa who, in a different matter raises the
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3.2.7 Imitation
The problem of copying others is perhaps an inevitable result of improvised research 
tempered with indifference to the issues of corruption. So the tendency is, from time to time, to 
imitate what others are doing, often foreign ideas, codes and practices without proper regard to 
context. Araujo, a lawyer, accuses that we adopt codes inspired in the rich European countries 
without thinking first if we have the means to put them into practice.171 Foreign models in 
themselves are not a problem as M.Carreira correctly explains: “If the models are in most cases 
essentially ‘imported’ from abroad and don’t work in Portugal, they are not necessarily unfit, but 
perhaps they are basically inadequate for our own needs” (Carreira 2001,2). Thus the urgency to 
take current context more seriously rather than simply imitating others, evading original research 
and adopting unsuitable ideas and practices.
Valente recalls that in the nineteenth century Portugal highlighted Belgium as a model of 
progress. In the beginning of this century it seems to be Ireland, the “Celtic tiger”.172 In the case of 
corruption, it is not uncommon to request, for example, an Italian style Mani Pulite, “Clean Hands” 
operation, specially after a major scandal is disclosed.173 Likewise when unresolved ethical issues 
come to light again.174 But others clearly reject it altogether.175 Figueiredo, however, sees another
pertinent question whether business’s objective is profit or social responsability, in DE:21.04.2003 
“Produtividade ou responsabilidade social?”.
171 See Araujo’s article in (Barreto 2000, 65).
172 See V.P.Valente, PUB: 16.01.2005 “Alas, land of our birth”; J.Cravinho, DN:18.12.2004 “Central Block 
under observation”; G.O.Martins, DN:23.03.2005 “The shadow of Sibelius”; and J.M.Moreira, 
PUB:27.02.2002 “The monster and the unfaithful servant”.
173 See PUB: 16.12.2000:4 “BE wants ‘operation clean hands’” (FPS case); RJD.Felner, PUB:05.09.2002 
“Minister of Justice doesn’t explain cases of dismission in the PJ” and BE leader, F.Lou9a, requests a Clean 
Hands. For individual request see F.Lemos, a business man, in VIS:22.10.1998 “There is octopus in public 
works”. Perhaps surprisingly, Alberto Jardim, the President of Regional government of Madeira commented 
in DE: 16.10.2002 that the “state of political degradation of the regime allows some situations, that in another 
country would have given way to a clean hands operation”, also cited in PUB.T7.10.2002. See also N.Santos, 
in EXP: 12.05.2003 “Operation clean hands now”.
174 See J.B.Moura, DE:13.11.2002 “News of the blockade”, in DE:04.12.2002 “The why of impunity”, and 
his interview in VIS-Online: 16.05.2003. Cf. M.Carvalho and C.Pinto, VIS: 15.05.2003 “The secret of 
Fatima”; M.Coutinho, and DE:09.10.2002 “With eyes closed”. The Madeira islands affairs have caused equal 
concerns - see PUB:25.11.2001 “CDS of Madeira wants ‘clean hands operation’”; and M.Carvalho,
VIS:27.01.2005 “Polemic: Webs of Madeira, part II: Complaints to the Public Prosecutor, requests for the 
fulfilment of an ‘operation clean hands’”.
175 See Antonio Costa, former Minister of Justice in PUB :28.01.2003 “The country does not need special 
clean hands operation”; P.Correia, DN:08.02.2003 “Marcelolangafarpas ao governo” in which the former
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problem when “one hand cleans the other” while everything stays the same.176 Therefore ingrained 
habits and practices must be accounted for, and beyond the flowery language fired at political 
opponents, in endless cycles. Democracy requires different ethical standards, as the Attorney 
General, Souto Moura said when he welcomed a “mentality of clean hands”.177
3.2.8 Prevention ignored
As widely agreed, prevention is always the best alternative, since a verdict will never 
compensate for the full damage inflicted. At best, it represents a sense of punishment with some 
recovery of losses only. Therefore it must be given special priority. This task belongs primarily to 
anti-corruption bodies, properly supported by legal statutes. But they are not fulfilling this essential 
responsibility. And this rather unthinkable omission contains a drastic message against the people 
whom the authorities seek to serve and to receive their support also.
Neither the PPS nor the PJ have a tradition of open, friendly and ongoing dialogue with the 
public at large in preventive related matters. This becomes clear through the organisations’ web 
page, a modem means of communication and a gateway too. The PJ anti-corruption DCICCEF has 
not even a web page of its own, only the PJ itself. As it is, corruption is one of many crimes 
receiving no special or priority attention. The same is true for the special unit under the PPS, 
DCIAP or regional DIAP. But the PPS’s website is rudimentary and seems to be constantly in its 
building stages, at least up to the middle of 2006.
Prevention is basically an educational project and should reach every citizen, and most 
particularly children at different stages of growth.178 Obviously nothing is being done at this level 
as Jose M. Lopes attested recently.179 But under his leadership, the DCICCEF published the first
PSD leader clearly rejects the idea too; A.A.Mesquita, PUB:20.12.2002 recalling S.Moura, Attorney General 
saying that “Portugal will not become a Republic of Judges nor will it have Judges being absorbed by other 
influences”.
176 See S.Figueiredo, PUB:13.12.2001 - Round here the meaning of clean hands is ‘one hand cleans the 
other’, and again in CM: 11.11.2002 “Democratic horror”.
177 See E.Damaso and R.Abecassis interview with the Attorney General, Souto Moura, PUB:27.01.2003.
178 Perhaps with irony, the former Bastonario of Lawyers, J.M.Judice, JN: 12.12.2002 made a point: “It is far 
too easy to break contracts, norms of conduct, and legal duties. In the school it would be better perhaps to 
insist less on the risks of smoking and more on the risks of corruption.”
179 See his interview in DN: 10.01.2005 “Greater corruption is found in politics and the tax system”.
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and only leaflet and distributed it among the public office administration. It seems to have been 
well received,180 although such an isolated action is inadequate and most certainly retards people’s 
conscientious cooperation.
One wishes that the latest appeal of E.Simoes of DIAP, who correctly recognises that 
preventatively almost everything is left undone, and then suggests the creation of a special and 
independent preventive body in a model similar to those of France, Italy and Paraguay, will not 
find echo among Portuguese authorities (Simoes 2006,41-42), not least until current legally 
entitled institutions are either asked to fulfill their duties or evaluate why they are actually 
incapable. Otherwise it is fiddling the system and the legislation again and again, thus passing a 
wrong message to society that laws are not to be obeyed.
Creating a separate institution will most probably add another strain on a typical and 
already difficult problem of relationships with several anti-corruption bodies, already made public 
on various occasions. And even more seriously perhaps, what moral and motivational pedigree 
will a newly established preventive institution have if, for example, criminal institutions maintain 
their usual relaxed conduct? It is something worth including in the analysis.
3.2.9 Ethics of the greenhouse
This problematic situation is widespread and it severely inhibits ethical changes because 
each part directly involved in the dynamics of a corrupt conflict is so vulnerable that no one seems 
capable of throwing “the first stone” any longer. For instance, the State owes money to private 
companies, or at best, pays its debts beyond the time limit expected.181 Such a bad reputation has 
deep roots ingrained in people’s minds. Some private companies prefer to retain payments due to 
the State, for example taxes and social security contributions. The Catholic Church, being at the 
receiving end of financial favours and closely “associated” with state affairs, seems not all that 
different either.
180 See C.R.Lima, DN:01.10.2005 “Mais de um tergo das camaras sob investiga^ao”.
181 See for example A.M.Inacio and R.Rebelo, DN:24.10.2000 “Health Ministry: debt leaps to 300 millions”.
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But in the end, each part appears to have “reasons” to justify its rather unhealthy conduct, 
thus leaving the ethical situation in a permanent impasse. Also the bipolarisation of parties in 
government has negatively affected the PSD and PS with “original sin” as Pedro Norton correctly 
advocates: “Portuguese democracy is affected by one original sin which takes away the legitimacy 
of major parties, including their fight against corruption.”182 And without a better moral framework 
for public action, the glass ceiling will certainly not resist.
In summary, the old but still present Catholic ethics, and the much celebrated Republican 
ethics have come up short in curbing malpratices. Or so it seems now. B.Santos prefers to theorise 
in favour of a “crisis of the republican ethics”,183 but one may legitimately wonder if there was 
even a short period in political economy affairs in either the 1st or 3rd Republic comparable to 
what Girling elsewhere calls “exceptional periods of integrity” in public life (Girling 1997, 12).
The problem, therefore, may not be centred around “a crisis” as such, but in actually questioning if 
the foundations for a comprehensive and coherent ethical basis in both public and private functions 
are fit enough for a democratic pluralistic society. Is it the case, for example, that the 1976 
Constitution provides such a basis? Will the Catholic institutions redeem the time and do better? 
Will the secular minded ones, free masonry included, try to make Republican ethics really 
functional? All shades of ethical conviction, or even a mixture of them are necessary so long as 
they “Seek the welfare of the city”.184
3.3 Concluding remarks
The words of F.S.Cabral, News Director of Catholic Radio Renascenga summarise well the 
dilemma this chapter is focusing on: “Corruption spreads, it is said and felt. But one cannot see the
182 P.Norton, VIS: 13.05.2004:50 “The original sin” - “Portugal escolheu - como tantas vezes faz - a via 
totalmente hipocrita da ficgao legislativa: os partidos impuseram a si proprios regras que nunca tencionam 
cumprir, e celebram entre si um acordo tacito para os contomar. Toda a gente sabe disso e todos fingem nada 
ver.” In another article (VIS: 19.07.2001) Norton writes: “E impossivel lutar contra a corrupgao no pais 
enquanto os principais partidos politicos continuarem a financiar-se por baixo da mesa e a custa de todos os 
grandes negocios do Estado.”
183 B.Santos, VIS:29.05.2003 “No fio da navalha”.
184 A title of Bruce Winter’s recommended book (he himself borrowed the title from Jeremiah 29:7) in which 
the overall behaviour of the early Christians fitted well the prophetic call, originally meant for the exiled 
Jewish people. Jesus’ followers were meant to and did function for the benefit of what were then the Gentile 
regions of the Roman Empire. See (Winter 1994).
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desire and courage which are indispensable to fight this cancer, which destroys the authority of the 
State. Now, in the matter of corruption, complacency is criminal.”185 So far, the issue of corruption 
and its impunity have been portrayed in general terms. Critical elements were identified as a result.
They include the problem of the inefficient control mechanisms, uncoordinated anti­
corruption bodies, inadequate legislation and judicial responses, and various kinds of social apathy 
with a special emphasis on the elite. Political conduct is of utmost importance as it holds up the 
means of change. And so far, these elements have been demonstrated generally. The next task is to 
examine a concrete case of corruption where these critical elements and others are intimately 
related.
185 See DN:08.08.2004 “Corrupgao”.
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Chapter 4 
Emaudio case study
4.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters sought to raise public and political awareness of corruption and 
its impunity. Our emphasis centred on the nurturing environment that underpinned certain 
structures of incentive and opportunity, which in turn jeopardised both administrative and judicial 
responses. This chapter redirects the focus entirely onto a single case study of corruption, moving 
from a general overview of the seriousness of the problem to a concrete example of it.
The main objective is to evaluate the possible success of an environment like this in 
dealing with a concrete case. It functions as a model, which is imperfect because each story has its 
own dynamics and particularities, but which seems nevertheless very helpful in pinpointing 
fundamental and recurring issues related to the Portuguese context. Hence the additional care we 
expended in selection, as we sought for a case capable of illustrating crucial concepts and 
misconceptions, diverse tactics and poorly conceived responses that characterise the phenomenon 
of corruption. The Emaudio case186 seems to fit these requirements due to its many interesting 
features, as the following paragraph indicates.
(1) It fits well the legal concept of “autonomous crime”,187 as active and passive corruption 
can exist on their own, that is, a case can have corruptors but no corruptees or vice-versa. (2) So 
far, it is the only case of a top politician to be charged with corruption since 1974, thus making it 
rather ideal for analysing how power and wealth interact.188 (3) It is a transnational case involving
186 Alternative names are “the Macao fax”, “Governor of Macao”, “Weidleplan case”, or any of the agents’ 
names involved. The last is rejected because this thesis goes well beyond individuals as argued in Chapter 
One. The same for the option, “the Governor of Macao” which unhealthy emphasizes “state-driven 
corruption” as discussed in the last chapter. The fax of Macao is attractive but the case has many more 
equally critical faxes too. Instead the company’s name is chosen, but not Weidleplan as its leaders were 
absent in the trial and the company continues to operate. That is not the case with Emaudio though, which 
closed down soon after the scandal.
187 For a brief explanation of this apparently strange hypothesis, see (Palma 1993, 6). For further legal basis 
see (Costa 1987, 32-51), particularly the concepts of “autonomous” versus “bilateral” crimes.
188 The importance of “catching the big fish” theory is much appreciated in literature as it often determines 
the commitment of an anti-corruption agency -see (Punch 1991,218; Pope 1999a; Klitgaard 1998, 4).
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Portuguese and foreign nationals, firms, and authorities in a context of the globalised world market. 
(4) It covers two Portuguese locations, one in the main territoiy and another outside, thus bringing 
to mind recent colonial history which still has a great influence, and reminds us of the current 
autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira islands. (5) The links with an influential political party, 
with the former president of Portugal, and with the private business sector give interesting insights 
concerning this mixed relationship. (6) The legal case has critical and complex episodes which 
facilitate perception of current jurisprudence and politics. (7) Both the media and individuals 
expressed their opinions which are important to consider. (8) And finally, the case is likely to seize 
attention for future socio-political and economic discussions of corruption.
But the legal case raises particular concerns too. Sixteen years later, it has not fully reached 
a final settlement yet because of the unresolved appeals. This is problematic in itself. In the passive 
corruption case, the public officer was finally acquitted after twelve long years. In such 
circumstances, why choose this unfinished case? Firstly, the legitimacy of the courts to judge cases 
is unquestionable and must always prevail. Secondly, this legal case is a public one, and has 
already been exposed in the media and academic articles (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993b; 
Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993a). One of the defendants published his own version of the case 
also (Mateus 1996). And thirdly, the outcome of the remaining part of this case is irrelevant as 
regards the reasons for which the case as a whole is included here.
However, when a reasonably simple case stays in the judiciary for 16 years without 
resolution; when one part of it reached a conclusion 12 years later and is very close to having 
reached a ‘prescription’ (prescrigao); when there are “irremediable contradictions” as publicly 
disclosed by the jury president himself; when appeals cover mostly legal procedures rather than 
factual matters; when final conclusions are based on procedures rather than substantial factors as 
with the Melancia case thus far, then a different route such as the Numberg’s axiom becomes a 
possibility: “the courts judge cases, but cases judge the courts”.189 Judge R.Cardoso, explains this 
rationale (IND:26.11.99:2) “The courts judge the cases but the cases also judge the courts. This is
189 M.J.Morgado, CM:25.05.2003 “E agora PortugaF.
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an expression extracted from the Tribunal of Numberg concerning the necessity for transparency in 
the action of judgment and in the action judged. The decisions are evaluated much more by their 
contents than by their conclusion. Everyone is free to make his own conclusion. The only limits 
are respect for one’s own intelligence and consciousness as well as for that of others.” Otherwise, 
the politizagao (undue influence of politics) over justice, and the judicializagao (excess of the 
judiciary’s influence) on politics remain unchallenged.
Therefore, this case study is more a critique of the systems of justice and politics (low 
penal and political responsibility) than a reflection on individuals involved; it is more directed at 
public and private institutions than at isolated individual cases; and it is more interested in the 
seriousness of corruption, its structure of incentives and opportunities that permeate most spheres 
of life than in the individual or casuistic approaches to corruption that have characterised 
Portuguese official conduct for decades now.
The fact that Melancia was acquitted is not in dispute here. He is indeed free and innocent, 
despite the unreasonable judicial delay of which he too was a victim. And after 16 years now, it 
would be desirable perhaps that those defendants of the active corruption case who are still alive 
should have a similar conclusion of the passive case. But whatever the outcome, the case is 
significant in both legal and political perspectives because it reveals the current Portuguese 
incapacity to deal with corruption, thus perpetuating a climate of impunity.
After a global description of the Emaudio story, the case analysis, starting with whistle 
blowing, the public prosecutor’s inquiry, the judge’s confirmation of charges, trials, appeals, and 
recovery of assets, pinpoints critical matters relating to corruption and responses used or omitted 
for further reflexion. The case also illustrates the need for a new approach in understanding and 
addressing the multidisciplinary challenges about corruption while Part Two begins by examining 
the critical factors that facilitate and ignore the problem.
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4.2 The Emaudio case study
In the course of his task as Governor of Macao, appointed by the president, Mr Carlos 
Melancia190 was legally accused191 of corruption in September 1990.192 Months earlier, an 
embarrassing fax193 supposedly reached Melancia’s residential palace demanding that he return 
DM 935,540.00.194 But he always denied having received it. However, as the fax hit the public 
news, it caused much gossip and commentary that lasted for months in Portugal, and also to some 
extent in Macao, where it was disregarded as a “peanut” bribery.195
The fax concerns the construction of the first international airport of Macao which 
Melancia’s administration was determined to undertake and for that purpose created two 
institutions to supervise the project namely the GAIM196 and the CAM.197 This was a major public
190 Since the April 1974 revolution, Melancia was twice Secretary of State in the Ministries of Heavy 
Industry, and of Economic Coordination. He was Minister of Sea, of Transport and Public Works, and of 
Education. According to Mateus, Melancia enjoyed the maximum confidence of former President Soares, 
was technically competent, had good links with the Church (Catholic) and was well regarded in right wing 
political circles (Mateus 1996,290, 305).
191 The Public Prosecutor Inquiry, hereafter designated as PPI (followed by page number), consists of two 
parts. Part one (pi-1202) deals with evidence collected in the course of the inquiry; Part two (1202-1290b) 
includes a synchronised description and analysis of the case (1202-1259-a), and charges consisting of 203 
articles (1260-1289-b).
192 See PPI: 1260.
193 See IND: 16.02.1990. On the front page and in a large print appeared: “50 million escudos on runway of 
Governor Melancia”. The entire pages 2 and 3 deal with Mr Melancia under two articles by Helena Sanches 
Osorio “Macau: carta acusa Melancia, governador desmente” followed by a play on words: “Ca se fax, cd 
se pagd’; and Ines Dentinho “O senhor administrador”. The fax, dated October 18,1989 is printed in full on 
page 2.
194 See IND:16.02.1990:1-2. The amount refers to the former German currency (DM). The total sum includes 
DM 606,000 equivalent to 50 million Escudos (250 thousand Euros in round figures) “already paid according 
to your instructions” said the fax; DM 54,540.00 of interest (9%) since January 1989; and DM 275,000.00 for 
the project’s expenses.
195 See C.Monteiro in O Jomal:09.03.1990:6 “O mini enigma oriental’; and P.Portas, IND:23.02.1990:12 “O 
regresso de Macau". What substantiates the “peanut” theory is uncertain though. Is it just because the 
amount is small in comparison with “normal” acts of corruption? Or is it because the amount is minimum 
comparing with a estimated cost (70 thousand million Escudos) of the airport? But for long, Macao has been 
associated with illegal transactions.
196 In 1988 the government of Macau requested an up-date of an earlier project done in 1983 by the Airport 
of Frankfurt. For the undertaking of a revision of the entire project, the government established GAIM
(Gabinete do Aeroporto Internacional de Macau) as its main advisory body under the leadership of Mr 
Vasconcelos and Mr Guimaraes. In addition, GAIM had the rights for negotiating the air space and the air 
traffic rights only. In May 1988 the government finally launched the project. The director’s master plan was 
concluded in December of the same year and officially approved by the government in March 1989.
197 CAM (Companhia do Aeroporto de Macau) was established by the government in January 1989 as a 
private company led by Mr S.Ferreira. Its capital was proportionally divided between the Government of 
Macau, Chong Luen of the China Union Industrial Association and a Macaense group STDM of Stanley Ho.
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project which Portugal was keen to finish before handing over Macao to China in 1999. And, as 
many scholars agree, corruption often flourishes in the midst of great financial projects (Lien 1990; 
Jones 1993; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Tanzi 1998; UNDP 1997). Macao appears to be no exception.
Melancia’s revelations to the Parliamentary Commission of Human Rights, Freedom and 
Guarantees, in the aftermath of the fax scandal are staggering. To a straightforward question “Is 
this a case of corruption or not?”, he answered “There was no public bid but a limited consultation 
of two companies... because it was urgent to appoint a project consultant. And concerning the bid 
itself, the companies that win or are likely to win followed a normal procedure in paying 
commissions. This happens not only in Macau. It is like this anywhere in the world.”198 Despite 
being an apparently honest answer, it is remarkable for a Governor to say such thing in Parliament, 
while showing no concern whatsoever to tackle such a practice. And the journalist remarks that the 
major opposition party - the Socialist Party - (with which Melancia is linked) “stayed silent” 
whereas the ruling PSD simply “enjoyed it” which clearly reveals the degree of political sensitivity 
of this case.199
Melancia also said in the Parliament that he only had two introductory meetings with 
Weidleplan agents, and subsequently left all the details to his staff, that is Mr Vasconcelos of 
GAIM and Mr Ferreira of CAM.200 This appears to be the most correct attitude for any government 
leader in dealing with outside investors.201 But the findings of the case reached different
CAM’s responsibility was to supervise the concession and the exploration of the construction of the airport 
by making sub-contracts with other companies. CAM’s consultant was MIAC, a consortium that included the 
London Airport and the Portuguese airline TAP. The runway was subcontracted out to GRID and Xangai 
Corporation. Several other companies were given some part in the initial project including Odebrecht 
(Brazil), Leighton (Hong Kong), Balest Nedam, Dondotte d'Acqua and Sadelmi (Italy), Soares da Costa and 
Construgoes Tecnicas (Portugal) and Campeon Bernard, SAE and Dunnez (France).
198 See IND:09.03.1990:10 “My fax is for the President”. Cf. Melancia’s earlier explanation prior to 
publication of the fax: “During a bid... no one pays in advance, I think. At the most, sometimes, they pay 
afterwards, isn’t that so?” in IND: 16.02.1990:2 “Cd se fax, cd se pagd\
199 In fact, the PSD party could hardly “throw” stones at the PS, as this case coincided with serious 
allegations of corruption affecting the PSD’s Secretary of Health, C.Freire.
200 The first Weidleplan meeting with Vasconcelos occurred in May 1988 in Macao. Ever since, parallel 
meetings with Melancia took place on several occasions reported in the Public Prosecutor Inquiry.
201 See IND:09.03.1990:10 “O meu fax e dopresidente” - his comments were “When a business company 
wants to invest in Macao, it has a conversation with the governor who explains the main political views. But 
the governor does not get involved in matters of detail. This belong to deputy secretary officials.”
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conclusions about Melancia’s conduct, which from a political viewpoint is relevant in determining 
whether or not the public office was used for personal benefit.202
Figure 1 Weildleplan Consulting Fax
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Source: O Independente, 16.02.1990, p.2
202 Later in the course of the inquiry, Melancia apparently presented a different version, saying his contacts 
with Weidleplan officers followed three distinct topics. See PPI: 1259.
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According to the fax, (Figure 1 above) a Stuttgart consulting firm, Weidleplan, wished to 
be granted a consultant role for which it previously complied with the “financial terms” proposed 
by the governor. But somehow, that position was given to another company, Paris Airport. And 
because no contract was awarded, the message concludes, “we would like to have the money back” 
according to Richard Weidle (President) who signed on behalf of Peter Beier (Director) and 
Antonio Strecht-Monteiro (the Portuguese intermediary agent).
Immediately, the Attorney General appointed A.Rodrigues Maximiano, assisted by a PJ 
sub-inspector Antonio Coutinho, to lead the inquiry which ended seven months later with charges 
of corruption against seven defendants. The Court confirmed the accusation, but allowed Melancia 
to face trial separately, that is, alone, on passive corruption charges. All three named Weidleplan 
agents included in the fax, plus an equal number of Emaudio partners namely Tito de Morais, Rui 
Mateus and Cardoso do Amaral faced active corruption charges together. Both Weidle and Beier 
escaped trial as by German law citizens involved in corruption in foreign countries cannot be 
prosecuted or extradited.
After all, the Independente's fax turned out to be a true copy,203 despite attempts by the 
Weidleplan president to discredit i t204 It perfectly matches the original one seized in Stuttgart, 
together with the entire file entitled the “Dossier Macao/Prospecgao Macau”. Weidleplan in time 
removed it swiftly from its headquarters in time, and “safely” handed it over to a German lawyer. 
But not for long, as the police confiscated it from the lawyer’s private office. The Court in Stuttgart 
promptly overruled two appeals, and allowed the police to go ahead and open it, only to find the so 
called “fatal fax” and other relevant material.205 But the removal from the Weidleplan headquarters 
was not complete either, as the police recovered the erased fax from the computer’s hard disk.
203 Except that the top of the page’s fax details used a Portuguese source instead of the Weidleplan telefax 
number as the original sending place. See PPI: 1207.
204 Even Mr Weidle attempt to divert the seriousness of the fax. See his fax to Independente’s journalist dated 
on February 22, 1990: “Dear Mrs Osorio, I would like to thank you for your today’s phone call and confirm 
the content of our conversation. The origin of the telefax in question is absolutely inexplicable to us. It is not 
recorded in our files. The content of this fax is by no means corresponding to the facts .... we never paid any 
amount of money whatsoever to His Excellency, the Governor. Our serious feeling is that there are severe 
disputes going on in Portugal resulted in the defamation of our company which can only be to our 
disadvantage and against which we strictly protest.”
205 See PPI: 1210. According to Weidleplan’s accounting records, the sending of the fax costs DM 2.76.
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Weidle’s secretary, for instance, admitted typing it, following instructions from Monteiro, and 
sending the fax to Macao after Weidle’s consent and with his signature.206 The police also noticed 
that records of all faxes around the October 1989 period were erased as well.207
With regard to the fax’s contents, the DM 606,000.00 has three different episodes. Firstly, 
a reiterative demand by Emaudio partners to receive it as a means of guaranteeing an open 
communication with Melancia.208 The reluctance to advance the money demonstrates that Beier 
lacked assurance. Monteiro signed for it, and only then did he receive a cheque from Germany. He 
passed it on to Emaudio partners in Lisbon but they rejected it. Instead, they demanded that the 
whole amount was paid in Portuguese cash. Thanks to his contacts in the bank, Monteiro managed 
within 24 hours, to deliver nearly 50 million escudos in cash.
Secondly, an equally persistent request from Weidleplan, this time for the money to be 
refunded, as no contract was awarded, not even a second best deal concerning building the 
passenger terminal which was also proposed. Approaching the end of the financial year,
Weidleplan could no longer justify the amount spent. Pressure was on Monteiro, and deadlines had 
to be changed several times.209 And with broken relationships within Emaudio partners, 
communication with Melancia ceased abruptly.210 Frustration led to the publication of the fax, as 
the initial paragraph states: “We very much regret that we have not received any reply from you...”.
206 PPI:1209-1209b.
207 PPI: 1215.
208 What withheld it being sent was the absence of any written document guaranteeing the contract and, in 
case of failure, ensuring that the money would be recovered. This was finally settled according to the charge, 
on December 29,1988, in the Tivoli Hotel in Lisbon where Monteiro agreed to be responsible for such a 
transaction - PPI.T228.
209 The deadline for reimbursement was initially set at September 30,1989; then to October 15; December 31; 
February 7,1990; and finally the end of February 1990.
210 An apparently negative episode happened in the general assembly of Emaudio held on July 20,1989. 
Morais left the Emaudio partnership in clear disagreement with Mateus and Amaral. The dispute concerned 
the possible increase of shares on behalf of another firm, namely Interfina, as suggested by Melancia and 
Morais but rejected altogether by Mateus. The implication for Weidleplan in particular was that neither 
Mateus nor Amaral was able to maintain direct contact with Melancia any longer. Morais avoided any 
contact with Beier and Monteiro too. The doors for parallel communication with Melancia seemed closed.
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Altogether, the fax reminds us, there were “eighteen months”211 of talks, but also contacts, visits, 
and many other faxes too.
And finally, the third story is the corollary of the PJ’s successful confiscating of a written 
agreement in which the Emaudio partners and Monteiro signed their consent to return 40 million 
escudos to Weidleplan. The Germans did not abandoned their attempts to get the money back, thus 
showing their consistency throughout, even after the discovery (apprehension) of the Macao file. 
Their lawyer, together with Weidle’s daughter came to Portugal a month before the criminal 
inquiry ended (August 1990), and met with four Portuguese defendants and two Portuguese 
lawyers at Solverde Hotel. On their way back, at Porto airport, the police confiscated a four page
217agreement.
The fax correctly reveals that Weidleplan was left with no contract whatsoever. The initial 
attempt to obtain a consultant role failed213 Later attempts to reformulate the original proposal 
proved unsuccessful, as legally it was completely unacceptable.214 Weidleplan then lost the contract 
for building the passenger terminal also.215
But the decisive issue is the reason for the 50 million escudos and what this amount was 
destined for. According to the accusation, over 27 million, went from Emaudio partners to
211 Weidleplan has all dates well registered. From the first contact in April 28,1988 until the sending of the 
fax in October 18, 1989 there is only a shortage of 10 days to reach “18 months”.
212 PPI:778, 779, 793, 797-800. The Public Prosecutor R.Maximiano writes: “E significativo que os arguidos 
tenham negado qualquer acordo relativo a restituigao dos 606.000 marcos e que tenha sido apreendido um 
acordo celebrado ja  no decurso do processo em que se comprometem, com excepgao do arguido Carlos 
Melancia, a restituir a empresa alema 40.000 contos, apos reuniao havida em Espinho com a presenga do 
advogado da Weidleplan.” (PPI: 1258b). Cf. The criticism of one of the lawyers in PPI: 1323 “...e apreendido 
no aeroporto de Pedras Rubras ao Advogado da Weidleplan, Dr. Frick, em acgao policial que em nada 
abona as autoridades portuguesas.”
213 Weidleplan, following Melancia’s advice, joined with another company (EGF) in submitting a proposal to 
GAIM. On January 17, 1989, Vasconcelos opened two proposals, the other one being from Paris Airport. On 
February 16, Vasconcelos communicated to Beier and Monteiro that Weidleplan’s proposal dealt with areas 
beyond GAIM’s responsibility, and it was very expensive. Cf. EXP:23.02.90:3 - Weidleplan’s estimated cost 
was 600m as opposed to 320m from Paris Airport. On February 28, Vasconcelos finally decided in favor of 
Paris Airport.
214 Upon reception of Vasconcelos’s letter (16.02.1989), Beier and Monteiro met with Melancia who 
suggested a reduction of the overall price for the consultant position. On April 14, a new such proposal was 
sent to Vasconcelos who immediately disregarded it as too late, as the final decision was taken, and the legal 
contract with Paris Airport was signed on May 12, 1989.
215 In June 1989, Weidleplan submitted its proposal to CAM. Mr Ferreira ignored it because the proposal 
only dealt with the project side and left out details about critical aspects of the construction, financing and 
management. Meanwhile, on July 5, Melancia met with Beier in Lisbon. Melancia advised Weidleplan to 
wait until the end of August to be awarded a sub-contract.
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Melancia as “grease money”, at least in two instalments - one to pay for goods purchased in a 
Lisbon auction shop, and the other credited to his wife’s bank account, both within a matter of days 
after their receipt.216 But the Emaudio partners argued that 31 million were invested in an 
associated Portopress firm, and the remainder used to pay Melancia’s shares in Emaudio, plus 
services related to “professional lobbying” with Weidleplan. Monteiro’s defense was centred 
around his intermediary role only. Melancia’s lawyer argued that his client was never aware of the 
Emaudio partners’ intentions as formulated in the accusation and that he acted normally in his 
capacity as Governor. The alleged “parallel” meetings, contacts and phone calls insinuated in the 
accusation were normal too. His main intention was to attract potential foreign investors. Those 
alleged payments were not taken from Weidleplan’s money, rather they were entirely banked in the 
Emaudio accounts in the Chase Manhattan Bank. The payments made to the governor covered the 
sale of his shares instead.
Lisbon’s Tribunal da Relagao agreed to charge all seven defendants, but required not one 
but two trials instead. Melancia, because he held political office, faced trial on his own “for speed’s 
sake” as the law allowed. This added a significant pressure on the jury, composed of three members 
each, who had to judge a single crime in two trials at the same time and in the same court. Such a 
unique event entertained the media for months. And what some feared most happened: the passive 
corruption trial ended in 1993 with Melancia being acquitted by majority vote, as the president of 
the jury voted against the verdict. He actually broke the law by disclosing and spelling out his 
reasons soon after reading the verdict, something not permitted to judges of the ‘first instance’ 
court.
Five months later, in 1994, the jury of the active corruption trial unanimously declared 
guilty all four defendants for attempting to corrupt the governor of Macao. The Emaudio partners 
were given prison sentences and Weidleplan’s intermediary a suspended prison sentence due to his
216 In the first payment, Morais together with Emaudio’s secretary paid 15.492.790$00 in cash to Leiria & 
Nascimento Lda, with the following details printed in the invoice, found in the Emaudio safe: Casa 
Liquidadora, Antigo Bazar Catolico, Capital Social: 100.000$00, dated: Lisboa, 20.01.1989 in the name of 
Eng. Carlos Melancia, charging for 7 items of antiques and paintings costing 13.870.000$00, plus 10% 
Commission: 1.387.000$00, and 17% VAT: 235.790S00. The second payment (27 January 1989) of 
12.000.000$00 (cash converted into cheque by Amaral’s friend) was paid into Melancia’s wife’s bank 
account.
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collaboration at certain stages of the investigation and in the court. The Emaudio partners appealed 
to the Supreme Court. They remained in liberty. Their first appeal was unsuccessful. Then, they 
appealed to the Constitutional Court. The final verdict of the case has not been reached yet. It is 
possible that this crime be made prescript or filed forever, after all these years in the corridors of 
justice.
4.3 Case Analysis
From the actual inquiry onwards, a series of developments and setbacks, contradictory 
perceptions and interpretations, refusals and silences, parallel events and distractions, tactics and 
agreements took place around critical aspects of the case which the following subsections seek to 
demonstrate. For clarity’s sake, the critical analysis will look separately first at each of the major 
stages. The purpose is not to incriminate individuals nor to discuss the reasonableness of the 
verdicts but to identify beliefs and practices likely to nurture and facilitate corruption.
4.3.1 Whistleblowing
Although the case reached the public through the Independente, the facts reveal that it was 
initially one Emaudio partner who gave a copy of the fax to a journalist, Helena Osorio.217 This 
attests to some internal relationship problems among the partners, including Melancia himself. So a 
broken relationship is in fact the initial cause of the case - a situation which is not unusual. A 
change of direction in a corrupt nexus often begins when one player changes his mind. If this had 
not happened, the PPS would not have noticed the problem.
Osorio refused to publish the fax, as the sender details on the top of the page had been 
erased.218 The second copy includes it, exactly as published but still omits the receptor’s reference 
details, that is, the Emaudio fax number219 This indicates that a whistleblower may have had other 
interests in mind disclosing only part of the information available as was convenient to him.
217 PPI: 1208. The copy is attached as PPI: 131.
218 PPI: 1208b.
219 PPI: 1209.
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Osorio claims to be the author of the contents, not the titles and subtitles of the articles on 
IND: 16.02.1990. The decision of the Independent newspaper to publish the fax, after prior 
discussion with the governor is positive and fulfils its obligation and mission, leaving the 
remaining tasks to competent authorities. However, the Independente has not always proceeded in 
this way.
The attached article by Ines Dentinho seems unnecessary when disclosing the apparent 
seriousness of the fax. Her many unsubstantiated details are presented in a succession of very short 
sentences about the style, views and tastes of the governor which are not directly relevant. The 
subtitle comments about his preference for oriental goods (loiga chinesa), and the fact that “he was 
bom to politics after 25 April only” actually contradicts his own statement in the article. Family 
details (about his daughters) appear inappropriate too. Years later, it became clear that the 
Independente was not entirely transparent as its former director Paulo Portas was often criticised 
for using it for political purposes. So the media, as well as other whistleblowers’ attitudes need to 
be correctly perceived and evaluated in context.
4.3.2 The Public Prosecutor Inquiry
A total of just seven months for investigations and charges is an outstanding achievement 
and the opposite of the normal situation in Portugal. Maximiano chose not to detain any of the 
defendants, thus transmitting the message that it is possible to investigate without the use or abuse 
of drastic preventive imprisonment. This sharply contrasts with other well publicised national cases 
in which accused individuals were detained in front of television screens. Both of these situations 
reveal weaknesses though, and would need to be analysed in depth. But the defendants in the 
Emaudio case seem to have taken some advantage of the situation and restated, changed, or even 
abandoned their views during the inquiry, particularly after the effective apprehension of the entire 
Weidleplan file.
Maximiano worked extensively to give descriptive and synchronized accounts, believing 
that the judges would share equally his own appreciation of “everyday rules of experiences” in
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evaluating a secretive and hard-to-detect crime of corruption.220 The active corruption case was 
evaluated in this way, but not the other, so it seems. However, he did not know that there would be 
more than one trial. But nevertheless, his accusation was too extensive,221 with some haphazard 
details irrelevant for dealing with hard core evidence of corrupt intention and transaction, and this 
also wasted the time of the jury. The defendants often argued that accusation assumes at face value 
its own hypothetical reconstruction of the case.
Judging by the Supreme Court judge Fisher Sa Nogueira, who dealt with the appeal of 
Melancia’s case, the accusation was largely based on “dolo eventual’ (probable deceit) which is 
subject to multiple interpretations.222 On another occasion his remarks were “But, in the case of the 
Macao fax, the investigation was quite complete at the level of the corrupting agents, but was 
presumptive against Carlos Melancia, that is: the charge was based merely on suppositions, without 
a firm basis... All because of the haste to make the case public.”223 His opinions are certainly 
debatable, not least because of the jury’s conclusion on the active case using exactly the same 
material and type of charge.224
But the core of the concept of a corrupt transaction appeared somehow diluted in many 
descriptions, both in reference to active and passive cases, this being described by Rodrigues in
220 PPI: 1250, 1258, 1258b.
221 It includes a synopsis of the case which is useful but extensive - see PPI: 1202-1259 including text on both 
sides of the each page. The accusation has a total of203 numbered items, therefore ideal to nurture 
speculation.
222 See CM:29.01.2004 “It’s always necessary to find someone to blame” - Interview with F.S.Nogueira, 
judge working for 50 years in the courts. His criticism of the existing laws is unequivocal, including the fact 
that a time for prescription of a negligent crime is two years whereas for “dolo eventual’ is 15 years; and his 
conviction that “we have a lack of information because of the excess of laws.”
223 See A.T.Ribeiro, VIS:02.11.2000:44 “Crimes VIP sem castigo”. Judge Nogueira was the Supreme Court 
“Relator” over much publicised cases such as the Otelo Saraiva, Costa Freire, Leonor Beleza, Abilio Curto, 
and Melancia. Future historians will most probably find interesting material behind these unsuccessful 
charges, including controversies regarding the appeals and their outcome.
224 Judge Fisher Sa Nogueira has made several comments about key cases which need special critical analysis 
and which this thesis cannot pursue as they are outside its scope. Cf. his comments on C.Freire’s case in 
PUB: 15.12.2000:22 “<Supremo manda repetir julgamento” by C.Gomes; his comments about the inclusion of 
President Sampaio’s name in the pedophilia legal case in CM:02.01.2004 “Processo: Conselheiro analisa 
anexagao de carta andnimd”. Cf. M.S.Tavares severe criticism in DE:08.01.2004 “A justiga nao esta acima 
da critica”; A.J.Teixeira, JN:02.01.2004 “A irrelevancia doprocurador da Republica”; and DN:02.01.2004
“Souto Moura sai em defesa do Presidents.
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terms of rounded off “grosso modo” (roughly) corruption.225 And as would be expected the 
lawyers took advantage of this. They, and perhaps the Supreme Court too, chose to discuss the 
accessory details rather than the core issues of the accusation.226
Corruption is often team work, as is seen in this case also. But the inquiry was in practice 
largely a one-man effort. This raises serious concerns regarding the Public Prosecutor’s style and 
capacity for a swift investigation of economic crimes, as these generally depend on simultaneous 
investigation on multiple fronts. As mentioned before, seven months for reaching the charge is a 
record, but our criticism here centres on the investigative type of decisions taken and the space that 
these provided for the defendants.
Equally serious is the legalistic and casuistic approach of the inquiry which ignores the 
fundamental “snow-ball” phenomenon characteristic of corruption.227 The inquiry opened up many 
critical avenues228 which Maximiano felt unable to pursue because of its apparently narrow 
interpretation of the mandate received: “.../«the defence o f the lawfulness and in the very interests 
o f the dignity and good name o f the Administration o f the Territory o f Macao. ” It it is true that he 
was unable to pursue obviously related matters, but he should have advised the prosecuting 
services to do so immediately. The entire accounts of the Emaudio should have been analyzed in
225 PPI: 1203b.
226 Again, the opinion of the judge Fisher Sa Nogueira cited by A.T.Ribeiro, VIS:02.11.2000:41-46 is critical 
of the investigation: “Para o conselheiro Sa Nogueira, a propria actuagao do anterior procurador-geral, 
Cunha Rodrigues, condicionou algumas imestigagoes. O que veio dar origem a julgamentos nao muito 
sustentados. Um dos casos que da como exemplo e o do fax de Macau... a gestao que fez da informagao 
sobre osprocessos ia condicionando a opiniao publica...” writes Ribeiro. Then cites Sa Nogueira certo 
que o PGR, perante os condicionalismos da altura, so podia desenvolver aquele tipo de gestao. O 
procurador e o MP tinham de se afirmar pela investigagao e tinham de se mostrar independentes do poder 
politico.”
227 Two examples illustrate the point. Firstly, the Italian 1992 case started with a very simple episode of 
extortion but ended up revealing that corruption was widespread and systematic. As a result more than five 
thousand people were investigated including PM, MP, Ministers and public and private officials - see 
(Colombo 2005). Secondly, the Portuguese anti-corruption unit in the PJ caught a pedophile while searching 
economic crime through the internet - see C.Femandes and L.Lima, DN: 15.02.2003 ‘“Apanhado’ pela 
brigada do colarinho branco”.
228 For instance, it would have not been unreasonable to call key political figures including Almeida Santos 
and other Emaudio current and former partners or mentors to testify about some aspects of the case; to 
request the opening of other inquiries into Emaudio’s associated firms including Emaudio International; to 
further inquire why Emaudio itself was technically bankrupt and yet its bank accounts received and passed on 
large sums, some of these in cash; and why Emaudio partners made financial transactions without any 
apparent backing a situation of which the official inquiry gives so many examples. In this regard see 
Mateus’s reply to a news article in IND:16.07.1999:49 “New proofs in the Macao fax case”, complaining 
against R.Maximiano’s limited mentality in the process of the investigation.
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detailed ways by competent auditors to reveal to what extent Emaudio overstepped the boundaries 
of its legal attributions, which partially was done but without consequences. This means that 
economic crimes involve low risk.
The links between the Emaudio partners229 and the PS party, and former President Soares 
were too obvious and should have prompted further inquiries too. For many years Macao had been 
publicly known to be under clouds of suspicion of corruption and to be a source of finance for 
political parties in Portugal. The inexplicable transfers of funds, from and to Emaudio, some of 
them to Switzerland, received no attention from anyone. This may indicate critical links with other 
companies and individuals.
When one company is willing to receive 12 million escudos in cash and then issue a 
cheque to make a payment that has nothing to do with its business this arouses suspicions and 
should lead to immediate investigation. Auction and antique shops are critical too. Melancia’s 
claim that some payments had to do with his shares leads to other equally critical considerations, 
including his declaration of assets and interests filed in the Constitutional Court, items which he did 
not declare. After all, if nearly 16 million escudos correspond to the value of his 250 shares in 
Emaudio, which he held for only 3 months, it means that he had a profit of 6,290%, which is 
unreasonable for a company that is technically considered bankrupt. A pertinent question is how 
many companies in Portugal have fictitious value, like Emaudio? How many act beyond their 
legally defined objectives, like Emaudio? And how many exist mainly to cover up apparently 
illegal activities? How many have fictitious accounts?
Banks that apparently facilitate transactions are another area of concern. If the Public 
Prosecutor’s attitude is simply to “turn a blind eye”, it is unrealistic to expect significant changes in 
already suspicious public and private relationships. After all, there is no legal basis for a firm to 
perform business outside its legitimate objectives. Lobbying as such is not part of the current law
229 For instance, Mateus was an influential PS public-relations person. He joined first of all the PS 
international department. He was elected a member of both the National Commission and the National 
Secretariat (1976-86). He was a founding member of several Foundations (Jos6 Fontana; Azedo Gneco; and 
Relagdes Internacionais) as well as some Institutes (Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento; and 
Cooperativa de Edigoes e Impressao Grafted). He was elected as a MP in 1979, 1980, 1983 and 1985. He 
replaced Mario Soares as President of the Fundagao de Relagdes Internacionais. Amaral was in charge of the 
financial administration of PS, and of MASP during Soares’s presidential campaign.
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books. Equally, there are standards of accountancy practices to be followed and the fiscal 
authorities should scrutinise these, but when there is suspicion of criminal procedures, the PPS’s 
anti-corruption body should act accordingly, and on its own initiative. This overall scenario 
reminds us of the climate of “informality” perceived in the McKinsey study referred to in the 
previous chapter. These are some of the critical matters arising from the Emaudio investigative 
case which require further analysis.
In summary, without a solid foundation and open minded investigation of multiple hidden 
connections in determining the extent of corruption, it is difficult to combat it effectively; the anti­
corruption policies of the PPS need a thorough revision and study, a better basis of conducting an 
inquiry and certainly more qualified personnel and resources in sufficient numbers to carry out 
such an important task.
4.3.3 Judge’s confirmation of charges
There is only one critical but major factor to discuss here. In December 1990, the court 
confirmed the charges but decided to separate the case in two parts. From that point onwards, there 
is one alleged crime and two trials. This was the most critical decision taken by judge Maria da 
Concei^o Oliveira in Lisbon’s Tribunal da Relagao. She accepted the request from Melancia, 
based on Law 34/87230 which allow crimes apparently committed while holding political office to 
be judged separately from the others, for the sake of a “speedy” process. The PPS strongly opposed 
but to no avail.
The trial of passive corruption proceeded without the presence of the alleged active 
corruption defendants. Legally they could be summoned to the trial, but equally legally they could 
choose not to speak at all. The lawyers also could request their testimony, and there they could be 
prevailed on to speak. This decision obviously favoured Melancia’s lawyer, as the rules dictate that 
evidence must be finally determined within the court’s sittings. Also the jury of an active
230 See Article 42 . - “(Separate judgement): The preparation and final decision of lawsuits relating to a crime 
for which a holder of political office is responsible and committed in the exercise of his duties, will be done, 
for reasons of speed, separately from those relating to others who also are responsible but are not also holders 
of political office.”
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corruption case could not prove key factors, exactly because this separation had been made, which 
makes the final judgement rather odd.
Therefore, the law in this particular case is a major obstacle against conviction for passive 
corruption in Portugal. In other words, it does not cater for a mixed public and private reality. This 
may well have been the reason for former president Soares’ refusal to replace the governor for the 
first seven months. Instead, he stayed in office until the charge was made, thus making the 
application of the law 34/87 fit the case. However, when the judge reached her decision, Melancia 
was no longer in an official position. She could possibly have made a different decision without 
breaching the law if she so wished. Now we know that neither case received any speedy 
consideration. It seems to have been a tactic well used by the lawyer, to his obvious advantage. The 
problem lies elsewhere though, in the actual quality and effectiveness of the law in combating 
corruption, in the privileges and legal norms regarding the fulfilment of political tasks and their 
respective control mechanisms.
One more detail seems problematic, raising some doubts about the impartiality of the judge 
C.Oliveira’s critical decision. In 1994, the journalist of the Independente, Mr Guerra asked the 
judge to comment about her family links with one of the lawyers involved in the Emaudio case, at 
least in its very early stages, at a time which coincided with Oliveira’s decision. Not pleased with 
the question, she replied: “I won’t make comments on this matter and I think it is great audacity on 
your part to insinuate like this.” The experienced journalist insisted and she asked a question 
instead: “Who told you to ask such a question?”, perhaps surprised to discover that the journalist 
knew that her husband was acting as Mr Beier’s lawyer in Portugal. Guerra kindly explained that 
his newspaper, Independente, had testified in the inquiry and consequently had access to 
Melancia’s criminal process. She then concluded: “the fact of being someone’s wife is no 
impediment.”231 This apparently is not a minor issue as such unclarified suspicion was left in the air 
without adequate response from the Conselho Superior de Magistratura (Judiciaiy Council) or any 
other relevant institution.
231 See IND:04.03.1994:4.
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4.3.4 Trial 1: Passive Corruption C ase
Although this section discusses the active corruption case separately, the following table 
gives the results from both trials, thus introducing at once critical selected matters. They cover four 
issues: Weidleplan’s objectives, intentions and conduct; Emaudio partners’ services and financial 
expectations; the Governor’s views, orders and financial transactions; and the “fatal” fax’s 
emission and reception. Having already discussed the implications of “one crime, two trials”, it 
must be said that in theory, the same conclusion could have been reached if there had been only 
one trial (Palma 1993, 6). Under this hypothesis, there would be no opportunity for several 
repeatable conclusions such as “not applicable” as found in both trials as stated in the table below. 
As noted, the German defendants were absent from the trial but that did not prevent the judges 
from reaching their verdict. These factors should therefore be considered when evaluating both 
trials, a summary of which appears in Table 1 below.
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Table 1 Passive and Active Corruption Trials
PROSECUTION CHARGES and VERDICT VERDICT
DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS* MELANCIA - TRIAL EMAUDIO - TRIAL
WEIDLEPLAN (W):
1. Weidle and Beier of W wished to obtain 1. Proven 1. Proven
business contracts in Macau.
2. Weidle and Beier appointed Monteiro (W- 2. Proven 2. Proven
trio) as ‘middle man’ between W and E-trio
who had business relations with Melancia
(M)
3. W-trio proposed to pay E-trio and M in 3. Not proven 3. Proven
exchange for contacts and contracts.
4. W did not obtain any contracts. 4. Proven 4. Proven
5. Monteiro gave to E-trio the equivalent of 5. Proven 5. Proven
606.000DM in Escudos.
6. Monteiro acted as mediator and was not 6. Not applicable 6. Not Proven
aware of E-trio’s intention.*
7. In W’s accounts 606.000DM referred to as 7. Proven. 7. Proven
“Prov.Macau” and “Foreign Sub-contract”
EMAUDIO (E):
1. E-trio told M that W was willing to pay 1. Not proven 1. Proven
unspecified amount as long as M treated W
favourably and partially.
2. E-trio told M that 606.000DM received from 2. Not proven 2. Proven
W referred to the above arrangement.
3. E-trio told M that 27.492.790$ referred to 3. Not proven 3. Proven
below was taken from 606.000DM.
4. E-trio knew that they were acting illegally. 4. Not applicable 4. Proven
5. E-trio were ‘lobbying’ only.* 5. Not applicable 5. Not proven
MELANCIA (M):
1. Ordered goods valued at 15492790$. 1. Proven 1. Proven
2. Instructed 12.000.000$ be put into his wife’s 2. Proven 2. Proven
account, and 3 975000$ into his own account.
3. M gave instructions to E-trio to pay the above
amounts from 606.000DM. 3. Not proven 3. Not proven
4. The above sums (1-2) corresponded to E’s
payment regarding M’s share. 4. Not proven 4. Not proven
5. The above sums (1-2) corresponded to private
business between M and Morais.* 5. Not proven 5. Not proven
6. M advised W to associate with EGF.
7. M acted partially and favoured W to the 6. Proven 6. Not proven
detriment of other participants. 7. Not proven. Rather M’s 7. Not applicable
attitudes were irreprocha-
8. M’s relationship with W-trio was normal and ble and transparent.
part of his responsibilities in attracting 8. Proven. 8. Not applicable
foreign investment for Macau.*
9. M sold his shares to E-trio.* 9. Not proven 9. Not proven
FAX OF 18.10.89-SENDING&RECEPTION:
1. Fax sent from W was real. 1. Proven 1- Proven
2. Fax’s contents were dictated by Mateus, sent 2. Not applicable 2- Proven
to Monteiro on to Beier and signed by
Weidle. 3. Considered proven 3- Not proven
3. M received the fax.
Source: Author’s compilation based on case’s verdicts
The passive case reached a verdict on August 4,1993, after 150 hours of 24 court sittings, 
plus 1 hour and 40 minutes to read the final sentence. The decision concludes that both the official 
Administration of Macau and Governor Melancia’s attitudes and behaviour are “isentos de
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reparos” i.e. beyond reproach; that no damage was inflicted on third parties; the entire process of 
awarding contracts is “transparent” and provides “equal” opportunities for all participants; the 
relationship between the Public Administration of Macau and Weidleplan is “absolutely normal” 
without any evidence of “favouritism” for the latter; all decisions, including the consultant contract 
awarded to Paris Airport instead of Weidleplan, were taken after Melancia had given his formal 
approval; the additional loss of contract by Weidleplan (construction of airport terminal) happened 
simply because its proposal touched areas not included in the bid; and finally with regard to the 
alleged payments that “benefited Melancia”, the verdict concludes that no evidence was given to 
support the accusation charges (the major part was given to Melancia) nor the defendant’s 
arguments (regarding investments, payment of shares, service for lobbies, lending to Melancia).
This verdict raises three critical issues. Firstly, the jury president Ricardo Cardoso 
concluded the sentence saying that Melancia was “not guilty”, but adding: “this statement is signed 
with my vote cast against it - ‘voto de vencido\” Aware that he was defying the rules (Cf. Penal 
Code Procedures, Article 367), something which Cardoso argues violates the Constitutional Law 
anyway, he therefore acted in accordance with his own conscience instead. So, in sixty five hand­
written pages, a copy of which was immediately submitted to the Conselho Superior de 
Magistratura, he discloses several reasons underlying his disagreements and specifies a list of 
parallel episodes, contradictions, and coincidences which, in his views, could only lead to
232incrimination.
Secondly, the fact that 163 pages of the Sentence were entirely written by the president of 
the jury appears problematic. Although duty assigns such a task to the president of the jury, in 
theory, it seems that it will be difficult for him to express fairly the beliefs and rationale of the other 
two judges. Therefore, it appears difficult to accept some critical words (“beyond reproach”; 
“absolutely normal”) to have been the style and phrases actually chosen by other judges if they 
were writing the verdict themselves. The contrast seems so shocking, and make the subsequent 
explanation of the president of the jury seem pretty obvious at first glance. The other two judges
232 Parts of his document appears in (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993b); PUB:05.08.1993:2-4; 
PUB:06.08.1993:18; and IND:06.08.1993:16-19.
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did not make their opinions known outside the court. Their conduct is correct and merits equal 
respect as they felt no need to substantiate their views any more. But the rules of the game 
demanded that Cardoso should write the sentence. So these matters remain for our discussion.
And finally, this verdict unequivocally demonstrates serious internal problems within the 
judiciary itself. This turns out to be the heart of the problem of this case and perhaps of the anti­
corruption cause too. The judges have contradictory perceptions regarding the core concept of 
corruption. This should not be confused with their varying interpretations of the facts concerning 
the episodes of a particular case.
Therefore, Ricardo’s document, which is not part of the verdict as the Constitutional Court 
was very keen to emphasize, correctly in our view, remains highly debatable. This precisely 
enriches the case study for future researchers as almost nothing appears as simple as the discussion 
of what constitutes corruption, particularly so when the context is taken seriously. With this 
controversy, the interest of this case is magnified as long as critical matters are raised for further in 
depth analysis and beyond pure speculation, not least because the first decision - but not the last 
though - of the Supreme Court (10.02.1994) annulled the trial on procedural matters, thus requiring 
its repetition in the same court, which also added a further complication to the case - in addition to 
Cardoso’s conduct. One also needs to consider that, on previous occasions Cardoso had done 
exactly the same thing.235 As an independent judge, and representative of one of the four sovereign 
and constitutionally protected national bodies, he has the right to act according to his own 
conscience and ethical standards. But on exactly the same grounds, his views need to be equally 
respected and evaluated in an open democratic setting.
233 See Acordao N° 137/2002/Tribunal Constitucional in Diario da Republica - II Serie, N° 223, page 16305, 
of September 26,2002.
234 Cf. Judge Conceisao Oliveira’s strong criticism in the Congress of Judges held in Tomar - P.Guerra, 
IND:04.03.1994 “Ricardo de fora”; and A.Santos in (Barreto 2000, 58), although she did not specifically 
refer to Cardoso.
235 Cf. PUB:05.08.1993:2. Cardoso writes “I take this attitude with the same calm spirit and a sense of duty 
by which I declared the inconstitutionality of that norm used by the Prime Minister to oppose the coming of 
secret agent officers to the court”.
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Table 2 Verdict and Jury President Defeated Vote on Melancia’s Administration
VERDICT JURY PRESIDENT DEFEATED VOTE ARGUMENTS
Melancia’s
Administration:
“beyond reproach”
“absolutely normal”
“no favouritism”
“equal opportunities for 
all”
“no damage on third 
parties”
1-Fax of Weidleplan (W) is the central proof: so evident that Melancia (M) 
understood it that he never ever admitted it -  its reception was considered proved 
by the court.
2-Parallel administration
(1) The manner in which W introduced to M is indicative of a parallel approach
(2) 09/05/88After the first meeting with Vasconcelos of GAIM, M calls W 
agents for a meeting in his Palace on following day
(3) When Vasconcelos did not answer, W contacted Emaudio Partners instead
(4) 15/09/88 Mateus gives W instructions how to proceed with M and 
Vasconcelos
(5) 04/10/88 Mateus informs W that M will receive them shortly
(6) 17/10/88 E-p asked for DM 606000 after W’s initial contact with M.
(7) 16/12/88 Soon after M authorised a direct talk with W and Airport of Paris, 
he gives Mateus a book to deliver to W’s headquartes and asks for payment 
again.
3-Unexplainable Coincidences:
29/12/88 Letter from GAIM + Monteiro signed guarantee of transaction 
06./01/89 Cash payment received + 31 million for Melancia 
16/02/89 First proposal submitted by W + Melancia ordered goods 
16/02/89 W reduced the cost + Morais paid the bill, using a witness 
05/04/89: M met the Germans + Advised reduction of price and received 
3975000$
Aug and Oct/89 Mateus said twice that M had received the greatest part: 31 out 
of 50m
4-Lack of Transparency:
(1) Giving a project-book to Mateus, who delivered it in Stuttgard, falls outside 
of normal official and administrative channels
(2) private meetings held alongside official ones
(3) recommendation to join another firm’s business (EGF) is not acceptable for a 
Governor
(4) advice to offer another proposal, beyond the time limit is odd
(5) all facts between 5-14/4/89 (from the accusation) were proven
(6) W relied so much on its payment, following the advice to associate with 
EGF, that they failed to follow the rules set by Vasconcelos
(7) Not deciding on the origin of these money/payments is not transparent either 
-  (in reference to Verdict)
5-Concept of Corruption & practices:
(1) “silences”
(2) “changing statements”
(3) “parallel contacts”
(4) “cover up of financial transactions”
(5) “impossible to require verification of numerical notes between Monteiro’s 
cash and Auction shop’s cash”
(6) “money without origin” is unreasonable
(7) the value of “rules of experiences” is fundamental
Macao’s Administration 
directed by Vasconcelos 
& Guimaraes:
“beyond reproach” 
“absolutely normal”
“normal procedures of administration” can only applied to Vasconcelos and 
Guimaraes who safeguarded the Airport of Paris bid entirely, by choosing the 
less expensive and the only one that complies with the norms.
They also “correctly refused to accept later attempts to change the figures” as the 
time limit had expired.
Source: Author’s compilation
The above Table 2 is a summary of views regarding the administrative and political 
conduct of the governor highlighted by Cardoso. This political perspective is valid and should not
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be entirely confined to or confused with, judicial matters. Cardoso explained why the verdict 
interpreted correctly all the “facts” considered “proved” and then failed to reach an appropriate or 
logical conclusion. In his view, the verdict contains many “irremediable contradictions” and fails to 
account for the “numerous factors” that he ironically called “coincidences” and “parallel 
activities”. Furthermore, the judges have the obligation to know the “historical roots” and “judicial 
characteristics” of each crime, including corruption. In other words, judges must be subordinated to 
logic, psychology and axioms or rules of everyday experience, this not being confused with 
arbitrary attitudes. He goes so far as to “accuse” his two colleagues of having missed the “essence 
of the crime” - something which is undoubtedly serious and polemical to say the least - “So judges 
cannot present a fact as proven and then, against logic and the rules o f experience, come to the 
opposite conclusion. ”236
This is such a sensitive issue that it was openly criticised in a congress of judges held in 
Tomar in the following year. There Judge Conceifao Oliveira was not short of words when she said 
“When we (judges) enter into the media show and allow our faces to sell newspapers with 
ambiguous news... when one of us, before the entire nation, is capable of publicly despising a 
corporate judicial decision, a deep wound is open in our organisation...” She concludes by saying 
that the competence of two colleagues “was put into question as if they were blind and incapable of 
seeing what the enlightened ones saw.”237
Going back to the verdict again, identical arguments were made by Maria Jose Morgado 
who represented the PPS in the trial. In her view, about ninety per cent of the prosecution charges 
were proved within the court. She then called attention to the president of the jury’s defeated 
vote.238 In this environment of fundamental contradictions within the judiciary regarding the core 
concept of corruption, the anti-corruption cause must suffer from a severe handicap. If such
236 See (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993b, 33-34); E.Damaso, PUB:05.08.1993 “Juiz nao acreditou na 
inocencia do reu”, in PUB:06.08.1993:18 “Vencido mas nao convencido”, and “R..Cardoso expoe 
coincidencias incriminatorias do caso Melancia”.
237 See P.Guerra, IND:04.03.1994:4 “Ricardo is out”. The journalist noted that Ricardo Cardoso was about to 
speak in the congress, held in Tomar, but cancelled it at the last moment because he did not want to give 
opportunities for further “frantic interventions”.
238 E.Damaso, PUB:05.08.1993:2 “Juiz nao acredita na inocencia do reu”; G.R. and M.V. in 
IND:20.08.1993 “Recurso a Melancia”.
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contradictory views are real, then much needs to be done in preparing existing and future judges to 
deal with the complexity of economy-related crimes. It might imply that one of four sovereign 
bodies are not yet prepared to fight corruption. This inevitably needs further analysis.
In conclusion, the court made one point very clear: the origin of the money with which Mr 
Melancia paid for goods in the Lisbon auction shop and credited his wife’s bank account; and 
Mateus’ payment in Melancia’s bank account, is completely unknown. Therefore, both versions put 
forward by the prosecution and Melancia’s lawyers were equally disregarded.
4.3.5 Trial 2: Active Corruption Case
The active corruption verdict reached a conclusion on January 13,1994, after 23 sittings. 
Three judges, under the presidency of Filipa Macedo make a unanimous decision239 in which all 
four defendants were found guilty240 of corrupting the governor of Macao. Article 190 of the 
verdict summarises why the jury seems sure of the decision taken because the “unlawfulness of 
factors reaches a high level” and the “defendant’s guilt directly fits the framework of the fraud and 
reaches a high level”.241 It makes it clear that Monteiro, Morais, Amaral and Mateus acted 
voluntarily and were aware of its illegality. In addition, they all knew the position of the former 
Governor and “only because of that” did they behave as they did.
This verdict gives special consideration to the core matters of corruption under section III 
“Judicial framing of factors”. Certainly aware of the previous trial’s outcome, it goes into greater 
detail in clarifying the autonomous character of active and passive corruption as a simple promise 
of undue payment to a public official is legally considered corruption. There is no shortage of 
quotations from both historical and contemporary authors, including an extended 7 paragraphs 
from then President Soares’ speech when Costa Braz took office as leader of the anti-corruption
239 See parts of the verdict in (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993a); and in PPI:2747-2832.
240 Monteiro was sentenced to three years in prison together with a fine of7.000S00 daily for 90 days or 
alternatively, an extra 60 days in prison. Mateus and Morais were sentenced to four years and six months in 
prison plus a fine of 130 days at 7.000$00 daily or an extra 86 days in prison each. Amaral was sentenced to 
four years in prison plus a fine of 110 days at 7.000S00 per day or an extra 73 days in prison. Due to some 
collaboration, Monteiro’s imprisonment was suspended for five years. The remaining three were given a 
pardon of one year each of their respective prison sentences because they had no criminal records.
241 See (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993a, 45, 51).
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special unit in 1988.242 Such an inclusion is perhaps not innocent either, as the Emaudio business is 
somehow perceived to be associated with the President himself. It cites Silva Ferrao’s comments in 
1856 saying that “The corruption of public personnel is an extremely great moral plague in society; 
corruptors and corruptees are more dangerous than public thieves and murderers”.243
Equally interesting is the emphasis laid on the active corruption agents by citing the severe 
penalties applied in France, Italy and USA where the maximum is 20 years in jail. While on this 
topic, and apparently out of context - or maybe not - reference may be made to both Belgium and 
Luxembourg’s penalty forjudges (passive corruption) to include “trabalhosforgados” (hard 
labour) for 10 to 15 years, fine and banning from office.244
In conclusion, when these two verdicts are jointly analyzed, the evidence of crucial 
contradictions seems evident. For instance, all the five items under Emaudio’s section in the table 
above testify to the opposite conclusions regarding the motives in spending the money received 
from Weidleplan. Equally serious are the first five items under Melancia’s section - they all reach 
similar conclusions but their final outcome is different. In matters of economic crimes, the judge’s 
uniform view is the sine qua non for the reduction of impunity that prevails in current conditions. 
This case therefore raises critical questions regarding judges’ own perception of corruption which 
bear direct implications on the application of law. It is not as simple a matter as the journalist 
Osorio thinks to explain what happened: “All of this mess, which was absolutely incomprehensible 
to the majority of the population, was the consequence of an early decision to separate the trials.”245
4.3.6 Appeals
The right of appeal is also unquestionable and a natural part of a legal process. This case 
has seen a number of appeals to the Supreme and Constitutional courts. Defendants can appeal 
several times during the process, and some of those appeals incur a suspension of prison sentence
242 See (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993a, 49).
243 See (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993a, 50).
244 See (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa 1993a, 50). Cf. Cardoso’s allusion to early Roman jurisprudence, during
the imperial period where corruption was seen as a crime of the magistrates - (Tribunal Criminal de Lisboa
1993b, 33).
245 See Ind:14.01.1994:19.
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too. It is generally perceived that appeals are used as part of a delaying tactics for a defendant’s 
lawyers. A critical issue comes from the extended time until the courts make the decisions. When 
there are more than one, as in this case and others, the problem simply becomes worse.246
We refrain from going into detailed analysis behind multiple appeals because they are 
almost entirely related to procedural matters as opposed to the hard facts behind corruption itself. 
But consider briefly some of the appeals regarding the passive case. After the first sentence 
(August 1993), the PPS immediately appealed to Constitutional Court concerning the defeated vote 
of the president of the jury, and to the Supreme Court as well, requesting that the trial be annulled 
altogether. Six months later, on February 10,1994, the Supreme Court made three decisions.
Firstly, to invalidate the trial “from the first court session until the process was sent to the Supreme 
Court.” Secondly, to return to Melancia all 43 documents presented in one of the final court 
sessions held on May 28,1993. And finally, to repeat Melancia’s trial in the same Tribunal da Boa 
Hora in Lisbon.
On the other hand, Melancia’s lawyer promptly contested the last decision of the Supreme 
Court, claiming three iinulidades processuais” (procedural annulments), but the same Supreme 
Court quickly answered, on April 21, 1994 by not altering its early decision taken in February 
1994. Melancia appealed to the Constitutional Court (already his third appeal though), by 
requesting a decision on procedural matters and the interpretation by the Supreme Court of three 
articles of the Penal Process Code,247 and to the High Court again. In 1997 the High Court decided 
this time to cancel its latest decision and reconfirmed the initial acquittal.
Now was the PPS’s turn to appeal, this time to the Constitutional Court again. Two years 
later, in February 1999 the Constitutional Court decided in favour of the PPS and decreed that the 
verdict - not the trial - be reviewed in the High Court. In November 1999, the High Court reviewed 
the verdict and decided to maintain the acquittal. The Public Prosecutor requested the “plenario” of 
the High Court (i.e. in plenary session) to declare the latest decision invalid.
246 See the Appendix A, Figure 10 Melancia’s Court Case Procedure, Expresso 28.01.2000, p.4 which 
illustrate Melancia’s appeal cases. See also Appendix B, Figure 11 Costa Freire’s Court Case, Expresso, 
08.01.2000, p. 12. Both appeared while the legal cases were not fully settled.
247 For its details, see Ac6rdao 137/2002 of the Constitutional Court, page 16303.
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The rest of the story can be seen in two further complex steps. Firstly, in the Constitutional 
Court Decision 137 of 2002,248 where three appeals were discussed at the same time, following the 
Supreme High Court decision of May 16, 2001. One of these referred to Judge Cardoso’s defeated 
vote, made by the PPS in 1993 - it took nine years for the Constitutional Court to declare that his 
act “does not constitute part of the court’s decision” and therefore was not under any specific 
control. And secondly, the decision by the Supreme High Court in October 3, 2002 in which 
Melancia was permanently acquitted. The case nearly reached its prescription, and therefore, it was 
to no avail to appeal again to the Constitutional Court, although in theory it was possible. The PPS 
decided not to do it. In the end, simplistically stated, the PPS lost the case, and Mr Melancia won it 
and, as a result, is free for ever of this case.
The active corruption case is not very different in terms of speedy resolution either. Only in 
terms of time was it worse - because it extended four years beyond the passive case. Soon after the 
verdict, the defendant’s lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court on two basic counts: firstly, the 
fact that the judge did not take into account the united version presented by four of the offenders 
and secondly, the penalty was based on Article 420.1 (old Penal Code) and in their view it should 
have been on Article 420.2, due to the fact that the objective (Weidleplan winning the contract) was 
not achieved. The former Article envisaged a penalty of up to six years in prison whereas the latter 
speaks of a penalty of up to one year in prison only.
A year later, on May 3,1995 the High Court refused the appeal thus confirming the first 
verdict which caused another appeal. Over three years later, on December 2,1998 the 
Constitutional made a decision - Acordao N° 680/98 in favour of the reformulation of the Supreme 
Court’s previous decision. In practice, it amounts to an annulment of the sentence, obviously in 
favour of the defendants. This active case is almost back to square one, so it seems now, and is 
likely to reach a prescription.
If the passive case had the incident of the president of the jury’s defeated vote, this last 
decision of the Constitutional Court creates another major incident, though not equally well known
248 See the Acordao do Tribunal Constitucional N°137/2002/T.Const. - Processo N° 363/01, published in 
Diario da Republica - II Serie, N°223 of September 26, 2002, pages 16303-16307.
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because the media has largely lost interest, it seems. In fact, after so many years, it is unlikely to 
gain further attention. Except for one person. The presiding judge of the active case, Filipa de 
Macedo went public in an angry reaction against the Constitutional Court (hereafter CC).
Consider the following four comments of Macedo. Firstly, her own personal views, 
perhaps too emotional ones: “Estou ofendidissima”, that is “I am utterly offended by the CC 
decision” because the first instance court was confirmed by the judges (Juizes Conselheiros) of the 
Supreme Court as “well elaborated, well based, the penalties were just and adequate to material 
factors seen as proved in the sentence.” Secondly, she sees a perfect correlation with the passive 
case process which is “entangled” and moves nowhere (“nao ata em desata”). Thirdly, an 
accusation against the system of justice, as the decision as such “does not have a minimum basis 
and it will discredit even more the Justice and the CC”; and as the substance of the decision is “an 
extremely formal way for the CC to cancel a decision that it intended to cancel” anyway. And 
finally, the most serious statement: “The CC is one hundred per cent a political Court”. These 
comments put the current judicial framework into question and bring alive the ingrained perception 
that the economic crimes of the powerful are left unpunished.249 Or, in the words of L. Sousa, it is a 
case of “double-standard application of justice in Portugal” (Sousa 2002,274).
4.3.7 Recovery of assets
This legal case has not included any attempt to revert to the State any misused funds 
whatsoever. This is an area which the jury of the active corruption case did not consider at all, 
something that needs a review as well.
4.4 The need for a new moral perspective
So far, several critical matters were raised in the context of this interesting legal case, 
following its various steps. They are sufficiently broad and not exhaustive, but they are indicative 
that there are cloudy areas in the current Portuguese context of public and private life. Political 
intervention lacks consistency; laws are ill made; administrative control mechanisms do not
249 See the editorial by J.V. in EXP:22.05.1993:8 “Tribunal politico e tribunal ju d ic ia land J.Garcia, 
EXP:01.05.1993:16 “Um crime, doisjulgamentos”.
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function properly; the judiciary faces several problems which cast doubt on vital aspects regarding 
the time when decisions are made, and the contradictory results which come from similar pieces of 
evidences.
With regard to the private sector, business companies operate with little supervision; 
accounts reveal malpratices as payments cross personal and business accounts without proper 
justification or documents; banks are used to transfer money which may include illegal activity; 
certain shops are known to receive millions in cash in exchange for goods; and others exchange 
cash for cheques with no apparent reason other than to satisfy a friendly request.
Within the mix of public and private sectors, the political parties play confused roles 
behind the scenes. Its leaders or former leaders have many links with politicians and people in 
public functions and also in the private sector; the movements to and from political office raise 
many suspicions; meanwhile critical laws, though imperfect, such as the financing of political 
parties and mechanisms regarding politicians’ interests are not implemented nor checked along the 
way; and these reflect a rather confused climate which easily favour illegality, as this case 
illustrates.
As far as this transnational case is concerned, the cooperation between Portugal and 
Germany functioned well and swiftly. The law in Germany remains too protective of nationals 
when dealing with international corruption. The impact of recent international agreements by 
OCDE and the United Nations may bring an effective change. Had Germany similar laws to the 
United States, Weidleplan agents would have faced criminal actions within the country too. But 
this case demonstrates that corruption sees no boundaries and it is important that there should be 
better cooperation among countries in fighting corruption.
So, with regard to Portugal, both the administrative and judicial mechanisms to prevent 
corruption failed to act swiftly and on time. The complaints about a cloud of suspicion in Macao 
were continuously ignored. In the three short years of the Melancia administration there were 
serious charges earlier in connection with the TDM case which received minimal attention. The 
Emaudio case could have been a good opportunity to reverse the situation of suspicion but the anti­
corruption authorities did not seem prepared to deal with the snowball effect and its wide
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implications. If it were not for the valuable cooperation of the Portuguese and German Public 
Prosecutors and Police, this case would have remained a mystery like many others. But even with 
such massive evidence in written form, this case did not reach a satisfactory conclusion in the 
courts.
PART TWO 
CAUSE & RESPONSE PATTERN
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Chapter 5 
Historical determinants of corruption
5.1 Introduction
This chapter marks the beginning of Part Two and deals with a critical evaluation of 
contextual factors of corruption and its responses. As stated in the introduction, it is only possible 
to undertake a detailed analysis of the latter (see Chapter 7 - Types of existing responses to 
corruption), whereas the former, here subdivided into two parts, namely the historical (this 
Chapter) and contemporary factors (Chapter 6) provide an overview of the underlying conditional 
factors behind an apparent subculture of corruption. This in turn provides a fundamental basis upon 
which to propose an anti-corruption response (see Chapter 8 - Formulating an alternative moral 
framework).
Although the author has undertaken a substantial examination of both historical and 
contemporary nurturing factors, something that has proved to be germane to the preliminaiy work 
of this thesis, and despite the restrictions of the word length, it is nevertheless right to concentrate 
even briefly, on identifying certain regularities or patterns of practice, and perhaps the structure of 
incentives and of cultural assumptions likely to account broadly for the occurrence of past and 
present corruption.
This chapter goes beyond the single case study approach. Although the focus in the last 
chapter was exclusively on the Emaudio case, the purpose there was to identify critical 
administrative and judicial errors in dealing with suspicion and the occurrence of corruption. Those 
findings paved the way for this and the following chapter to explore key holistic factors that most 
likely feed corruption. The first step consists of examining the historical or remote factors that are 
still perceived to be influential in perpetuating current patterns of corrupt practices.
The following section identifies key political, economic and social historical factors that 
influence current Portuguese affairs. Each factor is defined, explained and briefly discussed with a 
view to demonstrating how it is still conditioning the current situation and showing the relevance of
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considering its implications when determining and addressing contextual elements which underlie a 
climate of corruption.
5.2 The need for an historical perspective
The inclusion of an historical perspective is important because current culture is in part a 
result of inherited conditions. Gary Becker’s Nobel Lecture calls on economists to detach 
themselves from traditional narrow assumptions about self interest by recalling the fact that 
“Behaviour is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences” (Becker 1992), most of which 
are passed down over the generations. Therefore, as it is widely perceived, culture is neither static 
nor easily changeable. Good changes often take a while to be introduced as habits were acquired 
over a significant period of time (Corkill 1999, 124,186, 226; Fukuyama 1995). In the overall 
process of change, a fair perception of past realities and experiences is critical for the following 
two reasons.
Firstly, as correctly noticed by Johannes F. Linn, the World Bank Vice President for 
Europe and Central Asia, attempts to quickly “jump” towards solving the “proximate causes and 
consequences of corruption” in countries in transition suffer from a deficient knowledge of 
“historical factors underlying the persistence of corruption in the region.” (World Bank 2000, viii). 
Therefore, failure to consider an historical analysis may lead to ill designed anti-corruption 
strategies and inappropriate prioritisation of critical issues (UNDP 1997).
Secondly, corruption is a contextual concept in which past, present and future realities and 
expectations are mixed in a complex way. Given the fact that history cannot be changed, the way 
forward must be based on as correct an interpretation of the past as possible, particularly those 
aspects that still prevail and influence key individual and institutional performances and outcomes. 
So the inclusion of remote factors is necessary to explain, for example, why certain changes are 
either difficult or slow to implement.
A warning, though, is needed regarding the possibility of exaggerating the historical 
conditioning factors that in the Portuguese case would recall two perceived traits. The first one is 
“saudosismo”, a unique Portuguese word that deals with an excessive adherence to past ideals and
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views, and the second is a fatalism that leads to resignation and dangerous tautologous explanation: 
“things are the way they are because they are the way they are.” (Meny and Rhodes 1997,99).
Both extremes need to be dismissed as we proceed with this cultural and historical analysis.
Additionally, it is equally important to clarify from the outset that Portuguese culture as a 
whole is not to be seen as corrupt. Such an assumption is wrong because it tends to confuse one 
aspect, though important in itself, with the total picture. However, there seems to be no question 
that certain practices of corruption exist and need to be properly identified and accounted for by the 
competent authorities. Such routine practices constitute something which could be designated as a 
subculture of corruption.
5.3 Historical Determinants of Corruption
Portuguese political and economic affairs in the 20th century lacked a sense of stability. 
This was the inevitable result of changes in the political regimes, which within a century alone, 
moved from monarchy (until 1910) to the First Republic (1910-1926) to dictatorship in the Second 
Republic (1926-1974) and to the current democracy. Therefore, the country suffered from a 
permanent period of transitions and from 1960 to 1974 it also experienced a series of military 
conflicts in its former African colonies.
Within this volatile period the least affected of all major historical institutions was the 
Catholic Church even though it did suffer a rather arbitrary but short-lived persecution and the 
confiscation of its property during the confused period following the end of the monarchy. But the 
New State under Salazar and Caetano’s regime favoured Catholicism in a very special way. As a 
result, the church expanded its influence in social and educational areas as never before and 
benefited from the 1940 Concordat that guaranteed it certain unique social and economic 
privileges, most of which still exist today. These made Catholicism a stable institution which could 
equip the Portuguese people ethically for vital civic tasks.
Given these general features, the following are eleven remote (secondary) factors worth 
considering. Each of them will be briefly defined, exemplified, and its inclusion justified with 
particular emphasis on how it is still conditioning the apparently existing climate of corruption.
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5.3.1 Clientelism as a consistent feature in political economy
Clientelism covers a vast array of “informal relationship between people of different social 
and economic status” which includes a “mutual but unequal exchange of favours, which can be 
corrupt”250 (Clapham 1982; Kurer 1997, 31-43). Such informal culture and practice was deeply 
ingrained in all previous Portuguese regimes affecting not only politicians and business agents but 
also the people in general (Lopes 1991; Lopes 1993; Silva 1997; Mattoso 1998, 101, 108; Shuen, 
K. H., Public participation in combating Macao’s bureaucratic corruption, 1996).251 Therefore, in 
such settings, knowing a very important person is of the utmost importance in securing a special 
concession. And even knowing someone in certain key areas, such as in the hospital, seems also 
important to guarantee a medical appointment on time.
Such a clientelistic web always favoured the intermediary functions which also relied on 
the exchange of favours. In a society largely based on unequal opportunities, knowing the right 
intermediary was perhaps what was most needed to open the key doors. For a long time, the 
Portuguese people had been moulded to accept this reality. For instance, the Catholic religion in 
general had always accommodated a number of intermediary agents in reaching the throne of 
heaven or God in search for needed favours or grace. There is nothing wrong with that, but it 
illustrates a common practice as each believer is encouraged to have his own object of devotion.
For instance, the sociologist J.F.Almeida tells of a peasant who visited the village church 
and decided to donate a gift firstly to Saint Michael and then to the devil whom the saint had 
stabbed because he was not certain who would win, and therefore, it is better that both 
intermediaries should somehow be appeased (Almeida 1986, 323).252 So the entire way of life and 
not just politics or economics is generally geared towards a similar approach via intermediary 
relationships. Some may lead to a clientelistic type of exchange, which is not uncommon either.
250 See http://www.u4.nO/document/glossary.cftn#clientelism.
251 Cf. J.Aguiar, EXP:08.07.2000:24 “A Nation held captive by the State”; A.Barroso, EXP:21.08.1999 “In 
the shade of the banana tree”.
252 In the Portuguese Popular Religion, the Devil and God are never opponents as each chooses his own 
clients (Santo 1990,16; Carvalho 2000). Exactly as Pessoa used to say: “God is good and the Devil likewise 
is not bad”.
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This basically historic clientelistic environment inevitably facilitates both the acceptance, 
and the giving of gifts in exchange for favours, contracts or important deals from those in positions 
of power and or authority whether in the State or in private institutions. In many ways, this scenario 
continues to reflect the current socio-political and economic situation,253 and according to 
M.V.Cabral not even the Carnation Revolution has altered clientelistic practices yet (Barreto 
2000, 348).254 From a popular viewpoint, Portuguese has its own unique word which is 
untranslatable, and known as “cunha” (Morgado and Vegar 2003, 57,59; Aragao 1985, 190). It can 
also involve corruption but it often refers to favours that have been widely accepted and tolerated in 
all sectors of life.
Another expression from academic quarters widely used is “caciques” and “caciquismo” 
(chiefs / bosses) (Ruivo 2000, 70-72; Almeida 1991,129; Sobral and Almeida 1982). According to 
Lopes, this is largely based on “face to face”, “personalised” and “reciprocal” relationships 
between politicians and the public, particularly the private business sector (Lopes 1993, 732). All 
of these varieties of clientelistic habits reveal the negative historical implications behind a climate 
of corruption which remains largely unchallenged today and exists in different new formats, as 
Ruivo’s research clearly demonstrated (Ruivo 2000, 12).255
5.3.2 Monarchical and republican bureaucracy
Many of the clientelistic practices were due to poorly functioning, bureaucratic public 
administration imposed by the State and its personnel. Such an old and cumbersome bureaucracy 
had made difficult the lives of so many citizens and business enterprises (OECD 1996, 87-88). All 
past generations had countless stories to tell about inefficient structures, over regulation and 
illegitimate discretion of public officials. This prompted ways of circumventing bureaucracy
253 J.Cotter, PUB:17.01.2001:14 “The clientelistic cancer and the presidential function”; P.Serra,
DE:29.10.2003 “The master who is followed”; J.Guerra, DE:21.05.2004 “Portuguese style elite”; and 
D.Barroso, EXP:20.02.1999 “State clientelism”.
254 Likewise think the historians J.H.Saraiva, SEM:05.10.2000:18 “With the Republic, Portugal lost more 
than it gained”; and RRamos, PUB:07.02.2005 “In the last two centuries we made very few reforms but 
there were some revolutions”. Cf (Almeida 1986, 375; Silva 1994, 373).
255 Cf. D.F.Amaral in (Barreto 1998, 88); and J.Miranda in (Barreto 1998,180).
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through greasing the blocked system, something often referred to as “petty corruption” (Maximiano 
1993, 30).
Thispetty corruption became a normal part of life, thus causing no great concern among the 
people. Such a rather trivially conceived attitude was always justified because of the need to speed 
up the public administration’s answers to citizen requests. However, it always had a negative effect 
on the general climate of toleration to corruption and most particularly regarding people’s 
reluctance to denounce such ingrained practices (AACC 1990, 66,128, 130), something which 
Antunes called “social apathy” (Antunes 1996,154). This, after all, was never a minor issue as it 
first appears because of its snowball effect. Tolerating small errors can often lead to a rather more 
complex phenomenon, because if one can tolerate small corruption why not tolerate a big one? The 
former USA Secretary of State for Commerce, William Daley, warned that a prohibition of certain 
types of bribery might well be interpreted as the legalisation of others.256
This appears to be serious in itself. It seems to have been historically based on something 
equivalent to “venial sin” as opposed to “mortal sin”. Petty corruption is unequivocally perceived 
as a venial sin, so why bother too much about it? These theological concepts are deeply rooted in 
historic Catholic doctrine and might have contributed to minimising the seriousness of the so- 
called, less important sins. Such a minimum moral cost inevitably leads to some kind of 
willingness to tolerate corruption.
5.3.3 Politics of the few and for the few
A climate of corruption was made much easier because political activity always remained 
within closed doors where very few people dominated it throughout all the regimes of the twentieth 
century. The negative side of it lay in the absence of any tradition of accountability on the part of 
political agents and parties. This enabled a small group of politically empowered actors to 
manipulate key functions of the State, namely legislative and executive offices, to their own 
advantage. There corruption may occur but will most likely be unnoticed, except when someone 
internally breaks the chain and denounces it, or at the beginning of a new political regime, as the
256 PUB:24.11.1997:12 “International prohibition of bribery - what corruption?”.
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newcomers always accused the previous leaders of acting corruptly, but always for minor political 
and convenient reasons only.
For instance, during the First Republic, many rather short lived governments came to 
power, but, on the whole, the same few people returned to public office or else occupied the non­
elected administrative posts. Although some alternation did take place, the fact was not followed by 
any effective political alternatives or changes of personnel.
Another critical feature was centred around a handful of charismatic leaders in detriment of 
political ideas needed to transform society. Such an emphasis on a individual leader has remained 
the most popular solution even today, when there is a widespread belief that deep rooted problems 
can be solved by a single and highly regarded leader. A good example was undoubtedly the former 
dictator Salazar. He eliminated all political party activities and throughout his regime, politics 
remained a privilege of the very few, while a large majority of the population were politically 
illiterate as well as largely uneducated.
This politics of the few also accounts for concentration in main urban and coastal areas to 
the detriment of rural and interior regions, where not even the national media was interested. The 
local media in rural areas also lived behind closed doors so that sensitive information rarely 
reached the public. So, local corruption in rural areas hardly reached the news because attention 
was always concentrated in major cities.
5.3.4 Political alternation without change
As mentioned already, political alternation without change had an additional negative 
impact when dealing with the issue of corruption. For long, the monarchy was regarded as 
manipulating resources for the benefit of its own members (Maximiano 1996,375). The historian 
V.P.Valente said that he could not recall any historical period since the late eighteenth century in 
which corruption was not present in political economy affairs.257
In many ways, the Republic ideal was determined to transform the negative habits of the 
monarchy. Pires’ PhD research entitled “The idea of decadence in the generation of the seventies”
257 V.P.Valente, DN:23.04.2004 “Corrupgao”.
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(1870s), recalled how famous writers of the late nineteenth century pictured the negative political 
influence of all previous governments (Pires 1992), and some writers such as Ramalho Ortigao 
remained critical in the early years of the twentieth century too.
The concept of decadence was indicative of many poorly-functioning political systems and 
activities which academics had not been able to fully discern yet (Reis 1984; Amaral 1985; Franco 
1994, 258). But one of the most famous discourses of the seventies generation was by Antero de 
Quental (Quental [1871] 1994; Pires 1992, 64-72). His thesis gave a significant emphasis, in 
addition to religious matters, on the lack of political ability to overcome critical backward and 
historical conditions of the country. But this type of discourse and analysis was banned by the 
authorities, leaving critical comments to appear in other literary forms of which Ramalho Ortigao’s 
As Farpas is perhaps one of the best known today.258
From an ethical viewpoint, the highly praised Republican ethics did not alter the situation, 
just as Catholic ethics did not do so in the following Salazar regime either. Both, in fact, prolonged 
political instability and failed to discipline their own members in key places of decision-making 
and authority. Neither gave any priority to educating the population at large, which was always 
treated as incapable of grasping the complexities of political activity. So much so that dictatorship 
was peacefully received by the people as from 1926 onwards, and in 1974 it was similarly removed 
without much turmoil.
In conclusion, one looks in vain to find any past governments that considered corruption as 
a serious national issue needing special attention. Instead, the problem remained a taboo, except for 
short periods during electoral campaigns under the First Republic, and again during contemporary 
electoral periods. At best, corruption was viewed as exceptional, needing to be contained by 
appealing for better moral conduct by key agents in the State administration, exactly as the 
historian F.Rosas attested that changes of governments in the last twenty-five years of democracy 
do not mean any change of old corrupt habits.259
258 J.P.Guerra, DE: 12.04.2004 “A-dos-Cimhados”; and A.L.Marinho, DE:07.05.2004 “Failure”.
259 F.Rosas, 24H:23.12.2000:5 “Corruption in a pure state”.
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5.3.5 Corporativism: a selfish nature of defending one’s organisation
The attempt to protect personal and institutional interests has a legitimate social and 
political side in any society. The existence of corporations and professional associations of various 
sorts is found everywhere too. But Portuguese history had some distinctive features worth 
highlighting at this point. The entire New State was built on the specific 1933 Constitutional 
concept of a “Corporative State”, commonly designated as a “Corporative Regime” too. Economic 
associations organised themselves in accordance with their own collective function, rather than by 
individual representation.
From this concept there are critical terms which fit well the Portuguese historical context 
such as “corporativismo - corporativism” and “corporativo - corporative”. However, these terms as 
Wiarda has correctly pointed out remain “exceedingly ambiguous and often loosely employed” 
(Wiarda 1979, 89). Conceived originally as a means of enabling associations to perform both 
professional and civic duties, it was then viewed from the apparently selfish standpoint of 
defending one’s own corporation to the detriment of public interest and welfare. Over the years it 
became associated with vices, inertia and illegitimate self-protection, something which Aguiar 
described as the “absolutizagao dos interesses”,260
In this regard, “corporativism” carried a rather negative connotation. Common welfare was 
neglected, and instead of a good and healthy spirit of association there existed an inward looking 
corporative structure. The importance of this rather well rooted idea for a corrupt environment 
appears significant not only in the past but also in the present. Every collective body strove to 
achieve its own private objectives independently of whether or not they collided with wider 
national interests or expectations. Such selfish conduct on the part of corporative bodies was 
regarded as blocking any idea of reform which might disrupt their individual and narrow purposes.
Lucena has significantly expanded this theme by explaining its function, firstly within the 
Salazar and Caetano leaderships and then how it carried over into the current democratic regime, 
which is sometimes regarded as a neo-corporativist regime too (Lucena 1979; Lucena 1977;
260 J.Aguiar, EXP:06.02.1999 “Corporativism in democracy”.
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Lucena 1985; Lucena and Gaspar 1992; Lucena 2002). Vital Moreira sees corporativism and public 
administration as two “cancers” affecting the national health services, for instance, because the 
current economy is rather “corporative”, in that cartels and corporations agree together against both 
the State and patients in favour of their particular interests in a climate of impunity where no one is 
made accountable.261
This sort of example is repeated in many different sectors of life including in the political 
parties, judiciary and higher education. With such inbuilt traditions, the common welfare is 
relegated to second place and so is the anti-corruption cause.
5.3.6 Negative traits of colonialist attitudes
Being a colonial power, certain negative work habits were developed and accepted which 
proved to be conducive to national corrupt environment (Marques 1990, 11) both in the colonies 
and in mainland Portugal. The case study in the previous chapter dealt with the former colony of 
Macao. There, in a land distant but nevertheless ruled according to the Portuguese tradition and 
values, corruption was largely tolerated and even seen as a means of personal or institutional gain, 
though illicit at times. For long, suspicion of corruption was neglected by all the authorities. 
Unfortunately Macao was always associated with corruption (Shiu-hing 1993).
In the 1995 Anti-corruption conference held in Beijing, two contributions dealt with 
Macao’s case. Shuen explains how the Portuguese bureaucracy favoured the “middle man”, and 
“red tape”, and tolerated the “bad habits of local citizens” in giving presents to government and 
administrative personnel, including schools and employers (Shuen, K. H., Public participation in 
combating Macao’s bureaucratic corruption, 1996).
The second contribution from Jack Lo is a comparative study between the anti-corruption 
agencies in Hong Kong and Macao (Lo 1996). Regarding the latter, the Portuguese colonial powers 
had a very bad reputation for two consistent reasons, namely the lack of political will at the top and 
unchallenged bureaucratic absurdity in public offices. For decades, he writes, it “has been an open 
secret that the enclave’s government is riddled with corruption”. The creation of the so-called anti­
261 See 24H: 14.07.2001:7 “The health system suffers from two cancers”; and PUB: 14.07.2001.
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corruption unit in Macao was nothing other than a “toothless tiger”, added the author, following the 
same wrong Portuguese model introduced in 1983 in Lisbon.
Two faulty procedures characterised the Portuguese effort. The first is limited 
administrative power with no criminal investigative mandate whatsoever which only gave Public 
Prosecutor services the reputation of being “very slow and tortuous” (Lo 1996,1611). The 
relationship between these two agencies was faulty, to say the least. And secondly, investigation in 
the private sector was “strictly off limits”, that is, there had not been an adequate concept of private 
corruption. Instead, under the “veneer of human rights”, suspects of corruption managed to escape 
conviction. And finally, the over “judicialisation” of anti-corruption procedures in clear detriment 
to an administrative and preventive approach, always prevailed. Such structural and functional 
problems were not unique to Macao but extended throughout former colonies.
Portuguese colonial conduct with regard to corruption was therefore negative and clearly
affected the image of the country both internally as well as externally. Isolated and individual good
•  262procedures always existed but were insignificant in dealing with a culture of corruption.
Meanwhile, the habits that tolerate corruption abroad were intertwined with unchallenged national 
habits that left many ill designed control mechanisms within the State and private affairs intact.
5.3.7 Negative influence of long-lasting dictatorship
The long lasting dictatorship had a negative impact on society in general. Such an 
inheritance has two aspects, one which favours corruption and the other that obstructs effective 
responses to corruption. Among the first, there was a definite culture of secrecy within the public 
administration which hindered access to public information. Such a lack of transparency has 
persisted to the present and facilitated corrupt transactions and deals in closed networks. As 
Barreto explains in the opening chapter of A Situagao Social em Portugal, 1960-1995, information 
is power and those who have power, have information also. But the Portuguese experience is rather 
painful, after such a long spell of censorship and lack of political freedom and competition. Then
262 The resignation of former Governor P.Machado (1986-1987) is one example: “for reasons of institutional 
dignity which I have not forsaken, reasons which are of such importance to me personally that I should lose 
my self-respect...” - as cited in (Shiu-hing 1993, 34; Lo 1996,1609).
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he cites Salgado Zenha in the early period of the current democracy saying “In Portugal, more than 
the secrecy of the State, the true problem is the State of secrecy” (Barreto 1996, 21).
Not only the State but private agents too have a strong tendency to view public information 
as something “confidential” in matters regarding public and private relationships. Barreto rightly 
concludes that current attitudes and beliefs still support secrecy as opposed to an open concept of 
administration and government. And despite recent progress, the Portuguese context remains 
closed in many vital areas such as the legislative process and State budget (Barreto 1996, 23). The 
end result is never positive, as Fonseca clarified well in declaring that “The crime of corruption is 
profoundly linked to the existence of secrecy... which is not compatible with freedom and human 
rights” (AACC 1990, 102).263
With regard to obstructing responses to corruption, the inheritance of the past provides 
several excuses for not investigating corruption to the final stages. The so-called “traumatic 
historical experiences” are often used, for instance, to prevent attempts to create or even discuss the 
hypothesis of a specialised court for settling economic crimes (Simoes 2006, 37; GRECO 
2003, 12). Such a court recalls old fascist practices of manipulation of justice, argued some, in a 
clear effort to defend the tolerance of corruption in acceptable political terms.
Past experiences with the special secret police, PIDE, which was notorious for curtailing 
freedom and infringing on human rights, are continuously recalled when anti-corruption efforts are 
undertaken. Even the task of whistleblowing is often confused with former secret police officers 
and their collaborators, and seems to be discouraged as another illegitimate excuse (Ferreira and 
Baptista 1992, 90). Politicians in particular appeared very keen to lift up the banner of human rights 
while clearly neglecting the urgent need to reduce corruption.264 All of these still happen, even 
thirty years later, because of incorrectly handling past historical experiences, thus using them as 
excuses for not acting appropriately in reducing opportunities for corruption, and in neglecting 
adequate responses.
263 J.Ferreira, PUB:25.10.2001 “The secret democracy of the PS party”; and (Morgado, et al. 2003,104).
264 A clear example is the exchange of arguments between the PSD member, J.Neto and former deputy 
director of PJ, M.J.Morgado during the parliamentary inquiry - (Parliament 2002).
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5.3.8 Negative view of the  State
For many centuries, the Portuguese population has nurtured a very negative impression 
regarding the State in general. Former president Sampaio explains this rather negative view against 
those in positions of public authority quite well, and he quotes one of the most popular sayings that 
“to steal from the State is not a sin” which expresses a lot about the sentiments held over the 
years.265 From this type of comment to actually “rob” the State’s resources and reputation is a small 
step, as it seems when one recalls another well-known saying that the “thief who robs a thief has 
100 years of forgiveness”.
Therefore, as long as one is not caught, not paying taxes or failing to uphold the welfare of 
the State seems something highly tolerable among citizens. And if one is caught, it is conceived as 
bad luck, which is not all that unrealistic given the arbitrary conduct of state control mechanisms. 
So, almost everyone has the apparent right to accuse the State, as if it were an abstract entity and 
something very detached from a normal Portuguese human environment.
When the State appears not to satisfy someone’s need in the usual paternalistic style, or due 
to its many faults,266 the accusation can easily turn into verbal public insults against those in 
positions of authority, including the politicians in particular. For instance, even a bishop can join 
the crowd at times. The bishop of Viseu, apparently not happy with the discussions concerning 
abortion, went public to accuse Portuguese politicians of being corrupt by saying: “The truth is that 
the people are right, as the politicians are almost all corrupt but it is necessary to choose the lesser 
evil”.267
Such an historically rooted attitude always provided a basis from which to assault public 
resources for private benefit, of which corruption was just one example. M.Judice was right in 
saying that this cultural idea that “we are one thing, and politicians are another”, appears to 
penalise the political class but in reality it is highly excusable - that is, we are abdicating basic civic
265 J.Sampaio’s interview in DN:08.11.2000:6-8.
266 F.S.Cabral, PUB:02.09.2000:10 “Mission impossible” where he points reasons why the State could no 
longer be viewed as a “good person”; and PUB:07.10.2000:15 “The disaster of the State”.
267 DN:27.05.2001 “Bispo of Viseu calls politicians ‘corrupt’”. Cf. JJudice reaction in IND:01.06.2001 
“Questions of method”. See also another bishop’s comment in accusing the State in IND:01.03.1996 
(Revista) “Interview with Dom Eurico” - “From time to time the State comes and rob the church”.
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rights, including the responsibility to choose and monitor those whom we elect for public function 
(AACC 1990, 138). Given such behaviour, it can only stimulate further corruption by clearly 
neglecting to uphold and even protect State resources.
5.3.9 Negative ecclesiastical influence
The Catholic Church of the past was heavily hierarchical and largely monopolistic, 
allowing no other religious movement to exist or penetrate society in any basic competitive sense 
of the term. Throughout history, it was mainly a religion of the masses and rarely a prophetic voice 
of impartial nature and conduct. Such an absence from public life was largely responsible for the 
corrupt climate that was then installed in various sectors of national life for two reasons. Firstly, 
religious leaders were seen as models which people tend to follow but they generally failed to live 
up to Christian ethical standards. And secondly, they also failed in discipling believers to uphold 
critical doctrine and ethics for themselves.
As an influential religion, it had the “totality” of the people on its side, thus controlling the 
masses rather successfully for the purposes of retaining power and prestige which hardly fitted its 
fundamental religious and moral causes. This power, together with schools and various sources of 
income and additional resources, was not used for building a strong and independent civil society. 
Instead, power made religion a social and cultural force, probably at the expense of a feeble 
spirituality, which then affected its internal perception of key doctrines and its external ethical 
performance.
When religion failed in its basic mission, which according to Jesus who founded his church 
to defeat the evil forces by being instead “salt” against the corruption in the world, and “light” to 
enlighten minds and hearts of citizens, and when the Catholic Church illegitimately became 
involved with mundane political temporary power thus compromising itself in exchange for equally 
temporary material benefits, it then abandoned its very noble and religious reason for existing.
Negative examples were seen, for instance, in the way Jewish believers faced harassment 
and even death. Not only did their religion disappear almost completely from Portugal, but the 
country and its people in particular were deprived of their social, professional and economic
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contributions which in many parts of the world made an unquestionably positive and long lasting 
impact. Just as the business sector that functions without fair competition can mostly result in 
corruption, the monopolistic and inward looking religion of the past failed to challenge the State 
and its administration regarding its corrupt relationships that impoverished the entire society.
The Harvard historian and author of The Wealth and Poverty o f Nations, David Landes, 
unashamedly attributed to the old practices of Portuguese Catholicism the main responsibility for 
the backward economic conditions of Portugal in the past. Having attended an International 
Conference on Globalization, Science, Culture and Religion in Lisbon, Landes, in reply to the first 
interview question “Do you believe that the Catholic Church is guilty historically for holding back 
the Portuguese economy?” he said “In great measure. I do not know which type of answer you 
want...”. “An honest answer”, replied the journalist. Then he added: “If one accepts the fact that to 
remain competitive... it is necessary to work alongside all types of people and accept their 
differences and criticisms, and one church instead insists on homogeneous beliefs and practices and 
isolates, segregates, and expels others, it then loses... the advantages of what is now called 
pluralism. ...This made Portugal a backward country.”268
In addition to interviews, several articles appeared in the newspapers citing Landes but it 
was a surprise not to find any strong opposition to his unequivocal accusation against the 
Portuguese Catholic Church of the past. Such silence was unusual, so it seems. Instead, 
commentators prefered to emphasise the errors of Islam and generally refrained from including 
Catholicism that also fitted the picture.269
Such historical factors are now changing as the Catholic Church seeks to internalise new 
democratic values exactly like other Portuguese institutions today. Such a transformation is bound 
to take time to adapt and improve existing democratic standards in socio-political, economic and 
cultural sectors.
268 David S. Landes’ interview in IND: 12.10.2001:36-37 “The Catholic Church held Portugal back”. Cf. 
another interview in GR:November 2001:78-86, and in PUB:05.10.2001.
269 L.Marques, EXP:05.10.2001 “The politics of poverty”; H.Monteiro, EXP: 19.10.2002 “Masterly lesson”; 
J.C.Espada, EXP: 19.10.2002 “Worldwide opening”, and previously in EXP:06.06.1998 “A deferred reward”, 
and aftewards in EXP:08.01.2005 “Open sea: an inheritance and a project”; and much later, J.Vasconcellos e 
Sa, DE:23.02.2004 “The Arab report”.
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5.3.10 Conservative and elite manipulation
Apart from the past faults of the Catholic Church’s influential organisation as such, the 
elite, whether individuals and groups, were totally indifferent to corruption also. Not all of them 
were Catholics though, as many probably were only marginally so while others were clearly hostile 
and even joined the mass of anti-clericalist feeling that permeated various historical periods.
• ♦ • • 270Historians correctly place a special emphasis on the elite’s role in changing society. 
Portugal has not yet received much positive input from its elite which also conditioned any past 
possibility of reforming backward institutions. R.Borges, a former MP published an interesting 
article “The elite and power”.271 With few exceptions, he argues, the elite has not truly changed in 
the last 150 years. It remains “dilettante”, without strictness and competence and in favour of a 
culture of ease. It suffers from historical vices including envy and false rumours that maintain the 
status quo in being for their own ends. He then analyses the achievements of former leaders, 
namely Salazar and Soares.
Salazar was successful in bringing “peace”, firstly among Catholic brotherhoods 
(conservatives and liberals) and then between Catholics and the Freemasons. The latter, he argues, 
was cleverly “extinguished” while maintaining good relations with its leading key members, some 
of whom were colleagues in government, something which Borges called “irony”, whereas the 
former were given added privileges such as the Concordat (1940) and explicit support for its 
missionary activities in all the former colonies. With mastery, Salazar introduced a common 
enemy, the Communist Party and set it right in the middle so that the elite could amuse and apply 
their minds against such an evil threat, in addition to having silenced all the disturbing academic 
voices without any complaint from the elite.
270 The case of Britain, which like Portugal was a colonial power and once heavily connected with corruption, 
and how it eventually transformed itself due to positive elite influence, including religiously motivated elite 
and politicians - see (Harling 1996, 7, 262-263): “Similarly, while it is clear that a number of Tory and 
Conservative ministers felt an ethical impulse to reduce their own perquisite and patronage opportunities, and 
to govern frugally and fairly, the most powerful ethical impulse to sanitize government would appear to have 
come from independent Evangelical MPs, most notably William Wilberforce and the Saints, whose critique 
of wartime ‘extravagance’ stemmed from their belief that the greed and ambition of Pitt’s associates had 
ruined his commitment to reduce public spending and ‘irregular emoluments.” Cf (Girling 1997, 119, 130- 
132).
271 EXP:22.01.2000 “A elite e o poder”.
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From the seventies onwards, Soares created some basic conditions (secularism, unrestricted 
freedom, and lack of precision in conducting the State affairs) which satisfied the elite in the 
modem democratic period. Simultaneously, Soares extended the other hand to the Catholic Church, 
fostered private education and related to the USA and EU. In this way, argues Borges, Soares 
manipulated and silenced the elite too. So much so that nowadays, the elite is unable to react 
coherently to critical social, political and economic issues including corruption. Borges rightly 
concluded that whether one likes it or not, power in Portugal is dependent on the power of its elite 
with all the attachments thereof. So it is an illusion to dream of any reform of the political system 
and the State itself without transforming the mentality of the elite and benefit from its contribution.
5.4 Concluding remarks
None of the above historical factors, alone, or in combination, is likely to account directly 
for the occurrence of any single corrupt action. Each individual case needs to be judged by its 
unique characteristics. But the concern here is not with individual cases but with the man made 
environment which moulds current institutions.
As Portugal enters the 21st century, it leaves behind a century deeply marked by the rise of 
prominent isolated individuals, a lack of long-term political stability, a state authority marked by 
bureaucracy and patronage, a lack of efficient organisation and a vacuum in its associational life to 
use Wiarda’s terminology or “civic community” in Putnam’s sense (Putnam, Leonardi and Naneti 
1993, 86-87). It is obvious that Portugal has also a deeply ingrained corporatist tradition based 
upon the widespread acceptance of hierarchy, elitism, state dependence in the economy, religious 
intolerance, and a pervasive form of clientelism which neither the liberal revolution in the latter 
part of the 19th century nor republicanism and democracy in the 20th century has been capable of 
changing or modernising in significant terms (Wiarda 1979). These critical and pertinent historical 
matters need to be combined with contemporary factors which occupy the central focus of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 6 
Contemporary Factors of Corruption
6.1 Introduction
This chapter continues to focus on the environment of corruption by examining 
contemporary factors, in addition to the historical ones presented in the last chapter. Both offer an 
overview of an atmosphere that both nurtures and ignores corruption. The aim here is to draw 
together previously unrelated material in an original and multidisciplinary way in order to inform 
deeper reflection on the current search for environmental factors of corruption and responses to it. 
We examine certain individual and institutional practices and omissions that are regulated through 
a number of systems of norms, which include formal and informal, written and unwritten, and 
permeate politics, economics, legislation, customs, morals or religion. Figure 2 below provides a 
global overview.
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Figure 2 Institutions at the Interface of State-Market-Civil Society
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Each sector (State, Market and Civil Society and respectively black,grey and white 
corruption272) influences the other and shapes the way national politics and business operate in 
society. The interaction of power, wealth and values plays a vital institutional role. At the centre 
lies the fundamental structure of incentives and opportunites that nurture and ignore corruption in 
search for scarce resources. The following five condensed sections cover an extensive ground of 
beliefs and attitudes linked almost exclusively to economic-related crimes, starting from 
fundamental principles, political bodies of sovereignty, religion, anti-corruption policies, and 
further political, economic and social conduct that nurtures a partially corrupt environment.
272 See footnote 62.
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As stated in the last chapter, this thesis seeks to provide a basis upon which to offer a new 
and more contextually relevant proposal for an adequate anti-corruption response. This continues to 
be the main focus which the next two chapters cover in greater detail.
6.2 Distorted basis: The case of fundamental principles
Portugal, like many countries, has a Constitution.273 Such a statute is correctly viewed as 
the most fundamental basis with which all other ordinary laws need to be in full harmony. 
Moreover, it functions as a Magna Carta to which every citizen and institution must refer in 
looking for key principles for the enhancement of the country’s welfare. But the problem is that the 
1976 Constitution does not appear to fit this purpose because it is both incoherent and (therefore) 
largely not observed by the Portuguese people.
The Constitution is very long, with a total of 32,258 words in 296 articles. It is very 
difficult to grasp and open to conflicting interpretations. By contrast, the 1787 Constitution of the 
USA has 7,622 words in 7 articles and 27 amendments whereas the Chinese Constitution has 
11,365 words in 138 articles. Although the Portuguese Constitution contains important principles, 
many articles are rather vague, with good intentions that are difficult to implement and open to all 
sorts of demagogy.274 It includes sections that are symbolic in nature and have no practical 
relevance whatsoever, such as the articles on Economic Plans. It is also marked with ideological 
preferences, being largely left wing in nature.
275The consequences are that the people do not have a credible reference point to turn to.
This is highly problematic and one of the sources of bewilderment. With a track record of low law 
observance, this is highly problematic, for example, for matters regarding the anti-corruption cause. 
It fundamentally lacks a solid basis of trust, thus making the Constitution largely a "decorative" and
273 See the Portuguese and English versions in www.parlamento.pt
274 See J.M.Morais Cabral in DE:23.01.2004 “As corporagdes” in which he views the Constitution as 
something which easily accommodate “all forms of demagogy”.
275 See J.M.Cabral, DE:26.09.2003 “The Constitution and informality”: “Nao pensemos que serao maquinas 
fiscais ultrasofisticadas e mais tribunals que resolverao esta questao. O que resolvera o dilema onde nos 
encontramos, e que cada cidadao se reveja numa Constituigao, como a sua carta de deveres e garantias na 
Sociedade que integra. E esse o “trust” queprecisamos de criarpara todos acreditarem na verdade das 
instituigoes.”
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complex statute. Instead of solving problems, it is more likely to provide a basis for apparently 
endless disputes, including those within the judiciary.
Another, and perhaps even more serious, consequence is the unbalanced views regarding 
certain constitutional values. For instance, handling human rights standards on one hand, and 
upholding responsibilities on the other, appears to be deliberately unbalanced. When individuals 
and institutions can easily get away with certain malpractices and suspicion of corruption because 
they insist mainly on matters preserving and protecting human freedom and rights while neglecting 
key, but equally protected, common responsibilities, the anti-corruption cause is likely to suffer a 
rather serious defeat. This is not unusual in the current Portuguese context.
Because corruption apparently produces no victims, no one seems strong enough to support 
them and attempts to do so fail on rather false grounds of human rights or similar evasive 
“banners” that, in the end, prevent full investigation. A good example is the apparently endless 
discussion regarding the disclosure of bank secrecy. In a country where tax evasion is massive and 
widely perceived as a national scandal, access to bank accounts has been denied to investigative 
bodies for most of the periods under discussion, and only recently have there been any important 
changes. For instance, political party accounts are still restricted. So, the banner of human rights 
without a proper acceptance of responsibilities remains a Constitutional matter of discussion in 
which the wrongdoers are so far winning to the detriment of the country’s welfare.
6.3 Weak Sovereign Bodies
This section examines all four bodies that exercise sovereign power. According to the 
Constitution, they are the President of the Republic, the Assembly of the Republic (a unicameral 
Parliament), the Government and the Courts (Article 110). The analysis of the top political 
structure reveals certain features that concern the way anti-corruption issues have been covered in 
the past thirty years.
6.3.1 Weak Head of State
In the first two years of the transition to democracy there were two nominated presidents, 
namely Antonio de Spinola (1974) and Costa Gomes (1974-76). Ramalho Eanes, seen as the hero
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of the November 1975 countercoup, won the first presidential election in 1976, and was re-elected 
in December 1980. He stayed in office for a total of 10 years (each mandate lasts for five years), 
and so did the following presidents Mario Soares (1986-96, re-elected in 1991) and Jorge Sampaio 
(1996-2006, re-elected in 2001). The current president is Cavaco Silva.
According to die Constitution, the presidential function includes, among other things, the 
responsibility to guarantee “the proper functioning of the democratic institutions...” (Article 120), 
and to either appoint or, when proposed, confirm members for key posts such as the President of 
the Court of Auditors and the Attorney General, the Council of State and the Supreme Judicial 
Council (Article 133). Although the role of the president is not to be confused with governance 
matters restricted to the PM, there seems to be a permanent discussion regarding its effective 
power. But very few question the influence that a president has in the overall structure and 
functioning of the remaining bodies of sovereignty. For clarity’s sake, anti-corruption policies and 
efforts remain primarily matters of governance.
Despite the initial confusing period of political instability and transition to democracy 
(1974-1985), Portugal has always had stable presidential mandates and the last three stayed a solid 
ten years in office. Looking back, none of them made any specific or positive impact on the anti­
corruption cause. Leaving aside President Eanes who ruled in the difficult years of the transition to 
democracy and in a context of short-lived governments, the focus concentrates more on Soares and 
Sampaio. They are both agnostic and former leaders of the Socialist party. Soares had government 
experience while Sampaio had been mayor of Lisbon. Both, but most particularly Sampaio, raised 
the issue of corruption very occasionally and at various isolated ceremonies, but none of them 
succeeded in influencing a move towards establishing a nationwide and comprehensive anti­
corruption scheme.
Their anti-corruption discourses to moralise the public administration and appeals for a 
better judiciary had no practical consequences. Therefore, the influential, as well as the symbolic, 
role of the former presidents was not effectively used to support the anti-corruption cause. If 
corruption distorts fundamental democratic rules and thus affects the normal function of the
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institutions, the power and influence of all previous presidents were weak to prevent, as well as to 
account for, many signs of suspicion of corruption.
For instance, the consistent malfunction of so vital a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on 
all cases relating to alleged economic misconduct reveals a complete inability of Parliament to 
exercise a basic checks-and-balances mechanism. Worse still is the fact that the Inquiry 
Commission has not been functioning for the last four years, indicative of the weakness of the head 
of State in guaranteeing the proper function of vital democratic institutions. This inevitably 
contributes to a climate that facilitates the ongoing occurrence and ignorance of corruption.
6.3.2 Weak Parliament
Parliament occupies a central role in politics, including critical matters of legislation, 
budget control, and checks-and-balances in the exercise of political activity through its Inquiry 
Commission, and appoints ten out of the thirteen judges of the Constitutional Court (Constitutional 
Article 222). Examining all previous parliaments, the end result regarding economic crimes is very 
weak.
Starting with legislation, the field of anti-corruption remains faulty in the sense that current 
laws are not only sporadic but fail to be comprehensive and adequate. Over the years, the system 
provided short-lived legislation that kept changing in an atmosphere of permanent trial. So much so 
that many think of legislating over and over again.
Regarding the control of the national budget, it is public knowledge that one budget 
replaces another within a year with needed corrections. Additionally, there has never been a time 
when the opposition party does not pinpoint misleading figures. A lack of effective control of such 
an important monetary function creates a rather promiscuous climate of illegality with the official 
accounts. A quick reading of all the past annual reports of the Court of Auditors reveals a climate 
of permanent omissions and administrative faults that keep occurring, and changes only come 
gradually. Meanwhile, the country's accounts continue to have many kinds of ambiguities. This 
indicates a degree of carelessness in running vital public affairs.
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And, as stated above, the obvious inefficiency of all the Parliamentary Inquiry 
Commissions regarding economic crimes is beyond dispute. They were all inconclusive. Unable to 
come to terms with several controversies, the Parliament passed a very negative message to the 
citizens. It substantiated a climate of impunity which truly characterised this important 
parliamentary function. This thesis deals with one of these Inquiry Commission cases in greater 
detail and explains the extent of its failure. Therefore, the national house of politics reveals a very 
weak and vulnerable condition that needs major structural changes in order to cut down present 
incentives and opportunities for corruption.
6.3.3 Short-sighted Government
Good governance is essential to provide the right conditions to fight corruption. Again, if 
one bypasses several short-lived governments of the first ten years since 1974, the emphasis 
concentrates mainly on the stable leadership under C.Silva (1985-95), and Guterres (1995-2002). 
Unlike the previous two presidents, they are devout Catholics and divided their rule between two 
most influential parties, the PSD and PS. Their record of anti-corruption achievements is equally 
weak.
Cavaco inherited a difficult economic situation, but he took over from the Central Block 
government which had already referred to corruption as a national problem. His leadership has 
ignored such seriousness and treated it mildly. Such a mistake on the part of C.Silva, himself an 
economist, turned out to be fatal, as he failed to established a comprehensive anti-corruption policy 
after the replacement of the former High Authority Against Corruption. His government left the 
anti-corruption cause divided among conflicting bodies under the Ministry of Justice (PJ and 
Courts), the Ministry of the Interior (the remaining police forces), and the PPS, in addition to 
precarious collaboration from diverse institutions across public administration, of which the tax 
office and local government are just some critical well-known examples.
The continuous misuse of public and EU funds was left unresolved, including unrealistic 
budgets of most of the public works undertaken which ended up being rather expensive. These 
features created a climate of carelessness in politics despite economic recovery and achievements.
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So after ten years of the PSD governments, the electorate removed it from office, in a climate of 
saturation and dissatisfaction too.
The PS under Guterres (1995-2002) tried to reform a number of these perceived 
malpractices. Although the people supported the change, the outcome in the end was far below 
public expectation. The suspicion of corruption continued to appear significantly widespread, and 
the Guterres government hardly moved beyond empty discourses and promises.
The case of corruption in the Junta Autonoma de Estradas was poorly handled, despite 
having Joao Cravinho, one of the most prolific writers on corruption, in charge of the Ministry of 
Public Works. Some of the more positive laws came as the effort of the Minister of Justice, 
Antonio Costa, but again only sporadically. But Guterres was unable to provide sufficient evidence 
of controlling the lobbies and the situation ended in a heavy moral loss, which terminated rather 
abruptly in the aftermath of the local elections in December 2001.
Portugal therefore remains without a firm and coherent anti-corruption policy and strategy, 
largely because of the weak anti-corruption governance policies of both Cavaco and Guterres. This 
was openly acknowledged by members of the Durao Barroso administration (2002-2004) on the 
occasion of Greco’s visiting team, regarding the evaluation of the anti-corruption situation in 
Portugal. In his short administration, three ministers resigned on moral grounds. He somehow 
maintained political support when his Minister of Defence, the leader of the other coalition party, 
was under heavy suspicion of unethical conduct related to his prior involvement with the private 
firm Amostra. Like Guterres, Barroso also abruptly departed from government in 2004 to head up 
the European Commission in Brussels.
Despite a clear majority in the Parliament, his successor, Santana Lopes had little time to 
rectify critical political mistakes and even added to them, so much so that he was dismissed by the 
former president Sampaio in 2005. It is too early to analyse the current government under Jose 
Socrates which has only been in power for just over a year.
Therefore, previous governments are all responsible for the absence of a comprehensive 
policy and strategy to fight corruption with a minimum hypothesis of success. Instead, anti­
corruption remains neglected in this rather accidental nature, discussing trivial matters without any
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proper regard for protecting rather scarce public resources. In practice, governments are keen to 
both talk and promise to defeat corruption but, so far, they are clearly losing this strategic battle.
6.3.4 Ongoing crisis in the judiciary
The justice system is independent and subject only to the law. Although supported by 
public funds and generally under the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary seems so far unable to 
bypass an internal climate of crisis and confusion which negatively affects the anti-corruption 
objectives in particular. And yet, fundamental for any study of corruption is the functioning of 
justice. This section deals with the problem of the judiciary as a whole while section 5 below refers 
specifically to anti-corruption issues.
The Justice in crisis? Crises o f Justice, edited by A.Barreto, consists of forty five 
individual contributions from people, the majority of whom have inside working knowledge of the 
judiciary. The result is a pluralist and multidisciplinary perception of critical issues such as the 
efficacy, accessibility, responsibility and credibility of the judiciary which are worth referring to.
To shorten the bibliography, and except otherwise stated, references to individual authors in this 
section, followed by page numbers, are from this book (Barreto 2000). The purpose is to identify 
key aspects likely to bear some relevance to the investigation, accusation and punishment of 
corruption.
As many correctly insisted, this crisis of justice must be seen in its wider context, alongside 
the societal crisis (J.C.Ferreira, 209; L.Rebello, 341); more specifically the crisis of citizenship 
(A.Barreto, 26; L.Lucio, 32; A.Filipe, 113; E.Costa, 173; P.Vasconcelos, 409); of values (A.Cluny, 
102; J.Miranda, 253); of law (L.Chorao, 337; A.Cluny, 97) and obviously the crisis of politics 
(A.Lima, 129; D.Carvalho, 139; G.Fonseca, 208; J. Ferreira, 246).
According to D.Bravo’s theory (263-74), there is a growing noise being heard throughout 
Portuguese society. He concludes that there is indeed a real crisis of justice beyond the "noisy 
environment". However, the views vary significantly on what are the basic causes affecting the 
five existing major branches such as the police forces, the Public Prosecution, the defendants’ 
lawyers, the judges and the court officials. Araujo accurately views the major problem as primarily
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one of defining the crisis (63). In fact, the situation has always appeared confusing, exactly like the 
case surrounding the anti-corruption strategy. Consider the following factors.
We have a “pluralist system” (cf. civil, criminal, constitutional, administrative, fiscal and 
auditor courts, in L.Lucio, 36) which in the words of E.Costa functions as a kind of “poli- 
centrismo” (multi-centred system) (179). It includes the following Supreme Councils such as the 
Conselho Superior de Magistratura (of the entire judiciary), the Conselho Superior do Tribunal 
Administrate e Fiscal (of the Administrative Court in particular), and the Conselho Superior do 
Ministerio Publico (of the Public Prosecutor Services). Additionally, there are two other bodies, 
namely the Conselho de Oficiais da Justiga (of all officials under the judiciary), the Autonomia 
Organica of the PJ (the autonomy given to this branch of the police only). All of these operate with 
apparently no greater evidence of accountability, cooperation or coordination within and between 
themselves (cf. E.Costa, 178; L.Lucio, 37; P.Ferreira, 192). As such, it is a worrying phenemonon 
affecting one of the basic pillars of democracy.
E.Costa appears to have no doubts in affirming that “From this convergence of phenomena, 
corruption will be bom as a politico-criminal phenomenon of major proportions in contemporary 
democracies and a new and spectacular focus of conflict between the legislative/executive powers, 
due to the perversion of the political system.” (178) Although he is referring to the European 
situation in general, we think this applies to the post-1976 Portuguese Constitution as well.
Maia, himself a PPS official in the Supreme Court of Justice, pinpoints the fact that the 
PPS has achieved a status of independence as never before. D.F.Amaral takes it further by saying 
that it is now a "State within a State" (152). But moving beyond the argument either in favour of, or 
against, the PPS's present status of autonomy from the government, the major relevant problem 
remains, precisely because the PPS, despite its favourable conditions, has not yet in practice 
achieved any success whatsoever in fighting corruption. This is the point which Amaral observes 
specifically too (153). And elsewhere he again affirms how a climate of corruption is created 
within the judiciary: “From this (slow justice) to using corruption so certain cases are resolved 
quicker, or in time, is just one step...” (Amaral 2000, 250). So, despite its comprehensive
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autonomy and responsibility to persecute corrupt offenders, the PPS’s anti-corruption results in 
practice fell well below the minimum expected level of success.
The current judiciary is faced with other critical problems. A serious one has to do with 
contradictory conclusions reached in different courts over a similar legal issue (D.Bravo, 265-6, 
270). It is also noticeable that both the PPS and the judges need further expertise to deal with the 
increasing sophistication of crimes, particularly with organized crime and corruption (cf. D.Bravo, 
265-6; M.Pimentel, 303; and P.Vasconcelos, 409). Another is the re-enforcement of the old 
corporatist tradition (P.Carvalho, 139,141; E.Costa, 178; G.Silva, 205; J.Caupers, 227; J.Miranda, 
256,259; M.Pimentel, 303; L.Chorao, 337; M.V.Cabral, 347-8; M.Torres, 385; P.Magalhaes, 420; 
and R.Pereira, 431), leading to two drastic consequences that coexist, namely the politicisation of 
justice and justicialisation of politics. Regarding the former, Costa Andrade went public to call this 
as “estrondoso falhango dos politicos” (resounding failure on the part of politicians). Speaking in 
the aftermath of a major scandal in a state-controlled orphanage, he theorises the procedure most 
applied by those in politics. That is, when someone is accused of something, they proceed 
immediately to the courts. Why? Precisely because the possibility of being found guilty is very 
small indeed. In the absence of a “civic conscience” based on a proper acceptance of political 
responsibility, the major problem remains, he argues, “As long as there is a colonisation of the 
criminal procedures by the politicians” we shall live in the “swamp” (pantano).276 This equally 
applies to economic crimes which remain largely unpunished.
The judiciary problem extends to matters of shortage of personnel, productivity and 
blockades within the system. For the former, A. Bica (77-96) presents some self-evident statistics. 
In 1997 there were 386 criminal courts of which 381 were of the “primeira instancia” (first 
instance) and the remaining 5 of the “Relafao” and the Supreme High Court with 1,267 judges, 964 
agents of the PPS and 7,410 of other personnel; 29 administrative and fiscal courts which included 
the Central Administrative and the High Administrative courts with a total of 131 judges, 68 PPS
276 See interview of C.Andrade (law professor, former MP [1975-95] and actively participated in the makeup 
of the 1982 Penal Code and Penal Process Code and Constitutional revisions) in DN:07.12.2002 “Falhango 
estrondoso dos politicos” and “Ausencia de punigdes e uma ‘praga ’ in Portugal’. Exactly a year before, the 
PM Guterres dismissed from government in order to avoid the “deep mudd”.
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agents and 366 other personnel; 7 military courts; one Constitutional Court with 11 judges, 4 PPS 
agents and 63 other personnel; and one Auditor Court.
Considering just the case of the criminal courts (first instance), there were in January 1991 
260,461 pendant lawsuits in the hands of the judges. That number increased every year so that by 
December 31, 1997 the number had reached 724,086 lawsuits. During the same period the number 
of judges also increased from 923 to 1,190 although 70 of them were not on duty. In 1991 there 
was an average of 282 lawsuits in the hands of each judge, but by 1997 that figure had jumped to 
608. The final result is inevitably a congestion of legal cases which can take many years to resolve.
These figures would have been much greater were it not for the amnesties given in July 
1991 and May 1995. Delays are made even worse when there are appeals to higher courts. When 
they eventually reach the Constitutional Court, they are significantly increased. This type of 
criminally-facilitated condition somehow explains why, for instance, the rather simple case of 
Emaudio has still not been fully and satisfactorily resolved from its detection in February 1990 
right up until October 2006.
With regard to blockades, the Portuguese words “prescrito” (lapsed/proscribed) and 
“arquivado” (filed) are by far the best examples. For brevity’s sake, we shall explain the first one 
only, which refers to cases that have passed the time of liability for processing criminal charges. 
A.Filipe (110) tells us that in 1992 there were 569 “lapsed” cases whereas during 1993 tol998 
there were about 40,000. There are several causes including an error in legislation during the PSD 
government covering the period of 1987 to 1995 (cf. D.Bravo, 269-70); the defendants simply do 
not obey the courts’ notification to appear, and miss the sittings in the trial; lawyers make use of 
the “facilities” provided in the penal process code and elsewhere; and notifications are simply not 
delivered - in the District of Lisbon alone, there were 132,000 processes on standby for lack of 
notification, 15,000 reports to be made by the special police laboratories and 6,000 autopsies to be 
written by the forensic medicine departments of Lisbon and Oporto. These apparently chaotic 
situations deeply frustrate the general public and re-enforce the sense of laxity and impunity, thus 
making the anti-corruption cause, among others, something which every citizen is virtually advised 
to stay away from.
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Meanwhile the problem remains. Proen9a de Carvalho (141), a highly regarded lawyer in 
Lisbon categorically affirms that none of the governments thus far has had the courage to confront 
the powerful corporatist groups within the system of justice (with similar arguments cf. M.Veiga, 
393; L.Lucio, 37; and A.Simoes, 59). All governments are keen to reaffirm the independent status 
of the judicial courts and judges. But all of the above and others tend to agree that the political 
powers are advocating “independence” as an excuse for not intervening in time. The outcome, in 
the words of E.Costa (173), is that the entire system is both “auto-desculpabilizante” (self- 
excusing) and “hetero-culpabilizador” (blaming others), so that no one is to be held responsible.
M.V.Cabral, himself a sociologist, has no doubts too that the political powers have 
completely failed to instil democratic values and principles into the judiciary and the police, 
leaving untouched the oligarchy, clientelism and corporatist attitudes and behaviour (347-8). The 
crucially needed reforms are constantly being postponed (G.Silva, 206-8) and even the occasional 
small reforms are quickly being replaced by other “little reforms” (J.Carvalho, 324; A.A.Santos, 
56) and without the proper involvement of other key sectors within the plurality of the justice 
system (R.Frances, 426). With this environment, it seems obvious that our politicians and the elite 
are turning a blind eye towards certain types of crime, including corruption. The main winners, if 
there are any, appear so far to be the lawyers who see the accusation of corruption brought against 
their clients as largely inconclusive, either by escaping trial or by having verdicts annulled or even 
declared lapsed.
6.4 Weak ‘national’ religion
Catholicism, as in the past, has contributed in moulding the character and values of various 
citizens who reached prominent political and economic positions including the roles of the 
President and Prime Minister. However, its weakness lies in that only a tiny fraction of the elite 
appears to practise Catholicism in their everyday conduct of public business.
In fact, most Catholics are not yet well informed about fundamental aspects of Christian 
doctrine and values, something which has proved to be inadequate to cope with the demands of an 
open and free society today, including fulfilling a vital watch-dog role. This requires a deeper level
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of commitment to democratic principles and values on the part of the people in general. Such a 
fault is primarily an institutional one, it seems.
Catholicism's fault, in general, is due to its own lack of zeal for evangelism (making new 
converts) and discipleship (training of believers) and appeals towards moving in these directions 
are now being heard. Meanwhile, one must not ignore the fact that thousands attend moral and 
religious lessons in public schools and within ecclesiastical organisations every year. Many parents 
baptise their children and have them enrolled in religious classes. But somehow, there seems to be 
no in-depth interiorisation of beliefs likely to result in adequate ethical conduct in public spheres. 
Theologically, it has not been influential either. It has failed to produce a viable contemporary 
theology and have it open up to a public discussion of relevant national topics.
Nevertheless Portugal remains on the list of European countries that most value religion, 
although it is still largely a case of a "religious monoculture" according to the European Value 
Systems Study Group.277 This study confirmed, through the variable of work ethics and the analysis 
of nine theological beliefs, that most Portuguese people are unable to articulate beliefs beyond the 
level of mere “social conformism” (141) (Fran?a, L. d., Portugal, valores europeus. 1993, 28). 
Another worrying aspect is that Portugal is among countries that least value politics, and distrust 
politicians immensely. So much so, that Fran?a correctly set a pertinent question: “Can democracy 
progress in Portuguese society with such low trust?” (Fran9a, L. d., Portugal, valores europeus. 
1993, 17).
As we see it, the answer is negative. Thus there is a need to examine this important 
dimension of the Portuguese context. Being Catholics only by birth (and baptism), nationality 
(historical influence) and culture (unquestionable tradition) is not enough to form a solidly-based 
democratic structures and individuals.
Moreover, the same study reveals an interesting factor that people with fewer religious 
interests and convictions are the ones that approve and encourage the Catholic Church to be more 
involved in social problems (Fran9a, L. d., Portugal, valores europeus. 1993, 172). To some
277 See (Fran9a, L. d., Portugal, valores europeus. 1993). Two other studies reveal important features 
regarding the practicabilities of religion in current Portuguese society (Fran9a, J. A., Sondagem nos anos 20, 
1983; Fran9a, L. d., Jovens perante a religiao, 1985).
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sociologists, religious beliefs and practices are the most powerful criteria for an ethical evaluation 
of the “Portuguese way of life” (Silva 1994,227,234; Santo 1990,145; Almeida 1986, 310). And 
the country will only lose if Catholicism remains weak or is tacitly marginalised. The Catholic 
Bishops, however, appear determined, and rightly so, to see their voice and influence 
communicated in public, including on matters of social importance.
But only once has the Portuguese Episcopal Conference included corruption in its 
documents - Pastoral Letter "Joint responsibility for the common good" (Sept. 15,2003), which 
identified it as one of the seven social sins. It is no more than a single phrase.278 Such a simplistic 
contribution is not all that different from past and present political discourses with no practical 
consequences.
So, there must be other reasons beyond numbers and general observations. As S.Franco 
once warned, the diversity of waves and of institutions under the umbrella of the Catholic Church 
made simplistic all the greater generalisations stated about its relations with the establishment 
(Franco 1989). If, on the one hand, it is unacceptable to make inconsistent or generalised 
statements about Catholicism with all its complexity, it is equally unacceptable to bypass a critical 
view of such an influential religion with fear of misrepresentation. This or similar reasons are not a 
valid excuse for omitting the most important socio-cultural phenomenon, and it ought therefore to 
be included in this study of a specific theme such as corruption. One perhaps needs to examine the 
basis of certain key dogmas (doctrine and beliefs) that shape moral theology thus far.
Dogmas are often disregarded in the context of social ethics studies. We have seen that 
tendency in some contemporary Portuguese authors too (Santo, M., Religiao popular. 1990; Santo, 
M., Comunidade rural ao norte do Teio. 1999; Almeida 1986; Silva 1994) though not so much in 
the case of Sons o f Adam and Daughters o f Eve (Cabral, J. P. 1989). If theory and practice are 
rarely completely harmonious in any sphere of life, not least in moral theology, it is nevertheless a 
mistake to disregard either of them.
278 It reads: “corruption, the real framework for social sin, which is expressed in perverse ways which violate 
human dignity and the moral conscience for the common good.”
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J.Mahoney, a Jesuit scholar and author of The Making o f Moral Theology (Mahoney 
1989)279 provides a valid analysis280 of Roman Catholic Moral Theology, hereafter RCMT. Unless 
otherwise stated, references to page numbers in this section come from Mahoney’s book. His 
methodology follows a thematic approach rather than a chronological one. In the process, he pays 
close attention to key ideas, concepts and thoughts and to the fundamental "makers of moral 
theology" such as Augustine (concept of sin) and Aquinas (nature and the supernatural) without 
neglecting a number of other less known ones like Abelard, Pope Pius XII, Jansen, William of 
Ockham and, more recently, Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul n. He covers several influential 
ecclesiastical movements and events including universities, the Magisterium, and Church Councils. 
Through them all, he describes the way key doctrinal issues have been handled and, most important 
of all, how they have finally shaped the moral aspects of both individual and collective life.
Mahoney correctly starts with the theme of auricular confession281 of sins as the single 
most influential factor in the long development of RCMT. Space forbids to expand the influence of 
critical historical developments from Tertullian (160-220 AD) in linking together early Christian 
thought and the Latin language in which he introduced a strong legal bias to that thought;282 to the 
first Council of Nicaea in 325 which also dealt with disciplinary matters of how to handle sins for 
which a variety of responses subsequently appeared, including the appearance of meticulous lists,
279 The author is grateful to Dr E.D.Cook for introducing the works of Mahoney in the course of developing 
this section of the thesis.
280 The advantage of using Mahoney’s research is threefold. The author speaks from an inside knowledge of 
Catholicism. His critical comments represent a genuine effort to evaluate a wide variety of moral themes 
without neglecting the polemics, events and experiences of history. And finally, far from either emphasizing 
the past or simply concentrating on the profound changes lately introduced by the Second Vatican Council, 
the author handles current Catholicism with a remarkable degree of both balance and seriousness, by fully 
acknowledging the “continuity” as well as the “renewal” aspects of the Church of today. One criticism is 
that the author showed no explicit consideration of the development of moral theology outside the confines of 
the Roman Catholic Church.
281 His analysis covers primarily the anthropological questions of “Who is man? How is he to relate to 
himself, God and others?” It deals simultaneously with man’s view of God and God’s relationship with 
mankind. In the middle, there is a powerful concept of “sin” which, according to biblical theology, needs to 
be properly acknowledged and personally dealt with (cf. John 20.22-3). The issue centres around the 
discipline of penance, how to deal with sin and have it either punished or confessed and forgiven.
282 Tertullian emphasized, for instance, the forensic imagery and the dread of Christ’s judgement based on the 
court of law analogy. God was viewed primarily as the supreme judge.
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classifications and family trees of sins.283 By the time of Augustine (354-430) the traditional 
division of sins into “mortal”, which can be expunged only by full confession and contrition,284 and 
“venial”, as all the daily lapses, were firmly established.
And later, the teachings of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) came to occupy so central a place 
in moral theology.285 Aquinas’ aim was to construct a synthesis between reason and faith, 
philosophy and theology, Aristotle and Catholic doctrine. He believed that correct philosophy can 
greatly aid theology (Lane 1986, 94). His fundamental definition of any law as an order, or 
arrangement, of reason for the common good (78) was to be distinguished from Augustine’s eternal 
law which was impressed on human beings.
Aquinas stressed, on the other hand, the functioning of man's reason in building up a whole 
logical scheme of moral reasoning without neglecting divine help and revelation altogether. His 
expressed confidence in man's reason being able to come to some knowledge of God's eternal law 
convinced him that morality is essentially rational conduct, and as such it must be accessible, at 
least in principle, to human reason and wisdom (106), so that the purpose of revelation, so far as 
morality is concerned, appears to be essentially remedial, not necessary for man but in practice 
almost indispensible (107). But Mahoney commented that many Catholics greeted this conclusion 
with reluctance and unwillingness to accept that there was nothing specifically distinctive about 
Catholic ethics as compared with the best of humanist ethics.
Returning to the fundamental concept of sin, the penitential discipline begins to develop its 
criterion upon which confessor and penitents alike were to mould their conduct. One needs to 
remember that in the earliest stages it was an attempt to draw Christians out of folk religion and 
their magic and pagan customs into a close fellowship with God himself. But Mahoney (7, 14)
283 Cf. The authoritative lists of Cassian and Pope Gregory the Great. The former includes the eight 
‘principal vices’ of gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger, dejection, sloth, boasting and pride. This is perhaps 
the earliest attempt to classify sins using criterion of seriousness, which deeply influenced people’s conduct 
in both religious and social affairs.
284 For hither explanation see A.McGrath in New Dictionary o f Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology 
(FJ.Atkinson and D.H.Field, Eds, IVP, 1995), pp27-33.
285 As N. Harvey correctly noted (in NDCEPT:218-9; cf. Lane, 1986:98), “natural law” occupied an 
insignificant place compared with his extended treatment of the virtues. Rather, it was Pope Leo XII (1878- 
1903) who gave to the thought of Aquinas a status which his work had not enjoyed in medieval times.
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noted that from the beginning the literature of penance was selective in its subject matter, negative 
in its approach, and shocking in its more lurid passages which resulted in a "self-defeating" system 
for ordinary Christians. The final result, he added, "seems to have been that the great numbers of 
ordinary Christians must have lived in what could only be called a permanent state of ecclesiastical 
delinquency. Until they were dying." (4)
With the monastic influence from the 6th century onwards came the general rule of private 
and repeated confession.286 By the time the concept of Pope as successor of St Peter became 
clearer, that is, around 1215, Pope Inocent ID called the Fourth Lateran Council. On that occasion, 
the Church as an institution increased significantly its influence and power. For instance, there 
they affirmed that there was no salvation outside the Church; reinforced the condemnation of 
heretics; approved transubstantiation; founded what was later called the “inquisition” and imposed 
on the whole Church the obligation of “Easter Duties” which still figures with a few modifications 
in the Church’s current legislation.287
The next critical developmental period coincided with the aftermath of the Protestant 
Reformation, which challenged the very nature and basis of penance. The Council of Trent (1545- 
63) felt it necessaiy to give thorough treatment to the subject. It reacted by reaffirming the Fourth 
Lateran Council and "thoroughly approved the practice of confessing during Lent" (23). The priest 
is portrayed as a presiding judge who alone is to pass the sentence of forgiveness. Trent, as most 
historians would agree, remained influential until changes were introduced by the Second Vatican 
Council (1962-5).
This Council was a call for renewal, including in the moral behaviour of the Church’s 
members (303), and an attempt to make moral theology more Christocentric with the hope of
286 The obligation consisted of observing the auricular confession at least three times a year, a practice that 
lasted for the next four centuries, during which the early scholastic theologians developed, clarified and 
systematized the doctrine of the seven sacraments (16). In assessing liability to penance, nuances 
distinguishing ignorance, inadvertence, carelessness and contempt were considered. A habit of sin in a 
particular area may be considered more culpable than a single act, and external factors were also taken into 
account. Two features of penance were highlighted namely “self-mortification” and “pilgrimage” as a means 
of expiating one’s sins.
287 It consisted of confessing all sins before one’s priest at least once a year and receiving the Eucharist on 
Easter Sunday. The penalty for disobedience was to be barred from entering the church in one’s lifetime and 
be deprived of Christian burial at one’s death (17).
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seeing faith seeking expression in behaviour (340). Mahoney explains that a morality of law 
(Augustine’s influence), and especially of natural law (Aquinas’ influence), “is not thereby ruled 
out, but it is seen to be ‘much too abstract and inadequate’” (304).
The much studied Catholic Social Teachings of the last 150 years are another positive 
attempt to put faith into social order and practices. But these reforms cannot be achieved without 
individual spiritual renewal first. This is precisely the weakness referred to in the begining of this 
section. To be positive, it must be tested in the public domain, in the market places where ordinary 
men and women, old and young, play a vital part in one’s own profession, community and society 
at large. So far, the result seems not yet to be positive in transforming culture in general, and work 
ethics in particular.
Mahoney’s concluding remarks on auricular confession are threefold. Firstly, he notes the 
excessive preoccupation with sins. Despite the fact that countless souls have received God’s grace 
and consolation throughout the ages, the penitential system in general was heavily responsible for 
increasing men’s weakness and moral apprehension. The entire system was based on a pessimistic 
view of anthropology which was concerned “almost exclusively with the darker and insubordinate 
side of human existence.” (28). In the end, it had great difficulty in realizing the need to help the 
individual to come to terms with his moral responsibility for himself. The preoccupation was not 
just with sin, but with sins (31). This led to a mentality disposed to discount sins which were not 
mortal, but “only venial”, and more significantly, it led also to an approach to the moral life as 
“discontinuous; ‘freezing’ the film in a jerky succession of individual ‘stills’ to be analysed, and 
ignoring the plot.” (31). Mahoney is right when he says that “for all its preoccupation with sin and 
its busy cataloguing and subdividing of sins, from the family trees of Cassian and Gregory 
onwards, moral theology has not always appeared to take sin itself seriously enough... It has, 
indeed, almost domesticated and trivialized sin, like the scientist or the zoologist handling deadly 
specimens with careless familiarity.” (32).
Secondly, there was a clear concentration on the individual aspect of sin. This stress on the 
individual, with a view to his confession, is one reason why the Church’s moral tradition has found 
it difficult to handle the ideal of collective responsibility on a large scale. An issue such as macro-
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ethics rarely was dealt with officially by the established hierarchy, except perhaps, Mahoney 
noticed, when it considered the morality of voting for communist or pro-abortion candidates in 
local national elections (34).
And finally, there was a deep obsession with law. The entire penal theology was heavily 
legalistic and originated a mentality, which undeniably favoured the defensive and juridical 
approach of which Trent was the clearest evidence. Mahoney actually devoted an entire chapter on 
the theme of law to which we are not able to proceed due to imposed limitations on words.
We therefore think that Portugal continues to suffer from a traditional religious, political 
and social approach that favours a rather casuistic and isolated treatment of “sin”, to which 
corruption is no exception, it seems. The rather historical tendency to minimise certain ingrained 
practices (traffic of influence, cunha ["leaning" on someone], petty corruption and the like) as 
trivial; and to ignore the “plot”, as well as its social implications, that is, the interrelationship of 
corruption with contextually based factors that nurture and therefore lead to impunity, is, after all, 
indicative of the current confusing anti-corruption status that still characterises Portuguese society.
Although there nothing wrong, as already stated before, in being Catholic and sharing a 
wide Latin culture, these factors are just a token of the overall culture. But nevertheless, they need 
to be considered and possibly adjusted to address new challenges evident through the anti­
corruption strategy.
However, we are aware that these explanations are incomplete. Other key dogmas such as 
the assurance of salvation where individual and social trust probably comes from; a sense of God's 
calling and conviction; faith and works which indicate the social relevance of religion; eschatology, 
including eternal punishment, - all are equally important and capable of revealing additional critical 
features. But concentrating mainly on the concept of sin has proved somehow the key to 
understanding contemporary ethical issues from the perspective of religion, in addition to political 
and economic viewpoints.
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6.5 Dysfunctional anti-corruption policies and mechanisms
This section covers two aspects, namely, the inadequate legal basis, and inefficient internal 
and external cooperation within several administrative and judicial bodies.
6.5.1 Inadequate legal basis
Laws regarding corruption are confusing and therefore an obstacle to deterring corruption 
adequately. And yet, to have a clear and comprehensive legal basis for anti-corruption strategy is of 
utmost importance. This section explains the contextual problem posed by existing legislation. 
J.F.Dias reminds us that dealing with the judicial background of corruption is a vast theme which 
includes almost the entire fields of our legal system (Dias 1991, 58). He is right, and J.Costa’s 
article is a major contribution to understanding the connection of corruption with many other types 
of crime (Costa 1996).
Crimes are divided under two categories, namely specific and common crimes. The former 
includes a total of eighteen “proper” and “improper” crimes as described in the previous 1982 
Codigo de Penal Portugues, (Portuguese Penal Code) hereafter CPP.288 He briefly expands seven 
of them such as (1) “personal favouritism”289; (2) “public official’s omission”290; (3) “illegal 
prison”;291 (4) “prevarication”292; (5) “denial of justice”293; (6) “disclosure of secret material”294; 
and (7) “peculation or embezzlement”.295
288 For current penal laws relevant to corruption, see 11 eleven articles selected, and a list of 29 other relevant 
laws in (Morgado and Vegar 2003,147-151).
289 As shown by a civil servant (cf. articles 410 and 411 of CPP) to cover up, and / or to frustrate the 
prevention and prosecution of criminals by the authorities.
290 It is the reverse side of personal favouritism (acting in favour of someone) is a public official’s omission 
(cf. art. 414) consisting of a failure to act against someone who violates legal norms and, or to impose 
restrictive measures to prevent further illegalities.
291 Cf. Article 417.
292 Cf. Article 415, in which a public official uses his/her competencies to break the law or falsely administer 
matters of justice.
293 Cf. Art. 416) including a non application of legal rights on the part of a public official.
294 Cf. Art. 419; and 433-435 on “violation of secrecy” - apparently a common one in the judicial matters. 
This often compromises the efficiency of our system of justice in dealing with economic crimes.
295 Of funds and other benefits for personal advantage (cf. art. 424-427), which covers various crimes of that 
kind.
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Among the “common crimes”, Costa cites seven of them including (1) the falsification of 
documents (cf. art. 228); (2) the invention or falsification of technical information (cf. art. 230); (3) 
the destruction, alteration and subtraction of documents or technical information (cf. art. 231); (4) 
issuing of false certificates (cf. art.234); (5) and organized crime (cf. art. 287).
Before moving to remaining “isolated” laws, we include the new “traffic of influence” law, 
which entered the Penal Code for the very first time in 1995 (cf. art. 335). Margarida Pereira’s 
article discusses critically the rather conceptually problematic history behind its approval, and its 
debatable usefulness (Pereira 1998).
Maximiano’s article consists of a systematic presentation of a total of twenty-two new laws 
directly related to corruption, something which we call “isolated laws” (Maximiano 1997).296 
Notice that these alterations took place between 1982 and 1996, that is, since the 1982 CPP 
replaced the 1886 CPP. A majority of the laws, that is, twelve out of twenty-two, deal with the 
definitions and the nature of the public official, including accumulation of wealth and 
incompatibility matters. The remaining are five laws dealing with anti-corruption strategy; two
297 • • 298laws regarding the financing of political parties; and laws concerning corruption m sports; 
money laundering;299 and the citizen's access to public administration information.300
And lastly, the current penal code laws concerning corruption. Like the 1982 CPP,301 the 
1995 CPP302 places corruption under Title V (Concerning crimes against the State), of Chapter IV
296 Not all of them will be referred to because some were already changed since Maximiano’s article!
297 The original regulation concerning the political parties is defined in the Law 595/1974 (cf. Sousa 1999:15- 
6). The laws 72/1993 and 27/1995 represent the government attempt to legislate one of the most essential 
aspects of political corruption in Portugal.
298 Cf. Law 390/1990 which include the case of corruption among referees in football games.
299 Cf. Law 313/1993 concerning the transposition of EU law into the national legal system.
300 Cf. Law 65/1993.
301 Notice the following summary of laws that replace laws in a speed that seems difficult to cope and justify. 
So, soon after the publication of 1982 CPP, the law 371/1983 appears to extend the concept of public official 
to include regional and local government officials, managers and workers of nationalized firms and 
institutions in which the State has a majority of assets. Law 4/1983 covers the issue of the accumulation of 
wealth by political officials which was revised through Law 34/1987 and Law 25/1995. The former 
introduced special regulations for public officials and allowed them to be judged separately from private 
officials involved in the same corruption process. The Law 9/1990 consigns a list of incompatible aspects 
related with public and private officials. This law was revised through laws 53/1990; 64/1993; 196/1993; 
28/1995; and 12/1996. The Law 7/1993 deals specifically with the members of parliament which was 
revised through Law 24/1995.
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(on crimes committed in the course of public duties), in Section I (of corruption), and consists of 
articles 372 to 374. These replaced and altered the articles 420 to 423 of the previous 1982 CPP. 
The current penal laws are broadly defined under eight key terminologies falling under three major 
classifications.303
The first refers to the status of the agent: corruption is “passive” (art. 372,373) if it is 
performed by a public official; it is “active” (art. 374) if done by a private agent. The passive 
consists of either “proper” or “improper” corruption. It is “proper” when the corrupt task 
performed is illicit, prohibited or unlawful (art. 372). It is “improper” when the corrupt task is licit, 
permissible or lawful (art. 373).
The law unequivocally conceives of passive corruption as more serious than active 
corruption. This results in heavier penalties for the former - from one to eight years imprisonment 
for proper corruption, and up to two years imprisonment or a fine for improper corruption; whereas 
active corruption is penalized with imprisonment for from six months up to 5 years for proper 
corruption and imprisonment for up to six months or a fine for improper corruption. In both cases, 
the law contemplates forms to attenuate the penalties, particularly in cases where the agent 
voluntarily contributes to ensuring that justice is done.
The second relates to the timing of the crime: corruption is “antecedent” when the request 
or receipt of the gift whether in money or in kind or simply a promise of it, occurs before the actual 
consummation of corruption. It is “consequent” when the corrupt deal is effected afterwards.
The third relates to the final objective of corrupt action: corruption is “immediate” when 
the final purpose is achieved simultaneously with the corrupt deal. It is “mediate” when the corrupt 
deal is effected without obtaining any automatic benefits. The point here relates to “preparing the 
ground” for future benefits.
There are two fundamental legal issues that deserve further comments. The first is 
regarding the actual juridical value or values that the law is aiming to protect. Is it equality?
302 For a brief comparative analysis between the two penal codes see (Gonsalves 1996; Leal-Henriques and 
Santos 1996).
303 The most complete discussion on legal matters of corruption is found in (Costa 1987). See additional short 
articles by J.F.Dias, J.S.Moura and others in (AACC 1990; AACC 1991).
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Fairness? Justice? According to well-known jurists (Costa 1987; Dias 1991; Moura 1993; 
Maximiano 1996), the penal code aims to prevent, first and foremost, the violation of the State’s 
autonomy in the course of the administration of public services. This fundamental violation 
consists of any attempt to “trade” or to engage in a shady business by using the offical position or 
duty to obtain all sorts of benefits. This “affair” brings further consequences characterized by a 
lack of equality, fairness and justice within society.
The second aspect discusses whether corruption is an “autonomous crime” or not. There 
are basically two theses in dispute. One is in favour of a “unit crime”, sometimes designated as 
“bilateral crime” or a “joint crime” in which there will be no crime of corruption if there are not 
simultaneously a corruptee and a corruptor. This also implies that, if corrupt deals do not take 
place, then corruption cannot exist. The other theory is in favour of “autonomous crime” or 
“independent crime” in which one may be found guilty of being corrupt independently of having 
found or not the corruptor or vice-versa. In this case, corruption takes place independently, 
whether the corrupt deal took place or not, as the mere promise is sufficient to assert the crime of 
corruption, be it a case of active or passive corruption. Most legal commentators agree that the 
current penal code is in favour of the “autonomous crime”.
All these penal laws, further laws and amendments, by no means complete, reveal among 
other things, that the government is concerned about the issue of corruption, particularly among its 
own political class; and "in between the lines", it is possible to perceive corruption as, somehow, a 
serious phenomenon. However, the government's attitude unequivocally reveals also a high degree 
of confusion, lack of planning, and above all, an intermittent approach to combat corruption. The 
legislation is profoundly diverse with important aspects frequently being added, replaced or altered 
(Barreto, A., Ed., Justica em crise?. 2000, 53, 254, 373,405). As such, it does not facilitate 
comprehension of its workings. Conceptually, corruption is unnecessarily subdivided into many 
parts as discussed above. Additionally, it fails to bring together multiple interrelated crimes of 
embezzlement, traffic of influence, and money laundering, to mention only a few. The end result 
justifies the current confusion and venial penalties. This is a sign of weakness.
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For instance, the Singapore anti-corruption legal history since 1960 has just three steps!
Just a unified legislation304 - The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 241 with two additions. In 
1989, The Corruption (Confiscations of Benefits) Act which was then substituted by The 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crime (Confiscation of Benefits) Act. This is 
simple, short, accessible, and comprehensive legislation which helped Singapore to become a case 
study of anti-corruption success in the world.
Therefore, we conclude that such a legal complication and unclear concepts constitute an 
inconsistent legal system, and as such, it is another incentive for corruption to remain largely 
unpunished. As it is, the law remains open to endless debates and multiple interpretations of 
something which could be much more simplified and unified.
6.5.2 Inefficient internal and external mechanisms and cooperation
Existing anti-corruption agencies such as the PPS (DCIAP), PJ (DCICCEF), and the Courts 
are suffering from two rather chronic diseases. They seem unable thus far to project for the outside 
viewers an image of stable cooperation and coordination among themselves. The actual structural 
concept of these critical bodies was created in such a way that complicates any attempt to secure a 
viable cooperation, something which is, in fact, a pre-condition for anti-corruption success. This 
justifies why key leaders of these agencies often appeal for changes within the system. For 
instance, Candida Almeida, director of DCIAP, wishes the PJ to be under the PPS.305 Others, 
perhaps not satisfied with the results of the PPS, wish it to return to the government’s jurisdiction. 
So, tensions between these bodies are not exceptional.
The judiciary as a whole remains unfit or unwilling to respond to economic crimes, as both 
the Law and its application are faulty. It affects critical areas of investigation, procedures, and 
structural matters. Firstly, the investigative process is weak. Only a few people with limited 
resources are involved in supporting the investigation. Appeals for more personnel and means are
304 It consists of 37 articles under 6 main sections (Preliminary; Appointment of staff and personnel; Offences 
and penalties; Powers of arrest and investigation; Evidence; and Miscellaneous) with a total of 7,554 words. 
Note also that following two additions did not alter the basic foundation set in this law.
305 See her interview in IND:17.05.2002:32-33 “PJ devia depender do Procurador-geral da Republica”.
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not uncommon.306 There is little tradition of teamwork. The Emaudio case study revealed this 
weakness. As a lawyer, Garcia Pereira, who followed the alleged case of corruption denounced by 
his client, Pequito, inquired how a complex investigation involving twenty-eight laboratories had 
only one investigator.307 Morgado severely, but rightly, criticised the backward techniques of these 
investigations, which are largely confined to office and paper work, as opposed to what she calls 
proactive and on the spot investigation.308
There are obvious unresolved tensions between different branches of the judiciary (PPS, 
various Police offices, and, in particular, the PJ and its various branches) that seriously compromise 
the end results. The investigations also suffer from various kinds of blockade (Barreto, A., Ed., 
Justica em crise?. 2000,18,48,405). The excess of secrecy approach on the part of various 
hierarchical superiors often delays or obstructs the investigation.
Secondly, in terms of the penal and court procedures, there are several undecided issues. 
For example the wiretapping procedures have not been fully clarified, thus compromising several 
critical cases. Another issue relates to the disclosure of bank secrecy and how certain critical 
bodies, such as the PJ, could gain access.
Judges often neglect the rule of experience (tacit silence, lapse of memory and similar 
evasive attitudes), as well as the context of incentive and opportunity structures that nurture and 
tolerate corruption across society. Too many delaying tactics are accepted, most of which centre 
around matters regarding penal procedure. The Constitutional Court is used and abused because it 
has provided some assurance of its effectiveness in delaying the cases for years. For instance, the 
appeal raised immediately by the PPS regarding the defeated vote of the jury president in the 
Melancia case (1993) was only dealt with by the Constitutional Court in 2002 (Tribunal 
Constitucional 2002,16305). All those years to state that the Jury President's attitude did not 
constitute a part of the verdict and therefore cannot be subject to appeal in the Constitutional Court.
306See C.Almeida, DCIAP’s director in EXP: 11.12.2004 “DCIAP combats crime with computers and cars in 
poor condition”, and in VIS:20.05.2004 “Ha um crescendo depolicializagao”; and PUB: 12.12.2004 
“Director of DCIAP denounces lack of means to combat criminality.”
307See VIS:02.11.2000:44 “VIP crimes not punished”.
308See (Parliament 2002b; Morgado, et al. 2003,123-127).
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The final set of reasons is structural. With several agents and agencies, the success largely 
depends on coordination as well as cooperation. These are lacking (Barreto, A., Justica em crise?, 
2000, 37,178,192). Accountability in and among these bodies is also weak. There is not a 
trustworthy mechanism to ensure adequate checks and balances within the judiciary (Barreto, A., 
Ed., Justica em crise?. 2000, 25, 70,105,181,204, 302), most particularly in the PPS, which 
benefits from a wide legal and independent status but fails to achieve minimum anti-corruption 
results.
Vagueness in defining key objectives dominates the attitudes of critical bodies. The Public 
Prosecutor manages it, others conduct it (PJ or others), thus allowing them to throw the blame on 
each other. The multitude of control mechanisms rightly scattered throughout institutions is often a 
means of delaying investigation, supposedly due to a lack of communication and cooperation, as if 
criminal investigation is not legally entitled to enter public institutions.
The same is true regarding external cooperation, that is, between these anti-corruption 
agencies and the outside bodies, including particularly those from the public administration. Both 
former PJ members, M.J.Morgado and A.Salvado, alluded to extreme difficulties in obtaining 
cooperation on time from dozens of vital institutions across public administration and the private 
sector too (Parliament 2002b; Parliament 2002c). With this difficult scenario, again corruption 
receives a further incentive and corrupt agents are well aware of this rather unhealthy national 
condition.
6.6 Further critical political and citizenship matters
The following three issues are raised with the citizen's concerns primarily in mind. 
Although they largely cover structural political matters, the issues deeply affect society's perception 
and its willingness to become a co-partner in the fight against corruption. Firstly, an analysis 
concerning the most used gateway into politics, the political parties; secondly, the functioning of 
the State and citizens' affairs; and finally some further practical implications.
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6.6.1 Confusing political party policies and ethics
Political parties play a vital role in democracy. L.Sousa’s article, Corruption and Parties in 
Portugal, poses several critical questions: Why did it take so long for parties to be publicly 
condemned? Why so little transparency? Why does legal action only become effective in a 
context of social unrest? His hypothesis favours an answer which blames the general climate of 
tolerance and impunity in society (Sousa 1999,34). Though relevant, this is only partly to blame. It 
is relevant because he correctly emphasizes the irreplaceable value of civic action, including its 
watchdog responsibility. Such pressure does not yet exist, either upon political parties or in general.
But apart from looking internally at a party's organisation, as well as externally on 
whatever enforcing mechanisms that are likely to control certain aspects of a political party’s 
activities, political financing being one of the most serious issues in itself, one must clarify another 
major anomaly perhaps rarely observed, that is, that political parties have not yet shown any 
conviction or determination to create a democratic structure, which is actually a foundational basis 
upon which to develop vital political activity in transparency and accountability.
By foundational structure we mean a clear framework, without vagueness and trivial 
matters, where checks-and-balances mechanisms can truly function irrespective of the party in 
power. One example already mentioned above is the complete inability of the Parliamentaiy 
Inquiry Commission to perform its function with the current rules. The key issue, we argue, is 
precisely the lack of a reasonable framework where rules cannot be manipulated as easily as they 
have been thus far. Because of its inexistence, the Ethics Commission in the parliament, the 
Ombudsman, former AACC and current DCICCEF and DCIAP, and similar bodies are not 
succeeding in moralising political and administrative activities.
And yet, political parties hold enormous powers including those of nominating most 
individuals for critical institutions such as the Constitutional Court. Almost ironically, it is that 
same Court which is responsible for examining and approving the annual political parties' accounts. 
The end result is public and amounts to a fiasco, year after year. Additionally, party history has 
developed from a one party state (1926-74) to fifty parties that appeared after 1974, and it is now 
largely dependent on two major parties. The problem is not numerical either. Although many
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democratic countries have almost the same scenario, the difference lies in the existence of adequate 
internal and external checks and balances.
Otherwise, how can one explain the fact that an obsolete 1974 law regulating the activities 
of political parties took nineteen years to change, when laws and decree-laws were multiplying in 
other areas?309 Never in those long years, nor in the present, was the issue of corruption treated 
seriously by all major or influential party leaders throughout the democratic transition and 
consolidation process (Lobo 1996; Bandeira 1996; Cruz 1988).310
And finally, perhaps much to the blame of political parties, one is almost obliged to raise 
suspicion on one item of the most recent agreement between parliamentary bench leaders of PS and 
PSD signed in September 2006, concerning the reform of the judiciary. According to the list of 
solutions envisaged, under the Penal Process Code, item 4 reads: "A preventive imprisonment is 
only applicable for crimes punishable with more than five years imprisonment." If this is 
applicable, and the expected new Penal Code does not raise the penalties substantially, which 
seems unlikely and even unnecessary, the defendants of active and passive corruption (licit only) 
cases will escape being detained altogether. This appears inconceivable and truly jeopardises 
investigation. Although some news highlighted this matter and was followed by a statement from 
the authorities guaranteeing that such a case will not recur, one can only question why such hopes 
were unambiguously stated in the first place.
Political parties need a far better environment upon which to develop their vital function. 
Being both players and referrees just increases their need of impartiality and accurate checks-and- 
balances beyond the casuistic cases. Such a gateway to politics represents the best route to alter 
critical national issues concerning the country’s own development.
309 Despite some earlier attempts (cf. 1991 Law Proposals 540 and 661 by the PS and PRD respectively), the 
new Law 72/93 was finally approved by the majority PSD party only on November 30,1993. The remaining 
parties voted against, which testified to the very low level of consensus over this important aspect of 
Portuguese democracy. Meanwhile, the consequences of this lack of consensus helped various ingrained 
political habits to persist, causing devastating damage to the image of the new-bom democratic regime. Cf 
(Franco 1994,211-2; Portas and Valente 1990).
310 The main parliamentary parties since 1974 were party to this situation. To start with, the PCP used the 
initial chaotic period (1974-76) to replace the old notables in the bureaucratic sectors with people 
sympathetic to them. The subsequent massive nationalization process was the ideal environment for 
replacing the leadership of key economic activities with party-connected members too. The PS, CDS and 
PSD all had their turn as well.
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6.6.2 A case  of a  labyrinth S tate?
This section seeks to grasp certain informal exchange regulations and mechanisms that 
occur between the State and citizens in a variety of situations. Three studies introduce critical 
matters likely to constitute a feeding ground for malpractices in which corruption becomes a much 
easier crime at the interface of public and private individual and institutional relationships.
The sociologist B.Santos argues that the country is thoroughly intelligible. In its 
intermediate level of development, it could not be simply identified with the “First World” nor with 
the “Third World” countries (Santos 1994, 49-67). It is both a “bridge” and a “plug” in an 
intermediary role between the two worlds. Thus his preference for Wallerstein’s concept of “semi­
periphery”, as expanded in another book (Santos 1990, 105-150).
Being a semi-peripheral country, Portugal has not yet a fully functioning market economy, 
precisely because State power and influence hardly allow civil society in general and economic 
agents in particular to flourish. Instead of having a healthy welfare state, it encounters another 
contrasting reality, namely a "welfare society". It includes a web of relationships among family 
members, neighbours and friends in which mutual support, help, and exchange mechanisms of 
various sorts often take place in parallel with the legal way of life.
Two concepts illustrate this dilemma. Firstly, the “strange civil society” (alien) is when an 
anonymous citizen (i.e. without any sort of reference to begin with) has to relate to the extreme 
form of rigidity, distance and formalism of state bureaucracy, thus facing the difficulty of many 
inaccessible services, filling in unintelligible papers and even paying unjust taxes. Secondly, the 
“intimate civil society” (friendly) in which a known citizen (i.e. with good personal references) 
encounters a quite different environment of extreme flexibility and intimacy with casual forms of 
achieving the same services from exactly the same bureaucratic personnel. This ambivalent state 
attitude probably accounts for the apparent failure to eradicate the old habits of clientelism, 
personalism, nepotism and corruption (Santos 1994, 86, 88,116).
In Portugal: TJm Retrato Singular, B.Santos and eighteen other social scientists, including 
J.Reis, A.Fortunato, E.Estanque, and F.Ruivo argue that the establishment of a democratic state is 
characterized by two distinct phases, namely, a “Parallel State” (1974-85) and a “Heterogeneous
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State” (since joining the European Union in 1986). But throughout these phases, the political 
developments pave the way for “micro-states” (informal conduct), “state ambiguities”, “state 
absenteeism”, “business-state”, discrepancies between law in books (normative state) and law in 
action (everyday experience) which foster both clientelism and an illegitimate relationship between 
public and private entities311 (Santos 1993,17-55).
So, it is not exceptional that the State continues to create, support and promote private non­
profit institutions and then re-direct state funds and personnel to those institutions. Santos calls this 
initiative a “secondary civil society” in which the welfare state is weak and the welfare society is 
strong. He concludes by noting the irony of the state's own discourse characterized by its “anti- 
state” approach.
In many ways Santos argues that until 1989 (cf. second constitutional revision), the 
conflicting ideology between all the constitutional governments since 1976 and the Constitution 
itself resulted in the proliferation of beliefs and practices (i.e. disregard for fundamental laws, 
carelessness, ambiguities) that account for the “parallel State” situation (Santos 1993, 30).312 Since 
the Constitution does not provide such a reference point, nor any other potential sources such as the 
government, parliament, and political parties, let alone individuals like the president and judges, 
the ground becomes rather propitious for illegal and unethical practices.313
While Santos’ sociological approach appears scientifically based and debatable,
J.M .Judice, a well known lawyer, writes his reflection on the nature of political culture, discourse, 
support and conduct. His “non-scientific” approach (13-14), is based entirely on careful 
observation (Judice 2000), based on three concepts: discontinuity, pendulum, and conservatism.
The overall result is a “de-synchronized” status of political culture.
311 B.Santos quotes M.J.Rodrigues’ identification of several State practices that foster a climate of some 
illegality such as clandestine work, subcontracts, feminine manual-labour, and self employment.
312 According to B.Santos, the early outcome resulted in a "parallel state" in which the new adopted 
Constitution (1976) envisaged a socialist concept of the state with no classes and exploitation (cf. Article 83 
on the irreversability of nationalization that took place already between 1974-75). However, since the first 
constitutional government, the political leaders have adopted new objectives that were openly contrary to the 
Constitution. This state conduct (formal) inaugurated a new space for "micro-States" (informal), with 
disrespect for the law. The state ceased to be consistent.
313 Elsewhere the author established the lack of solid reference to which the Portuguese people could refer to, 
which does not include the Bible, even among Catholics -  (F. Fernandes 2004).
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Discontinuity is the process of jumping from one political task to another without keeping 
any sense of a stable purpose in the long term. The winners are always those who acted in the 
“centre”. Centrism, in recent times, corresponds to Soares314 acting on the right of left-wing, and 
Cavaco on the left of right-wing, politics. Historically, Salazar, Cunhal, Caetano, Costa Gomes or 
Eanes were, in their group of action, the “centristas”. They all won, but their victories were nothing 
more than a real tragedy for the ultimate project of reform.
Everyone re-started his political programme thus introducing discontinuity. He reminds us 
that the “centrist is acceptable rather than being wanted” (15). So, instead of having a coehesive 
political culture, based on diversity and pluralism, we end up with all kinds of inconsistent political 
“tastes”. This kills any chance for one project to be explored in its specificity.315 The present 
continuous change of programmes leads to the concept of pendulation.316
He insists that it has nothing to do with “alternation” attitudes. The pendular rhythm is 
rather a-rhythmical. The end result is massive destruction of any stable political aim or motivation. 
The people in general welcome a “moderate” or “centrist” personality as a means of contradicting a 
radical tendency, and then the same people drop them halfway through the process, and move on to 
another opposite solution. The pendulum swings between the pulse of modernity and archaic 
tendencies.317 The entire political system goes in the direction of a conservative mindset. The 
ultimate goal is to keep on re-adapting rather than reforming and change.
314 Cf. The consistent accusation against Soares that he has placed the socialism in the drawer (socialismo 
engavetado). See H.Monteiro in EXP:23.05.1998-Revista “Socialismo nagaveta (1978)”; F.Esteves in 
IND:10.08.2001 “Cobrador depromessas,,\ and M.Carvalho in VIS: 13.03.2003 “Soares e Freitas”.
315 Aguiar reaches a very similar conclusion (J.Aguiar 2000:84). Commenting on the 1995 parliamentary 
election, he says: “In fact, it is not the parties nor the political personalities who are leading the development 
of Portuguese society. This is given to its own dynamics of crisis consisting of the impossibility of 
supporting any continuity.”
316 His example goes back to Caetano who was massively aplauded in the Lisbon football stadium and a few 
days after was enthusiastically replaced by Cunhal and Soares at the First of May, 1974 celebrations. A more 
recent example is with the PSD supporting the creation of a democratic alliance with the PP and months later 
voting for an opposite proposal.
317 The excess of modernity causes an inside reaction in the archaic social fabric of Portuguese reality. The 
archaists are those who want to maintain the status quo whereas the modernists are those who want to change
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If Santos’ analysis points towards a culture of deep informality, Judice’s observations seem 
to fit, for example, what we argued above concerning the confusing and intermittent legislative 
action and inconsistent anti-corruption policies.
The third analysis comes from Ruivo’s research, The Labyrinthine State (Ruivo 2000). 
Contrary to both Santos and Judice whose analyses were based on the general overview of the 
central State relationships, Ruivo's contribution focuses primarily on the attitudes and beliefs of 
local politicians in their need to attract resources emanating from central bureaucracy (1976-1996). 
He demonstrates how certain old Portuguese administrative customs such as high centralization, 
webs of relationships based on personalisation and manipulation, socio-political and economic 
inequalities, parallel state, clientelism and corruption remained almost the same despite all the 
democratic changes; in short, how absurd practices are suddenly made new.
The research is based on a confidential enquiry sent to 275 presidents of Municipal 
Boroughs, to which he obtained a remarkable 142 responses (51.6%), and 45 personal interviews 
with key agents including presidents and former presidents, high-ranking civil servants, local 
deputies and “privileged local actors”. He rejects the traditional view of north and south divide 
(including religious-based explanations) to explain the striking differences that exist in political 
administration of northern developed countries and the relatively backward systems of the southern 
territories of Europe. Instead, Ruivo favours a model based on “the dynamics of dependency on the 
part of the periphery”. In his view, this fits the context more seriously. It is also capable of better 
illustrating the weblike mechanisms and hidden social forces in operation, which enable some 
“notables” to enter and capture the resources partially available from central administration.
The local political agents are profoundly dependent (politically and economically) on the 
central government and bureaucracy, largely due to its concentration on major cities and coastal 
areas to the detriment of interior and less populated regions. So they need to exercise their 
creativity to attract scarce resources. The means used are largely based on “informality”, within a 
“subterranean” man-made context, with greater emphasis on a singular phenomenon of 
“personalisation” - the relevance of “knowing” the right intermediate person in the central 
establishment and beyond, somewhere in Brussels.
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The dynamics of dependency follows the Circuito Topografico Organizativo 
(organizational topographic circuit), which includes the laborious process of “procurement, 
mediation, and decision making”. To reach a favarouble conclusion, a complex web of networks 
needs to be activated. Firstly, the entire process is presented as something ordinary (“natural”, in 
the sense of being trivial) - “everybody does it” type of argument. Secondly, the process is 
deliberately detached from any reference to morality, i.e., it is amoral. This is a relevant factor 
which both nurtures and self-justifies a favourable environment of "promiscuity" (literal 
translation) within the public administration. And finally, there is a need to "rationalize" the entire 
process, which is easily perceived as one analyses both the enquiry and the interviews used 
throughout the thesis.
Ruivo lists several negative effects which truly nurture clientelism and corruption (257ff). 
He questions the true nature of Portuguese democracy which seems to limit its function primarily 
to providing regular and fair elections. Although the author’s focus is on the local agents' attitudes 
and beliefs, he blames the central government and bureaucracy as the main “promoter of 
exceptions”. Additionally, the confusing party politics and the electoral system also distort 
fundamental democratic principles, which require major structural reforms.
With this threefold and global scenario, which appears to be fair, one may legitimately 
argue that it is an open door to multiple malpractices, illegalities and unethical conduct being 
exploited to exhaustion by citizens operating either alone or on behalf of private sector and state 
institutions alike. From this reality it seems a very small step indeed to massive tax evasion (IRS 
and IRC), false contracts, bad work ethics, unusual appetite for laws, absenteeism, 
misappropriation of state resources, low productivity, confused media with its own dependency 
status on certain economic forces, inequalities in accessing public information and resources, 
illegitimate lobbies, fictitious companies and assets, offshores, accumulation of “benefits and 
privileges”, illegitimate immunities and impunity, demoralised civil servants and the waste of 
common resources for the benefit of agents working for public companies and the private sector.
Time and space forbid us to elaborate a detailed examination of each of these “normal” 
anomalies, for which there would be no shortage of material. These anomalies are often portrayed
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as “small matters” (petty corruption, venial sins, cunha, sacos azuis) that appear regularly in the 
news and some academic writings.318 It is perhaps pointless to emphasize particular areas of 
corruption and cases that permanently hit the news, as scandals replace scandals continuously. The 
pendulum exists beyond the noisy environment, giving substantial grounds for a parallel state and 
not just a parallel economy; for strange/alien and intimate/friendly civil societies; for the State acts 
both as father and step-father; for promoting “exceptions” rather regularly, and thus contributing to 
the growth of the welfare society while delegating civic action to secondary place, to the clear 
detriment of citizenship. It is the toleration of this environment that needs changing.
So corruption in the judiciary and particularly in the police forces, local governments, 
construction firms, football, central government and administrative services, private sectors, and 
the pervasive tax system is therefore much facilitated by this contemporary environment which 
nurtures and ignores corruption. Unresolved suspicions in all these areas abound as the judiciary 
fails to respond adequately. And yet almost nothing will be changed overnight, it seems. Such a 
miracle does not exist, not even for those who are believers in some kind of supernatural force. 
Sebastianism, Catholic and Republican ethics, applied as they were, have thus far taken us 
nowhere.
6.7 Concluding remarks
Both the historical and contemporary conditions as sketched in this and previous chapters 
indicate that anti-corruption strategy is a genuine need that has been slow to appear in Portugal.
The following two chapters focus on understanding contemporary responses to corruption and why 
they remain inadequate; and finally on some guidelines likely to fit the national context for
318 It appears rather unfortunate that prominent citizens fall into this ‘temptation’. When F.Felgueiras was 
briefly detained for interrogation, the Bishop of Porto, D.Armindo Coelho expressed publically his views. He 
supported Felgueiras by admitting difficulties in viewing those irregularities as crime. He stated: “A crime or 
sin are far more serious” -  for futher details see O Comercio do Porto:09.01.2003:4.
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implementing a much needed reform that resists the swings of the pendulum that for so long have 
destroyed our own potential human and organisational resources.
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Chapter 7
Types of existing responses to corruption
7.1 Introduction
This chapter concludes Part Two of a critical evaluation of Cause and Response Patterns by 
analysing existing responses to corruption. Two previous chapters briefly examined both historical 
and contemporary factors that nurture the current environment of corruption. But such a 
combination only refers to one side of the twofold nationwide problem identified in chapter one, 
then generally explained in chapters two (The problem of corruption) and three (The problem of 
impunity). They were exemplified through Emaudio case study in the final chapter of Part One’s 
summative evaluation of the Problem-Awareness Pattern.
Throughout these chapters corruption has been primarily seen as a result of the yet 
unchallenged opportunity and incentive structures which both nurture and ignore corruption and its 
environment. They usually flourish in the midst of specific cultural assumptions within a complex 
mixture of socio-religious, political and economic fields which are closely interrelated. But 
corruption is also a matter of risks (Doig, Watt and Williams 2005, 50). If corruption carries a high 
risk, people are most likely to refrain from corrupt practices. So the way to analyse the risk level is 
by assessing the actual effectiveness of both administrative and judicial responses to corruption.
There is no doubt that constraints on corruption exist in different forms. Anti-corruption 
discourses and codes abound everywhere in the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial 
fields. But the following complex legal case confirms that responses to corruption are rarely 
straightforward. As Araujo writes, “The mayor of Felgueiras... hurried through the streets of the 
small north-western Portuguese city in the early afternoon of May 5, 2003. She was late for a 
funeral. But before she arrived at the cemetery, she took a phone call, returned home - and 
disappeared.”319 Actually to Rio de Janeiro, via Spain, and it was on that very day that the Court
319See RAraujo’s article “Corruption notebook” in (Sousa and Araujo 2004, 5).
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ordered her detention on 28 charges, including 11 of corruption.320 Such evasion had its costs 
though. She was forced to stay in Brazil for twenty-eight months without the company of close 
family, friends, church and country even at times such as Christmas. Whilst constraints set some 
limits, they are not sufficient in themselves, as the remainder of the story reveals.
Felgueiras (her surname too), returned to Portugal on September 21,2005, which took 
many by surprise,321 not least by the speed in which, within just a few hours, she was detained at 
Lisbon airport, taken up north to Felgueiras’ Court, and then liberated. Outside, an euphoric local 
population waited for her. There she announced herself as an independent candidate for the 
December 2005 local election.322 Less of a surprise though, and despite the legal case, was that she 
won a comfortable majority for the third consecutive time, though now without her former PS 
party.
Like corruption, this rather complex legal episode confirms that responses to corruption are 
often confused. They need explanations, and actually demand a deep contextual analysis because 
inadequate responses have a certain rational basis. This undoubtedly makes corruption flourish 
more easily, not least because of the multiple and still largely unstudied, shortcomings that need to 
be properly identified and put together in coherent models of responses to corruption, in order to 
grasp a holistic picture. This provides the basis for Part Three where a Possible Solution Pattern 
will be proposed and discussed.
320Cf. CM:02.01.2006 ”Justi$a: Estudo inedito analisa 224 processos e tra?a perfil dos criminosos”.
321Among others, C.Silva, then a possible candidate, now President of Portugal, said: “E obvio que estou 
estupefacto com o que esta a acontecer em Portugal nesse dominio [justiqa]", and concluded “Eu nao sou 
jurista epor isso tenho interrogaqdes semelhantes aquelas que tern um cidadao normaV’ in CM:24.09.2005. 
Cf. F.M. Flores, perplexed, comments: “E/a e a metafora sobre a grave crise e a grande barafunda em que 
estamos metidos. Chegou legalmente, foi detida legalmente, foi legalmente posta em liberdade, cumpriu os 
preceitos legais para se candidatar e pode, dentro de toda a legalidade, ganhar as eleiqoes na sua terra.Nao 
e ela que esta mal mas sim a legalidade....” in CM:26.09.2005 “0 pais da barafunda'’.
322This is not a unique episode though. Rui C. Pinto, VIS: 19.12.2002 writes: “Hoje, incredulos, tentamos 
compreender como epossivel um cidadao - Pimento Machado - ser preso para dormir nos calabouqos VIP 
da PJ ao domingo, ser ouvidopor um juiz ao longo de mais de nove horas na segunda-feira, passar na RTP 
como uma vedeta na madrugada de terqa-feira e ser recebido como um herdi, em Guimaraes, na quarta- 
feira."
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7.2 Aims, Definition, Scope and Methodology
The aim here is twofold. Building on the knowledge of opportunities and incentive 
structures previously identified, the first aim is to complete the “holistic picture” of national 
corruption by examining both administrative and legal responses including cases that have 
ultimately seen the courts’ verdicts.323 And secondly, it is to construct critical patterns of response 
that characterise current Portuguese ways of counteracting signs and evidences of corruption.
In the literature, responses largely refer to ideal remedies,324 something that still needs to be 
introduced and enforced. As has already been noticed, there are comparatively few noteworthy 
books that undertake a national holistic approach to corruption (Nieto 1997; Morris 1991; 
Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1996; Mitchell 1996). None of these authors analyses responses in 
context. The general tendency is to jump immediately from timeless and general causes to equally 
general remedies. Fewer give an interdisciplinary and contextual treatment. Perhaps a good 
exception is The Anatomy o f Corruption in Kenya by Kibwana, Wanjala and Owiti.325
So, in this chapter, responses refer exclusively to the manner in which Portugal has actually 
tackled corruption. It deals with current and past situations as a way to understand why corruption 
remains largely unchallenged. Such an understanding is of utmost importance prior to advancing 
any form of contextual remedies (see Chapter 8).
This thesis continues with a holistic, dynamic, and contextual approach. Therefore, 
responses are viewed as a process rather than a single, isolated, or sporadic event. As such, 
responses should comprise prevention, enforcement, investigation, detection, prosecution, 
punishment and finally seizure of funds earned through corruption. But as national experiences so
323Although the court’s verdicts are very limited in numbers and affected only the “small fish”, it is 
nevertheless a gross mistake to think that corruption has been flourishing without many responses from 
leading politicians and institutions alike.
324This is the case, for example, of the USA Center for Democracy and Governance’s Handbook on Fighting 
Corruption, which puts causes and institutional hypothetical responses side by side - See (Center for 
Democracy and Governance 1999,18). Most literature takes a universal rather than a national approach 
moving from a core set of cross-country rounded causes or sources to effects or consequences and finally to 
remedies or solutions, either treated separately (Geddes and Neto 1992; Gomes 1993; Ouma 1991; Olowu 
1992) or in combination form (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Elliott K., 1996; Hope and Chikulo 2000). They tended 
to be descriptive rather than analytic.
325See (Kibwana, Wanjala and Owiti 1996).
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easily demonstrate, in between any of these stages in the process, the desired response can so easily 
be delayed, confused, diverted, diluted, trivialised or even aborted altogether.
So, within this wide spectrum lie multiple forms of administrative and judicial responses 
which we seek to typify in what follows. On the administrative side, an ideal response must rely on 
prevention, effective control and enforcement mechanisms, each on time as well as on sight. When 
these are either not likely to be sufficient or have not functioned well, then one must look towards a 
judicial settlement. An ideal judicial response implies reaching its final phase on time, with fairness 
(full compliance with human and legal rights) and success (clear punishment, and significant assets 
and trust restored whenever possible).
With regard to methodology, a comprehensive understanding of existing responses 
depends on contextual analysis anchored in specific cases. So context, again, is the key to 
understanding the uniqueness of the Portuguese situation prior to any attempt to launch a relevant 
anti-corruption strategy (World Bank 2000, 39). There are twelve types of response, selected on the 
basis of the author’s own observation and analysis of recent cases. As types, they reveal a model 
that keeps reproducing itself on a fairly regular basis. For clarification and analysis’ sake, the 
twelve models are incorporated into three cluster groups. The first typifies the preliminary stage of 
response; the second covers the administrative response; and the last relates to judicial answers. 
Each type will be clearly defined one after the other within the cluster. But because of its close 
relationships with others, the analysis will be based on the entire cluster group thus avoiding 
unnecessary repetition, except for the second cluster. The analysis seeks (1) to indicate how the 
solutions were tried; (2) by means of relevant examples; (3) with an explanation why they failed or 
were inadequate.
7.3 Five Individual Types of Responses on Behalf of Institutions
The first cluster represents five distinct but interrelated types of individual response, often 
made on behalf of key institutions. They reflect the preliminary phase of response. Although a final 
response matters most, the initial response phase is actually more crucial in determining its degree 
of seriousness and in deciding if the case is worth pursuing. Experience tells of so many cases that
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died out in the early stages without proceeding to any kind of administrative or judicial inquiry. 
Therefore it is important to undertake a serious analysis of this preliminary phase too.
7.3.1 Re-Active Response
The word “re-active”, with hyphen, is chosen to further distinguish between proactive and 
reactive attitudes. The latter represents what could be a merely responsive attitude whether good or 
bad, whereas the former envisages a reasonably well prepared response. But “re-active” here has a 
rather negative sense of a backfiring response. Almost as if one is left with no other alternative but 
instinctively, intensely and insensitively to react to a stimulus factor, thus causing an immediate 
“explosion”. So, re-active response can be further illustrated as “gut reaction” denoting an 
unthinking as well as uncoordinated response.
When the fax of the Macau scandal became known, former President Soares re-acted 
immediately in support of the governor whom he had nominated. He did not dismiss him until the 
judiciary could settle the issue. Nor did the governor step down immediately but he stayed in office 
until the charges were confirmed by the court. At that time, another major scandal affected the PSD 
party in power too. When the first news about C.Freire and others’ involvement in corruption 
appeared, the party leaders had a similar attitude. In F.Felgueiras’ case the Socialist Party had a 
profoundly mixed reaction to start with. B.Moura stood up and requested immediate disciplinary 
action which was not supported by the leadership. Instead Moura was put aside within his own 
party.326 The allegations in the Junta Autonoma de Estradas (JAE) led former PM Guterres to re­
act by demanding the whistleblower prove the case before the PPS. The traditional sayings are: “if 
anyone knows about corruption, he or she should contact the PPS immediately” and “Any member 
of government who finds evidences of corruption will certainly not hesitate to contact the PPS 
immediately”.
326See the following revealing articles, some of which appeared after the death of J.B.Moura: S.Galvao, 
DE:04.04.2003 Barr os Moura em 4 lig o e sR.Vaz, DE:06.05.2003 Editorial “Elei^oes ja”, and in 
DE:21.05.2003 “Populismo ou corrupgao?”; and E.Damaso, 26.03.2003 “Barros Moura, o adeus de um 
combatente”.
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Re-active behaviour gives no regard to internal administrative control mechanisms. Re­
active conduct places the burden on vulnerable individuals who later have difficulty in 
substantiating the claims because they are not in a position to prove it.
7.3.2 Blaming Response
The old biblical narrative of Adam and Eve blaming each other and even the serpent is a 
fair portrait of this type of behaviour. The key idea consists of eccentrically discharging oneself of 
any full-blown responsibility in a alleged corruption case by unashamedly accusing others instead. 
Because response often involves several national agents and agencies, it seems very easy to go on 
and on, in circular rounds of one endlessly blaming the other.
In the JAE case, the blame was against the former president who blew the whistle. 
Cravinho, the Minister in charge, even called him “out of his mind”. And yet, no current or past 
leaders seem to hold any responsibility whatsoever. Instead, blame is levelled against the 
inefficient political system as a whole. Cravinho claimed that a democratic regime was in deep 
crisis which demanded special attention from all. This blaming attitude repeats itself within the 
judiciary system in which it is easily transferred in circles.327 A common excuse is that economic 
crime has developed faster than the system of justice. Judges lack skills to deal with complex 
corruption. Politicians protect themselves under the traditional separation of powers, the so-called 
“independent judicial status”. In summary, the blame is always transferable from a Minister to the 
independent courts, to judges, to public prosecutors, to the police in endless futile circles, in 
addition to blame for lack of qualified workers, resources and expertise too.328
7.3.3 Moralistic Response
Although corruption intrinsically invokes morality, the point here is its unreasonable use to 
the extent of becoming deplorable. Such an exaggerated appeal to moral ideas makes morality 
effectively useless. Deep down it is another “righteous” simulation. But in the process it shows not 
much regard for basic matters of principle, including administrative ones in performing
327See various authors’ comments in (Barreto, A., Justica em crise?. 2000,20, 60,173, 393).
328See (Barreto, A., Justica em crise?. 2000, 69,139).
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fundamental every day duties, such as effective control mechanisms. In the end, moralistic 
response turns out to be a virtuous farce in favour of a self-pitying and judgmental attitude often 
against general matters, namely the political system as a whole or even the “abstract” State.
Such examples were often put forward by politicians who usually come from minority 
parties. Former CDS-PP leader Manuel Monteiro was known to be a moralist who often spoke 
about corruption. At the occasion of the 1998 referendum about regional governments his party 
campaign spread everywhere large posters of “Corruption x 8” as if regionalism, in itself, would 
necessary bring more corrupt officials into the political scheme. Instead of arguments, they 
exploited populist anti-political feelings. So, after several years of moralistic talks there has been 
no progress in the anti-corruption cause from the CDS-PP party, despite all the promise “to 
moralise the system”.329
Paulo Portas, once director of a weekly newspaper, was directly involved in accusing many 
politicians of both PSD and PS parties of using a deplorable moralist language too. Ironically, 
when he entered active politics, and replaced Monteiro as the CDS-PP leader, he seemed to have 
forgotten some of those moral values.330 He appeared to make a mess of his own alleged 
Amostra/Modema case which led the opposition parties to demand his resignation from the 
government. He stayed on in the midst of profound criticism.331
7.3.4 Diffuse Response
Whereas the blaming response has a target, the diffuse model engages in wordy discourses, 
deliberately vague and often extensive in which loose ideas have no specific people or group in
329Sousa reminds that the early 1990s were dominated by the “moralisation of politics” (Sousa 1999, 31). See 
also J.A.Saraiva, EXP:09.05.1998 “O PP serve para que?”; S.J.Almeida, PUB: 13.02.2002 “Seis anos de 
maioria socialista no Parlamento” refers to “moralist fury” of Monteiro’s PP; and in IND:24.03.1995:26 
“Sondagem” in which 8,3% of 1200 people recognised Monteiro to be the hero in the fight against 
corruption.
330See J.M.Femandes, PUB:30.07.2001 “Paulo Portas vive dias dificeis. Por sua exclusiva culpa”, and in 
PUB:21.09.2002 “Dr Jekill and Mr Hide”. Cf. J.B.Moura strong criticism in DE:04.09.2002 “As acusaqoes 
de falta de transparencia no finaciamento do CDS-PP e do proprio Paulo Portas pelos gestores da 
Universidade Moderna, nao apenas revelam um flagrante contradiqao entre o moralismo do oposicionista 
populista e a recusa de agora ministro dar explicagdes convicentes; elas inquinam a relagao de confianga 
com os eleitores que e exigivel aos responsaveispoliticos.” (Also cited in PUB:05.09.2002 “Lido”).
331A.P.Azevedo, EXP.T4.09.2002 “Portas mantem popularidade”; E.Lourenfo, PUB.T9.09.2002 “Portas 
explicou-se na TVI”; and T.S.Dias, CM:28.11.2003 “Portas saiu ileso”.
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mind. Occasionally, there seems to be some objectivity in the discourse that is somehow used to 
bring in an appearance of seriousness only. But the end purpose is to diverge from the core problem 
in a dilatory fashion. Corruption then becomes something circumlocutory. No one is to blame or 
gets the blame, and life goes on as usual because something else happens or is made to happen so 
that attention is now concentrated on the latest “new” case. This denotes no strategic thinking 
concerning patterns or paradigms of corrupt cases. The isolation of cases together with 
“interesting” parallel issues are deliberately introduced to confuse the analysis.
In the JAE case, after all those re-active and blaming comments, there was very little 
follow-up in finding the root problems. The inquiry (sindicdncia) was used to divert public 
attention and nothing concrete has ever come out. Likewise, all the Parliamentary inquiries 
concerning allegations of economic crime have failed to lead to any concrete disciplinary measures. 
So many meetings and hearings, and so much time and money have been used to absolutely no 
purpose, apart from diffuse conversation or apparently intense disputes.
7.3.5 Escapist Response
The recourse to an utopian, platonic type of symbolism aims to illustrate what turns out to 
be an enthusiastic escape route out of a corrupt case. The entertainment set in motion around the 
scandal, including diffusive talk, somehow makes escape possible. Mere dismissal becomes an 
honorable attitude from a “politically correct” point of view. Corruption as a problem is not dealt 
with. Such a circumvented response brings no concrete charges or consequences against anyone. 
Responsibility is simply avoided.
When the bridge Hintz Ribeiro, also known as Entre-Os-Rios, fell down in March 2001, 
killing 59 people, the Minister in charge of Public Works, including JAE, resigned in what was 
considered a correct political attitude. In fact, he simply escaped from any responsibility, as did all 
the previous Ministers, including current and former directors within JAE. After a while, when 
emotions had calmed down, the case simply disappeared, so it seems. Often, an extended period of 
time passes by and then the escape route seems very easy to follow. One or two cool reactions 
make no difference whatsoever.
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Some Ministers have resigned after being caught in tax evasion.332 They stepped down, 
paid the bill, and nothing else happened. They returned to “private” life, where a journalist could 
no longer demand a public explanation. This response makes illegality appear permissible with few 
consequences. People even perceive that such cases end with former politicians occupying key 
leadership roles in well paid State companies.
7.3.6 Global Analysis of Five Individual Types of Responses
Any of these models can happen on their own, in combination, or altogether in a single 
case. For the last of these possibilities, perhaps the best example is the Parliamentary Inquiry 
Commission (CPI) concerning the dismissal of two deputy national directors of the Judicial Police 
(PJ) in November 2002. The political and administrative response in this case seems relevant for 
several reasons.
Firstly, it appears to have obstructed the fighting of corruption, a serious matter in itself 
particularly when many correctly think that corruption flourishes due to inadequate investigations. 
Secondly, it happened at a unique time.333 If ever there was a single moment in which anti­
corruption progress seemed convincingly visible that unquestionably occurred when Maria Jose 
Morgado was Deputy Director of the PJ anti-corruption unit (2000/11 - 2002/8). Thirdly, it 
provides unique internal insights about criminal investigation conditions. Fourth, Morgado’s team 
resolved old pending cases which were still “lost” in a multitude of bureaucratic papers. Fifthly, 
they started a dozen or so highly sensitive investigations touching places where they were unheard 
of before such as the tax offices, football clubs and their associations. And finally, such a “high” 
moment lasted less than two years of what could have been a three-year renewable commission.334
332M.Santos, SEM:06.09.2002:12 “Crise no govemo, ou crise no Estado?”.
333 Three key factors are worth mentioning. The former President of the most popular football team (Benfica) 
was taken into custody and found guilty, and the legal case was completely over in a record time, that is, less 
than a year. Needless to say such a case was highly complex, involving assets located in foreign off-shore 
accounts. Secondly, massive investigation among Traffic Police officers was started. And finally, there were 
sensitive ongoing investigations, which included top agents of the tax office in the Ministry of Finance, and 
top leaders of football clubs and agencies. Some were taken in custody but in total there were more than one 
hundred detentions fully endorsed by judges.
334 For instance, the former PJ Deputy Director of CDCOC, Orlando Romano, replaced by P.C.Lopes, stayed 
in office for 16 years, making this special branch a good example in combating crime in general. Something
Types o f existing responses to corruption 167
Why? Answering this illustrates well the types of response of this cluster group. The task 
begins with a general background description, followed by critical analysis of both the format and 
the substance of the Parliamentary Inquiry.
Morgado’s leadership and initial achievements certainly disturbed some “comfortable” 
sectors. Thankfully she was not eliminated like the Italian judge Giovanni Falcone or the Spanish 
prosecutor Carmen Tagle. Instead, she was abruptly interrupted, literally put aside in what appears 
to have been an arbitrary decision by any democratic standards. It happened soon after the new 
coalition government of D.Barroso (PSD/CDS-PP) took office in April 2002, following Guterres’ 
unprecedented withdrawal as PM. The new Minister of Justice, Celeste Cardona (CDS-PP) 
appointed Judge Adelino Salvado (May 24, 2002) as the new PJ National Director in place of one 
who was already due for a replacement.
In less than three months, Salvado got rid of two of the three Deputy National Directors. 
Like Morgado, Judge Pedro Lopes was asked to resign as Deputy National Director of the Central 
Directorate for Combating Organised Crime (CDCOC). Unlike Morgado, he refused it. But he 
could not stay either. Likewise, he was arbitrarily fired three months after Salvado had selected him 
in a Lisbon coffee shop.
For Lopes it was an abrupt, confused and mysterious decision.335 His successor, Jose Leite, 
when asked “how did you find the CDCOC?”, he replied: “Normal I  hope to give continuity to a 
machine that is well refined!”336 So, if that department was fully operational at that time, why then 
was he dismissed? One must certainly look beyond those three general administrative reasons337 
provided which nevertheless raised additional serious doubts anyway, not least because within 24 
hours, Cardona and Salvado agreed the terms of both dismissals, not having even personally 
discussed the matter with either of the two (former) deputy directors. Salvado refused to do so
which does not yet happen with economic crimes, where the average length of stay for a Deputy Director of 
DCICCEF is 20 months.
335See (Parliament 2002a, first and second interventions).
336See the interview in CM:21.11.2002.
337According to A.Salvado, the three reasons are: change of strategy within PJ; Pre-defined orientations not 
fulfilled by Lopes; and his lack of profile for leadership. But none of these seems to fit the case, nor was 
sufficiently and convincingly explained during the inquiry except the freedom that any National Director has 
to implement changes as he so wishes.
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when she requested it as she was only 40 minutes away from Lisbon (according to Morgado); he 
appointed the replacements with their full consent, even when one of them needed by law to be 
granted special prior permission from Conselho Superior de Magistratura. How this came about 
was never explained either, despite the persistence of several MPs and evasive responses. What a 
speedy process for the notoriously backward bureaucracy! So much so that in the words of one MP, 
it is guaranteed an entry in the Guinness Book of Records.338
Both cases happened in August when Morgado and Lopes, like the majority of Portuguese, 
were enjoying the final days of their holidays. But that did not prevent political turmoil. The 
Parliamentary Commission of Constitutional Matters called all four to an open house inquiry on 
September 11,2002. Morgado and Lopes refrained from substantiating their claims on the basis of 
professional secrecy and criminal justice restrictions. From the outset, Salvado and Cardona 
refused any political interference in criminal investigation. But contradictory views as to the form 
and substance of both dismissals were pretty obvious and thoroughly exploited by the media.
With great reluctance339on the part of coalition parties, the Parliamentary Inquiry (CPI) 
began its work, by examining all four individuals again, this time behind closed doors (in 
‘secrecy’), on Tuesday morning, Nov 5, 2002 at 10.20am with the following wide terms of 
reference: “Inquiry concerning the behaviour of XV Constitutional Government which led to the 
dismissals of Deputy Directors of PJ three months after being appointed”.340 In practice finished, 
nearly three days later in the early minutes of Friday, at 00.10am, after 22 hours of direct inquiry -  
see Table 3 below and subsequent ones in this section with detailed counting of words spoken by 
key individual and party’s participants -  numbers in bold represent a total of words. The double 
numbers under the President represent his words plus editorial (e) words in the document (i.e. list 
of MPs in introduction).
338See A.Filipe in (Parliament 2002d).
339Reluctance, first of all to agree on the usefulness of the inquiry; secondly on the actual terms of reference; 
and finally on the methodology.
340Actually, only Lope was nominated three months before. Morgado was already a Deputy National Director 
when Salvado took office. He chose not to dismiss her at the time.
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Table 3: CPI, Summary of Four Inquiries, 5/6 Nov 2002, 22 hours
15,588
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002a; Parliament 2002b; Parliament 2002c; and Parliament 
2002d)
The actual reason for the abrupt closure of the inquiry is simple. The opposition MPs 
demanded more inquiries, including a joint confrontation between Salvado, Morgado and Lopes 
knowing that one or more of these magistrates had unequivocally lied to the Commission. Upon 
rejection, the opposition MPs suspended their participation for a while. In the meantime, they 
appealed to the President of Parliament while the President of Portugal closely followed the case 
too. The former was unable to help and the latter summoned all party leaders but to no avail either. 
So on Friday, November 8, the media announced the unilateral closure of the Commission -  
without the opposition parties it is pointless to proceed, argued the coalition parties.
In short, the MP J.Magaihaes’ conclusion is right because “eternal doubt” and “galloping 
suspicion” remained exactly the same despite a marathon 22 hours of hearings. There was simply 
no conclusion or consequences. The way the commission acted contrasted with what was done 
before to Garcia dos Santos who refused to declare the names of people involved in corruption. For 
him the commission proceeded to the court whereas in this case no legal action was pursued even 
though one or more of the deponents lied to the commission.341
However, the country is left with four rather relevant documents unusually disclosed on the 
Parliament’s website.342 Surprisingly, the media only vaguely explored it. Such a release somehow
341This was not only obvious but J.Magaihaes openly said that the commission was faced by a “clash of 
versions” and “deceptive clashes” - (Parliament 2002c, last set of interventions).
342These are incomplete documents though. It excludes the minutes of the MPs discussion of the hearing’s 
outcome. The elected ones preferred to hide their comments from the public eye. The four documents, 
totaling 320 pages are herewith identified as (Parliament 2002a) for P.C.Lopes’ inquiry; (Parliament 2002b)
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demonstrates the extent of disorientation that follows. So much so that Marinho (PSD) summarises 
well the point: “I think that no one will win this (dispute); the country will not win either; and even 
less so the PJ.”343
In any investigation, methodology plays a critical role. The inquiry’s format is a flaw of 
major significance though. The following Tables and Figures provide details of each of the four 
inquiries. The first (Table 4) and last (Table 7) inquiries were the shorter ones, which lasted about 3 
hours each. P.C.Lopes’ inquiry begins to reveal critical features, and they get worse with both 
M.J.Morgado (Table 5) and A.S.Salvado’s case (Table 6).
Table 4 CPI, P.C.Lopes (PCL), Inquiry, 5 Nov, 2002: Duration 10:20-13.20 = 3 hours
U B S
I I I
1,337
+122
2,625 1,965 4,590 3,896 1,111 900 489 6,396 12,445 13,849 26,294
47 8 6 14 11 4 2 1 18 79 26 105
1,930 1,238 1,193 351 702 489
(6) (5) (1) (4) (3) (2)
80 352 588 294 0 0
990 949 3,292 671 3,840 735
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002a)
Each MP willing to inquire has up to five minutes to place all the questions (identified as 
‘1st Q’ in Table 4 above, followed by the number of words, and the number of intervention in 
brackets which only include the first six interventions). The witness is free to reply by taking as 
much time as needed (see ‘1st Ans’). Then the inquirer would finish by making a brief comment or 
seek further clarification if they so wish (see ‘2nd Q’).
Such a method hindered the search for truth. The length of questions gave the witness an 
easy opportunity to either answer partially, omit questions, ignore fundamental points, or above all, 
confuse the inquiry. For instance the first intervention-question set by the PS took 1,193 words (w)
for M.J.Morgado; (Parliament 2002c) for A.S.Salvado; and (Parliament 2002d) for M.C.Cardona. They were 
released in December 2002 in (www.parlamento.pt/comissoes/inquerito/xijpjudiciaria/index.html). 
References will identify the speaker, followed by the speaker’s intervention number whenever possible.
343See (Parliament 2002b, Marinho’s first intervention). His additional words were: “Foram, pois, cometidas 
aqui inconfidencias que me levam a perguntar: como e que vamos deslinda-las? Dado tratar-se de conversas 
tidas a dois, qual e que vale mais, a sua palavra ou a palavra dele, Sr.a Procuradora? Ambas sao palavras 
que, a partida, merecem e tern de merecer todo o credito. Mas pergunto-lhe como e que vamos sair distoT
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long, whereas the sixth intervention by PSD had l,930w. The remaining three inquires made things 
look much worse as Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 below indicate.
Table 5 CPI, M.J.Morgado (MJM), Inquiry, 5 Nov, 2002: Duration 15:15-23.15 = 7 hours
w i t .n kC O A l/l
rio.\
OPPOS
ITIO.N
11,079
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002b)
Table 6 CPI, A.S.Salvado (ASS), Inquiry, 6 Nov, 2002: Duration 10:30-19.30 = 8 hours
Suh
Total
(Pres+
Coal-r
Oppos)
l,435mt
1,2401
12,396 20,665 35,682 38,890 74,572
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002c)
Table 7 CPI, M.C.Cardona (MCC), 6 Nov, 2002: Duration 20:45-00:10 = 3,5 hours
OPPOS
ITIO N
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002d)
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In Morgado’s hearing (Table 5), the first PS question has 1,164w. Her reply consists of 
5,468w. These facts make the entire inquiry look rather bizarre. The minor CDS-PP party of the 
coalition, which appointed Cardona as Minister of Justice, exploited this weakness to the utmost 
extreme. Two of their MPs (Teixeira de Melo/3rd Intervention, and Telmo Correia/6th 
Intervention, included in the Table 8 below) spent in total 7,33 7w in only two questions.
Table 8 CPI, M.J.Morgado, The First 12 MPs Intervention-Questions
Inter Member of Parliament Party 1st Question 2nd Question
1 Eduardo Cabrita PS 1,164 626
2 Jorge Neto PSD 2,227 587
3 Nuno Melo CDS-PP 3,138 334
4 Antonio Filipe PCP 423 31
5 Francisco Lou?a BE 946 0
6 Telmo Correia CDS-PP 4,199 912
7 Alberto Martins PS 577 0
8 Jose Magalhaes PS 790 0
9 Odete Santos PCP 158 132
10 Eugenio Marinho PSD 1,605 99
11 Luis Montenegro PSD 1,260 0
12 Adriana Branco PSD 331 31
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002b)
The following Figure 3 visualise the point in a much clear way. It globally reveals the 
extent of the methodological errors, democratically approved prior to the start of the CPI. It also 
confirms the usual tendency to politicise the inquiries into economically related crimes, particularly 
by two major parties MPs (PSD and PS) in this particular case.
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Figure 3 CPI, M.J.Morgado, The First 12 MPs Questions
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Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002b)
The coalition parties (PSD/CDS-PP) in particular, and the major opposition party (PS) 
made long introductions before setting the questions. The worst case was in Salvado’s hearing 
(Table 6 as well as Table 9). The first CDS-PP’s intervention-question consists of2.979w long, 
something that exceeds a normal undergraduate essay. It prompted Salvado to answer in two 
stages. Firstly, he spent 1.435w to complain on methodological (identified as ‘mt’ in Table 6 ,1st 
Ans. above) issues alone, plus 12.401w to actually reply, making a total of 13.836w. There seems 
to be no better way of providing both diffuse and escapist responses.
Although the rules so dictated, the opposition PCP’s MPs refused to follow them. They 
refrained from any extensive introductions and comments, particularly Odete Santos. She was so 
sharp that Salvado could not contain himself: “Senhora Deputada, do not ask me such a question 
because I do not accept it” he commented.344 Table 9 and Figure 4 below illustrate the point only 
partially because out of l,585w attributed to the 1st Q is somehow misleading. In fact, O.Santos,
344See (Parliament 2002c).
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upon permission from the president broke the rules and asked 42 short separate questions, which 
give an average of 37w per question. So did her colleague A.Filipe.
Table 9 CPI, A.S.Salvado, The First 12 MPs Questions
Inter Member of Parliament Party 1st Question T d Question
1 Telmo Correia CDS-PP 2,989 279
2 Alberto Martins PS 2,264 298
3 Jorge Neto PSD 1,794 0
4 Francisco Lou9a BE 1,830 473
5 Antonio Filipe PCP 1,408 329
6 Isabel Castro OV 1,409 68
7 Antonio Machado PSD 1,011 0
8 Jorge Lacao PS 2,171 663
9 Marques Junior PS 1,205 0
10 Luis Montenegro PSD 944 0
11 Eduardo Cabrita PS 1,327 353
12 Odete Santos PCP 1,585 0
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002c)
Figure 4 CPI, A.S.Salvado, The First 12 MPs Questions
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When the author first analyzed this data, another sensitive inquiry was under way in 
England regarding David Kelly’s death in August 2003.345 The style and methodology were 
completely different. There, for instance, each question (250 in total) to the Prime Minister Tony 
Blair has an average of 20 words or less each and lasted only 2 hours. And the answers were 
equally concise. Lord Hutton, or any other person minimally qualified to lead a successful inquiry, 
would simply not approve the methodology or tolerate such evasive questions or responses.
Why then did this happen in the Portuguese Parliament? Is it the case that our MPs are less 
qualified? Certainly not. Neither politics nor the Parliament should be belittled in value or respect.
It has much to do with irresponsible concrete behaviour left unchallenged which nurtures the highly 
popular feelings against politicians. Additionally, the lack of a proper democratic basis for the 
exercise of political power is also responsible which points towards the legislators’ fault too. This 
Portuguese inquiry was poor because a few known MPs, under the leadership of the President 
elected to moderate the inquiry, chose an odd methodology, which was apparently 
“democratically” supported.
Therefore, bad politics dominated over good politics, so much so that minutes regarding 
their analysis of all the inquiries were not released to the public. The country was not able to know 
what each MP said regarding crucial matters of the case. This violates basic democratic principles 
regarding access of information. Individual accountability and adequate checks-and-balances did 
not exist, leaving some political parties free to behave against fundamental principles.
The working times and conditions became a needless marathon. Morgado and Salvado’s 
hearings took over seven hours each with just one short break. The first day of hearings (Lopes and 
Morgado) started at 10.20am continuing until close to midnight making a total of nearly fourteen 
hours’ work. The second lasted from 10.30am until 10 past midnight with a short lunch break at an 
unusual time (after 3 pm). What a distressful and unreasonable schedule - ideal to promote both 
exhaustion and confusion.
345The inquiry was available in http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/index.htm.
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On comparative grounds, Lord Hutton’s inquiry had a fixed and strictly observed schedule 
from Monday to Thursday, 10.15am to 1pm and 2pm to 4.15pm. The first phase lasted from 
August 11, till September 4; and the second from 15 to 25 September. In the first phase alone, 67 
individuals were summoned to bear witness. Permanent reports were released during the inquiry. In 
the Portuguese inquiry, the majority party MPs simply refused to call any witnesses apart from the 
four mentioned individuals.
Lastly, in matters of format there is a criticism of the president’s style and apparent 
partiality. Firstly, when Salvado went on and on (1.435w) complaining about methodology, the 
President did not tell him that he himself was the actual author of such a methodology.346 Secondly 
he did not himself comply to the rules at all. The five minutes allocated for questions was ignored 
continuously, especially by the majority party members such as J.Neto (2.227w), N.Melo (3.138w), 
E.Marinho (1605w) and the worst of them all, T.Correia (4.199w) in Morgado’s hearing (Table 8.).
The president waited an hour (8.46lw) to warn Morgado to abbreviate her reply, which 
took a total of 11.079w with 13 interruptions, to answer the first PS question question by E.Cabrita 
(1.164w). But in Salvado’s case, his similar appeal came only after 9.356w (excluded 1.435w of 
complaint about methodology) of a total of 12.401 w used with 4 interruptions, to answer the first 
question (2.979w) by the CDS-PP, T.Correia.
Thirdly, the president should not have allowed Salvado to come so close in dictating the 
rules and mandate of the Commission, something yet unseen in previous inquiries,347 not least 
because the previous two hearings (Lopes and Morgado) happened in the way that Salvado was 
now opposing.348 His revealed sympathy with most of Salvado’s views allowed further ambiguity 
to prevail to a point of almost considering the inquiry as a “forced” matter imposed by the 
proponents (opposition parties) and not by the Parliament itself.
346The job of clarifying it was done much later by Odete Santos who patiently awaited her turn to speak. See 
(Parliament 2002c, O.Santos’ first intervention).
347See the comment of one experienced MP in parliamentary inquiries, A.Filipe in (Parliament
2002c, penultimate intervention).
348As pointed out by A.Filipe - see (Parliament 2002c, first intervention).
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The President unreasonably qualified the relevance of some questions posed by opposition 
MPs. For instance, when A.Martins (PS) in Salvado’s inquiry sought clarification about a 
journalist’s visit to PJ headquarters, the President minimised such an event as “historieta” (a ‘little 
tale’) and actually said it was irrelevant to the inquiry. But it was not because Salvado freely used it 
before.
Lastly, what is no doubt the most serious charge for which the President has some direct 
responsibility concerns the agreed secrecy of the inquiry. Just over twenty MPs meeting in closed 
doors in the Parliament buildings was not sufficient to prevent the media from quoting, with 
precision, excerpts of the inquiry that happened on the same day. Actually, the CDS-PP T.Melo 
was the first one to tell Morgado “not to be *ingenucT (naive) because later in the evening the 
television will tell everything”. Such ‘prophecy’ was fulfilled. That is, confidentiality became 
utterly meaningless. Later on, when he had no right to speak, he switched on the microphone again 
(to make sure his words would be recorded), and let the Inquiry Commission know that Morgado’s 
recent words have been aired by Lusa, the Portuguese News Agency, and on television. Morgado 
simply said “I did not abandon my seat nor did I use the telephone”. But someone passed it to the 
media. Who? Why? This remains a mystery in the midst of unaccountable Parliament.
A moment later, another MP, A.Filipe of PCP interrupt to ask permission to pass on to 
Morgado a copy of the Lusa’s latest news release. Osvaldo Castro of PS and Vice-President of the 
inquiry said “Fonte da maioria” (the source is the majority parties). The President categorically 
classified Filipe’s interruption as “completely irresponsible”, something which he did not explicitly 
say in the first case. Why? Another mystery perhaps. Looking back, the President took no action 
whatsoever to investigate the leak.349 In fact, several news agencies published inside information 
in the following days too.350
349Such a serious national problem was easily coped with, exactly as something very usual that causes no 
reaction. The Executive Editor of Correio da Manha called the leak as “sigilo de polichinelo” and concluded 
that the Parliament’s Channel could well compete with the Big Brother - see CM:08.11.2002 “Inquerito 
Parlamentar: Concorda com tira-teimas entre Morgado e SalvadoT\
350For instance, Portugal Diario published twice on the same day (at 19:16 and 20:14 hours), that is, while 
Morgado was being inquired: PD:05.11.2002 “Moderna: Portas e Cardona implicadosand in 
PD:05.11.2002 “PSD e PP nao acreditam em M.J.Morgado”. Cf. PUB:07.11.2002; and EXP:09.11.2002 
(Online) “ Varias historias, muitas versdes”. F.Madrinha was right in saying “O caso PJ, com a extravagante
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With regard to substance, all five individual types of responses occurred in this case. The 
Parliament solution began to be a “Re-Active” type. The first attitude is a defensive response. The 
representatives of both coalition parties reacted quite strong against any view likely to point 
towards illegitimate political interference. The re-active mood was equally shown by 
“guaranteeing” from the outset the blameless conduct of both the Minister of Justice and the 
Director of PJ.
The second attitude moves towards a more offensive approach of a “Blaming” type. Above 
all, they blame the opposition parties for wishing to “politicise” the case that purely curtails to 
matters of straightforward strategy which any PJ National Director is entitled to propose and 
implement at his own discretion. They also blame Morgado by accusing her of excess of visibility, 
and illegitimate self ambition.
The third attitude has a “Moralistic” element which is meant to protect the “blameless 
reputation” of the PJ. Basically, the coalition parties accused the opposition MPs of disrespecting 
the hard work of more than two thousand PJ nationwide agents. Moralism confuses a tree with a 
forest. Such a moralistic protection pays no attention to potential abuse nor does it allow any 
independent inquiry because such action is previewed as an ‘attack’ on the entire institution.
The diffuse response type of attitude was a direct result from the wrong methodology. 
Salvado’s attitude was to divert attention to peripheral issues (methodology, fear of invalidating 
Modema’s trial case of corruption, wiretapping). Morgado’s attitude was to elaborate on how 
corruption should be tackled. Altogether they all spent a lengthy time discussing false issues or 
matters not pertinent to the inquiry. In this way, critical questions were ignored and confused 
“successfully”. Because this is indicative of this cluster of response, the following four Figures 
reveal the extent of the political parties’ behaviour in using a significant part of the inquiry for their 
own purposes. In this way, emphasis centred on institutions too.
comissao de inquerito a porta fechada mas de onde sairam relatos minuciosos acerca de quase tudo o que 
por la se disse, ja  foi suficientemente danoso para os dois magistrados envolvidos - isto para nao falar dos 
deputados incontinentes.” - EXP:23.11.2002 “Equivocos mal esclarecidos”.
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Figure 5 CPI, P.C.Lopes, President, P.Parties and Witness Interventions
Pedro Cunha Lopes
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Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002a)
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Parties'Interv. 
47 .1%
The Figure 5 above and Figures 6-8 below illustrate the time spent by each political parties, 
coalition versus opposition and finally President-parties versus Witness. These reveal the extent 
that inquires were ‘politicised’.
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Figure 6 CPI, M.J.Morgado: President, P.Parties and Witness Interventions
Maria Jose Morgado
□ PRESIDENT
□ PSD
m CDS-PP
□ PS
□ PCP
□ BE
□ OV
□ WITNESS
COALITION 
L 25.2%
P re s id e n t  
+ P a r t ie s ' 
Interv. 
39.8%
WITNESS
60.2K PS
5.7K
OPPOSITION
9.2%
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002b)
Figure 7 CPI, A.A.Salvado: President, P.Parties and Witness Interventions
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Types o f existing responses to corruption 181
Figure 8 CPI, M.C.Cardona: President, P.Parties and Witness Interventions
Maria C eleste Cardona
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Source: Author’s calculations based on CPI (Parliament 2002d)
Lopes and Salvado’s inquiries reveal an almost fifty-fifty situation, which clearly indicate 
that witnesses were not the main focus. Instead, party politics prevailed over the interest of the 
inquiry. The worst case is in Cardona’s inquiry. Calling the Minister of Justice to give a testimony, 
at 3 pm which only started at 8.45pm, and then saw MPs using 71.1% of the time seems rather odd. 
The opposition parties and the president himself wasted the Minister’s time whereas the CDS-PP, 
which proposed Cardona as Minister of Justice, remained quiet (2.7%) leaving the task to the PSD 
instead (11.3). The coalition parties, and most particularly the CDS-PP manipulated Morgado’s 
inquiry using together 25.2% of the time whereas the opposition reached its lowest point (9.2%) in 
all the inquiries. There is a rather consistent contrast between leading and opposition parties largely 
dependent on the witness of which Morgado’s case is the obvious example (coalition/25.2 versus 
opposition/9.2%) whereas in Cardona’s case the reverse happened (coalition/14.0 versus 44.0%). 
The main opposition PS was not a good example in any of the inquiries (14.9 -  5.7 -  16.6 — 
23.4%). Likewise for the president who increases his time consistently (5.1 -  5.5 -  8.5 -  13.1%).
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Lastly, having explored the four interrelated responses to the extreme, which added 
confusion and unnecessaiy complexity to facilitate an “Escapist” route without solving the problem 
and knowing that the environmental democratic structures are weak, the coalition MPs escaped by 
arbitrarily closing the inquiry. Common sense simply did not prevail. The opposition parties, being
• * 351a minority, were legally unable to reverse the situation. Neither the President of Parliament, nor 
the President of the Republic,352 theoretically the source of garantee for “the proper functioning of 
the democratic institutions” (Constitution, Article 120) resolved the problem, and the case was 
arbitrarily dumped as if democracy were entirely powerless. Since then, there has been talk of 
reforming the Commission of Inquiry’s rules, but as of June 2006 there have been no concrete 
changes approved.353
To sum up, this case illustrates how individuals representing key institutions such as 
political parties, government, Parliament, and PJ among others appear to pervert the normal cause 
of justice in matters of economic-related crimes, thus perpetuating a wider sense of illegitimate 
immunity in association with impunity - obviously not by advocating corruption but by astutely 
obstructing opposition to it.
7.4 Three Institutional Types of Responses
This second cluster represents three models of institutional response by means of 
legislation, disciplinary and organisational measures. These reflect a further stage beyond the initial 
individual responses analyzed above. Due to distinct characteristics of each of these responses the 
analysis is done separately.
351He was away in an official visit to Hungary, and delegated specific comments to Leonor Beleza, the acting 
President then - See VIS:08.11.2002 (Online) “Terminou investiga?ao parlamentar ao caso PJ”.
352He did call all party leaders to his palace but to no avail - see CM:09.11.2002 “Presidente chama todos a 
Belem”. Before, he made the following specific comments “As comissoesparlamentares tern funcionado mal. 
Ha que tirar as necessarias ligoes para que o seu funcionamento melhore e sejam mais eficazes, porque so 
dessa forma sepodeprestigiar o Parlamento.” in CM:08.11.2002 “PR descontente com Comissoes 
Parlamentares”. The President also called Mota Amaral, the President of the Parliament to Belem - 
VIS: 12.11.2002 “Sampaio recebe AmaraF.
353See PUB:11.11.2004 “Parlamentopondera voto secreto nas comissoes de inquerito”', DN:20.06.2005 
“Inqueritos parlamentares estao nas maos de Socrates”.
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7.4.1 Legalistic R esponse
A legalistic response consists of a strict or literal adherence to the existing laws while 
largely neglecting other critical interrelated aspects deriving from wider socio-cultural, political 
and economic contextual factors. It also consists of either changing, replacing, or even creating 
new laws altogether. This behaviour aims to assure the public that governmental leaders are deeply 
concerned with the eradication of corruption.
All Portuguese parliaments in recent times have engaged in this, making it by far the most 
recurrent and inefficient type of administrative response. L. De Sousa is not alone in calling this a 
rather paradigmatic case in which the “law has regularly been perceived as a substitute for ethics” 
in what turn out to be no more than “cosmetic legislative reforms”.354
This is certainly the case with the former anti-corruption agency - the High Authority 
Against Corruption (1983-92), created by the Bloco Central (centre-right/left government, PS-PSD 
coalition, 1983-85) in October 6,1983 through Decree-Law 369/83. From this point onwards, 
consider the following laws:
Two months later, the Resolugao do Conselho de Ministros (RCM) (D.R. 292, II Serie, 
21.12.1983) appoints the High Commissioner. Through the Decreto Regulamentar 3/84 (January 
12, 1984) the nature of the High Authority is further explained and matters of recruiting personnel 
are covered in more detail. A year later, Decree-Law 327/84 (October 12,1984) aims to clarify 
some doubts in the two previous laws concerning personal status and authority. The RCM 21/85 
(May 17,1985) has the sole purpose of instructing all official bodies (no specification whatsoever) 
to cooperate - willingly and speedily whenever solicited by the High Authority.
When C.Silva became PM firstly of a minority government (1985-7) followed by two 
consecutive majority periods (1987-91 and 1991-5), there also appeared additional laws. On April 
1986 the RCM 31/86 dealt again with matters of career recruitment. The Resolugao da Assembleia 
da Republica 15/88 of July 30,1988 appointed the same High Commissioner chosen more than
354See (Sousa and Araujo 2004); and L.Sousa, PUB:07.10.2001 “Legistar nao bastapara combater a 
corrupgao”. Many others have acknowledged this enormous apetite for creating new laws without solving 
critical ethical issues. Cf. E.Damaso, PUB:30.05.2002 (Editorial), “Parreirao e Amaut”.
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four years earlier. The Decree-Law 446-A/88 of December 9,1988 partially reformulated the 
earlier personnel norms set out in Law 327/84. In addition it dealt with routine matters of office 
space within the House of Parliament and official identity cards for its members.355 Then, a new 
Law 45/86 of October 1, 1986 was meant to update as well as to replace the original three laws, 
namely Law 369/83, Decreto Regulamentar 3/84 and Decree-Law 327/84. In addition, it stated the 
need to regulate again, within sixty days, the High Authority Commission and demanded another 
nomination of the High Commissioner within ninety days.
The entire on and off regulation process followed again. The location of the office moved 
from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the House of Parliament. And eventually in 
1992, following a debate in Parliament, a decade of legislative history ended with Law 26/92 on 
August 31, 1992 that extinguished the High Authority altogether. It was then seen as an 
unnecessary duplication and something unfit for a democratic society which they thought already 
had good mechanisms for addressing corruption. Therefore its task was re-directed to the PJ within 
which a special anti-corruption unit was created.356
Without going into a detailed legal analysis of the various changes in the Organic Law that 
regulates the PJ, it is noticeable that the average length of service of a national deputy director in 
charge of the anti-corruption unit is only twenty months.357 This factor alone causes all sorts of 
disruption and anomalies. So legal changes concerning personnel, plans and strategies occurred 
with short intervals, thus becoming the recurrent key pattern that obstructs any possibility of 
implementing a successful and consistent anti-corruption project.
355It is not uncommon to see top political and administrative leaders more concerned with mundane matters 
of career, office, buildings, cars and even mobile phones. The same happened within the PJ under Salvado’s 
leadership. According to both Lopes and Morgado, the National Director and the Minister of Justice were 
more preoccupied with these little “cosmetic” things. See (Parliament 2002a) concerning car registration 
plates, and (Parliament 2002b) regarding mobile phones and cars.
356A similar process is also happening with the PJ’s special anti-corruption agency. Initially designated as 
Direcgao Central de Investigagao de Corrupgao, Fraudes, e Infracgoes Economicas e Financeiras - 
DCICFIEF, created by Decree-Law 295-A/90 on September 21, 1990, it was then called DCICCEF. Some 
new legal norms were introduced via Law 34/94 on September 29, 1994; Decree-Law 299/94 on December 
13, 1994; and Decree-Law 275-A/2000 on November 9,2000.
357According to RC.Pinto, VIS: 10.04.2006 ”Sem meias palavras”.
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This intermittent legislative action surrounding the High Authority was largely inadequate. 
The first set of reasons is found within the legislative body itself. Firstly they intended generally to 
moralize the entire administration without first creating a wider consensus amongst all political 
parties. The first law which created the High Authority was a Decree-Law (government only) put 
forward by the fragile coalition government. It was not a Law of the actual Parliament itself.358 
Thus it evaded political debate in the first place. Therefore, the High Authority somehow lacked 
political legitimacy from the very start.
It also lacks solid foundations upon which to build an anti-corruption unit because 
politicians approach it mainly as a legal issue with clear disregard of key political, economic and 
administrative concerns, particularly those related to monitoring agencies - a vague concept in a 
critical moment when the re-privatisation of banks and insurance companies began to take place. 
Political mistakes made at the start of the 1974 revolution, namely nationalisation of private 
activity, were about to be repeated at the start of new re-privatisation period simply because no 
minimal political foundations were laid beforehand.
And thirdly, the special unit was largely experimental in nature rather than a decisive, well- 
conceived initiative. That justifies the ongoing regulation on trivial matters regarding career status 
and office location when critical issues of defining concrete goals, priorities and timings seem 
absent altogether.359
The other set of reasons covers matters of methodology and efficacy which left the High 
Authority with bare minimum of conditions needed to succeed. The agency did not have 
comprehensive powers at all. It had only limited administrative powers set in a context largely 
dominated by secrecy and self-defensive corporate attitudes with highly ineffective control
358Abel Barreto wrongly affirms that the High Authority was created and extinguished by the Parliament. 
Only the latter is true (Law 26/92). See (Barreto, Abel. 2005).
359 See for instance critical words which are vaguely expressed in the introduction of the first Decree-Law 
(368/83): suspicion of corruption must be clarified “with greatest brevity, giving immediate and full 
accountability to public opinion”. Never in this law or subsequent ones are such goals specified or measured. 
The following laws include key revealing words of uncertainty such as “The innovative characteristic of this 
institution demands precautionary reserves and confers on High Authority a greater level of experiential 
exercise” (see Decreto Regulamentar 3/84). Such behaviour led to the need to call all state institutions to 
cooperate, with a sense of priority and urgency, as if the earlier laws had no power in themselves to demand 
such conduct (see Resolugao do Conselho de Ministros 21/85).
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mechanisms right across the public sector. Thus the pathetic law of the Council of Ministers 
(Resolution 21/85) demanding an urgent “duty of cooperation” as if such a thing could ever be 
achieved through legislation. They completely failed to address the cultural incentives that 
perpetuate the lack of transparency and accountability across state and private institutions alike.
Secondly, such abortive legislation is based on the traditional slogan of “divide and rule”. 
In a Portuguese saying, the plethora of legislation resembles a “manta de retalhos” - patchwork. 
The High Authority depends on “genuine cooperation” from a number of external and autonomous 
bodies so that it is simply unrealistic to expect a successful administrative inquiry. It is interesting 
to note that those bodies were never identified either but certainly included the tax officers, banks 
and a multitude of inspectorate offices in various places. Each argues its own case to the detriment 
of a national cause. So, as experiences elsewhere clearly reveal, corruptors will not give in 
voluntarily and rarely cooperate in investigations, particularly administrative ones (Passas 1997; 
della Porta and Vannucci 2000).
Thirdly, the agency was supplied with practical and personnel means through a hiccup 
process. That is, three years after its constitution, basic rules regarding personnel recruitment were 
still appearing on an intermittent basis. And finally, the High Authority did not have any criminal 
powers of investigation whatsoever. It totally depended on police cooperation. And three branches 
of police, with perceived rivaliy disputes between them, made the task for the newly bom High 
Authority doubly difficult. After all, it took almost a decade for the High Commissioner to perceive 
the structural weaknesses of his own organisation, so that when he finally requested more powers, 
the government simply chosen to terminate its mandate.360 In practice, these were ten wasted years 
of anti-corruption experience.
In summary, the legislation is weak, irregular, dispersed and highly confusing both 
conceptually and strategically. There never been a tendency to create a unified anti-corruption
360In an apparently remarkable speedy way, the proposal Law 199/VI which favoured the extinction was 
submitted, debated, approved generally as well as specifically, and the final vote took place in a single day of 
July 17, 1992 with votes in favor from PSD, PS and PSN; the abstention from PCP, Os Verdes and two 
independent Members of Parliament (M&rio Tome and Raul Castro); and a single vote of discordancy from 
Leonor Beleza - See (Barreto, Abel. 2005).
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code.361 Thus the continuous appeal from various sources and individuals to reform the law 
altogether in a way that gives consistency and breath to the an anti-corruption agency and 
strategy.362 This partially explains why the “small fry” remain the favourite target of economic 
crime investigation.363
This paraphernalia of legislation is not unique to the an anti-corruption agency. It is 
repeated in other relevant ethical fields.364 For brevity’s sake we simply refer to three examples 
namely the disclosure of assets by politicians365; the financing of political parties;366 and the 
electoral system.367 Taking them all together, it is interesting to see how the government of C.Silva 
approved, in the very last days of his ten consecutive years in office, a rather abrupt set of 
moralising laws widely but ironically perceived as a “transparency package”.368 It was an obvious 
cosmetic exercise imposed unilaterally through the abusive use of majority parliamentary status. 
That following governments had to either dismiss or alter them, again and again, without achieving 
any basic level of consistency either.
36IThe problem of dispersed laws affects other critical fields such as forestry and labour policies. The latter 
has recently been unified by former Minister B.Felix (see his article written on the same day when the 
Labour Code was approved in DN:01.12.2003 “O codigo de trabalho” whereas the former, despite the Basic 
Law of Forestry, Law 33/96 of August 17, 1993 it did not assemble together all the dispersed laws that 
existed for over a century ago - see Vital Moreira, DE:21.08.2003 “Um codigo florestal”.
362See the appeal of President Sampaio in DE:24.04.2003 “O caminho da reforma imposta pelo Presidente” 
by J.Andrade and M.Baptista; M.M.Carrilho, DN:10.10.2001 “Um novopacto”; P.A.Sande, DN:04.05.2002 
Reformar um pais” and in DN: 17.03.2003 “Azuis como a neve"',
363See B.Santos in (Maxwell 1986,188).
364For a good general legislation overview see (Maximiano 1997).
365The first is Law 4/83 of April 2,1983 which was altered by Law 25/95 and further regulated by Decreto 
Regulamentar 1/2000 of March 9,2000.
366The legislation started with Law 72/93 of November 30, 1993 that changed in 1995 (Law 27/95), in 1998 
(Law 56/98) and in 2003 (Law 19/03). Despite these, there have always been claims for a change. See among 
others R.Vaz, DE: 14.01.2003 “Pela transparencia" and in DE:21.05.2003 “Populismo ou corrupgao?”;
H.B.Moura, DE:08.01.2003 “O financiamentopartidarioand LP.Guerra, DE:23.01.2004 “Ligagdes 
perigosas”.
367P.Pereira, PUB:11.01.2002 “Os partidos nao sao etemos”; Jorge Miranda, PUB:20.01.2002 “De novo, 
sobre a reforma do sistema politico”;
368It basically consist of four laws issued in August 1995: Law 24/95 which altered the Statutes of Members 
of Parliament; Law 25/95 which altered Law 4/83 regarding the declaration of wealth by politicians; Law 
27/95 which altered Law 72/93 concerning the financing of political parties; and Law 28/95 which altered 
Law 64/93 dealing with the incompatibility rules for political office. For a brief commentary on these laws 
see (Victoria 2005; Maximiano 1997,25). Cf. F.B.Costa, IND:08.01.1999 “Financiamento escondido... com 
cauda de fora”; H.Monteiro, EXP:22.01.2000 “O virus da transparencies!'.
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According to Tavares and Ferreira the multitude of regulation also affected the highly 
critical aspect of financing the political parties. It suffers from complexity, secrecy and 
irresponsibility.369 This legal paraphernalia led R.Maximiano, himself a former member of the High 
Commission, to affirm years later that “national legislation is the first obstacle in the fight against 
corruption”.370 The anti-corruption laws then and now suffer from chronic problems without 
addressing the root causes, thus making corruption largely untouchable still.
The same is true with regard to supervisory institutions. It is remarkable to see the actual 
comments of one of the Presidents of the Constitutional Court which is responsible to oversee the 
politician’s declaration of assets. When asked if the Court has some means to monitor the veracity 
of declarations he replied “It does not have nor does it need to have”. So the journalist concluded 
that Portugal is confronted by a “simulacrum of transparency”.371
7.4.2 Corporative Response
This model seeks, first and foremost, the interest of one’s own corporate body as well as of 
its individual members over and against everything else including wider public interest. This 
functions as a solid protective wall even when allegations of corruption are held against one of their 
members. Representatives of the corporate body use its influence to either directly protect the 
accused individual or introduce mechanisms most likely to prevent accountability and 
transparency. This is quite common particularly in regard to economic deviance crimes.
As already noticed, Portugal was constitutionally regarded as a “corporative state” during 
Salazar’s dictatorship and Caetano’s interlude. Some of its effects remain influential and even 
developed into neo-corporatist forms of various kinds. The economist J.S. Lopes sees a striking
369J.Tavares and P.Ferreira, PUB:14.05.2001 “Quernpaga a democracia?". For a good background 
information regarding the legal basis of political parties’ finances see (Costa 1998).
370See his interview in EXP:24.12.1999. Cf. V.Moreira in (AACC 1991, 80-83); L.Sousa, PUB:23.12.2001 
“A democracia chega amanha”; C.Almeida, Director of DCLAP in DN:05.07.2006 “Lei impede combate a 
corrupgao".
371See interview with Cardoso da Costa, President of Constitutional Court in PUB:21.04.2000:8-9, and three 
years later in DE:04.02.2003 “Tribunal Constitucional recusa aplicar san?oes”. See also the opinion of 
another President, Antonio Mauricio in PUB:05.02.2005 “TC nao se da bem com papel” in which he said that 
the Court cannot monitor the declarations too. Cf. An interesting article by S.Sapage and C.Teixeira, 
VIS:30.06.2005 “Eles ganham mais que o Presidente" which notes that a vast majority of declarations are 
not updated annually as the law demands.
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difference between these two periods. Having lived half his life under a dictatorship he argues that 
the State then effectively ruled over corporations whereas now they actually obstruct governments 
from fulfilling their functions.372 But, as Vasconcelos puts it, “Portugal is full of old and new 
corporativisms. In this way we go nowhere” he claims.373
The following example illustrates the extent to which politicians (with or without political 
parties) have “corporately” and inadequately responded to allegations of corruption. According to 
Marques Mendes, an experienced politician, the parliamentary immunity scheme, as applied in the 
last decades, largely accounts for the current discredit of the Parliament and democracy.374 But 
illegitimate immunity cannot be confined simply to parliamentary affairs. There is also the electoral 
immunity375 in addition to what one may perceive as functional immunity. The last refers to a 
variety of practices that enable someone, somehow, somewhere to be almost untouchable without 
any explanation being given whatsoever at the time.
In a well publicised case, Antonio Cruz (PSD) was apparently involved in an allegation of 
corruption in Agueda prior to being elected as an MP. It took a long time for the Ethics 
Commission to decide on this case.376 And when they did, the decision was inconceivable and even
372See his interview in DE:15.06.2003. Cf his views on the effects of corporatism upon the economy in 
(Barreto, A., Situacao social. 1996,338-340).
373J.C.Vasconcelos, VIS: 12.06.2003 cited in DE: 12.06.2003. Cf. J.Aguiar, EXP:06.02.1999 
“Corporativismos em democraciaand (Sousa 1999,6-7).
374See DD:23.06.2003. He favours a drastic change in PPS’s statutes. But this lacks consistency within 
Mendes’ own party. For instance, Guilherme Silva (PSD bench leader in Parliament) conveyed an ambiguous 
message concerning the immunity of politicians - see PUB:24.06.2003 “PS e PCP apontam contradigoes 
entre Governo e PSD"; PUB:28.05.2003 “Brago de ferro entre direcgao do PSD e Cruz Silva". On the order 
hand, M.J.Morgado’s advice is for the Parliament to apply an automatic loss of immunity to anyone being 
investigated on charges of bribery and traffic of influence - see DD:05.06.2001 “Falar claro” by F.
Madrinha; likewise thinks the Bloco de Esquerda (PD:22.01.2003 “BE quer que deputados investigados 
‘abandonem cargos’"); and most recently, the Council of Europe - CM:10.08.2005 “Greco - Mais rapidez... 
Corrupgao deve retirar imunidade", which requested a change of law until December 31, 2006. Cf. also 
VIS:28.08.2003 “Portugal corrupto” by S.Sapage; and CM:29.09.2005 “Crime economico”.
375The most extreme case is F.Felgueiras who escaped being imprisoned by flying to Brazil. Two years later 
returned to Portugal as an independent candidate to local election thus acquiring immunity status in a 
complex, even puzzling, case for the public.
376According to PUB :22.03.2003, the judge requested urgency in the withdrawal of immunity. It took a 
month for the Commission to decide. Such a delay can so easily disrupt or compromise the efficiency of the 
criminal investigation.
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regarded as anti-constitutional.377 The Parliament lifted his immunity which allowed him to give 
evidence only in writing. And worst of all, it forbade the court to take any measure apart from 
confining him to a “term of residence”. That is, the judge could not emprison him at all. This fits 
the corporatist model of response for the following reasons.
The PSD party used its influence in Parliament in general and within the Ethics 
Commission in particular to protect the interests of one of its party members by neglecting the 
interests of the nation in a case that had nothing to do with the actual exercise of political or 
parliamentary activity. It is rare for an MP to be charged with corruption and therefore this case is 
of great significance for anti-corruption analysis. Irrespective of the case’s outcome, the PSD 
clearly obstructed the course of justice by delaying it, as well as by perverting the law. PSD also 
took illegitimate advantage of its majority position in government. Worth noticing is the fact that 
VJ.Silva, a couple of months later, and while still a member of the Ethics Commission in 
Parliament, went public to announce his desire to abandon it. He argued the Commission was 
heavily corporative in its rather blind defense of the party’s own members.378
One recalls that Cruz’s case took place prior to his being elected. Therefore immunity 
should not have been used for past episodes. Otherwise, this conduct seems to confirm Parliament 
as a safe haven.379 As it was widely noticed then, the law clearly obliges Parliament to lift 
immunity status as soon as someone is charged with a crime for which the penalty extends to three 
years of imprisonment. This case fitted that category too but was not applied consistently. The idea 
of imposing conditions on the court is beyond justification in a democratic context. For the public, 
this causes disbelief, not least because the party might have benefited financially.380 And finally, 
there seems to be no effective separation of powers. That is, politicians make rules regarding
377See CM.T7.04.2003 “House of Parliament makes unconstitutional decision”; PUB.T3.05.2003 “Situagao 
de Cruz Silva sem alter ago es".
378See PUB: 12.06.2003 “VJ.Silva wants to leave Ethics Commission”. The context refers to Edite Estrela’s 
case in the Ethics Commission which disappointed Silva.
379Former PS Minister of Justice Antonio Costa in the (hit) of parliamentary debate affirmed that if it is 
serious to fly to Brazil (referring to PS Felgueiras case), even more so is it to run away to the House of 
Parliament to evade justice (in reference to Antonio Cruz of PSD) - DN: 16.05.2003 “It is more serious to flee 
to the House of Parliament than to Brazil”.
380See DN:27.05.2004 “PSD admits having cheques from Cruz”.
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themselves. In practice it makes accountability and transparency almost impracticable because they 
also supervise themselves. In summary, this illegitimate protection, supposedly to safeguard the 
freedom and rights of politicians, seems to pervert the course of justice.
Other political examples are Paulo Portas’ alleged participation in the Modema University 
case via Amostra; Fatima Felgueiras’ disappearance to Brazil and her return two years later,
381 • 382 i i  *Isaltino Morais who resigned from a ministerial position, and Avelino Torres. Also relevant is 
the above mentioned case of dismissals in the PJ.383 They all merited wide media coverage.
Outside politics, the multiple football cases are notoriously known for their obvious 
corporative attitudes. When Morgado publicly accused some football associations and clubs of 
being heavily corrupt, their leaders reacted strongly including Valentim Loureiro, the League’s 
President. Later when he was himself involved in the “Apito Dourado” corrupt case alongside 
others, the public began to believe that some justice was finally underway. Despite much publicity 
the case was watered down and no one now thinks that there will be any exemplary punishment. 
The police, Public Prosecutor and the Justice system seem powerless to act swiftly and promptly 
against these apparently powerful and often self protected corporations. Other similar corporative 
attitudes include professional bodies such as doctors384, and lawyers385 to mentioned just a few.
381Morais left Durao Barroso’s government on charges of tax evasion. Then he bypassed his own PSD party 
which refused to support his return to Oeiras Municipal Borough. But his popularity granted him a majority 
election again in 2005 even when the legal case had not been dealt with.
382An apparently compromising article published by VIS: 11.03.2004 “And we see them go by” by 
M.Carvalho says that despite many judicial processes no one stops the man who rejoiced to have bought the 
PJ for 500 thousand escudos and evaded taxes - “For years the complaints that entered the Court of Marco de 
Canaveses against Avelino Ferreira Torres were filed (or dismissed)”. Cf. DN:25.01.2003 “Do azul dos sacos 
ao verde dos terrenos”; and P.I.Carvalho, JN:25.01.2003 “CDS-PP mantem confiangapolitico".
383J.A.Lima in his weekly column heavily criticises the former President of Parliament M. Amaral for the 
inconclusive inquiry commission. He goes on to accuse the coalition parties of acting anti democratically in 
favour of a “dictatorship of the majority” - EXP: 16.11.2002 “altos & baixos”.
384See the views of A.B.Veloso, EXP:01.08.1998 “Os medicos easua Ordem”; of E.Rangel, CM:31.05.2003 
“O ultimo tabu do regime”; F.A.Silva, DN:27.08.2003 “Faltam medicos, sobram bons alums"; F.Madrinha, 
EXP:19.11.2003 “Contra a Ordem"; and F.S.Cabral, DN:25.11.2003 “Medicos".
385See H.Garrido, DE:30.01.2004 “Os advogados instalados"; P.Oliveira, JN:25.01.2003 “Noticias de 
P ortugaland V.Moreira, PUB:23.07.2002 “O exemplo da Ordem dos Advogados".
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7.4.3 R eplacem ent R esponse
Similar to the legalistic model, this response, instead of reformulating or creating laws, 
either replaces problematic institutions or creates new parallel ones without addressing its original 
fundamental root causes too. It is the same as changing the outside labels only but the personnel, 
habits and structures usually stay almost the same and without any reasonable internal 
administrative control mechanisms to safeguard corruption. Such an elusive process often succeeds 
to assure the public that something is being done.
While the international exhibition of Expo98 was taking place, JAE’s case reached the 
news with the usual suspicion between private construction companies and political parties. The 
former Minister Cravinho, who is the PS’s most outspoken person on matters of corruption decided 
to close down the historical JAE in 1999. Three brand new public companies386 replaced it while an 
inquiry over the allegations of corruption was going on.387 Without dealing with any convincing 
case of corruption, the solution of merely replacing the institution had taken place already.
Such a decision, backed by the Council of Ministers, did eventually cool down the overall 
climate of suspicion among the public.388 And in such a process, there were no changes of 
personnel except at leadership levels.389 But none of the previous leaders have been accountable 
either. Meanwhile, in the spring o f2001 a major tragedy occurred when the Hintz Ribeiro bridge 
fell down at a time when a tourist bus and three cars were crossing it, leaving a total of 59 people 
dead.390 This event immediately raised concerns over the quality of maintenance work by the 
former JAE including those three replaced institutions. It is highly likely that an illegal extraction
386They were the Instituto de Estradas de Portugal (IEP), Instituto para a Constru?ao de Obras Rodoviarias 
(ICOR), and Instituto para a Conserva?ao e Explora?ao de Redes Rodoviarias (ICERR).
387See VIS: 15.03.2001 “Castelo de Paiva - Ao sabor das correntes e das mares” by A.T. Ribeiro and 
R.C.Pinto; VIS:07.06.2001 “A idade do Ferro” by F.Luis.
388A s  usual, “small-fish” were bothered only. See EXP:13.02.1999 “Casos sob investigagao - JAE: 
corrupgao so atinge funcionarios".
389T o  add an element of complexity and even perhaps deliberate confusion in the analysis of critical matters 
of accountability lies the fact of a short-lived leadership. For example in 15 years (1986-2001) there were 8 
Presidents in charge of the former JAE and subsequent three Institutes created by Cravinho in 1998. See 
DD: 13.04.2001. In a comparative basis, criminologist Moita Flores recalls that JAE had 8 presidents during 
1927-1996 and equally 8 for 1996-2003 - CM: 14.09.2003 “As pontes do inferno”.
390See chronology of the events in CM: 18.04.2006 “Tragedia de Entre-os-Rios” by J.A.Miranda.
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of sand caused some structural damages to the 1888 bridge. Others pointed out that the three new 
companies were not formally prepared to carry on with general maintenance tasks.391 In actual 
facts, there were many unclarified suspicions about the case.
At least, there was an immediate suspension of extraction for the following three years 
(2001-4).392 But as usual, the official accident inquiry took more and more time and five years later 
there has been no proper accountability yet. However, one judge attributed the cause of such a 
disaster to bad weather due to heavy rain at the time. In another parallel situation, a court case 
started in April 2006 involving six former engineers.
But the saga of closing and opening continued, as soon as Barroso took office as PM. His 
government closed down all three of the above created companies, in 2002. They merged them 
into one company again thus calling it Instituto das Estradas de Portugal (IEP). Two years later, its 
status was changed thus becoming an “entidade publica empresariaF - (a public business entity) 
with similar designation “EP - Estradas de Portugal”.
This represents an inadequate response. The habit of setting up a new organisation, thus 
giving the impression that everything is new and deserves another chance, appears irresponsible on 
several grounds. To start with, a sensible question is if nothing true comes out of the immense 
cloud of suspicion, why then close down these institutions? Why interrupt the extraction of sand 
just for a limited number of years? What justifies the creation of new ones, using the same 
personnel and procedures?
The problem it raises is simple. Starting afresh without dealing with problematic causes is 
simply either transferring the disease or postponing it for later times. Meanwhile the problem 
persists and critical matters are left untouched, causing even more suspicion which inevitably 
corrodes any institution from within.
Equally serious is the fact that potential corruptors from the private sector are almost 
completely unaccountable too. And the old issue regarding illegal financing of political parties
391See an interesting article by J.B.Moura, PUB:29.03.2001 “Fungoes naoprivatizaveis do Estado: as
estradas”.
392SeeCM:01.12.2004.
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remains both unclarified and unchallenged. All of these inevitably represent an heavy blow for any 
anti-corruption efforts, sending the wrong message to the public in general, and to wrongdoers in 
particular, that corruption is indeed a very low risk crime in Portuguese society. This, in turn, 
nurtures those incentive and opportunity structures that make corruption a way of life rather than an 
exception.
7.5 Four Judicial Types of Responses
This cluster deals with judicial institutions in their ultimate attempt to respond to 
corruption. It covers cases that went beyond the realm of administrative inquiry. The judiciary 
includes police forces393 as the auxiliary agents of criminal investigation; Public Prosecutors whose 
magistrates are responsible for criminal investigation; and Courts such as the First Instance,
Relagao, Supreme, and Constitutional.
The following inconclusive, abortive, delaying and venial models characterise most of the 
judicial Portuguese responses to corruption. An overall joint analysis explain why the judicial 
response remains broadly weak.
7.5.1 Inconclusive Response
Inconclusive response refers to criminal cases which the system of justice, in particular the 
PPS, Police and/or the Tribunal de Instrugao Criminal (Court of Criminal Investigation), somehow 
failed to proceed with charges without being able to provide convincing justification. In those 
circumstances, the case simply died out, often after extended bureaucracy. When such an 
inconclusive approach repeats itself frequently, it inevitably becomes a pattern of inadequate 
response known by the well-known Portuguese word “arquivado” - filed - forever, that is..
This outcome is not exceptional as the Minister of Justice, Alberto Costa, recently stated on 
the occasion of another internal legal reformulation of the PJ: “There are many non-investigated
393As recalled by M.Flores, since the introduction of the Law 20/2001, the PJ lost its exclusiveness in 
criminal investigation because up to two thirds of crimes from the Penal Code are in the hands of PSP and 
GNR. In addition there are also the following institutions: DIAP, DCIAP and SEF which, in his view 
corresponds to a state of “general confusion” - DN:11.03.2002 “Investiga^o criminal”.
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crimes. More than half of the cases are left on one side.”394 Among the non-investigated ones there 
are several political cases.395
The daily newspaper Publico was the first to disclose what became widely known as the 
Saleiro case in November 1997. According to Publico, Saleiro was allegedly involved in an 
apparently complex corruption case.396 After two years of investigation (1100 pages of inquiries 
and documents) the Public Prosecutor in Beja decided not to proceed with formal charges. This, 
according to Madrinha, is relevant because Saleiro was the Governor of Beja district.397 The case 
had other apparently serious episodes which were not investigated such as the Fundagao de 
Amizade Holanda-Portugal, the Radio Voz de Almodovar and the Chinese fax known as Semblana 
Golfe. Such complaints were openly expressed by the Publico which led the newly appointed 
Attorney General to re-open the case in early 2001. He trusted the DCIAP in Lisbon to re-examine 
the case.
Over two years later, it reached a similarly inconclusive end.398 But this time they 
acknowledged the existence of certain indicators (indicios) of crimes which could not be criminally 
pursued because their liability has been proscribed,399 something which unequivocally
394M.Moreira, CM:08.11.2005 “New criminal policy will be to establish priorities”; and O.Ribeiro,
CM:08.11.2005 “Crimes without punishment”.
395For a brief introductory exposure to such cases see J.Neto, M.Ganhao and S.Lopes, CM:25.05.2003 “And 
now Portugal?”. They refer to various politicians including C.Melancia, M.Cadilhe, B.Macedo, A.Saleiro, 
M.Nabo, A.Vitorino, A.Coimbra, J.M.Custodio and A.Pedras. Then they explored the following general 
ethical cases, some of which deal with corruption but not exclusively: L.Beleza (1987), C.Freire (1988), 
A.Curto (1992), Modema University (1997-8), J.L.Judas (2000); F.Felgueiras (2002-3), C.Silva (2003), and
I.Morais (2003).
396See the following articles in PUB:09.01.2001:2-4 “The example o f the filing of the Saleiro case” by 
J.Cerejo; “Testimonies annul PJ’s proof’ by J.A.C.; “Uma historia exemplar” by J.M.Femandes (editorial); 
and “Cases that the Public Prosecutor ignored” by J.A.C.
397Before he was President of the Municipal Borough of Almodovar (1982-95) and afterwards a MP - See 
EXP:08.11.1997 “Honestidade: Os votos e apalavra de honra”. Madrinha contrast Saleiro and Judas’ 
attitudes with Murteira Nabo who stepped down immediately after he was accused of tax evasion. Then the 
PM Guterres accepted the resignation whereas now (Saleiro and Judas’ case) he apparently failed to take a 
firm action, according to J.A.Lima’s article in EXP:08.01.1997 “Saleiro e Judas”.
398See TSF:24.10.2003 “A.Saleiro sees case filed”; and CM:25.10.2002 “Case against Saleiro filed”. Publico 
did not publish this conclusion immediately because some of their journalists were responding before the 
Court in a criminal process of defamation launched by the deputy prosecutor from Beja. This case was settled 
outside the court through an agreement between both parts - see PUB:23.12.2003 “Caso Saleiro”.
399J.A.Cerejo, PUB:25.06.2003 “Inquerito contra Saleiro indiciou diversos crimes”; and Suspeita de 
eventual branqueamento ’ no Projecto Semblana Golfe". According to these reports, the PPS mentioned that 
Saleiro did evade taxes twice. In the first case, the crime liability elapsed and in the second case, he paid it
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demonstrates a judiciary’s own failure to act, on time. Why, then, did it take over two years to re­
examine the evidence? According to Publico, the inquiry saw no direct evidence of his external 
signs of wealth being linked with concrete allegations raised against Saleiro in the first place. 
Neither did they seem willing to go the extra mile in clarifying the issue. So, this case ended as 
“arquivado” / filed.400
7.5.2 Abortive Response
This model refers to cases that passed the Tribunal de Instrugao Criminal (Criminal 
Instruction Court) with a formal accusation but somehow have not reached the court’s verdict. 
Thus the reason to designate it as abortive.401 The result is a further step towards impunity 
particularly when cases get so easily lost in complex dilatory penal procedures, making law in 
books substantially different from law in action.
In this model, corrupt cases are usually decided not on matters of facts (substantive) but 
largely on complex penal process issues. According to A.Cluny, in charge of the Magistrates’ 
Trade Union, the system of justice suffers from a great deficit of needed skills and qualifications 
across magistrates, judges and the police force, so that the defendants have an easy way to explore 
to the limits all sorts of delaying tactics, including frequent appeals from early on in the criminal 
investigation.402
extemporaneously. Cf. TSF:24.10.2002 “Fraude F is c a lCommunication report by the PPS on October 25, 
2002 by Ana Lima (Press Spokesperson) in www.pgr.pt “Caso Saleiro”.
400 For father examples of inconclusive response, such as (1) the case of Sousa Martins and Lisbon Airport 
(1988-91), se L.MP.Guerra, IND: 15.06.2001:20 “Corruption in Lisbon Airport case proscribed in TIC”; and 
A.P.Azevedo and M.L.Rolim, EXP: 12.09.1998 “Cases without justice”; (2) Rui Canas and the Ministry of 
Finances’ tax office, see (Morgado and Vegar 2003,115-117).; and (3) Pequiro and the Pharmeaceutical 
industry, see brief chronology (1996-2001) in PUB:04.09.2001; F.Camacho, GR:November, 2000:49-60 
“The man who knew too much”. But afterwards there have also been charges against Pequito for alleged 
forgery - see CM:02.06.2005 “Pequito accused of lying to the judiciary”
401E.Damaso, PUB :09.03.2002 “The game of sporadic reforms”. According to Gabinete de Politico 
Legislativa e Planeamento, in 1999, out of 353 registered cases only 9 per cent, that is 32 faced trial.
402See his comments in EXP: 12.09.1998 “Cases without justice” by A.A. Azevedo and M.L. Rolim. See also 
(Santos, et al. 1996, 387-408).
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The evidence seems obvious. In fact, almost all the famous cases related to apparent 
misuse of European Social Funds403 aired through the media in the 1980s ended, fifteen years later, 
without seeing the court’s verdict404 They included UGT’s case (General Trade Union) ;405 
Partex406; Caixa Economic Agoreana (a bank in the Azores);407 and Amorim’s Cork companies.408 
According to judge Margarida Veloso, some of the reasons for such a massive failure were due to 
the slow process leading to formal accusation and difficulties in notifying the defendants 409 Large 
criminal cases encounter an added difficulty from the penal process code making the country’s 
system of justice appear very vulnerable indeed.
The overall situation of criminal investigation in 1980s to late 1990s went through a very 
critical stage.410 It resulted in several thousands of various criminal cases being proscribed or 
extinguished due to a well known episode of “legislative omission” (1988-95). Looking back, such 
a complex and man-made situation was due to the lack of harmony between the new 1995 Penal 
Code and the Penal Process Code following changes from old norms of “instrugao contraditdria>’
403See (Gon9alves 1991).
404One exception includes the case of “small fish” - two former local government officers of Municipal 
Borough of Caminha were sentenced to prison in 1996. Upon unsuccessful appeals to Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts they were sent to jail in June 2002 for 17 and 6 months - see PUB:22.06.2002 “Former 
Caminha town councillor arrested”.
405This 1987-9 case included 37 defendants, including five secretariat members, and 13 companies with 
additional 15 defendants. The trial should have started in May 1999. But ever since, there were eight 
adjournments. In March 2002 the judges in Lisbon proscribed it although in 2004 the Supreme Court opted to 
carry the case forward, but just for a while, as the case, fourteen years later, was definitely closed. The 
criminologist, M.Flores, calls this the biggest profanation of the secrecy of justice in recent Portuguese 
history - see CM:23.11.2003. For a brief chronology see EXP:14.10.2000:10 “UGT goes to the witnesses’ 
bench”; PUB:22.03.2002 “Proscriptions” (Prescribes) by L.M. Viana; and CM:30.01.2004 “Other cases 
which made history”.
406The 1986-8 Partex case, formally indicted in 1997, had 73 defendants and 71 associations although in the 
beginning it included nearly 300 companies. This complex case was proscribed in 2001. But nevertheless, the 
PPS seems determined to request some financial repayment of 7 thousand million Escudos - IND:19.01.2001 
“Raios os Partex” by P.Guerra; PUB: 16.01.2001:44; and PUB:09.11.2001 “Similar cases proscribed”.
407AnaP. Azevedo, EXP:06.11.1998 “Judges aim to avoid proscriptions”; S.P.Coelho, PUB:06.09.2001 “The 
accomplices of the Law”; EXP: 10.10.1998 “Supreme Court decrees general amnesty”; and EXP: 15.09.2001 
“Judgements in the public eye”.
408A.P.Azevedo, EXP:28.11.1998 “Amorim on the list of proscriptions”; and PUB:04.05.2002 “UGT case”.
409See C.Gomes, PUB:22.03.2002 “UGT prescribed partially”. Cf. R.D.Felner, PUB:09.11.2001 “UGT/FSE 
case postponed for sixth time”; PUB:05.02.2002 “UGT case postponed for eighth time”; and 
PUB:20.04.2002 marks the moment when Torres Couto (UGT) changed from being a defendant to witness.
410See a list of other cases in EXP:11.11.1999:18 “Justice from the dropper” by A.LAbrunhosa; and 
EXP:08.01.2000:12-13 “Justice with no chance of a reply”.
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into what it is now simply “instrugao”.411 The Supreme Court only settled this matter in November 
2000 but not without critical voices being heard 412
During most of 1990s the situation only marginally improved as the following cases 
demonstrate. The organised crime case of the “Setubal Connection” (1984-1997) is a further 
aborted example. After thirteen years the case was proscribed too. This merited a special study 
(Gomes, et al. 1998). Despite its complexity, the substantive matters of facts were straightforward 
(p. 171). The same cannot be said with regard to various delaying techniques used and abused 
throughout the process which lead to it being almost completely proscribed in 1995.413 According 
to the authors, this case fits well the concept of “intimate civil society” put forward by B.Santos in 
which the defendants benefited from their powerful status with “good contacts” within public 
administration and banks (p.166-7).414
Worth noticing is the actual time spent with all the fourteen appeals that existed alongside 
the Setubal Connection case which took a total average of 9 months and 2 days to process each of 
them. However, two of those appeals (despacho de pronuncia) had a “suspensive” timing effect 
attached to it - something that favours potential criminals. For the first one, it took 4 years, 3 
months and 4 days; and the second took 6 years, 10 months and 2 days. This explains how some 
appeals take so long to settle that, in the end, the case turns out to be proscribed.415
7.5.3 Delayed Response
Fortunately, not all cases are proscribed. Some of them only reach a verdict much later, 
that is, several years after the judicial case has started. The assumption behind this model is that
411See PUB: 18.11.2000:2 “Proscriptions were no accident” by C.Gomes which cites figures from (Santos, et 
al. 1996) and Observatorio Permanente deJustiga; and EXP: 10.10.1998 “Supreme Court decrees general 
amnesty”.
412See three articles in PUB: 18.11.2000:3 “The mistake” by C.G.; “Story of a (fatal) legislative omission” by 
A.Mesquita, and “Supreme injustice” by L.Francisco. Cf. several authors in (Barreto, A., Justica em crise?, 
2000,19, 74,110,217,350,405). M.S.Tavares writes: “It is two decades in which crimes perpetrated by the 
powerful are being washed away by the Judiciary while prison cells are overflowing with those who are 
deprived of similar defense mechanisms of the rich” - PUB: 13.04.2001 “The latest affront of the Law”.
413 With the exception of just one case of passive conuption, which involved two individuals. They were both 
acquitted (31.10.1995).
414See also A.P.Azevedo, EXP: 12.09.1998 “Why are big cases slow?”
415See Quadro II.3 “Duration of appeals” - (Gomes, et al. 1998, 187).
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delayed justice is an actual evidence of injustice416 in addition to being a weak response, often with 
unpredictable results. The only consolation goes with the popular saying: “Vale mais tarde do que 
nunca” (it is better late than never)417
Much of the delay is often explained against the background of what appears to be a 
permanent crisis of justice. D.F .Amaral refers to a growing number of new and unfinished legal 
cases being carried over every year in contrast to what seems to be fewer settled cases. The result, 
he says, is that normal cases that should take from 6 to 12 months to be settled actually extend for 
five years; and difficult and complex ones which should take 2 or 3 years actually extend for 15 
years.418 This may certainly not account for every case, including some corrupt ones. However, this 
current judicial environment seems nevertheless ideal for supporting corrupt incentive and 
opportunity schemes, particularly when judges find it hard to punish wrongdoers after so many 
years.
In the case of corruption concerning driving licences issued by the Centro de Exames de 
Tabua (Examining Centre of Tabua where a criminal investigation started in 1988), the Public 
Prosecutor magistrate recommended suspended jail sentences for all defendants precisely because 
he thought the length of delay was so great that it was unfair to punish them after such a long 
period. However, in 2004, the judges only partially fulfilled the recommendation. Out of 23 
defendants, 7 were sentenced to from three to four years in prison, 10 got a suspended prison 
sentence, and 6 were acquitted.419 Other well-known examples include the Caixa Economica
416See (Carreira 2001, 35); and F.Madrinha, EXP:24.12.2004 “Marking time”.
417V J.Silva, DE:23.04.2004 “From 25th April to the «Guilded Whistle»”: “Having said this, it is better late 
than never to lift the comer of the veil which covers one of the most persistent disgraces of the democratic 
regime: the promiscuity between political feudalism, the wheeling and dealing of the building industry and 
the football circus.”
418See (Amaral 2000, 249; Almeida 1997). Cf. J.Cravinho, DN.T6.05.2005 “Corruption: an anaesthetized 
democracy?”.
419This case also involved a lawyer who happens to be a MP and leader of PSD for Lisbon city. As such, his 
case was taken by a different legal route and process - see TSF:08.06.2005 “Ethics accepts A. Preto’s plea for 
suspension”; VIS:02.06.2005 “A.Preto suspends MP’s mandate”; and CM:30.06.2005 “Shame yet to be 
proved” by J.Barradas . For additional information regarding corruption in T&bua see EXP: 17.07.2004 “Hot 
summer in the Judiciary”; EXP: 16.10.2004 “Public Prosecutor stops detentions” by A.I.Abrunhosa. An 
appeal then followed.
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Faialense case (a bank in the Azores Islands),420 the legal cases of the former town councillor 
Abilio Curto,421 and the very old and obviously manipulated case of “Viagens Fantasmas” - Ghost 
Trips.422
7.5.4 Venial Response
Finally, venial response consists of court verdicts in which punishments are minimum 
compared to the maximum legal possibility. That is, the sentences are so venial that some may 
genuinely argue for the low risk punishment because the benefits acquired are greater than the 
penalty. In the end, it fails to reduce the system of incentive and opportunities for corrupt 
behaviour. Somehow the wider population may perceive that corruption results in actual gain.
Consider for instance the following judicial statistics on corruption. In 1997, there were 67 
defendants and 46 convictions of which only 6 had prison sentences; in 1998, 50 defendants, 33 
convictions and 8 prison sentences; in 1999, 43 defendants, 24 convictions and 5 prison sentences; 
in 2000, 62 defendants, 43 convictions and no prison sentences; and finally in 2001, 69 defendants, 
39 convictions and only 4 prison sentences 423 Taking into account the fact that there are many 
suspicious cases of corruption reaching the media, of which only a few are investigated, and fewer 
proceed to the courts, it seems staggering that such a very small number of people faced prison 
sentences, that is, in five years, out of 175 convictions only 23 (13.14%) were given prison
420 The case started in 1986 and was settled in courts 18 years later, in 2004. This actually dramatic story led 
J.Bairos Fernandes to write an open letter to the PM, Minister of Justice and Finances, the Governor of 
Banco de Portugal and to the regional President of Azores - PUB:01.04.2004 “My life a nightmare which has 
dragged on for 18 years”; and the opinion of his lawyer in DN:08.02.2005 “Off-the-record defence: Justice 
far from people”. See brief chronology in PUB:02.03.2004 “Chronology of a delay”; and in DN:08.02.2005 
“Chronology: Lawsuit wonder 18 years through the courts”
421 See EXP:05.02.2000 “A dinosaur of local power”; PUB:22.07.2001 “Abilio, ((President of the Villages))”; 
and “Courts upholds accusation against Abilio Curto”; EXP:16.05.1998 “Abilio Curto condemned for 5 
years”; and A.Marinho, S.Carvalho and S.Rainho, EXP:05.02.2000 “Autarcas a prova de suspensao”. 
PUB:06.03.2004 “Abilio Curto imprisoned yesterday afternoon”. Cf. The reactions registered from CDS/PP, 
CDU and PSD people in the same newspaper.
422 The case went through various phases of analysis and enquiry over the years. It was widely exploited by 
the media and certainly added to an already very negative image of politicians. See the comments of
J. Amaral, himself a former MP in EXP:21.08.1999 “ Viagem-Fantasma na Justiqc£''\ A.P.Azevedo, 
EXP:28.08.1999 “Opinion poll on ghost trips”. There are now new rules but apparently they raised another 
polemic issue - See N.Simas, DN.T2.08.2004 “Parliament to spend 2.2m Euros on visits abroad”.
423Source: Gabinete de Politico. Legislativa e Planeamento do Ministerio daJustiga, cited in CM:30.08.2002 
“Corruption gives low prison sentences” by N.Ivo.
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sentences. This statistic does not tell us how many of these 23 actually went to prison and, as 
experience confirms, it is apparently easy either toescape or to see the penalty substantially 
reduced.
When the proof of corruption is certain beyond any doubt, a large number of the convicted 
receive “suspended sentences”. Those who receive prison sentences can then appeal to the 
Constitutional Court, during which time they escape being jailed. This happened to the former 
secretary of the Health Ministry, C.Freire, who was initially sentenced to 7 years in prison in 1994. 
He appealed, firstly to the Supreme Court (settled in 1996), then to the Constitutional Court (1999). 
The case went back to the Supreme Court in 1999 and finally it was proscribed in 2005.424
The Modema University case captured wide public and political attention which ended 
with seven defendants being convicted. Upon appeal, the Tribunal da Relagao de Lisboa acquitted 
5 and substantially reduced the penalty for the remaining two. Jose Braga Gonfalves’ jail sentence 
was reduced from twelve to seven and half years whereas Pedro Rosado’s was reduced from three 
effective years to two but suspended. So, in a case that started with 13 defendants, only one 
remained in jail after the last appeal was concluded, which is a weak result. It truly deserves the 
title of the Correio da Manha newspaper “Poderosos Vencem” (The powerful win).425
And finally, two cases of inside trading in Lisbon’s Mercado de Valores - Stock Market. 
For years there have been rumours of economic crime there. When the court was finally able to 
convict the first two people, the penalties were minimum too. Miguel Cintra only repaid a fraction 
of what he gain illegally.426 So did Magalhaes Pinto 427 These cases demonstrate that “crime 
compensa” - crime actually pays for the wrongdoers.
424See an interesting formula in picture concerning this legal case in EXP:08.01.2000:12 “The formula which 
leads to filing: the Health case” by A.P.Azevedo.
425See CM:24.06.2004 by Jorge Paula.
426A..Campos, PUB:26.07.2003 “Miguel Cintra condenado apena deprisao suspensa e multapor crime de 
mercado”. Cintra was sentenced to 18 months suspended prison for three years on demand pay 499 thousand 
Euros to four charity instituions and additional penalty equivalent to 35.4 thousand Euros. But he earned 
something like 3.9 million Euros in the first place. Cf. Cristina Ferreira, PUB:26.07.2003 “Umapena 
moralizadora mas ‘de mao leve J.Malheiros, and PUB:29.07.2003 “0  crime compensd\
427In this second case, the Public Prosecutor requested that all profit should be withdrawn - see PUB 
(Revista):29.12.2003 “Osprotagonistas doAnd'>', and P.F.Esteves, DE.T9.12.2003 “Abuso de informagao
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7.6 Concluding Remarks
These threefold clusters of responses seem to indicate that corruption remains largely 
beyond accountability. Both administrative and judicial systems appear dysfunctional and, 
therefore, more supportive of a corrupt environment. The way forward is to reconsider afresh how 
to tackle corruption by effectively reducing present incentive and opportunity structures that 
nurture it and its impunity in administrative, judicial and private institutions. The following chapter 
seeks to address this issue in detail.
privilegiada: Acusagao pede multa no caso EngiT\ But the judge convicted C.M. Pinto to pay only 63 
thousand Euros out of his 138 thousand Euros profit.
PART THREE 
TENTATIVE SOLUTION PATTERN
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Chapter 8
Formulating an alternative framework of response
8.1 Introduction
This chapter corresponds to the thesis’ title: “Turning a blind eye?”. In the course of a 
summative evaluation of Part One, the thesis raises awareness of corruption (Chapter 2) and its 
impunity (Chapter 3) as serious national problems. These are specifically illustrated through 
Emaudio case study (Chapter 4). Part Two deals generally with causal evaluation from both 
historical (Chapter 5) and current perspectives (Chapter 6), and most critically by identifying 
inadequate contemporary responses (Chapter 7) to corruption. This chapter provides the basis for 
an alternative anti-corruption moral framework, which aims gradually to reduce both the incentives 
and the opportunities that nurture and ignore corruption.
8.2 Turning a blind eye?
For the sake of internal coherence, there seems to be only one sensible response, that is, an 
unequivocally negative answer. In refusing ‘to turn a blind eye’, this thesis follows a different 
route. From mere ignorance, resignation and fatalism it moves towards contextual remedies. 
Following this path is right because corruption distorts power, wealth and values, thus eroding the 
most valuable capital, namely trust.
To reverse the situation requires a determination to counteract society-made complexities, 
relativisms, fears, and confusion that obstruct critical reforms. The task consists of tackling those 
identified cultural assumptions, patterns of practices, structures of incentives and opportunities that 
nurture neo-corporatism, monopolistic, and arbitrary corrupt attitudes.
What follows indicates the way forward. First, this chapter clarifies the aims and scope of 
this specific anti-corruption strategy. Secondly, it further clarifies the methodology to be used. 
Thirdly, it presents a series of six alternative remedies from which the solution is chosen. Finally, it 
offers a new moral framework structure and policies.
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8.3 Aims, definition, and scope
This chapter has two aims: first, to propose a broad, unified, and comprehensive anti­
corruption scheme, and, secondly, to prepare the ground for launching the first part of a multi phase 
programme to reduce incentive and opportunity structures that nurture and tolerate corruption.
By “broad-unified-comprehensive” we mean: (1) a unique multidisciplinary programme 
which covers public, private, and civil society sectors alike; (2) a fully equipped team from the start 
(effective legal basis, power, accountability, personnel, and resources); (3) with a visible, clear, 
measurable and time-oriented goals in harmony with an agreed mission, vision, core values, code 
of conduct, and democratic procedures.
The scope of this proposal considers the fact that Portugal has never yet had a fully 
comprehensive anti-corruption project based on citizens’ consistent support, which makes this 
proposal the first of its kind. As such, to start well is by far the most important aspect of all. In 
addition, there are the following specific features and implications to consider.
First, it is concerned with foundations. Good foundations are essential. If an agreed basis 
exists, that will easily accommodate critical new decisions regarding methodologies, techniques 
and priorities without disrupting or changing the character of the project. The major single benefit 
is avoiding further false anti-corruption signals.
Secondly, it only covers the beginning of a multi phase strategy. It is premature at this 
stage to speculate about future reactions, simply because of the unpredictable and dynamic nature 
of this process. However, it is certain that opposition will arise and grow against concrete efforts to 
combat corruption. This also takes seriously current political unwillingness as top leaders may feel 
there is no alternative but to go on turning a rather guilty blind-eye with obvious demagogy. If this 
happens, the key task will be to raise further awareness of the problem.
Thirdly, it concerns broad policies only. The “big picture” view is most likely to set the 
right pace towards specific action because much still needs to be done in the way of preparation 
regarding employees, research, resources, and institution building. Preparation alone constitutes a 
key aspect of this project. This conduct avoids giving a rather false promise of attacking everything 
and anything at once.
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Fourth, it gives high priority to both articulation and integration of all policies envisioning 
an “holistic anti-corruption system”428. Without these elements, this project will not differ from 
several isolated responses which various governments and institutions have made in the recent past.
And finally, Portugal, unlike Singapore, needs first to reduce corruption from an apparently 
medium to high level to a medium to low level. This reveals the seriousness of the task, prepares 
for reactions, and avoids disappointments in the process. Ocampo argues that it is easier to reduce 
corruption from ninety to fifty per cent than from two to one per cent429 Therefore, it is vital to 
recognise the extent and seriousness of corruption.
8.4 Methodology
The process of building a new anti-corruption framework is best explored by considering 
six alternative solutions. After distinguishing between them, a brief summary of possible effects is 
advanced. Then, through a process of elimination, the final alternative route is chosen and argued 
for. We conclude by elaborating a broad policy structure upon which to build critically a new moral 
framework against corruption.
8.5 Choosing from six alternative remedies
The following six alternatives are chosen from perceived comments and attitudes that 
frequently appear in public discussions in Portugal concerning remedies for corruption. Each has 
some degree of support, be it popular or political or economic or a mixture.
8.5.1 Messianic Like Alternative
This alternative is a revival of long-held expectation that keeps reappearing, as most 
commentators have noticed, even in recent times. Some expect that one influential politician with 
charisma might, one day, deliver the country and change the status quo altogether. This is widely
428 See (Seumas, Roberts and Spence 2005). The preference for an holistic approach seems obvious. Cf.
Many individuals (Eigen 1995; Vogl 1998; Strombom 1998; Dudley 2000; Yener 2001; Van Tonder 2001; 
Irwin 1999; Sangweni 1999; Williams 1987) and corporate bodies such as TI (Pope, J., TI Source Book. 
2000, vii, xv, xx, 32-7); UK Department for International Development (DFID 2002,1,27); WB (World 
Bank 2000,4,42); and US Department State (Department of State 2001) are willing to follow this way.
429 As cited by (Padilla 1996,14).
Formulating an alternative framework o f response 207
known as Sebastianismo which expects the late Dom Sebastiao’s ‘return’ to solve critical yet 
unresolved problems including corruption.
Prime Ministers such as Cavaco and Guterres, have been “given” such a role. And 
regardless of their refusal to accept it, some sectors of Portuguese society continue to nurture this 
expectation. When Barroso resigned as PM, Alegre warned him that his party was looking for Dom 
Sebastiao.430 So the idea still remains alive, or so it seems now.
8.5.2 European Union Alternative
Portugal has been part of the EU since 1986. Having lost its colonies in 1975, it turned 
towards Europe. For some, it was a survival strategy. For others, Europe is the place which 
historically should never have been “abandoned”. There was an assumption that Portugal could 
become a better country and most of its political and economic structural problems would 
eventually be solved, corruption included. This rationale partially justifies the very high trust in 
European institutions then and now.431
The EU is concerned with fraud, corruption and waste. Over the years, a number of 
institutions have been established such as the European Court of Auditors (since 1977, regarded as 
the “financial conscience” of the EU); OLAF {Office de Lutte Antifraude, the European 
Commission Anti-Fraud agency); Europol (Law Enforcement Organisation accountable to the 
Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs); and recently Eurojust (Judicial Cooperation 
Unit, since 2002). These institutions merit national respect, and are somehow believed to have the 
capacity to shape, modernise, and equip Portugal likewise to fight fraud, corruption and waste.
8.5.3 International Alternative
This proposal goes well beyond Europe to include worldwide efforts to combat bribery. 
There are several legal and organisational efforts to deter corruption, including the United
430 M.Alegre, EXP: 18.08.2001 “S. Jorge, Eqa, D.Sebastiao e Camdes". Cf. M.Monteiro, EXP:23.05.1998- 
Rev “0  sonho do norte de Africa"', and (Cardoso 1982).
431 J.Guerra cites a recent Eurobarometro survey in which out of 100 Portuguese citizens, 80 do not trust 
political parties, 63 the government, 52 the Parliament, and 66 the judiciary system. But 62 trust the EU 
(DE:24.02.2006 “Portugueses e Europeus”).
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Nations.432 Some treaties and conventions press for a bribe-free world such as the OECD’s 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions already signed and ratified by Portugal; the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Crime, and the Council of Europe’s two treaties: Criminal Law Convention (ETS 173/1999, 
ratified and legally binding in Portugal since 2002, with Additional Protocol, ETS 173/2003) and 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174/1999)433
These responses are often regarded by political leaders as a public reassurance that 
Portugal is well placed alongside key leading countries to counteract corruption. The media also 
covered widely recent cooperation between Portugal and the newly formed Greco (Group of States 
Against Corruption) initiated by the Council of Europe in 1999 434
8.5.4 New Regime Alternative
This views the need to break into the current democratic regime that is allegedly 
responsible for the ongoing political and economic crisis. Not long ago, former President Soares 
drew attention to the growing dissatisfaction with institutions and their leaders who are perceived 
as responsible for the spread of corruption in the “State, political parties and local governments”. 
He concluded that if Portugal were not an EU member, a military coup would have taken place 
already.435
Alegre, once exiled for ten years in Algeria, also alerts us to the fact that people, without 
any form of constraint, are now affirming, even on television, that they would prefer a new Salazar 
to take over the government than continue with this kind of democracy.436 Although this comment 
was set in the context of people’s fear for their own safety and security in most cities, one
432 The UN Office of Drugs and Crime prevention introduced the International Day Against Corruption 
(December, 9th) first observed in 2005. It is best known for its anti-corruption toolkit GPAC (Global 
Programme Against Corruption) (United Nations 2004). UNICRI (UN Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute) is a legal resource and a recognised forum too. Its research projects include the 
International Crime Victim Survey, and the International Crime against Businesses Survey.
433 For other relevant treaties see a useful compendium in (UNODC 2003).
434 See both reports (GRECO 2003) and (GRECO 2005).
435 See TSF:19.11.2004; and CM: 19.11.2004.
436 See DN:2001-02-16, Interview with M. Alegre entitled “Um partido sem rumo”.
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nevertheless senses this tendency towards a new authoritarian style of leadership as a solution to 
the problem.
8.5.5 Monetary Alternative
Some believe that current institutional mechanisms are sufficient in numbers but they lack, 
above all, financial resources to perform a supervisory role in a more efficient way. The solution 
therefore lies in adding more funds which in turn will train more qualified personnel and better 
equip existing institutions.
Over the years, it has not been uncommon to see key leaders seeking more financial 
resources for their own institutions. In fact, various government programmes ratified in Parliament 
in recent years have stated the need to add more funds in fighting corruption and tax evasion. Some 
governments, such as the first one headed by Guterres has indeed allocated more funds to 
institutions including the PJ.
8.5.6 New Agency Alternative
This last alternative views a solution via the creation of a new national and independent 
anti-corruption agency. Its main idea is to set a unified strategy capable of coordinating and 
monitoring the struggle against corruption. Several political commentators agree that Portugal has 
not yet truly addressed the phenomenon in a rational manner.
Some even recall the former AACC agency and regret its abolition in 1992. The 
replacement with a special unit (later changed to be DCICCEF) operating within the PJ has yet to 
prove itself why does it not work. Therefore, a new agency is seen as a solution.
8.5.7 Analysis of alternatives
Four out of the six alternatives represent a national solution whereas two are distinctively 
international. Two of the national, namely the Messianic and the New Regime, have some 
similarities. Both reveal some degree of disillusionment with politics. One blames politicians 
whereas the other blames the system. Both transfer the solution onto others rather than being part 
of it. The Messianic looks for a change in leadership, whereas the other seeks structural changes.
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With regard to leadership in the last twenty years, there were well regarded Presidents, 
Soares (1986-1996) and Sampaio (1996-2006), and PMs Cavaco (1985-1995), Guterres (1995- 
2002), and Barroso (2002-2004). They won elections and earned great popular support. All PMs 
eventually fall under severe criticism437 and in the end abandon their position rather than lose an 
election. To their credit, none of them has been associated with corruption 438 All PMs have 
embraced prominent new roles,439 a clear indication that there never been a shortage of leaders with 
integrity. Guterres440 and Barroso441 promised to combat corruption. Cavaco largely ignored i t442 
As far as anti-corruption results, none can legitimately claim any victory whatsoever.
Arguably, it is not their fault because corruption has for long permeated the entire political 
and economic system. But the system did overcome them. Damaso is right in affirming that both 
Cavaco and Guterres were defeated “by the barony of respective parties” dominated by 
“contractors, real estate promoters, financial speculators and commission agents of all kinds.”443 
Cavaco did not hide his anger against political parties. So much so that, ten years later, “The
437 Cf (Judice 2000)..
438 Soares, however, had a difficult moment in the context of Emaudio’s case. See P.Pereira’s comments “O 
momento mais dificil de Soares depois do 25 de Abril foi todo oprocesso chamado ‘E m a u d i o A  historia 
nunca foi verdadeiramente esclarecida, nem o envolvimentopessoal de Soares, que gozou sempre de uma 
impunidade impar na vidapoliticoportuguesa, por boas e mas razoes.” in PUB:09.12.2004 “Uma Vida- As 
Decisoes de Mario Soares”. Cf. L.R.Pinheiro, CM:24.11.2004; J.M.Martins, CM: 18.09.2005; and Soares’ 
former party colleague, Rui Mateus in his well publicised book “Forbidden stories: Memories of unknown 
PS” (Mateus 1996).
439 Barroso became President of European Commission in July 2004; Guterres, the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees in June 2005; and Cavaco, the President of Portugal in March 2006.
440 See (Corkill 1999, 55)
441 Barroso, as PM candidate told in RTP1 Television debate that Portugal has not a case of corruption been 
condemned in court (cited by P.Guerra, IND: 15.03.2002:34); and in an interview expressed that Socialist 
government cohabits with corruption (VIS:21.02.2002). See F.S.Cabral, PUB:08.08.2004 “Corruption”; and 
Barroso’s own article in DN:20.02.1999 “ Client elismo do Estado”.
442 See Cavaco’s response to following question: “Dr Borges, whom you have cited said that corruption is 
number one problem. Do you think the same?” “I don’t like to talk when I am not in condition to substantiate 
it” (EXP:08.12.200l:Revista). It is remarkable that someone who was PM for ten years feels not qualified to 
talk or substantiate about corruption. Cf. S.Sanches’ attempt to understand Cavaco’s position in
EXP:25.09.2004 “A economia do bolso furado”, or is it J.Ferreira’s view more acurate?: “E de supor que a 
sua (Borges) passagem pelo Banco de Portugal no auge do cavaquismo Ihe tenha dado uma visao deste 
problema portugues, precisamente numa altura em que tambem Cavaco Silva dizia que Portugal nao era um 
pais de corruptos” in SEM:27.07.2001:8 “A.Borges e o combate a corrupgao”.
443 PUB:28.12.2001, “Noticias do Pantano-F. E.Damaso has, over the years, consistently conveyed his 
thoughts concerning corruption in Portugal. His concept ofpantano (marsh) was further applied when 
Guterres resigned as PM on a similar basis - DN:01.10.2005 “Corrupgoes”; DN:27.11.2005 “A Arte do 
Aplauso”', DN:31.10.2005 Editorial; DN:07.10.2005 “Autarquica”.
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Master of Silence” according to Barreto,444 won the presidential election by denying even to his 
own PSD party the possibility of taking an active role in the electoral campaign. The country still 
favours and nurtures faith in individual characters.445
However, experience tells us that corruption is a complex phenomenon unlikely to change 
as a result of one man’s good will only. To insist on that is to go on sacrificing citizens of high 
quality. Though leadership is important in itself, it is not enough and needs further actions which 
can not be entirely tied up with one PM or President. Therefore looking for a messianic figure is 
not the solution needed.
With regard to changing the regime, it is not new for Portugal either. In the twentieth 
century alone, there was a succession of changes from monarchy to democracy (1910) to 
dictatorship (1926) and democracy again (1974). All these changes occurred after wider allegations 
of corruption.446 None brought any significant solution. This in itself does not yet justify the 
elimination of this alternative. However, seeking to replace democracy once again with a new 
dictatorial regime is unacceptable. Infringement of basic human rights is never a justified means to 
counteract corruption. Dictatorship is a false escape.447 Portugal knows that too well.
Any monopolistic power tends to exacerbate corruption rather than deter it. For a long time 
democracy has been seen as an antidote to corruption. Recent studies by Treisman specify that 
democratic longevity matters significantly. He even indicates that “Had Portugal experienced 
uninterrupted democracy from 1950, the estimates imply, it would have been slightly less corrupt 
by 1998 than Germany.” (Treisman 2000,433). However imperfect the Portuguese democratic 
regime might be, the way forward is not replacement but an improvement. So this alternative needs 
to be rejected also.
444 See how a well-known sociologist analyzed Cavaco’s (a)political trajectory of the last ten years (1995- 
2004) in PUB:05.12.2004.
445 N.Sampaio, DE: 10.01.2006.
446 See (Valente 1999, 34-39). Elsewhere he writes: “I do not remember a single regime, since the end of 
18th century, in which corruption... had not been seen as a “normal factor” (V.P.Valente, DN:23.04.2004).
447 The contrary is true - corruption flourishes in dictatorship regimes, kleptocratic states, and Marxist 
countries as several scholars pointed out. See (Hope and Chikulo 2000,19-23; Charap and Harm 1999; 
Grossman andNoh 1990; Kwong 1997; Olowu 1992) (Hope, et al. 2000,19-23; Hope, et al. 2000, 19-23)
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The remaining two national options stand alongside two transnational alternatives. These 
are largely confined to legal initiatives, and aim at mutual cooperation among nations in 
minimising corrupt transactions around the world. This is particularly so in the case of OECD,
COE and UN anti-corruption regional or global initiatives. Slightly different is the EU case which 
will be examined subsequently at length.
The relatively new international initiatives448 deserve support but they cannot substitute a 
national ownership in fighting corruption (Commonwealth Secretariat 2000, 17). The intention of 
treaties, as has often been reiterated, is not to interfere with internal cases of corruption. They 
function as additional tools, particularly in areas of prevention, policy advice and institution 
building without which there would be no meaningful cooperation in a globalised world. So, the 
following are key factors to consider.
In the first place, transnational cooperation is not conceived as a national programme to 
combat corruption. Secondly, it has clear limitations on how much it can improve anti-corruption 
mechanisms within a national context, not least because it is largely based on universal principles 
rather than on concrete national specific examples of corruption. Thirdly, a transnational initiative 
is largely legal in nature and content, whereas a national anti-corruption policy demands a 
multidisciplinary effort. And finally, corruption remains a sensitive issue, so much so that national 
pride would fiercely resist against too much outside participation. Charges of double-standards 
against foreigners are all too common (Savona and Mezzanotte 1997). To sum up, corruption is 
primarily a national problem depending on internal political will and monitoring mechanisms to 
address the complexities of corruption. Therefore, this option cannot be adopted either.
The EU has galvanized Portuguese minds to a point of providing “a major psychological 
boost which lifted economic confidence” (Corkill 1999,213; Barreto, A., Portugal, a Europa, 1994; 
Franco 1994,258) with “spillover effects on the political structures” (Magone 1997, 161; Morlino 
1998; Pinto and Nunez 1997, 183), almost as a “life insurance” for its democratisation process
448 For an overview of several international efforts see (Csonka 1997; Bishop 1997; Chaikin 1997; Pieth 
1999; Pieth 2000; Shihata 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1997).
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(Moreira 1998, 84). This almost functioned as a panacea for the country’s old problems, and 
therefore needs substantial analysis.
The EU is a relatively new organization bom after two devastating world wars. Committed 
to avoiding further wars and successful thus far, it has grown and changed substantially (EEC-EC- 
EU; European Economic Community - European Community - and European Union) to become, in 
the words of Delors a “Non-Identified Political Organization”.449 These have background 
implications in evaluating the EU’s anti-corruption attitudes and beliefs.
The EU’s history of response to corruption prevents Portugal from seeing it as an 
alternative route for the following reasons. From its origins, the EU included countries where 
corruption was perceived as an unresolved problem. Italy was the most obvious example 450 This, 
in itself, did not endanger the EU entirely.451 As a matter of principle, and most validly for 
supranational organisations, the EU correctly opted not to interfere with internal national affairs. 
However, as an emerging democratic organisation, it was totally legitimate to set up a core of 
values upon which to operate. Here corruption becomes a relevant issue, so much so because 
economic matters were the EU’s original concern.
From the outset, and for several reasons which the scope of this thesis regrettably cannot 
accommodate, EU officials did not perceived corruption as a serious issue to a point of mobilising 
top-level attention. Therefore, there was no genuine political will to develop anti-corruption beliefs 
(in theory, conceptual analysis) nor attitudes (in practice, comprehensive anti-corruption 
programmes).
Only subsequent EU enlargements452 made corruption appear gradually worse. The 
evidence, which became much clearer in the eighties, dealt with a dense cloud of suspicion of
449 Cited by P.Gon?alves, EXP: 11.06.2003 “Guerra e Paz: intuigdes febris>\
450 Italy is a classic case, reasonably well documented (Della Porta and Vannuci 1999, 13-16; Della Porta and 
Meny 1997; Gundle and Parker 1996; Hess 1998; Galasso 1984, 300-322). For other countries such as 
France see (Girling 1997, 86-114; Medard 1997; Pujas 2000; Moodie 1988; Marengo 1988).
451 In realistic terms, supra national bodies need maturity to cooperate with countries that inevitably wrestle 
with corruption because optimum zero level is an impossibility (Klitgaard 1988; Becker and Stigler 1974).
452 Firstly, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973; secondly, Greece in 1981; thirdly,
Spain and Portugal in 1986; fourthly, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995; and finally, Cyprus, the Czech
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corruption hanging over the EU’s own image, affecting its internal affairs and most particularly its 
relationship with Member States (hereafter M-S) (Outrive 1992; Peterson 1997; Warner 2003; 
Passas andNelken 1993).
Of course, the EU has addressed the problem of fraud on many occasions (Leigh and Smith 
1991; Levy 1991; Delmas-Marty 1996; Salisch 1995; White 1998; Salisch 1995; Del Frate and 
Pasqua 2000). Documents of various internal institutions have also raised the issue.453 But the EU 
also invites criticism. It has largely reacted to on-and-off scandals. In between, despite eloquent 
discourses and random initiatives, the EU response has remained impotent.
On the conceptual front, in the early nineties, EU officials were reluctant to use the word 
“corruption”, thus giving the false impression that it exists only in some distant lands. Its literature 
and discourse are mainly centred around a rather generic category of “fraud” instead (Outrive 
1992, 125)454. For a long time, M-S were even unable to reach a common definition of fraud 
(Passas and Nelken 1991, 238). Pieth recalls that the EU approached corruption through the 
“backdoor” (Pieth 2000,25), correctly in our view, because it did so firstly under the umbrella of 
its budget which is truly an outdated excuse, and later on under threats from organised crime 
which is clearly a superfluous excuse too.
On general practical matters, in the second half of the nineties, TI’s two memoranda about 
the EU’s role further reveal its ambivalent conduct (TI-Brussels 1995; TI-Brussels 1999). In the 
first, TI felt that the EU was not doing enough and criticised - partially wrong in our view - its 
unreasonable relegation of the matter to M-S. TI requested more direct intervention in criminal law, 
tax deductibility of bribes, procurement rules, accounting standards, and foreign aid. In the second
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, making a total 
of 25 countries.
453 The author is grateful for documents received from Centro Europeu Jean Monnet in Lisbon. See concerns 
raised with regard to cooperation with M-S in (European Comission 1995,2, 6; European Comission 1994, 3; 
European Commission 1995, 32-35; European Commission 1996, 9-13), and particularly the COA repeated 
criticism concerning accounting procedures in (European Union 1996, 5-6). For other key EU institutions 
such as The Parliament, European Council, Court of Auditors, and Court of Justice see (European Comission 
1995,29-32).
454 For a conceptual discussion concerning the relationship between fraud and corruption see (Hodgkinson 
1997,17).
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one, TI urged the EU to complete the procedures for making anti-corruption instruments 
operational and raised concerns regarding the political credibility of M-S in general.
Meanwhile, unresolved corruption negatively affected the EU’s internal image (van 
Buitenen 2000; Committee of Independent Experts 1999). With regard to M-S, there was no 
shortage of scandals either (Della Porta, et al. 1997). So much so that, after forty years of the EU’s 
existence, there are still original and late comer corrupt countries. Heidenheimer uses the TI-CPI to 
perceive some M-S as “somewhat” (Germany, Austria, France, Belgium and Portugal) and “very” 
(Spain, Greece and Italy) corrupt countries (Heidenheimer 1996).455
At the start of a new millenium, the EU has not yet got its act together. Between scandals, 
EU reactions and weak responses can be summarised in four ways. Firstly, it keeps adding anti- 
fraud rules456, as if dispersed rules, and above all, general recommendations, could significantly 
alter the ingrained habits that nurture fraud in M-S where up to 80% of the EU budget is spent 
without on site and timely monitoring. Secondly, it goes on replacing short-lived institutions,457 
without prior evaluation and responsibility for actions or omissions exercised as expected in an 
ideal democratic setting. Thirdly, it creates new organisations with little articulation or connection 
with existing ones458, which raises additional stewardship concerns. And finally, it only gradually
455 For further adaptation of Heidenheimer’s classification see (Meny and Rhodes 1997).
456 London’s Institute of Advanced Legal Studies report says that “EU criminal law...suffers from a dual 
plague: fragmentation and ambiguity.” (Stefanou and Xanthaki 2005). Meny expands by saying that “The 
production of tens of thousands of regulations... have created a system that is easy to infiltrate and exploit but 
very difficult to monitor.” (Meny, et al. 1997,111). On this basis, Van Outrive concludes that “the 
complexity and unclarity of EC regulations and directives is one of the most criminogenic factors” (Outrive 
1992,127). Cf (Levy 1991). and (Leigh, et al. 1991).
457 Looking backwards, this rather reveals a degree of uneasiness and instability. For example, the Task Force 
for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention was replaced by UCLAF in 1987. UCLAF, bom with visible 
limited independence and resources, was replaced by OLAF in 1999. For instance, this last change occurred 
when the EU faced serious ethical accusations analysed by a special Expert Committee whose Report led to 
the unpreceded dismissal of the entire Santer Commission. UCLAF performed poorly, having been 
“notoriously disorganised” according to COA Special Report (Court of Auditors 2005, # 5). So much so that 
it was merely replaced.
458 If mere replacement is questionable, it is equally critical the way the EU is creating new organisations: 
OLAF, Europol and Eurojust. Their relationships are regarded as “complex institutional framework” by the 
COA’s Report: “It is not always clear how responsibilities are divided among these bodies, which results in 
risks of both duplication of effort and omissions.” (Court of Auditors 2005,4). Even more critical is the 
following statement: “As Mr Kendall noted, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust have been created in a piecemeal 
way. There appeared, in his view, to be an absence of coordination in the policy establishing these bodies (Q 
224). We agree. There has been no overall plan as to how they should work or fit together.” (House of Lords 
2004, # 89).
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up-grades the available resources rather than equipping at once its key anti-fraud institutions 
namely COA, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust.
In conclusion, the EU has not satisfactorily resolved its major external and internal anti­
corruption hurdles: how to monitor its interests within M-S where cooperation remains difficult;459 
and how to equip OLAF with criminal investigative power and resolve its independent status, 
which remains a contested issue.460 Meanwhile, the EU attempts to create a Public Prosecutor type 
of office, something which is tied up with the European Constitution which awaits approval.461 If it 
succeeds, it will be OLAF’s turn to be replaced, so it seems.
Therefore, the EU needs help or determination to win its battle against corruption. The 
latter is recommended, whereas the former tends to lead to unnecessary, deprecatory-style 
comments462 most likely responded to through equally unnecessaiy self-protective language.463 
Overall, the EU depends on a management that combines political economy vision with good 
governance through motivating ways that mobilize nations across Europe.
Portugal should be more critically informed about EU policies and agendas in general. For 
instance, painful recent experiences with the Stability Growth Pact should trigger serious warnings 
about the EU as policy maker and the conduct of the so-called leading nations. Regarding anti­
459 See (Court of Auditors 2005, # 4); OLAF’s Supervisory Committee, Opinion No 2/03 (Luxembourg, 
18/06/2003) which reads: “Ultimately, OLAF's external investigation work as such remains very limited, tied 
up in other activities, and seems not to be well received by some national courts, which want the proof 
submitted to them to be collected in accordance with their national procedures” and then cites an example 
(footnote 15) of the Portuguese Court of Setubal on 10 January 2001 (Case 1/97.4 ABLSB). See also Valerie 
Rampi, OLAF’s Spokesperson Administration comments (12.07.2005) in 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/anti_fraud/press_room/pr/2005/10_en.html.
460 In general, OLAF remains vulnerable - “Despite the damage fraud and fraud allegations do to the EU, its 
response has been largely ineffective. The EU only has an underresourced antifraud coordination and 
investigation unit in Brussels. Most fraud control is left to the uneven and irregular supervision of the M-S.” 
(A.Riley, “Is the EU missing a very effective U.S. trick in dealing with fraud?” Wall Street Journal, 
03.06.2004). With regard to OLAF independent status see positive comments in (Stefanou, et al. 2005), and 
negative comments in (House of Lords 2004,17-18).
461 Two countries voted “No” namely France (May 29,2005) and Holland (June 1,2005); thirteen ratified 
and ten called off their votes for the time being.
462 Such as Marquette’s comment: “This brings into question the EU's mandate in consulting on institutional 
capacity when it clearly lacks it as an institution itself. Perhaps the EU would be better advised to re-build its 
own reputation and to ensure the integrity of its own funds, rather than trying to advise recipients on how to 
avoid corruption.” (Marquette 2001, 30).
463 This is largely observed when EU officials insisted more on fraud rather than corruption without 
clarifying the concepts as stated above.
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corruption, Portugal should concentrate more on its own unresolved situation by doing the opposite 
of what the EU has done as outlined above. Firstly, it should unequivocally recognise the 
seriousness of corruption and its effects. Secondly, it should formulate a comprehensive and 
multidisciplinary plan to tackle corruption.
There are two remaining alternatives. Both, the Monetay and New Agency alternatives, 
have a common desire to improve democracy. Unlike the other two national alternatives, they 
refrain from blaming unilaterally the State or the politicians. But there are differences too. The 
Monetary demonstrates good faith in existing anti-corruption institutions whereas the New Agency 
option seeks to create a new one.
With regard to the Monetary alternative, there are several factors which lead us to believe 
that the essential problem is not a financial one. It is certainly one of many important issues. 
Although fighting corruption is bound to be expensive, as organised crime often uses sophisticated 
technological means which in turn require even more resources. In this context, finances remain a 
scarce resource. This wisely demands good governance and stewardship which may also imply not 
going on adding funds. Rather it relies on accountable organisations which operate according to a 
visible, transparent, and measurable plan. This seems to be lacking, judging by the growing 
dissatisfaction against the State administration where public expenditure is generally high for the 
results obtained. For example, this is the case with the national health system. Existing anti­
corruption institutions have clearly not projected themselves in this way either. So, in principle, 
adding funds in such organisations might well imply further losses.
Before accepting this alternative it would be advisable to find out what anti-corruption 
results were obtained with the current budget, rightly assuming the financial increase over the 
years, covering personnel and institutions like the PPS, three Police institutions, and the Courts - 
each of these with special supporting branches or units, and various others operating within public 
administration. If the balance turns out to be negative, which is most likely, then the way forward is 
to look for reasons first rather than adding more (lost) funds.
Current economic hardships exist for several reasons. One of them is waste. Another is 
diverting funds from meeting priority needs. Therefore, there is no guarantee, perhaps not even a
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minimum one, that, under current circumstances, adding funds would mean more results. Common 
sense leads the opposite way. Therefore it seems rational to abandon this alternative. The only one 
left turns out to be the New Agency.
8.5.8 The preferred alternative
Portugal needs a new anti-corruption agency with full legal, police and comprehensive 
powers and advanced mechanisms of checks and balances. Although this appears to be a generally 
recognised alternative route (Pope 1999b),464 one needs stronger reasons to move in this direction. 
On what basis and why? Several counter-arguments need to be discussed first, followed by direct 
reasons, some critical warnings and two brief case-studies on the ancient moral-theological 
framework and the contemporary anti-corruption success story of Singapore. As for counter­
arguments, consider the following.
1) Facts already reveal an excessive number of institutions including duplicated ones.
Another one will add even more expenses - Barroso’s administration closed some institutions 
and possibly more need to follow.
Massive waste of resources is already an acknowledged public concern. But it does not 
address the problem of corruption at all. This, in our view, represents one of the root causes 
needing special, even radical, attention. Most certainly the new agency will contribute towards the 
closure of duplicated institutions (DCIAP, DCICCEF for example) when corruption is properly 
detected and dealt with to a point of introducing new administrative and business culture.
2) Democracy is based on the rule of law. It also serves as antidote to corruption with several 
anti-crime mechanisms, so to create a separate one is to doubt the system.
Unfortunately, current democratic institutions control corruption only loosely. Two options 
remain, namely, the reverse occurs or democracy will suffer as discussed already in the New 
Regime alternative above. Portugal is widely perceived as a low law-abiding country which is the 
opposite of what democracy, based on law, is all about.
464 Not so much in Europe yet, as the existing ones are relatively young, as former ICAC Commissioner 
mentioned in an interesting paper for a conference organised by COE (Speville 2003).
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3) Corruption in advanced Western society is not seen as more serious than other crimes to a 
point of requiring a special unit.
According to the Greco Report, in Finland, transparency is “a key reason why corruption 
seems to be a rather exceptional event” and next comes “the high moral standard of Finnish Civil 
Servants” (Greco 2000,4). In such an environment, a special agency is needless. Portuguese 
experience reverses the order: moralistic discourses, then transparency which rarely exist. Instead 
the culture of secrecy associated with a man-made contusion which Cravinho sees as “deliberate 
and facilitated within public administration” that attracts and protects corruption to a point of 
making detection difficult and rare.465
4) The previous anti-corruption agency achieved little result, so why think of reintroducing it.
In fact, the former AACC was still-born. It did not have comprehensive legal status, lacked 
independence, and acted in administrative rather than criminal investigation. It was a lion without 
teeth. The central-bloc government just opened the door for anti-corruption rhetoric. That model 
was rather a false signal which should not have existed like that in the first place. When AACC 
asked either for wider powers or its extinction, the Parliament which had established it opted for its 
closure (Barreto, Abel., 2005; Sousa 2004a: 130).
5) Criminal prosecution is reserved to Public Prosecutor Services (PPS) only.
Rightly, and it must remain so. But this does not exclude the legitimacy for a new agency 
to act as a criminal investigator as long as it has legal basis and assures legal rights for all involved 
parties. As recently as 1999, and after a long battle undertaken personally by the Attorney General 
Cunha Rodrigues, the PPS created the Central Department of Investigation and Penal Action 
(DCIAP).466 But it is not solely an anti-economic crime unit, and therefore seems diffuse, under 
resourced, short-coming in results, and distant from citizens, who therefore do not support it. And 
above all, it depends on the quality and willingness to cooperate of another separate, if not “rival”
465 J.Cravinho, TSF:14.01.2005. Cf. J.Vasconcelos, VIS:09.01.2003:34 “Para defender as instituigdes”: 
“corruption is a cancer of democracy...needing a radical treatment”.
466 Created since September 15,1999 - Portaria n.° 386-B/99, de 25 de Maio.
Formulating an alternative framework o f response 220
entity namely the PJ to undertake effective criminal investigation. In summary, its mandate and 
means of operation is not yet as fully comprehensive as it should be to achieve timely results. It 
will most likely replicate the PPS which has always had a poor record in tackling corruption.
6) DCICCEF is a special PJ branch which replaced AACC and needs time to do its work.
It is “hidden” behind a complex PJ organisation and thus remains largely unknown and 
weak because of its several scales of hierarchy. Its Deputy Director can be nominated every three 
years by the National Director, with the prior approval of the Minister of Justice, which arguably 
allows extraneous political influence to occur, which has not been unheard of in recent times. 
Therefore, it remains vulnerable to political interference under Ministry of Justice as became 
obvious when former deputy director Morgado resigned in “mysterious” surroundings.467 The 
endless dispute about the quality of cooperation between two distinct organisations (namely PJ and 
PPS) is another perceived and unresolved obstacle.468 There are other weaknesses too. For instance, 
it does not have a web page of its own. Its unreadable initials do not help it to attract much 
attention. It remains distant from the people. Its programme of action does not have a public face. It 
lacks both research made publicly available, and preventive initiatives among business and civil 
society alike. No less uncomfortable is the President of Municipal Borough of Porto’s public 
accusation that PJ-Porto did nothing to help with corrupt cases raised during his first four-year term 
in office (R.Rio, DN:30.09.2005). The public has never seen a response from PJ sources 
contradicting such a serious accusation. Sousa goes further in highlighting critical procedural 
limitations:
“It [DCICCEF] does not, for example, have access to individual and company fiscal 
records and bank accounts, which remain a special prerogative of the Directorate-General for 
Taxation (Direc9ao-Geral das Contribui95es e Impostos) and the Customs and Excise (Direc9ao
467 A clear evidence is undoubtedly the political turmoil that followed the arbitrary dismissal of two Deputy 
Directors of PJ in August 2002.
468 Cf. DCIAP’s Director, C.Almeida, wishing that PJ were under PPS thus eliminating intermediary layers 
that so often disrupt sensitive investigations. (VIS:20.05.2004, “Ha um crescendo depolicializagao”). None 
of the most successful anti-corruption units such as the Singapore or Hong Kong had such a divided 
framework. Those units have full police investigative powers, as most agents are themselves police officers.
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Geral das Alfandegas e dos Impostos Especiais sobre o Consumo). Nor will it develop similar 
pedagogical, informative and legislative (input) functions due to its judicial and law enforcement 
nature.” (Sousa 2004b).
7) The main unresolved problem lies in the Courts, with its slow and contradictory outcomes, 
which pervert the system of law, and not with any anti-corruption agency.
The crisis of justice is a serious one and extends beyond corruption. Governments 
obviously need to settle this ongoing crisis. But a functioning anti-corruption agency, with 
professionalism and wide people’s support will add significant pressure on the courts to perform its 
duties. The case of Vale e Azevedo is a good example how investigation and courts can deal with 
complex cases on time and in full compliance with law.
In conclusion, the new agency likely to replace DCICCEF and DCIAP will need, from its 
conception, a far better and comprehensive status and legal basis; otherwise it should not be 
established at all. If this happens, Portugal simply remains unprepared to combat corruption.
As far as direct supporting reasons go, the following historical and contemporary ones are 
jointly included. For long Portugal has despised opportunities to recover from its perceived 
backward administrative and economic conditions. And yet, corruption corrodes from within the 
values needed to change the negative course of events via critical equally needed reforms. This 
jeopardises future generations in their legitimate striving towards better and safer human conditions 
and environment.
Unethical social, economic and political patterns of practices, structures of incentives and 
additional opportunities already identified prevented progress far too often. Key institutions like 
Governments, the business community, political parties and the Catholic Church did not help 
significantly in their respective fields, namely administration, economics, politics and theology, or 
otherwise. The people of Portugal have never been asked or properly motivated by leading figures 
and institutions to support the anti-corruption cause. Continuing to disregard the seriousness of 
corruption perpetuates instability even if it briefly leads to some progress. But progress without 
integrity falls short of the high moral standard needed for an anti-corruption scheme.
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Ethics pay. Ethics make the way forward possible because tackling corruption is an ethical 
imperative. It is not simply a matter of theoretical analysis but above all it requires practical 
determination. Before moving in this direction, some warnings are appropriate as we substantiate 
this claim and hopefully move towards this new anti-corruption approach.
There is nothing miraculous in creating a new and special agency. This agency itself is not 
the solution. There are more examples of failures than success even in countries which have created 
special agencies (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, et al. 2000; Langseth 2002, 8). This thesis has 
already criticised several weak approaches offered by institutions respected worlwide including 
WB, IMF, and TI. The first impact of a recent anti-corruption movement of the nineties only 
touches the important awareness aspect of the campaign. Cases of anti-corruption success still 
remain rare.
Secondly, nothing substitutes for hard, fair and competent work. Experience elsewhere 
warns that the anti-corruption struggle is extremely difficult and painful, largely because of the 
long established practice of corruption. Portugal has its own peculiar environment which needs to 
be gradually demolished. And lastly, a warning concerning the opposition that will commence as 
soon as the new agency begins its work. It will come from multiple, sometimes surprising sources 
including manipulated sectors of the population who have been primed to support dubious causes. 
The easiest option is to give up, thus perpetuating a false anti-corruption signal for further public 
discredit. And finally, there is a problem which is obvious but rarely avoided in Portugal. Mere 
imitation of foreign laws and examples will not work because it fails to contextualise critical issues 
by ignoring elements that remain typically Portuguese. The task is to consider paradigm models 
with critical cultural awareness. With these warnings in perspective, the following contemporary 
and classical case-studies are intended to motivate the process towards establishing a new anti­
corruption agency.
8.6 Contemporary Case-study
The first case is a contemporary anti-corruption example of success within the Asia-Pacific 
region undertaken by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB, working since 1952) in
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Singapore (Klitgaard 1988; Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991, 91; Quah 1995; Wei 1999; Leak 1999; 
Keong 2003).469 Unlike the UK where it took more than a century to bring corruption under 
control, Singapore shifted reasonably fast in less than thirty years - “jumped from a stable, high- 
corruption status quo to a new, low-corruption equilibrium” (UNDP 1997, 67) which Girling 
describes as “‘social engineering’ in a big way” (Girling 1997,170). It is a relatively small island, 
known as a “city-state” with an “entrepot” economy and highly conservative government with a 
population of 4.4 Million of which 76.8 per cent are ethnic Chinese, 13.9 Malay and the remainder 
Indian and minority groups, speaking several languages including English, and practising 
Buddhism (42.5), Islam (14.9), Christianity (14.6 of which 4.8 are Catholics), Taoism (8.5) and no 
religion (14.8).
Statistics compiled during the 1950s indicate that corruption was a way of life, facilitated 
by inadequate legislation, an inefficient anti-corruption unit placed within Police Force, and 
people’s indifference due to scepticism and fear of reprisals. It is worth noticing that, after 8 years 
of the CPIB’s creation, corruption was still rampant. But, when the People’s Action Party came to 
power in 1959, a new anti-corruption phase began by introducing effective unified legislation 
(Prevention of Corrupt Act) with a few updates, covering both the public and private sectors.
After independence in 1965, the top political leaders committed themselves to setting a 
good example and, largely due to the CPIB’s consistent basis (mission and vision statements 
supported by adequate core values and code of conduct), skills and determination (the “Swift and 
Sure” slogan) combined with exceptional organisational conduct (24 hours -7 days a week) 
exemplified by today’s figures which aim at: 90% attendance of public visitors calling at the 
Bureau within five minutes but none exceeding 10 minutes; answering the telephone by the 3rd 
ring at the latest; making a decision whether to act on complaints received by e-mail within a week, 
or immediately for reports received from walk-in complainants; and completing most
469 Many with minimum exposure to international literature would identify Singapore’s exceptional 
performance. However, it is largely unknown in Portugal. Reference is mainly confined to TI-CPI annual 
reports - CM:28.02.2002 “Portugal e dos mais corruptosL.S.Matos, PUB:02.09.2002 “Abaixo do 
Botsuana”', and sometimes in the context of the politician’s salary - PUB: 19.08.2002 “O salario: Dirigentes 
asiaticos sao os mais bem pagos do mundo”\ J.Rendeiro, EXP:31.12.2004-Economia, “Cronica de uma 
sociedade bloqueadd>\  The author is grateful to the thesis Supervisor, Dr B.Winter who lived several years in 
Singapore and for advice to include this brief case-study.
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investigations within 2 months or less, with the exception of cases demanding an extended period; 
while assuming the absolute confidence of whistleblowers’ identity, even in court proceedings, if 
so requested 470
Alone, that is without external monitoring or donations, it achieved within a relatively 
short period a remarkably (a) clean internal political (President, PM, Unicameral Parliament of 84 
seats),471 (b) judicial (reliable), and (c) economic (highly developed ffee-market, but still largely 
dependent on exports) environments. Its per capita GDP is equal to that of the big four Western 
European countries, making it the first option of international business companies operating in the 
region.
This is indeed an outstanding achievement despite the fact that Singapore has no 
significant natural resources; and against the stream, it took a unilateral bold decision to publish a 
blacklist of unclean corporations;472 and is currently surrounded by countries with abundant cheap 
labour. So much so that today, Singaporeans benefit from high standards of living and salaries,473 
and its top civil servants are among the best paid in the world (Eskeland and Thiele 1999, 30).
According to WB’s data, Kenya and Singapore shared similar economic indicators in 1971. 
Both countries had experienced one-party rule under the same leader for an extended time. When 
President Moi stepped down in 2002 after 24 years, Kenya’s per capita income did not exceed 350 
US Dollars (almost the same as when it became independent in 1963) whereas Singapore achieved 
24.800 US Dollars 474
470 See these and additional information in http://www.cpib.gov.sg/aboutus.htm.
471 There are complaints against apparently excessive governmental powers and absent political opposition 
which touch sensitive areas of human rights as advanced by civil society groups such as Think Centre, the 
Roundtable and the Socratic Circle (Global Corruption, 27/1172002:151 - find source; seen as “enlightened 
despotism” (Girling 1997,170)) (A. Gonsalves, CN: 13.01.2003, “A utopia dogoverno dos tecnicos”).
472 Cf. “But there can be no doubt that the international corporations blacklisted by
Singapore in the 1990s received a considerable shock, and that in the future others will think twice before 
attempting to bribe Singaporean officials. The World Bank subsequently went down the same path.” (United 
Nations 2004, 268).
473 In this regard, Quah notices that Singapore has gone a step further than Hong Kong by also reducing 
incentives to corruption in addition to opportunities thus raising Singaporeans’ salaries as another preventive 
measure (Quah 1995).
474 J.Heitor, PUB:27.12.2002 “Quenia despede-se de 24 anos depoder deArap MoF.
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This rather succinct case-study is just one paradigm model to stimulate reflection and drive 
in a similar direction. Whether Portugal considers it or not is another issue altogether. So far one 
can allude to a mixed reaction. It is interesting that J.Salgueiro has included Singapore’s example 
as something which Portugal should follow.475 Jardim, in power since 1975, recently announced his 
determination to “transform Madeira into the Singapore” model of success.476 The current 
government’s emphasis on “Technological Shock”477 is apparently based on the research of 
Castells who also highlights Singapore’s case as exceptional.478 One knows that a member of the 
current government, Campos, has spent time thinking about Singapore’s performance in 
comparison with Southern Europe.479 If nothing else, this case ensures that corruption has a 
practical solution.
8.7 Classical case-study
The inclusion of a classical case-study, from a moral and theological perspective, is 
intended to help us reflect on the need to adopt broad foundational anti-corruption principles. The 
following is all about “Great Words” (GWs), which appear twice in the Bible with minor variations 
in Exodus 20:2-17; Deuteronomy 5:6-21,480 universally known as the Ten Commandments or 
Decalogue. We have no intention of undertaking a detailed exegesis nor of promoting those values, 
knowing in advance that some items (adultery for instance) receive little support in contemporary 
society. Rather, we seek to reflect on the value of handling cohesively as well as coherently a core 
set of principles that need to be selected and adopted in undertaking the anti-corruption task.
This brief presentation adopts the Heilsgeschichte (salvation-history) approach with two 
intertwined Covenantal Pacts based on Abraham-Moses in the first instance and then followed by a
475 See interview in VIS: 16.11.2000.
476 T.Nobrega, PUB: 10.05.2004 uBarr os os agradece solidariedade do ‘Grande Patriota ’ Jardim”.
477 See PS 2005 electoral programmed (21.01.2005), Chapter 2 “Um Plano Tecnoldgico” in 
http://www.ps.parlamento.pt/.
478 See M.Castells interview in PUB:10.03.2005.
479 C.Campos, PUB:05.12.2003 liAssim nao vamos la”.
480 According to Wright, most of the pentateuchal laws (first five books in OT) are contained in three major 
collections, in addition to the Great Words itself: The Book of the Covenant: Ex 20:22-23:33, ratified at Sinai 
itself (Ex 24) ; the book of Leviticus; and the Deuteronomic collection (Wright 2004,284-8).
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new covenant in Jesus Christ. Apart from the Jewish-Christian heritage, other religious groups also 
share some of the GWs concepts, such as Islam, Buddhism, and Jainism. Beyond religion, business 
corporations, book and film producers alike have all done their part in spreading GWs either direct 
or indirectly, including in newly adopted versions. A quick search on the Internet gives a glimpse 
of different sets of 10 commandments applied to a variety of cases. Here, and for brevity’s sake, 
key elements for practical contemporary application are highlighted only. Readers should look into 
the footnotes if interested in additional references.
Three aspects are worth explaining: context, format, and contents. With regard to context, GWs 
belong to early Jewish literature inserted in a much wider, rich, and often neglected cultural 
background of the Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) traditions,481 in which certain common practices 
were observed, such as the signing of political treaties. Most scholars agree that the Jewish 
covenant formula shared similar formats with the other ANE’s peoples.
Table 10 below gives the overall co-relation between the Hittite Treaty and the biblical
articulation of covenantal formulae and language, which consists of seven elements: preamble; 
historical prologue; stipulations; deposit and public reading; a list of witnesses; blessings and 
curses; and the oath (Weaver 1965, 32-3). Note for instance that the earthly King figure in the 
Hittite case is replaced by the heavenly God in the Jewish framework.
481 For a general, non specialist historical introduction of Sumer, Akkad, and Neo-Sumerian civilizations 
(2000-1600 BC) in which Abraham and his descendants lived in Mesopotamia, see (Weaver 1965, 14-23).
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Table 10 Hittite Treaty and Covenantal Biblical formulae and language
The Hittite Suzerainty Treaty Covenant Biblical Literature
1. The Preamble:
“The acts of the sovereign’s benevolent Great 
King...”
“Thus says the Lord, the God of Israel” (Josh. 24:2) 
“I am the Lord your God” (Ex. 20:2a)
2. The Historical Prologue:
The acts of the sovereign’s benevolences are listed
“I... brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of 
slavery” (Ex. 20.2b). Josh. 24:2-13
3. The Stipulations: “You shall have no other gods before me” (Ex. 
20:3)
“Put away the gods which your fathers served 
beyond the River (that is, at Haran on the Euphrates 
River) and in Egypt, and serve the Lord” (Josh. 
24:14).
“The sovereign agrees to provide for and to protect 
his subjects, while the subjects agree not to seek 
security in relations with any other foreign powers.”
4. The Deposit and Public Reading: (Josh. 24:26 and Deut. 31:9-12) require that the 
covenant be placed in the charge of the priests, who 
carried the Ark of the Covenant. They are instructed 
to read the agreement (covenant) at the end of every 
seventh year.
“The sovereign requires the treaty to be deposited in 
the sanctuary of the vassal, and to be read in public at 
regular intervals.”
5. List of Witnesses: “You are witnesses” (Josh. 24:22). If they break the 
covenant; they will witness against themselves. 
(Note that witnesses of earth and sky, mountains 
and rivers were still used by Israel as seen in Isa. 1:2 
andMic. 6:1-2.
“The gods and other witnesses are to keep an eye on 
the covenant makers in order to punish any breach of 
contract.”
6. The Blessings and Curses: “If you forsake the Lord and serve foreign gods, 
then he will turn and do you harm, and consume 
you, after having done you good” (Josh 24:20)
“These are to be disbursed by the divine witnesses.”
7. The Oath: “And the people said to Joshua, ‘The Lord our God 
we will serve...So Joshua made a covenant with the 
people that day” (Josh. 24:24-5)
A solemn ritual
Source'. Adapted from Weaver, 1965: 32-3.
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Table 10 indicates to a certain degree how GWs had also been moulded on existing 
knowledge. Moses’ key task was to move towards a new monotheistic approach to God. The 
thesis’ key point is to highlight the usefulness of the internal assimilation of a core set of principles 
likely to sustain steadily any course of action in history.482 GWs had a particular original function 
of laying the foundation on which Israel, then an emerging nation, should live as a community of 
citizens and believers in the one and only God. Contemporary citizens, we argue, in different walks 
of life, and most particularly in an agreed programme against immoral corruption, need a basis; 
whether it is GWs or not is irrelevant at this stage of the argument. Still on the context, GWs as a 
literary genre fits within Sinai Covenant texts (Ex 19-34 and Deut 4-11) as a general preamble or, 
as Wright puts it, as a “boundary fence” around the kind of behaviour expected to be consistent 
with covenant membership483
With regard to format, GWs are simply stated one after another as a continuous piece of 
text. Its internal subdivisions lack uniformity now. For example, what is the 7th commandment 
(against theft) for Catholics and Lutherans is the 8th for Josephus, Philo and both the Jewish and 
Reformed traditions.484 However, GWs remain always associated with 10 sayings (Decalogue) with 
two widely perceived internal sections covering one’s conduct before God (1-4) and among fellow 
citizens (5-10). Flexibility is also seen in the way they are applied.
With regard to contents, GWs are not strictly laws because they lack the concreteness 
needed for either civil or criminal enforcements. For example, “You shall not steal” says nothing 
about the object. Rightly so, because it concerns primarily with principles to be applied in wider 
forms. Thus Calvin alone applied it to ten situations including “denunciation of bribery and 
corruption”.485 Pallister, in a recent book published in Portugal, interprets it in the light of both
482 See for example The Seven Principles of Public Life in practice in UK: Selflessness; Integrity; 
Objectivity; Accountability; Openness; Honesty; and Leadership (Lord Neill 2000, ii).
483 See (Wright 2004,284)
484 See this and related issues in (Nielsen 1968, 10-13).
485 Based o Ex. 23:8; Lev. 19:15; and Deut. 16:19-20. The remaining list, according to Calvin’s commentary 
on “Four Last Books of Moses” are: prompt payment of wages; care and impartiality for aliens; honesty in 
weights and measures; no removal of boundary markers; duties in respect of pledges for loans; laws against
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property rights and labour policies but not without firstly amplifying it to illicit appropriation of 
“anything that belongs to another person”.486 Only subsequent covenantal texts, such as Ex 23:1-9, 
covering specific matters regarding justice as in “you shall not take bribe”,487 could legitimately be 
integrated within the spirit of “you shall not steal”. Rather GWs convey general principles entirely 
related and relevant to a single topic of relationships (the vertical dimension includes God but 
could well be King, State, Government, for example, and the horizontal dimension includes fellow 
citizens) set within a rather complex theological concept of covenant (pact, agreement).488 They 
could be comparable (certainly not in its breath but in its significance) to a contemporaiy 
Constitution with which all remaining laws need to comply. Tertullian even argued that GWs 
always existed in human hearts before they were engraved on stone.489
As a set of foundational principles, its best function is to intersect critically with wider 
subjects, in an exercise fully open to the imagination and to correlations of which religion, family, 
work, crime, property rights are just a few themes.490 The Jewish community always valued the 
GW. It was certainly remembered by subsequent prophets at various challenging political and 
economic times.491 When Jesus began preaching in Palestine, he did so in continuity with these 
major principles. At one point Jesus answered an expert in the law by summarising all the Law and
taking interest; recovery of lost possessions; restitution for theft; prohibition of partiality, for or against the 
poor. As cited in (Wright 2004, 394-5)
486 See (Pallister 2002,147).
487 This and several other biblical references, including prophetic texts on bribery see an interesting analysis 
in (Noonan Jr 1987,14-30). Cf (Wiens 1996, 8-10; Samuel 1995,24-5).
488 For a useful survey of different opinions of such rich insights regarding covenant as a theological idea and 
institution see (McCarthy 1972).
489 As referred by D.H. Field in New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology, 1995:287, under 
“Decalogue”.
490 The following serves as an example of correlated issues worth noticing: “...although all death penalty 
offences can be linked to the Decalogue, the reverse is not true: not all of the Ten Commandments were 
sanctioned by the death penalty. The tenth (prohibiting coveting) was by its very nature not open to any 
judicial penalty, least of all death. But that in itself is ethically important, since it shows that a person could 
be thought of as morally guilty before God without having committed an external, judicially punishable, 
offence. Jesus applied the same principle to other commandments (Matt. 5:21-24,27-28).” (Wright 
2004,291).
491 Isaiah 1 is a powerful message against rulers who seek after gifts and bribes; Cf. Isaiah 5:23; Amos 5:12; 
and Micah 3:11. Minor Prophets in particular were very critical of moral political and economic conditions 
on behalf of the oppressed people.
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the Prophets under “Love the Lord... and your neighbour” (Mat 23:5).492 Again, Jesus conveys two 
broad and important principles, which his followers need to articulate correctly in all 
circumstances. The point to retain here is that Christians must operate on the basis of these 
fundamental principles, made shorter in the case of Jesus’ summary.
Jesus’ freedom and application of the texts did not despise the remaining GWs at all. His 
New Covenant built on ancient principles of caring for one another and for the community at large. 
The new Catholic Catechism that Pope John Paul II presented in 1992 explains GWs under Jesus’ 
twofold summary;493 something that Calvin has also done in his well-known Institutes.
How Portugal is likely to use, adapt or reconstruct a new foundation upon which to build 
such a demanding anti-corruption task remains to be seen. The current 1976 Portuguese 
Constitution consists of nearly 300 articles, far too long to gain popular support. Once, President 
Sampaio regretted that the Constitution, as a magna carta, has never been explained to students in 
general. It is certainly not the Bible that Portuguese people know well enough to be able to 
articulate with coherence.
For example, Singapore once adopted its own version and called it the Ten 
Commandments for the Judiciary, and it was included in the UN Anti-corruption Tool Kit of an 
earlier edition (United Nations 2002) as a case-study. Table 11 below includes on the left-hand side 
the Singapore version of the 10 Commandments (Yak 2003,235-236), and on the right, William’s 
and Doig’s suggestion for African Anti-Corruption Commissions (ACC) in (Williams and Doig 
2004,14).
492 Mahatma Gandhi is known to share similar moral beliefs: “Remember that all through history the ways of 
truth and love have always won. There have been tyrants, and murderers, and for a time they can seem 
invincible, but in the end they always fall. Think of i t ... always.” (As cited in Western Catholic Reporter, 
Canada, April 26,2004 by Fr. Ron Rolheiser).
493 See (Igreja Catolica 1993,443-534).
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Table 11 Examples of Commandments and Principles
Singapore’s 10 Commandments (Judiciary) Williams and Doig’s 10 Principles for ACC in Africa
1: Transparency in the selection of judges 1: Political will and broad political support
2: Adequate remuneration forjudges and court 
staff
2: Medium rather than very high levels of corruption. 
Where corruption is endemic and pervasive, ACCs’ 
function in form but not in substance
3: An independent yet accountable judiciary 3: ACC is situated in a comprehensive anti-corruption 
strategy supported by effective and complementary 
public bodies
4: A coherent system of case management 4: Economic stability and a focus on reducing incentives 
& opportunities for corruption
5: Performance indicators for the judiciary and 
the judges
5: Adequate financial resources and skilled staff
6: Consistent and objective criteria in the justice 6: A clear and relevant mission focusing less on 
punishment and more on administration of prevention, 
supported by planning, budgeting and performance 
measurement regime
7: Clear ethical markers and guidelines for the 
judges
7: Appropriate legal frameworks, including the rule of 
law, and sufficient legal powers for investigative and 
preventive work
8: A common vision for the judiciary and 
leading
8: Operational independence and freedom from political 
interference by example
9: Full transparency in the justice process at all 
times
9: High standards of integrity in ACC leaders and staff
10: Learning from lessons of forward-looking 
institutions.
10: Public awareness of, and confidence in, the ACCs 
mission
Source: Yak 2003,235-236, and Williams and Doig 2004, 14
In short, the high standards of morality needed to affect public and private administration 
demand a solid moral basis, which will be discussed in the context of building a new agency 
starting in the next section.
8.8 Anti-Corruption Agency, Structure and Strategy
This final section sketched the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Agency (hereafter, 
ACA) by proposing a fourfold integrated structure, and a critical strategic plan of action covering 
the first of a multi phase approach. The entire process envisages an holistic approach which is 
comprised of key indicators likely to address the root causes of corruption as argued thus far. This 
framework will be tested afterwards.
8.8.1 Foundational Structure
Corruption is fundamentally a moral problem. Its dynamic characteristics stream from 
multifaceted causes with manifold consequences demanding equally diverse but coordinated 
responses. These must be grounded, from beginning to end, on a clear and solid moral basis fueled
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both by moral courage defined as a ‘determination to face disapproval rather than abandon the right 
course of action’, and moral certainty as ‘a probability so great as to leave no reasonable doubt’.494 
These are critical features needed for resisting pressures from opposing individuals and groups long 
adjusted to corrupt environments and fearful of losing their “owned” grounds.
The classical case-study highlights this need in a special way. The GWs and Jesus’ twofold 
summary provide examples of how critical principles need to be internally assimilated and 
articulated by individuals. The contemporary Singaporean case-study gives an additional example 
of unshaken moral commitment by top political leaders, followed by essential legal framework 
tools to be used by anti-corruption bureaux to counteract corruption, with highly visible positive 
results.
Likewise, in England, Wilberforce grounded his anti-slaveiy campaign under a moral 
conviction which he expressed by saying that ‘God Almighty has set before me two great objects, 
the suppression of the slave trade and the reformation of manners’. For forty long years he stood 
firm, always believing that the slave trade was immoral and must be completely abolished.
Ghandi’s moral fibre was based on the principles of courage, non-violence and truth. Luther King 
had a dream which sustained him towards racial equality among all Americans. Mandela’s 
outstanding lack of bitterness after 27 years in a prison cell paved the way towards freedom and 
reconciliation in South Africa. All these great men had inward convictions and mobilised their 
fellow citizens. In some ways their objectives were not entirely fulfilled, which clearly indicates 
that each generation must refill its moral capacity, courage and certainty before facing new 
challenges ahead.
The following Table 12 below is one possible set of eight core principles. If adopted, 
adapted or replaced, it must nevertheless be internalised (incarnated, to use a rich theological 
concept). If properly assimilated and articulated by individuals in the remaining three anti­
corruption structures, that will probably boost the confidence of all the agents. However, this moral
494 See The Oxford Reference Dictionary, 1987 edition, 543 (moral).
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framework seems to fit well this thesis’s theoretical findings and therefore it may not be useful 
contexts other than Portugal at this exact moment and time.
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Table 12 Author’s Tentative Principles for Anti-corruption Basis in Portugal
Moral Foundational Principles For Anti-Corruption Response
1. Corruption affects every one.
For centuries, albeit unknowingly and unintentionally, we ignored corruption as one of the 
most serious problems that robbed us of integrity, stability, wealth, and prosperity. But there 
is nothing fatalistic or irreversible about it.
2. Only an holistic anti-corruption response works.
We move beyond isolated individual cases. We aim to address historical and contemporary 
root causes by reducing both incentives and opportunities that nurture and tolerate 
corruption in public and private sectors.
3. Citizens are our greatest partners
We most value people. So we want to be world-class listeners, irrespective of one's power, 
status, or creed. We definitely are not after programmes or diagnoses. The aim is to 'help not 
harm' citizens and institutions by primarily seeking to motivate, protect and encourage 
individuals, anonymous or otherwise, to conscientiously but fairly denounce alleged signs of 
corruption.
4. We value politics and politicians
Without benefactors' men and women, democratically elected or delegated, upholding values 
in key decision-making places, this cause remains completely lost. Therefore we unreservedly 
support their noble mission and unashamedly break away from a centuries long defamation 
attitude and demagogic criticism against the State as if it were an abstract entity.
5. We long to have more rich entrepreneurs
We abhor the idea that prosperity is associated with corrupt practices. This is often rooted in 
envy and distorted knowledge of economics. Wealth is essential and lasts longer in the midst 
of integrity. So we count on all entrepreneurs to provide peer support for a free and fair 
market and competitive environments.
6. Any form of corruption is a betrayal of trust
Mistrust often corrodes partnerships. In politics, it makes a new government undo the acts of 
a previous one. In economics, it prevents quality mergers. In society, it destroys its very fibre 
by aborting vital experiments and critical reforms. So we profoundly reject this rather 
ingrained distinction of'venial sin' for petty corruption and 'mortal sin' for grand corruption by 
combatting both with equal determination.
7. If it is morally right, we will embrace it
Corruption is fundamentally a moral issue. It should not obstruct rational decisions. However, 
the absence of an overarching moral ethos leads to ethical "vacuums" while exaggeration of 
morality makes it false. Both create confusion where the emphasis on some items in moral 
regulations excuses the violation of others. And yet neither politics nor economics is morally 
neutral. We uphold moral integrity while carefully rejecting both religious zealots and 
republican ethical rhetoric approaches.
8. We seek to make corruption a "high risk" and "low return" undertaking
Prevention is better than cure. Enforcement is better than impunity. We seriously commit to 
prevent, detect, and prosecute all cases swiftly, fairly, and transparently. We rely on 
adjudication alone to reverse the widely perceived notion that economic crime compensates. 
Independent of the court outcome, we endeavour to inform complainants of the 
developments of their case.
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8.8.2 Top-Down Structure
Having laid the foundation, the starting initiative for a comprehensive anti-corruption 
response is the sole responsibility of top political leaders. This sets the direction designated as “top- 
down” simply because top political action and example are the sine qua non of a trustworthy 
programme. PM and PR, in a traditional spirit of sound relationship and mutual cooperation, should 
reach a common understanding - in critical principle matters only, regarding the need to launch a 
nationwide effort. But the PM alone is unambiguously responsible for the creation of ACA.
The representatives of the two remaining bodies of sovereignty (Parliament and Courts) 
should be fully aware of and participate in sharing the core values and critical reasons underpinning 
the initiative. Under the PM’s direct action, the following critical recommendations are highlighted.
1) Launch an official statement to the nation recognizing corruption as a serious problem 
needing a special coordinated and comprehensive response.
2) Legally (Parliamentary Law) establish a fully independent and yet accountable495 anti­
corruption agency (ACA) under the PM’s office only, with:
2.1) Exclusive competence to design, implement and evaluate an holistic anti­
corruption program covering public and private sectors to include prevention, public 
participation, law enforcement, institution building; and monitoring performance
2.2) A comprehensive legal basis to include full and exclusive responsibility to 
undertake inquiries, including criminal investigation and prosecution related to public 
and private corruption and correlated economic crimes as they appear in current rather 
dispersed laws.
2.3) A comprehensive administrative basis to ensure that functioning and decision­
making processes in public sectors reduce incentives and opportunities for corruption, 
and that appropriate auditing procedures (under the International Accounting 
Standards framework) operate effectively in both public and private sectors.
495 See the following definition in U4 - http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfin : “Accountability denotes a 
relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies responsible for 
fulfilling or respecting that right.” It then explains that all accountability mechanisms operate according to 
three principles, namely transparency, answerability, and controllability.
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2.4) Unifying, as well as extending where appropriate, under a single legislative code, 
a comprehensive legal framework for the effective protection of witneses, preventing, 
investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, compensation (for victims) and confiscation 
of the proceeds of corruption.
3) Define clear accountability features within which ACA will operate to include:
3.1) A biannual report of activities to PM to include clear development indicators of 
cases such as the full number of complainants and respective follow up in several 
categories; updated surveys of public opinion and participation.
3.2) An annual report to Parliament with a copy to the PM, and the PR, made 
accessible to the public, with clear development indicators.
3.3) An Advisory External Committee of seven elements independently nominated by 
the PM, PR, Parliament, Courts, and three public figures (one from Portugal, Madeira 
and Azores). Its task would consist of issuing statements safeguarding the ACA’s 
independent status, democratic operational procedures, and transparent relationship 
with the public. This Committee would operate under transparent procedures and a 
code of conduct open to public scrutiny with full knowledge of the ACA and other 
sovereign bodies.
3.4) Open access to the public through friendly-approach offices and a webpage to 
include concrete internal information, operational results, indicators of progress, and 
ways for the public to participate.
4) Define clear goals, parameters, and competences within which the ACA will operate, to 
include:
4.1) A wide open approach to public scrutiny (objectives, means, and procedures), 
reserving confidentiality only for necessary procedures but removing it as soon as the 
situation allows.
4.2) Securing public support through open dialogue and accountability with the public, 
feeding continuous development indicators regarding prosecution, legal cases, and 
public awareness and reaction to corruption.
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4.3) A civilian police body with powers to search, seize, arrest and prosecute only 
cases in which corruption is involved without any external interference, so as to be 
well regarded, protected and accountable.
5) Appoint upon PR’s consent the Director of AC A, as a senior civil servant, with a clear 
and accountable job description to include:
5.1) Conditions for nomination, resignation and dismissal under strict and previously 
agreed principles of rights and obligations and a code of conduct.
5.2) Ultimate responsibility for the direction, administration, and budget of the ACA 
according to a transparent organizational organogram.
5.3) Recruiting, rotating and dismissing ACA officials, as civilian police or 
administrative officers, without necessarily assigning any public reason, under strictly 
disciplined conditions of the entry requirement.
5.4) Giving top priority to public relations in order to gain popular support for the 
ACA’s mission and vision.
6) Equip the ACA, at once, with effective means to include:
6.1) An initial over generous, realistic budget to cover high set up costs followed by a 
reasonable annual budget thereafter.
6.2) Buildings for modest but efficient central and regional offices with easy public 
access.
6.3) Officials, initially up to 80, with exclusive dedication, well motivated and 
integrated within teams, well paid, to fulfill specific accountable functions, under a 
clear hierarchical but transparent structure.
6.4) Resources to enable training and research, public relations, operational activities.
7) If these six specified actions are taken in a genuine spirit and with unambiguous political 
determination, then the following two structures must be put into place.
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8.8.3 Bottom-Up Structure
This structure seeks to include people’s cooperation to address the major identified 
problem of tolerance to corruption. Without people’s willingness to denounce alleged evidences of 
corruption the entire programme will fail. The following concrete efforts are highlighted.
1) To win people’s confidence by adopting a friendly and transparent approach with open 
information and access regarding the ACA’s operation and performance, to include the 
following concrete measures:
1.1) The ACA will have a permanent friendly team trained to receive individuals and 
groups of visitors from all ages and sectors of civil society, and supply to all interested 
people and institutions relevant updated information likely to gain their support.
1.2) The ACA, in conjunction with other national and foreign institutions will promote 
debates, expositions, conferences and symposiums to inform about consequences of, 
and possible solutions for, corruption.
1.3) The ACA will make accessible, via a webpage, the results of its specialized 
research in the field of corruption, including an external contribution from various 
sources such as Greco and U4.
2) The entire ownership of the anti-corruption effort must belong to the Portuguese people 
among whom the ACA must be seen and projected as a simple facilitator only.
3) There will be the assurance that every complaint, as it comes, irrespective of size and 
the people involved, will be followed up. This is one of the most important ways of gaining 
people’s support and securing a winning result against corruption. Therefore, the following 
procedures are important:
3.1) Each complainant will be properly informed, within a week, of the decision taken.
3.2) If the case turns out to be worth pursuing, the complainant will also be kept 
informed of the development if he or she so wishes.
3.3) Assuming that adjudication is an autonomous judiciary responsibility, all judicial 
developments and results will be followed up continuously so that the public may be 
fully aware of the judiciary’s responses.
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3.4) Information will be made available of all cases that have been passed on to other 
institutions because they did not fall within the ACA’s specialized field of concern.
4) Surveys of people’s opinions and level of tolerance and intolerance towards corruption 
will be kept up-to-date. In this area, whenever possible, active cooperation from 
universities and other research institutions will be sought.
5) Similar civil society, business and media initiatives will be valued and encouraged in 
awareness-raising and preventive activities, particularly in connection with children’s 
school activities.
8.8.4 Middle-Way Convergence
This is the point where top-down and bottom-up structures meet to find the ACA 
performing its critical function. The ACA’s main task is to monitor the effective reduction of both 
incentives and opportunities for corruption. Its critical organisation and function include the 
following:
1) A clear but full description of its:
1.1) Mission statement, consisting of a single phrase that informs as well as limits the 
nature and function of its existence in the eyes of the public.
1.2) Core Values, consisting of a critical selection of major historical, cultural and 
organizational principles shared nationally by which all members of ACA will abide 
in the course of its activities. A model is suggested in the first structure above.
1.3) Vision statement, consisting of a few and easy memorable words to include a 
measurable indicator and a time limit.
1.4) Organizational Chart, consisting of all internal administrative and operational 
teams under a clear hierarchical chain of command.
1.5) Principles of Team Work, consisting of key norms by which every member of 
staff will operate and remain accountable to each other in concrete ways.
1.6) Code of Conduct; consisting of clear guidelines to be observed in preserving 
human rights and consistently tackling corruption.
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1.7) Concrete mechanism for internal check and balance procedures to assure 
everyone of the proper use of authority and accountability.
1.8) Concrete mechanism to evaluate the degree of integration and coherence of the 
entire activities of ACA.
1.9) Mechanism to register and evaluate critical errors and how to avoid them in 
future.
2) Provision of a measurable list of initial preparatory activities to include
2.1) Mapping critical known areas where corruption occurs and defining resources 
needed; how to approach them; and listing critical potential errors to avoid.
2.2) Stipulating realistic goals expected for each area of activity in the first phase.
2.3) A list of institutional national and international partners likely to assist the ACA 
in accomplishing its mission, including signing specific working agreements.
2.4) A plan for the recruiting and training of personnel to include budget, time 
specifications and the monitoring of results.
2.5) A plan for resources and equipment needed for different aspects of the work to 
include budget, time specifications, and maintenance.
2.6) A specific annual plan of action for each team within ACA to include periodic 
evaluation reports and assessment.
3) Organizing a database of available surveys, studies and specialized research already 
available and using them as an initial set of reference indicators of development for internal 
and external purposes. This should include international studies such as TI corruption 
perception and bribery perception indexes, the Freedom House index on freedom of 
expression, and the Human Rights Watch Report.
4) Improvement of the database with an additional set of initial key indicators, and 
preparation for undertaking ongoing studies and surveys to monitor public trust and 
cooperation.
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8.9 Conclusion
This final section assumes an ideal scenario of cooperation involving top political leaders, 
popular support, and advanced technical and practical expertise under the single command of the 
ACA, and vital control mechanisms in both administrative and judicial sectors. As such, this 
fourfold structure, illustrated in Figure 9 below, addresses critical contextual factors that this thesis 
has raised regarding the dual problem of incentives and opportunities that nurture corruption and 
several inadequate contemporary responses.
Figure 9 Fourfold Anti-corruption Structure.
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The foundational structure provides the basis but certainly not the means, and key 
principles.496 Morality is not to be seen nor used as a weapon against individuals or instituions. It is 
not something that should occupy the main discourse either. But it is nevertheless essential that 
agents have a common basis for undertaking a demanding task, and above all, to follow it through 
till the end.
If there is an equally solid top-down structure of good will and determination, something 
which has never been seen yet, the people at large will not fail to support this initiative either, 
particularly if they see both consistency and fairness. The vast majority of the population is not 
directly involved in corruption and still less in its “benefits”. Instead, it is losing its opportunity to 
recover from a backward inherited society. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that a 
bottom-up structure will function in providing much needed support, following the good example 
that comes from the top as well as from ACA and administrative and judicial control mechanisms. 
Of paramount significance is the need to pass on critical values among children of all ages through 
their education periods. Ten years later or so, they will most likely live up to the challenges too.
The middle-convergence structure is exactly the level of field operation largely under a 
competent agency specially built to coordinate the overall effort. Working under concrete and well 
defined objectives and duly given legal authority and effective powers to use updated resources, it 
is then simply a matter of time before a concrete increase of results will be seen. Reducing 
incentives and opportunities for corruption will boost the nation, particularly when resources begin 
to be properly used leaving better opportunities to improve the living and pay conditions of the 
people. Of course, this is all done with adequate checks-and-balances and in full respect for all 
human and collective rights.
There are also less positive aspects to consider seriously. Chief among them is the need to 
secure the support of the top leaders. Thirty years of democratic experience are still working 
against this expectation. Too many political discourses, compounded with some isolated and 
dispersed anti-corruption laws and initiatives, have given too many false starts which have resulted
496 For a full description see Table 12, p.234.
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in a high degree of scepticism among the people. The low ethical standards of party politics, most 
particularly regarding their finances, have reduced even more the already low level of expectation.
Apart from politics, the inefficient court system poses serious threats also. Its 
transformation can only come from within. Its independent status must always be preserved. The 
old attitude of blaming one another within a complex judiciary system continues to favour corrupt 
practices right across Portuguese society. In summary, it is unfortunate that the only four 
constitutionally protected sovereign bodies, each with rather complex inbuilt structures, have not 
yet been able to establish a national coordinated effort to combat corruption. This may well account 
for the fact that educational policies remain so precarious and that civil society remains largely 
indifferent to corruption.
Without popular participation, there will be no civic pressure upon politicians and civil 
servants and, in the end, a climate of corruption will continue to exist and flourish until a new cycle 
appears again. With these warnings in perspective, alongside a concrete alternative response model 
suggested, this thesis now approaches its conclusion, but not without one last apparently positive 
sign.
On December 20,1999, the same day that Portugal returned Macao to China, a completely 
new anti-corruption agency CCAC (Commission Against Corruption - Comissariado Contra a 
Corrupgao) came into existence. It replaced the one set up by the Portuguese officials that was 
badly designed anyway. According to its first report, the leader Cheong U, used the first pioneering 
year for “foundation-laying” (CCAC 2000, 6). Six years later, a press release (February 28,2006) 
informed us that the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy ranked Macao fourth among 13 
Asian countries/regions, following Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong.497 Contemporary Macao 
illustrates that there is no culture which cannot defeat corruption, and this seems right.
497 The report, which included Macao for the first time in its Annual “Trend of corruption in Asia” 
(http://asiarisk.com/subscribe/dataindx.html). See also CCAC website (www.ccac.org.mo). Cf. F.C.Ferreira, 
PUB: 11.03.2004 “Macau: o sorriso chines”; and J.P.Coutinho, EXP:24.12.2004 “Roleta russa”.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
Corruption is a powerful indicator of the quality of democracy. It discloses the tensions 
within an ever-increasing mix of public and private relationships. This paradox particularly reveals 
critical exchange mechanisms behind a complex mixture of socio-religious, political and economic 
ideas that politicians insist on covering up with periodic legislation. In the case of Portugal, far 
more than a matter of personal misconduct, corruption is a serious social phenomenon with 
pervasive institutional consequences that ultimately erode trust and disrupt the people’s legitimate 
progress. Since the corruptly acquired benefits of the very few jeopardise the country’s image and 
its convergence with the developing EU countries, the transforming way forward rests solely with 
the country’s greatest asset - its people.
This theoretical study raises people’s awareness of the seriousness of both the occurrences 
of corruption and the ignorance of it, which are here perceived as one inseparable problem.498 The 
Emaudio case study not only illustrates this dual problem but also unequivocally confirms the 
inadequate contemporary responses from the anachronistic anti-corruption agencies and systems 499 
But people must be aware of the factors which cause corruption which are never isolated. They 
originate in the present unresolved legacy of historical issues,500 as well as in contemporary 
individual and institutional incentive and opportunity structures that remain unchallenged in the 
Portuguese context.501 Not all the elements identified were analysed beyond the initial perception, 
and some of them require further research. Not that they were strictly necessary for establishing the 
main arguments for a new approach that has never been implemented before, but they were only 
mildly and hesitantly tried in rather ambiguous ways (former AACC, DCICCEF and DCIAP).
The Portuguese context encounters an ingrained tendency to bypass written rules and 
unwritten norms by neglecting to pay due attention to common welfare. Instead, a variety of
498 See Chapter 2, The problem of corruption and Chapter 3, The problem of ignoring corruption.
499 See Chapter 4, Emaudio case study.
500 See Chapter 5, Historical determinants of corruption.
501 See Chapter 6, Contemporary Factors of Corruption.
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transactions permeate public and private sectors, most of which encounter no opposition from 
fellow citizens or administrative control mechanisms, and find the judiciary lacking 
determination.502 With little tradition of civic participation, weak religion, short-sighted political 
plans and commitment, and an unprepared business sector, the country continues its rather dynamic 
routine without perceiving well the effects of corruption, something which additional research 
should bring to light in more explicit ways, which we have not envisaged and thus have mentioned 
only in passing. Future researchers will have new grounds to explore in each of three main fields: 
politics (Parliament and the Judiciary attitudes and beliefs regarding economic crimes), economics 
(measuring the waste and possible savings under both corruption and corruption-free scenarios), 
and socio-religious factors (analysis of key values and counter-values that shape the nation).
The availability of this research is no more, but also perhaps no less, than a useful starting 
point, leading to vital areas of concern and strategy that have not been written about before from 
multidisciplinary and holistic viewpoints. However there should be no illusion, as the turning point 
inevitably rests with those who hold top-level political power. They certainly need adequate civic 
pressure, including that from the elite itself. If this happens, recovery is highly possible, perhaps in 
the not too distant future.
If the alternative solution patterns,503 based on the adoption of the core eight principles, 
receive due reception and assimilation, then it will be possible to motivate many for the cause of 
anti-corruption because it has a well-thought-out plan of action. The suggestion of a tripartite, and 
multi-directed initiative of top-down (sovereign bodies), bottom-up (people and media) and middle 
ground (controlling agencies in mutual cooperation) has the potential to motivate key agents to 
undertake a serious anti-corruption move for reducing the current high levels of informality. As 
only ethics pays, it is better to act now than later. Therefore the resolve to face up to one’s own 
reality cannot be taken for granted. But the choices we make today will largely determine future 
outcomes. Turning a blind eye? This is the key national question awaiting response.
502 See Chapter 7, Types of existing responses to corruption.
503 See Chapter 8, Formulating an alternative framework of response.
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n s j -  O MP inicia Inquerito 
a irregularidades no Minlstirio 
da Saude, ocorridas em 1987/88 ■a- MP acusa onze 
arguidos, por corrup$ao, burla. 
falsifica$ao e partfcipa§ao 
economica em neg6cio. 
Arguidos pedem abertura de 
instru^o
0 3 3 — Tribunal 
de Instrujao Criminal 
, confirma a acusa$ao 
e remete o processo 
para julgamento
SL
m
1993/94 -Tribunal da Boa 
Hora realiza o julgamento.
A senten$a condena os arguidos 
a penas entre dois anos e meio 
e a sete anos de prisao, ppr 
burla, participate em negocio 
ilicito e prevarica$ao. .
Os arguidos recorrem
Tribunal 
da Boa Hora 
repete , 
parted  
julgamento.
f f l h o :  Supremo 
Tribunal de Justi$a confirma 
a condena^ao, mas diminui 
ligeiramente as penas.
Os arguidos aiegam, 
inconstitudonaiidades 
no processo e  recorrem
l H U — O  Tribunal 
Cpnstltucional . * 
razao aos arguidos 
e anula p arte  da ‘ 
senten$a condenatoria
4 > SB
■ t JJ STJ reaprecia 
« ♦ o  processo.
« » « ■ ■ * ■ ■ »  Part© do julgamento'’ 
■; ■ ’ pode ser anulado
HS2- Processo 
6 reenviado ao STJ J
Os arguidoi podem recorder para o  STJ
‘ STJ analisa os recursos 
fe os arguidos podem voltar a recorrer 
p a rao  Tribunal Cqnstitudonal
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